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This is an inquest into the demise of the Cuban bourgeoisie.
How is it that, within the space of twenty-eight months, Castro's revolution was able to destroy this once powerful, talented and rapidly growing class?
It is the thesis of this dissertation that the Cuban bourgeoisie

was destroyed not only by pressure from without, by events beyond its
control, but also that it disintegrated in considerable part from within.
To an important extent, the bourgeoisie died of its own follies, its own
failures.
This dissertation focuses on the process of internal disintegration.

Separate chapters consider the impact of Castro's revolution on

the sugar mill owners, the sugar planters. the cattlemen, the industrialists, the banks, the public utilities, the Catholic church and the
professional organizations.

Other chapters discuss the naturE; of the

pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie, and their financing of Castro's rebellion.
Each chapter provides sufficient historical background to make evident

vii

the strengths a.pd wlnerabilities of the sector in question. And each
chapter is developed around one or more leading personalities of that
sector.
The outstanding characteristic of the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie was its ambiguity.

The Cuban bourgeoisie was torn between

.

-

Madrid and Miami, between an aristocratic and an egalitarian tradition.
It lacked widely respected leaders, and widely admired goals.

Most

members of the bourgeoisie were wrapped ir.. an intense individualism
and devotion to their famiiies.

They were only rarely able to conceive

of and support broader national interests.

Safe in their comfortable

economic and military dependence on the United States, the bourgeoisie
so~ght the p~easures. but not the responsibilities, of affluence.
Castro brilliantly exploited the weaknesses of the old bourgeoisie.
He played on their opportunism to help finance his rebellion. Once in
power, he cultivated ·and won the_ir support. giving his revolution a
powerful initial momentum.

Thereafter he began to turn against his

benefactors, encouraging the ambitions of the less successful ranks of
the bourgeoisie for the jobs, the lands, and the honors of their upperclass confreres.

For every organization of the old bourgeoisie, a new

revolutionary counter-organization sprangup to contest its authority.
The bourgeoisie, betrayed by its own rebellious clerks, began ~o crack
along lines of age. of class ranking. of economic interest.
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The speed and audacity of Castro's revolution left the bourgeoisie
stunned; paralyzed. A bourgeoisie accustomed to manipuiating government by financial lures found the revolutionary government was disinterested in money.

The bourgeoisie was unnerved by Castro's sway

over the masses, and fearful of penalties that might accrue owing to their
misbehavior during the Batista era.

The leaders of the bourgeoieie

vacillated, temporized, ·and then went into exile. Other burgueses
remained behind, attracted by Castro's appe&l to idealism, nationalism
and the heroic tradition.

In 1959 some were ready to substantially modify

their traditional dependence on the United States. And in an orgy of selfcriticism, others concluded that Castro was right: Cuba could no longer
affe>rd a bourgeoisie.
By 1960, .a bourgeoisie weakened by the increasing socialization
of the economy, and demoralized by its
fled increasingly to Miami.

own impotence and loss of status,

Even in exile the bourgeoisie found itself

disunited, able to agree only that the United States must save them.
When the U. S. failed to do so. they were lost.
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PREFACE

This is an inquest into the demise of the Cuban bourgeoisie.
Few classes in history have been destroyed so quickly.

A once pros-

perous, talented and rapidly growing class was, between January, 1959,
and April, 1961--a space of but twenty-eight months--reduced to a
museum piece.

This process has received relatively little attention.

Rather, all eyes have focused on the more dramatic aspects of the
Cuban revolution: Cast~o's struggle for power, his battle with America,
his alliance with the Russians, his attempts to create a new society •
. It is the thesis of this dissertation that the Ct:.ban bourgeoisie

was destroyed not only by pressure from without, but disintegrated in
considerable part from within.

This dissertation focuses on the process

of internal disintegration, a process facilitated by the bourgeoisie's lack
~f social unity, a shared ideology and respected leadership.

The bour.
1
geoisie c·racked on the question of nationalism vs. Plattismo, on the

1

Plattismo refers to the habit of dependence on the U.S. developed by some Cubans thanks to the Platt Amendment to the Cuban
Constitution of 1902, which authorized U.S. military intervention in
Cuba to maintain political tranquility. Though President Roosevelt annulled the Platt Amendment in 1934, the habit of dependence remained
in many a Cuban mind until the 1960s.

xi
issue of the aristocratic vs. the equalitarian tradition, on moral idealism vs. · realism and the business of getting ahead. It cracked also on
the grounds of opportunism and ·mdividualism. The opportunistic pursuit by many burgueses for better jobs, for an improved economic position, was an important source of support for Castro, and for the ruin

.

.

of the bourgeoisie as a class.

These were the principal elements which

left the Cuban bourgeoisie confused. demoralized, fighting amongst
themselves rather than against Castro.

The revolution cracked the

bourgeoisie, pitting large interests against small, young against old,
sector against sector.

Ultimately, it was literally every man for

himself.
This dissertation traces the disintegrative process in eight important components of the old society: the hacendados (sugar mill
owners), the colonos (sugar planters), the ganaderos (cattlemen)~ the
industrialists, the banks, the public utilities. the Catholic church, and
the professional class.

Other chapters conside~ the nature of the pre-

revolutionary bourgeoisie. and its financing of Castro's rebellion.
Each chapter is developed around one or more leading personalities in
order to demonstrate that the fall of the bourgeoisie reflected not only
a failure of the entire class, and the failure of its component organizations, but also the sins of omission and commission of its individual
members.
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A considerable portion of this dissertation is based on interviews
with about one hundred former burgueses now exiled in New York,

Washington, Miami, San Juan

I·
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It is important that

work of this nature proceed expeditiously over the next few years because the leaders of the pre-revolutionary bourgeoisie, all now in their
sixties and seventies, are dying.

An attempt has been made to balance the views of the exiles by
the substantial use of periodicals favorable to the revolution.

Interest-

ingly, however, the exiles have been remarkably self-cr~tical.
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and points between.

There are two terms of central importance to this dissertation
which need to be defined: bourgeoisie and intervenor.
11

The term

'

bourg~oisie" as used in· Cuba--and in this dissertation--is meant to

include both the middle and the upper classes. In many countrjes, and
especially in Europe. ''bourgeoisie" is taken to mean middle class, that
segment of society between the lower class of workers and peasants and
the upper class of plutocrats and aristocrats.

But, in Cuban usage,

bourgeoisie has come to have a broader meaning, including the middle
and upper classes precisely because the two were inextricably entwined.
Much of the middle class shared the values of the rich, while the rich
who posed as aristocrats were scoffed at for being fakes; burgueses in
thin disguise.

One writer refers to them scornfully as the "aristocracia

burguesa, "that is, bourgeois aristocrats. 2 The Castroites, for the
2 Francisco A. P ardiero, 11 Penetraci6n de la oligarquia financier a
· yanqui en la economia de la Cuba capitalista, " Universidad de la Hab::ma
No. 186-187-188 (July-December, 1067), p. 223.

xiii
· sake of convenience, generally refer to the whole of the old upper and
middle classes--the classes they destroyed.- -as the bourgeoisie.
The intervenor was the nemesis of the bourgeoisie. He was the
government agent who took tem.porary administrative control of businesses in Cuba, "intervening" them for violations of various government
regulations. As the revolution pressed on, the intervenors' "intervention" almost inevitably became permanent, and the business in question
became a government entity.
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DEU

Directorio Esiudiantil Universitario. University Student
Directorate. Anti-Machado University Student Organization
of the 1930s.

DRE

Directorio Revolucio'na.rio Estudiantil. R·evolutionary Student
Directorate.

FCSC

u; s.

FEU

Federaci6n de Estudiantes Universitarios ." Federation of
University Students.

FNTA

Federaci6n Nacional de Trabajadores Azucareros. National
Federation of Sugar Cane Workers.

ffiRD

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

!CEA

lnstituto Cubano de Estabilizaci6ri de Azucar •· Cuban Sugar
Stabilization Institute.'.

ILO

International Labor Organization.'

IMF

lµternational' Monetary Fund.

!NRA

Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria. Agrarian Reform
Institute.

IRS

U.S. Internal Revenue Service.

ITT

International Telephone and Telegraph Company.

I

JEC

J6venes Estudiantes Cat6licos. Young Catholic Students
organization.

I

JOC

J6venes Obreros Cat6licos.
organization.

M-26

Movimiento de 26 de Julio.

MRBM

Ministerio de Revindicaci6n de Bienes Malversados.
Ministry for the Recuperation of Stolen Property.

ORIT

Organizaci6n Regional Inter-Americana de Trabajadores.
Inter-American Workers Organization. Sponsored by U.S.
labor organizations and the CIA.

PRM

Partido Medico de la Revoluci6n. · Medical Party of the Revolution. Group of pro-Castro doctors.
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Foreign Claims Settlement Commission.

Young Catholic Workers

26th of July Movement.
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PRC

Partido Revolucionario Cubano~ Cuban Revolutionary Party
or Autenticos.

PSP

Partido Social Popular. Popular Socialist ~arty. The Cuban
Communist Party.

VTC

Vedado Tennis Club. A social club.
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This book denounces the aristocratic tradition,
pro-slavery and annexationist, and notes that
there is also a popular tradition, equ;;.litarian
and anti-annexationist, that ought to serve as
an example for the present generations.

I
I

--Raul Cepero Bonilla, 1948

The rich of Havana, and they are a sizeable number, invariably belong to swank clubs, live in
palatial homes and entertain lavishly .•.• Their
parties are handled by platoons of servants and
often take place in candle-lighted gardens and
glitter with gold services, fabulous jewels and
Parisian gowns.

I
I

--Th·e Diplomat Magazine, 1958 2

I
I

I. ' THE PRE-R,EVOLUTIONARY BOURGEOISIE

For Havana's ~ilded bourgeoisie, the Cuban revolution began

I
I

with a sumptuous wedding.

3

On the morning of January), 1959, while

Fidel Castro's guerrillas and militiamen were exchanging shots with
· the last of departed dictator Fulgencio Batista's henchmen, Marilyn

I

l 11.Azucar y abolicicm, II Obras historicas (Havana: Instituto de
Historia, ).,963 ), p. 20. Cepero, a lawyer and newspaperman, a
writ er for Carteles, and minister of commerce in 1959-1962, died in
an airplane crash in Peru in 1962.

I
I
I
I
I
I

1

2 (Washington), November, 1958, p. 27.
3This paper, for the sake of convenience, has divided the bourgeoisie into three parts: the alta-burguesfa or gilded bourgeoisie
including Cuba's millionaires, members of the three leading clubs,
meml:lers of the most prestigious families; the middle bourgeoisie of
managers and professional me~1. and the lower or petite bourgeoisie
of shop owners and white-collar workers.

..,

.

2

Terry Saladrigas, descendant of a famous sugar family, was marrying
the young medical student Enrique Johann Duplessis at the Corpus
Christi Church. Among the witnesses for the bride were the Princesa
de Candriano, Baron Julio de Blanc Terry, the former Vice President
Carl?S Saladrigas, and two Americans. 4 Thus th.e ~ream of the old
bourgeoisie: home-baked aristocrats, politicians, and Americans, all
quite unaware that their world was about to be destroyed.
Big weddings like this were the frosting on the cake of the intE:nse social life in a Havana whose gilded bourgeoisie boasted of spending as much on parties "as any great capital in the world. 115 Big weddings, big parties, big homes, yachts, Cadillacs, servants, private
schools, . a proud and sometimes arrogant demeanor--these were the
outward signs of a rich, powerful and self-confident class.

But, un-

happily, like many things in pre-Castro Cuba, this was an illusion, for
the most salient feature of the bourgeoisie was not confidence, but uncertainty, uneasiness, ambiguity.
-..glusive, contradictory.

Everything about this class was

This was a class without fixed goals or re-

spected guides: a class a.ttracted equally by Madrid and Miami, by the

4niario de la Marina, January 6, 1959.
5Luis de Posada in The Diplomat Magazine (Washington), November, 1958, p. 27. The U.S. Ambassador to Cuba in 1952, Willard
Beaulac, observed that Cuba's wealthy were "ostentatiously wealthy.
Wealth existed to be flaunted. Cubans outdid each other in lavish expenditure and in conspicuous display." See in his A Diplomat Looks
at Aid to Latin America (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,
1970), p. 9.
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3

aristocratic and the democratic tradition.

This was a class that could

be nationalist in the morning and Plattista in the afternoon.

6

It was a

class whose boundaries were vague, stretching from an aristocracia
burguesa(a gilded bourgeoisie) of sportsmen and sugar planters down to
include as much as one-third of the population.
men, dentists were also members.
thing, and one thing alone.

Shopkeepers, trades-

Cuba's bourgeoisie agreed on one

They all wanted to live well.

Cuba's upper classes lived in silent fear of ruin.

The 19th cen-

tury aristocracy feared slave uprisings and was eventually pulverized,
in part by blacks, during the wars of independence in 1868 and 1895.
The bourgeoisie which rose, unsteadily, from these ruins was itself
battered and cracked by the economic crises of 1920 and 1930.

Thus

Cuba in the 1950s would not_be ruled- -like its South American neighbors'."'-by a copfident,closely-knit aristocracy w:~h its own standards
and traditions.

Rather Cuba was governed by a plutocracy.

It was, as

one member put it, an "instarit ~ociety in which those with lots of money
and a little breeding rose· to the top.

117

The greatest dilemma of the bourgeoisie was its lack of unity, :ts
uncertainty on critical issues.

The bourgeoisie was never able to take

a consistent posit:on on the question of nationalism, of cubanfa.

This

6 Plattista, that is, those who favored the Platt Amendment to the
Cuban Constitution of 1902 which gave the U.S. the right to intervene
militarily in Cuba to maintain public order and political stability.
7comment of Mrs. Elda Romanach, New York Timei:;, March 6,
1972.

War for us, you know," said the Cuban Ambassador to Washington, Jose

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

T. Baron, in 1958.

1·

4

was especially true of the upper ranges of the bourgeoisie, whose memhers often felt more Spanish- -or American- -than Cuban.
you,

11

"Let me tell

said a member of the Havana Yacht Club, "we weren't very na-

tionalistic. 118 But how could they be, given their dependence on the
U.S. for security, for mark~ts, for ideas, for jobs.

For the upper

class, America was still a guarantee, as it had been since the early
1800s, against a rebellion by the masses.

These were the Plattistas who

put wreaths on the Monument to the Battleship Maine, and rendered
annual salute to the Rough Riders.

"You fought the Spanish-American

The Ambassador, who liked to be called "Joe,".

had lived in the United States for forty yea;s. 9
Even the imagined nationalists within the bourgeoisie often maintained a highly ambivalent attitude.

Thus the sugar baron, Julio Lobo,

could strike a nationalistic attitude, while maintaining offices in New
·York and seeking loans f~om the National City Bank. lO Politicians,
like President Carlos Prfo, might work for the ~uban Electric Company in 1942 which they had promised to nationalize in 1933. 11 The

81nterview with Mrs. Bertha Reguera Canler de O'Conn~ll.
American Club, Miami, January 6, 1971.
9 Diplomat, November, 1958, p. 29.
1 0 See below, p. 563.
1 ~ See below, p. 376.
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I
I

lower strata of the bourgeoisie was equally ambivalent.
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.U.S. --and in the afternoon flew to exile in Miami?

What of the

schoolmaster who, one morning in 1960, stood beside a statue of the
Independence hero Jose Marti'. and delivered a philippic against the

,.·

America was the root of bourgeois irresponsibility.

.

Dependence on
"Perhaps without

noticing it, " wrote the Cuban politician and millionaire Eduardo Suarez
,·

. .Rivas, "we were confident that when the situation became difficult we
would always have the aid of our ally just ninety miles away. 1113 The
same men who had de~ounced the Platt Amendment, and the principle of
American intervention in 1933, would feel betrayed in 1959 when the
United States did not intervene to save them.
In its social attitudes, the bourgecisie was torn between the
aristocratic and equalitarian traditions·, between the 19th and the 20th
centuries.

Each wanted to rule, to be a duke, to enjoy the power of

dominion.

Yet, at the same time:, each wanted to be treated demo-

cratically, fairly, impartially.

The bourgeoisie was enamoured of the

idea of abolengo (ancestry) and was intensely status conscious.

Thus

in the home of a middle class H9.vana optician, the lady of. the household

demanded that her thirteen-year-old maid address her husband as

121nterview with Nelson Valdes.

I
I
I
I

12

Albuquerque, N. M., January 17,

1970.
13Dia r io Las Americ as , F eb r u a r y 12, 1972. "What an error}'
Suarez Rivas would add, to have depen ded on the U.S. "We have paid
dearly for it. "

6

caballero, herself as s enora. her daughter as senorita.

14

And yet there were many very democratic fe.aiures about Cuba's
bourgeoisie.

Bourgeois status was available to almost anyone.

thing depended on money. no matter how acquired.

Every-

As the chief pro-

tagonist of Cuba's most popular novel, Juan Criollo, once observed,
after climbing from nowhere to become a congressman and power to be
reckoned with: "Make money honestly if possible.

If not, then make

money any way you can. 1115 Thereafter one could, to use the Cuban
phrase, a dquirir roce y c epillarse mucho, abandon one's rustic habits
and adopt urban refinements. 16
The upper ranks of the bourgeoisie sometimes imagined themselves an aristocracy, or at least a ruling class.

But ruling classes

must lead, not only in conspicuous consumption, but in affairs of state
.

as well. As one Cuban sugar man commented remoroefully,

II

the so-

called ruling classes, which did not rule at all, stood clear of what
was going on.

Too many, unfortunately, preferred to buy a public

servant than to be one. " 17 Indeed, the historian Carlos Marques

14comments of Victoria Miranda, once maid, today Cuba's most
proficient woman sugar cane cutter • . Granma (Havana), May 27, 1973.
15Miguel Angel Martmez, "Vision cubana de Carlos Loviera, "
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University. 1969), p. 51.
16 Mirta de la Torre Mulhare, "Sexual Ideology in pre-Castro
Cuba: A Cultural Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1969), p. 64.
17speech of Antonio Navarro before the Sugar Club, New York.
The Sugar Club Annual, 1960-1962, (New York, 1962), p. 12.
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Sterling thought that wealthy Cubans began to back away from politics
"with a sense of repugnance" at the very moment of independence.

18

Cuba's second--and successful--struggle for independence in
1895 not only shattered the remnants of the colonial aristocracy, but
also signalled the age of the masses.

Blacks and mulattoes, their.

dusky skins symbolic of barbarism and incultura, were rising to positions of prominence.

The rich backed away from politics _a s would

much of the middle class in the 1950s.

Politics was a dirty business.

"My family never mixed in politics)' said a Cuban matron. 19 Her
family's honor was secure; Cuba's was not.
The Cuban bourgeoisie lacked all sense of class consciousness.
Did such a class even exist? One of its most distinguished members,
the economist Raul Maestre, denied it.

20

The hacendado Antonio Barro

argued that the bourgeoisie lacked class consciousness precisely because of its extraordinary openness and social mobility.

This, he

thought, was a democratic virtue, not a defect. 21 The ganadero Jose
Castellanos wondered how, without a consciously aristocratic class,
standards could be maintained.

Cuba's difficulties, he thought, lay

18niario Las Americas, November 30_. 1971.
1 9rnterview with Eneida Bide Guernica y de Roux.
February 4, 1971.

Miami,

2 0 Raul Maestre, El latifundismo en l a economi'a cubana (La
Habana: Editorial Her mes , 1929 ), p. 17.
21 Interview with Anto~io Barro.

Miami, May 25, 1971.
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precisely in the lack of a clase rectora. 2 2
One result of this lack of identity and of empatl;Y within the bour· .: .
geoisie was an intense intra-class conflict. Perhaps this reflected the
enormous pressure in the 1950s to subir

(to rise). to climb into the

bourgeoisie, a pressure fomented by intense American-style advertising,
and by the knowledge that it was very possible indeed to get ahead.
Examples were legion.

I

In the Cuba of the 1950s, everyone wanted to

I
I
I
I

I

1.

get rich.
Contrarily, there were also signs of improvement,. of hope in the
bourgeoisie of the 1950s.

There was evidence of a growing nationalist

spirit in some sectors of business.

There was a growing social con-

sciousness and, indeed, ·a minor reformation underway in the Church.
There was now talk of, agrarian reform.

There was substantial im-

provement in the bourgeoisie's technical competence and. entrepreneurial ability.

Finally. there was a determined drive among some

burgueses for a return to democracy and political honesty.

These were

the men who would support Castro's political rebellion.

Bourgeois Aristocrats
In the late 1950s, Cuba's societal pyramid was capped by perhaps

a thousand millionaires, more per capita than any other nation in Latin

22 "Clase rectora, "that is, a ruling aristocratic class which
would lay down the social and ethical guidelines for the rest of Cuban
s.::>ciety. Interview with Jose Castellanos. Miami, May 28, 1971.
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America. 2 3 Most of the wealthiest and most prominent members of
Cuban society still owed their money to sugar mills or sugar plantations, though this· number was declining.

The richest man was Julio

Lobo, owner of fourteen sugar mills, sugar trader, banker.
est family were the Falla Gutierrez's.
$200 million.

24

The rich-

Castro thought them worth

The Fallas were agro-industrialists. with seven

modern all-electrified sugar mills, a large candy factory, a henequen
and board factory, an alcohol distillery, banking interests, and other
.
.
25
operations.
Other of the leading sugar families included the Aspurus, Azquetas and Tarafas with three sugar mills apiece, the Gomez Menas
,,

,

and Riva Domfuguez's with four, and the Garcia y Diaz's with five-albeit smaller- -mills. A substantial number of millionaires came
from the non-sugar sector.

In Santiago, there were the Bahun brothers

with a· cement plant and lumber mill, the Bosc_h -Bacardi clan with their
rum and beer plants.

In Havana, the Sarras had .a chain of pharmacies.

They probably owned more urban real estate than anyone else in Cuba.

2 3 Interview with Juli~ Tarafa whose father's three sugar mills
grossed $15_million a year. Southampton, New York, November 29,
1971. See also Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New
York: Harper & How, 1971), p. 1111. Leland Jenks has estimated
that 19th century Cuba had perhaps 1500 aristocrats who lived as well
as their peers anywhere in the world. See Our Cuban Colony (New York:
Vanguard Press, 1928), p. 25.
24

.

El Mundo, October 15, 1960.

25 Manuel Porfirio Arca, "Influence of Cubans in the Present Expansion of the Sugar Industry in the Central Florida Area Around Lake
Okeechobee" (unpublished M.A. Thesis., University of Miami, 1962 ), p. 55.
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The families of these rich men tended to intermarry.
Falla Gutierrez's three daughters each married well.

Laureano

Adelaida mar-

ried Viriatio Gutierrez, Senator, hacendado, oil investor.

Maria

Teresa married Agustfu Batista y Falla, president of the island's largest
bank, the Trust Company of Cuba.

26

Isabel married a Bonet.

Isabel's

son Alejandro would manage the Falla Gutierrez interests; his son would
attend Andover.

There were Fallas everywhere.

Miguel Angel Falla

was president of the American-owned Atlantica del Golfo, the largest
sugar company in Cuba.
The extended family, characterized by a tenacious unity, was the
most effective institution in Cuba.

The patriarch of the family, often

a grandfather, influenced the vital decisions of the younger generation.
Not infrequently, rich patriarchs found it difficult to delegate responsibilities in their family business even to t?eir own children.
give their sons allowances, but not authority.

They would

This patriarchal attitude

· was an important sourc·e of youthful dissolution and rebelliousness, and
would contribute--in the 1950s--to the rebellion of middle and upper
class youth, to the generational struggle.
One's family history was also important.

Cuban politicians

never failed to mention their blood relations, no matter how tenuous, to
heroes of the independence period.

When the politician Eduardo Chiba.s

26 In 1972 Mar{a Teresa was living in Geneva; Isabel at the Hotel
Ritz, Madrid.
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was accused of being communist in 1928, he replied indignantly that
.
27
his grandmother was an Agramonte of mdependence fame.
Need
one say more? When the Batistian~, Emilio Nunez Portuondo, wrote
to President John F. Kennedy in 1961, he observed that his father ''is
one of the most revered heroes of the Cuban people. 112 8 As one observer of Cuban customs saw it, "at the bottom of our purest historical
traditions lies a certain respect for the elite families, whose ancestry
and lineage stimulated a general admiration.

1129

Family-owned business tended to predominate, reflecting a
general lack of confidence in the broader society.

Cuban companies

preferred to remain small rather than gain capital, and lose a mea~ure
of control, by going pubiic. 3 o The Banco Nunez was family controlled;
three of the five directors of the Banco Garrigo were Garrigos; Bacard{ was held exclusiv~ly by the Bosch-Bacardi family; Julio Lobo's

27
Luis Conte Aguero, E du a rdo Chibas, el adalid de Cuba (Mexico: .
Editorial Jus, 1955}, p. ·117
28 Nunez Portuondo had met Kennedy at a French Embassy reception in Havana in 1958. See Diario de la Marina (Miami), April 8,
1961.
29 Mariano Perez Duran, prologue to Joaqufu de Posada's Anuario
de f amilias cubanas, 1971-1972 (San Juan: Graficart Corporation, 1971 ),
p. 3. The social historian Francisco Xavier de Santa Cruz y Mallen
(the Conde de San Juan de Jaruco y de Santa Cruz de Mompox), has
written six tedious volumes tracing the lineage of Cuba's more important
. families. See his Historia de familias cubanas (La Habana: Editorial
Hercules, 1940-1950).
·

30

The Cuban entrepreneur's disinclination to "go public II limited
the growth of enterprise. It was a significant cause of underdevelopment
in Cuba.
·

12
sugar enterprises and the tobacco empire of the Menendez 's were
family affairs.

The Diario de la Marina, chief spokesman for the

bourgeoisie, was a family firm.

Jose Ignacio Rivero was director, his

·brother Oscar, administrator, his sister-in-law, Silvia de Rivero, was
pres1'd ent. 31
When Fidel

observed that no one ever became a millionaire in

Cuba except by inheritance, he was not entirely wrong. 32

A study of

seventeen outstanding Cuban business leaders of the 1950s revealed only
three or four to fit the self-made category.

Seven of the seventeen were

educated at the fashionable Belen prep school; a total of nine had some
l experience.
.
33
.
U • S• e duca t 1ona
But there were enough men who had become rich--without virtue
of family connections--to stimulate the ambitions of the entire bourgeoisie.

A major opportunity for wealth was provided by the erratic

nature of Cuban history.

The wars of 1868 and 1895 and the economic

crises of 1920 and 1930 meant disaster for some but opportunity for
others.

For example, Jose Gomez Mena sold his sugar mills just prior

to the sugar collapse of 1920 and profited enormously. Fr.ancisco Escobar's father was able to buy cheap .l ands just after the bank crash of

31 Diario de la Marina, masthead, January 6, 1959.
32 Ibid., March 17, 1959.
33 Octavio R. Costa, Hombres y destines (La Habana; Editorial
Lex, 1954). Costa's subjects were mostly born around 190~. By the
1950s they were leading figures ·in Cuban business and society.
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1920 and was thus able to :r:ise from rriinor civil servant to colono and
,

eventually to ownership of the sugar mill Salvador.

34

The sugar czar of the 1940s.; Jose Manuel Casanova, was another
·of these Cuban Horatio Algers.

Left homeless during the war of In-

dependence in 1896--thanks to the reconcentration policy of the Spanish
General Weyler--he found work as a water carrier for U.S." occupa.,
tional forces encamped in Pinar del Rio. Thereafter he worked as a
cane cutter at the Frenchman Labarrere's Bramales sugar mill.

35

He became a clerk in _Labarrere's Havana office and in the evenings he
studied accounting at the Centro de Dependientes." He once told his
doctor, concerned with his appearance of exhaustion from overwork,
that he would "rather die than not progl'.'ess." Thence, he advanced to
manager of Bramales. on to the leasing of other mills, the management of others for U.S. and Canadian banks, and eve:::itually to ownership· of the Central Orozco, and -to the presidency, for amost two decades, of the Asoc.iaci6n de Hacendados.

"I am proud, 11 he once de-

clared, "to be my own ancestor. 1136
Urban commerce also had its heroes of meteoric ascent.

In the

young republic, the familiar pattern was that of the Spanish immigrant

3 4 Interview with Francisco Escobar y Quesada.
15, 1971.

Miami, April

35

The French influence on the Cuban bourgeoisie is as important as it is unrecognized. A substantial number of French planters fled
across .the Windward Passage from Haiti to Cuba in the 1780s, following
the black slave uprising there.
36 Interview with Jose Manuel Casano,;a,Jr.
June 11, 1971.

Coral Gables,

14
who worked his way up from helper at a grocery store saving every
penny.

These were men whose great and only pleasure was business.

Thus Carlos Nunez. w~ose life was seen by an admirer as "one glorious
II

.

ascent from rural shopkeeper's son to cart driver to colono to banker
to multi-millionaire.

By 1959 his Banco Nunez had twenty-one

branches.37
For many Cubans politics was a principal avenue of advancement.

Every Cuban president, with the exception of Estrada Palma,

has waxed rich in office, and perhaps none more so than the veterans
.
,
of the revolution of 1933--Presidents Ramdn Grau San Martin (1944-48),

Carlos Pr{o (1948-1952), and Fulgencio Batista (1940-1944; 1952-1958).
Pr{o and Batista entered. the presidency in modest circumstances and
left millionaires.

Grau was worth. according to his own declaration,

$2 million when he became president in 1944. 38 By 1951.' his home
alone·--a handsome mansion on Havana's Fifth Avenue.;-was estimated
to be worth $2 million.

39

The bureaucracy also"offered rich pickings.

.Jose Manuel Aleman, once a modest official in the education ministry,
rose to be minister, and, in 1948. flew to the United States with $19
million in his suitcase. 4 o Thereafter he became a major figure in

37 Costa, Hombres y destinos, pp. 13-26.
38

Interview with Eduardo Suarez Rivas, Autentico politician and
a friend of Grau. Miami Beach, November 23, 1970.
3g Hispanic American Report (June, 1951 ), p. 19.
40 Sam Boal and Serge Fleigers, "Toe Biggest Theft in Histor)j 11
American Mercury (April, 1952), p. 2.9.
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Miami real estate, investing in properties like Key Biscayne which he
•

11

later helped to develop with Manuel

Bebe

11

Rebozo.

41

,
Aleman left

$5 million in his will for a children's hospital when he died in 1950.
Eduardo Chibas, the fiery conscience of Cuban politics, suggested that
this gift was only 5 percent of what Aleman had stolen.

The least Ale-

man could do, suggested Chibas, was to leave the nation a tip of 10
percent_. 42

The Cr6nica Social
One of the most important personages of pre-revolutionary Cuba
was the social chronicler who functioned as publicity agent and scorekeeper for the highly mobile bourgeoisie.

It was not sufficient that one

had successfully assaulted the ramparts of high society, attended a
certain party, joined a certain club.
whole world should know about it.

What was important was that the ·

The social chroniclers' daily battle

reports decorated virtually every Cuban newspaper, and were avidly
followed by the whole bourgeoisie.

One solidly middle class bureau-

crat and politician recalls that the first thing his wife, and sometimes
even his maid, did in the mornings was to study the cronica.

43

41 Bohemia, April 2, 1950, p. 95.
42 Conte Aguero, Eduardo Chibas, p. 682.
43 Interview with Andres Suarez, former Cuban politician and
Treasury Department official. Gainesville, June 2 7. 1971.

.. .
..·. ··.
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The social chronicles began around the turn of the century, when
the old landed aristocracy was in its death throes.

The greatest practi-

tioner of the art was Enrique Fontanills, society editor of the Diario de
la Marina.

Fulgencio Batista, Cuba's greatest social climber, was

benefited by one cronista. In late 1933, having just risen by virtue of
rev.olution from obscure sergeant to commander of the armed forces,
Batista visited the night club Sans Souci to celebrate.

He was ·deeply

humiliated when the club's bourgeois clientele got up and walked out.
Was this a vote of democratic protest, or a protest against an upstart
mulatto?

44

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

In any case, the next day, a society editor made a favor-

able comment about his visit whereupon Batista showered the columnist
.
.
45
with gifts.
Batista's gesh1.re was the rule of the game.
publicity he received.

One paid for the

In the 1950s, on the birthday of Diario de la

Marina cronista Luis del Posada, a great table at the Country Club
would be laden with gifts·from his grateful clients.

46

Posada, himself

a man of modest origins, became a member of the Club.

His brother,

44 Batista's dusky complexion was a contributing factor in the
decision of some burgueses to support Fidel Castro's rebellion of
1957-1959. To t hem, Batista was "el negro." Blacks shared the belief of Cuba's communist party in early 1958 that Castro's rebellion
was just another bourgeois putsch.
4 5 The New York Times, June 2, 1959.
46 Interview with Clarence Moore, editor of the Havana Times.
Washington, D. C., December 16, 1970.
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"
Joaquin,
married into the s_ocially-prominent Berguiristain family.

Joaqufn

Jr. appeared in a photograph in the Diario de la Marina.

He

was shown at a dance of the Havana Military Academy, an institution

t ed by
.
f requen

II

.
.
1 f am1·1·1es.
our prmc1pa

II

47

In addition to the newspaper columns of the cronistas, there

were guides and directorios and golden books to chronicle the rise of
the new bourgeoisie.

48

To Cuba's intellectuals, the baroque praise

the chroniclers lavished on their clients-- "beautiful, sympathetic,
youthful, outstanding"--was nauseous, absurd.
differently.

The chroniclers thought

One argued that his column was not a vanity fair but rather

a teaching medium, striving to educate and refine the bourgeoisie's so. l
.
49
cia behavior.

While intellectuals of the 1950s were lamenting Cuba's underdevelopment, 'its social r.::hroniclers were relishing the island's most
gorgeous blossoming.

The recent social season had been extraordinary.

There had been a ball with a Watteau Shepherdess theme at Nina Perez
Chaumont de Truffins, Countess Camargo's Second Empire Ball, the
"Paris in 1900 11 dance of the planter Marcelino Garcia and Chea Pedrosa,

47 D'1ar10
. d e 1a M ar1na,
.
May 22, 1959.

.

.

48 Such as the annual Directorio social de la Habana; the Libro

de oro de la sociedad habanera, the Guia social de la Habana. In exile
the tradition is carried on in Luis Posada's Anuario de familias cubanas.
49 Comment of the cronista, Haul Roddguez Faura in Carteles,
June 14, 1959, p. 38.

18
the Christmas Eve party of real estate tycoon Ernesto Sarra, with three
midnight masses at Sarra's private chapel.

This was the stuff that suc-

cess warranted, and that dreams were made of.

50

The leaders of Havana society were, in Posada's eyes,
Lilly Hidalgo de Conill, Lolo Suero de Otero--whose portrait had been
done by Salvador Dali, Sra. Rosa Perdomo del Valle, Sra. Lolo Larrea
de Sarra, and the G6mez Menas, mother and daughters.

51

. The G6mez

Menas in fact dominat~d the old society, and Marfa Luisa de G6mez Mena,
the Countess of Camargo, was its queen.
Marfa Luisa lived in a magnificent 18th-century-style French
mansion, the house of the forty doors, a home built in the 1920s by her
uncle, the sugar millionaire Jose Gomez Mena.

All the materials used

in the house's construction were imported from France or Italy with the
exception of some Cuban marble and nine ·palm trees. 52 Maria Luisa
doubled her fortune by marrying a· once-penniless Spanish immigrant

50 The Diplom at Ma gaz ine (Washington), November, 1958, p. 39.
This special issue on Cuban society was designed to prepare the way for
a ball sponsored by U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, Earl E. T. Smith, in
November, 1958. Th(:; ball was in favor of the Florence Prichett Foundation for the education of young Cubans interested in women's fashion and
design. Among those attending were Secretary of State Dulles and Senator John F. Kennedy and his brother Robert. The Kennedys were friends
of the ambassador and visited him on occasion in Havana. Their father had
a home near the Smiths at Palm Beach. Some interpreted the presence of
these distinguished Americans at this affair as indicative of continued U.S.
support for Batista.

51 Ibid., p. 39.
52 "Lacasa de las 40 puertas," Cuba (Havana), June, 1966, p. 38.
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turned hardware store magnate, Francisco Cajigas.

Together they

owned a huge apartment block, the "Manzana de G6mez," a 50, 000 acre
finca on the Isle of Pines, interests in the Charco Redondo mines, a
luxurious estate at Wajay, an urban subdivision, a theater, and various
53
other properties.
Cajigas was also Batista's partner in a rice business. Cajigas was
selected by the White Rose counterrevolutionary group to be president of
Cuba, after Castro was eliminated.

54

once,prior to an election, Cajigas had

come to Camp Colombia and presented President Batista y,rith one hundred
thousand-dollar bills to help finance his campaign. 55 Perhaps Cajigas was
following the advice Maria Luisa's father Alfonso had once given her,
advice that most Cubans followed religiously: "one always had to be ~m
the side of the president. " 56 Thus, Maria Luisa never hesitated to receive Batista, but only while he was president.

57

Batista was aware of

53 Havana Times, February 26, 1959; The New York Times,
October 16, 1959.
54 Bohemia, November 6, 1960, pp. 29-30.
55 Suarez Nunez, E~ gran culpable, p. 17.
56 Interview with Andres Carrillo. Miami, March 10, 1971.
"Panchito" Cajigas, whose personal fortune has been estimated at $50
million, fled Cuba in 1959 in the plane of his business associate, the
American multimillionaire Arthur Vining Davis, chairman of the
Aluminum Company of America. See Diario Las Americas, January 13,
1970.
;
57 Interview with Andres Carrillo.

Miami, March 10, 1971.

20

this attitude of the rich, and while in public he sought their company;
in private, he had their phones tapped.
• _:

58

.. . #

While still quite young, Maria Luisa became the Condesa de
Revilla de Camargo.

Some say the title was her reward for good works

performed in Spain; others, that she simply bought it. 59 · She enjoyed
entertaining European royalty in her great house on 17th Street.

Leopold

of Belgium, the pretender Don Juan, ~nd the Prince of Asturias had been
visitors. After three months in Havana she would leave for New York,
Paris, or Madrid.

When she returned a plane load of flo~ers might be

sent down from New York.

She was a great art collector and was proud

of her assemblage of Spanish impressionists ." She also had several
pieces of Marie Antoinette's furniture which she had purchased at a
bargain. BO To suit the dictates of European fashion, She had her ample
bosom surgically reduced so as to present a more svelte silhouette.
Lillian Gomez Mena's husband Alfonso Fanjul y Estrada was in
1959 president of the Havana Country Club.

His . brother Rafael was

general manager of the Gomez Menas' sugar mills.

Another brother,

Charles, was administrator of the Cuban Trading Company's San
Francisco sugar mill.

Alfonso I s daughter Lillian married into the

58 Jose Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable (Caracas, 1963), p. 11.
59 Bohemia, FebTI1Pry 12, 1961.
SO Interview with Juan Zarraga.

Coral Gables, May 8, 1971.
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Azqueta sugar family; Alfonso. Jr. married the daughter of the sugar
and cattle man, Gustavo de los Reyes.
world indeed.

For the rich, it was a very small

For a time, Alfonso played along with Batista in the family

tradition, serving as·a member of Batista's Consejo Consultivo ·in 1953.
By 1959 all that had changed; Alfonso was an enthusiastic Fidelista and

was urging that Castro be admitted to the Country Club.

61

This motion

did not pass.
Marfa Luisa G6mez Mena's winning of the title "Countess of
Camargo" exemplifies one of the great curiosities of Cuban socie~y; the
dream of nobility.

Everyone wanted a title.

For .t hose w!10 could not ac-

quire
a marquisate, there was always the middle
.
. bourgeoisie's own species of nobleza, the doctorado.
noble titles.

In 1959, Cubans held about one hundred

There were at least twenty-two marqueses, eleven earls,

various viscounts, Papal Knights, and other titl.ed persons from
highest sector of society."

63

"the

These titles were brandished with

elan in the social pages beneath photographs of paintings, in royal

61
.
Interview with Andres Carrillo, · a member of the Country Club.
Miami,· March 10, 1971. In exile, the rich Fanjuls and G6mez Menas continue to play the comfortable role of social lions. Alfonso Fanjul is now a
leading party giver in Palm Beach. He and his son are members of the exclusive Seminole Goif Links along with such notables as former U.S. Ambassador to
. Cuba, E. T. Smith, now mayor of Palm Beach.
.
62 Bohemia Libre, (Miami), July 9, 1961, p. 89.
63 Pablo Alvarez de Canas, et al, Libro de oro de la sociedad
habanera (La Habana: Editorial Lex,1946), p. 5. In 1884 Cuba had
enjoyed the presence of 54 marqueses, 43 counts , 4 vicounts, one duke,
and one baron. See in Roland T. Ely, Cuando reinaba s1.1 ma,i estad el
azucar (Buenos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana, 1963 ), p. 718.
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attitude, of the titles' possessors.

Many of these titles were purchased.

The American traveler, Maturin M. Ballou, who visited Cuba in the
1880s, reported that $25, 000 will purchase any title.

1164

Thereafter,

the titles could be inherited.
President Batista was intensely interested in high society and is
a stellar example of social climbing in Cuba.

65

Subject t~ infinite

abuse by the rich, the butt of a thousand jokes--he did not understand
French, once wore a dinner jacket to the theater in New York, thinking
it de rigueur--he nonetheless continuously aped them and, over time,
came to be respected for it.

He gave $150, 000 to subsidize the Havana

I
I
I
I
I
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Philharmonic Orchestra in l 952, perhaps to show that he too was attuned to the delights of bourgeois culture. 66 Some say he divorced his
first wife because of her peasant origin.

67

His second marriage, to

the more refined and almost elegant Marta Fernandez de Miranda, was

I
·1

viewed as an important step upward.

64 Maturin M. Ballou, Due South--Or Cuba, Past and Present.
(Boston: Houghton and Mifflin Company, 1885), p. 229. Ballou was
appalled by the idleness of the Cuban rich, saying that the island required "the infusion of a sterner, a more self-reliant, self-denying and
enterprising race." Apparently, he had men like himself in mind. He
was an annexationist. See in Ballou, pp. 218, 316.
65

Batista's efforts at social climbing parallel those of the
Mexican dictator Porfirio Dfaz. Like Batista, Diaz began at the botII
tom, worked hard to "whiten his image, divorcing his first wife in
favor of a partner more acceptable to society.
66 The New York Times, July 25, 1952 • .
67 Carleton Beals, "The New Crime of Cuba," Nation,(June 29,
1957), p. 567.
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In the library at his Finca Kuquine, Batista had an escudo nobilario
.,

68

espanol. .

He once told a friend he was anxious to return to Spain and

search out his ancestors and his past~

But there was another object in

·
69
that library Batista admired most of all: his sergeant's diploma.
The escudo nobilario was no doubt a fraud; the sergeant's diploma wellearned.

Batista, like many Cubans, was caught between the aristocratic

and the equalitarian tradition.

Big Houses
In the days prior to World War II. the rich discovered the plea-

sures of the Varadero and Kawama beaches on the smooth shores of

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Cardenas Bay.

At Kawa.ma. developed by Colonel Eugenio Coronel

Silva, thirty-two lots were turned into a battleship's row of the gilded
bourgeoisie.

Batista, Hedges. Tarafa, Julio Lobo, .bzqueta. Countess

Camargo (the first in Varadero with a swimming pool). the Sarras. all
.resided there.

The most luxurious home at Kawama was that of Senator ·

Guillermo Aguilera. It was in fact two houses joined by a spacious terrace for· dancing.

70

The last -t:o build at Kawama was thE;! old lion him-

'
self. ex-President Grau San Martin.

68

He resided in a fortress-like

A family tree purporting to trace Batista's noble ancestry.

69 futerview with Harry Klovekorn. former vice-president of the
Cuban Telephone Company who visited Kuquine. Coral Gables. June 9,
1971.
70 when the Castroifos intervened Aguilera's house at Kawama,
they reportedly discovered a copy of Bonjour Tristesse lying open on
the senator's bed. (Bohemia, March 8, 1959), p. 121.
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cottage of twenty rooms. Thus sergeants-turned-politicians, politiciansturned-industrialists, sugar barons, real estate tycoons, horrie-baked
royalty and the leader of the revolution of 1933 lived tranquilly, side
by side. 71 For amusement, there was the "quietly perfect" Kawama
Club where ricl:i, Cubans might hobnob with select American visitors.
Hemingway used to drink there.

Elliot Roosevelt came for his honey-

moon. And there were movie stars: Gloria Swanson, Joan Fontaine,
Robert Taylor.

Ethel Kennedy's parents. the Skakels, used to fly down

in their private DC-3.

Beyond Kawama, occupying several thousand acres at the very
tip of the Varadero peninsula, was .Irenee .DuPont's estate "Xanadu."
· One enter.e d through a large gate, then drove two miles down a palmlined drive, past a golf course, to the great house itself.
•
b aroque II an d m

II

gran d b a d t as t e,

II

It was "ps.eudo-

. "tor. 72 Bui"1t m
.
accor d"mg to one v1s1

the 1920s to entertain visiting executives from the various DuPont in· terests, the estate included a private casino, guest houses, large dining
· strip,
·
·
room, yac ht h arb or, air
an d o th er f ac n·ities.

73

7l Interview with Isabel da Silva, whose husband developed Kawama.
New York City, September 24, 1970. See also Budd Schulberg's "Varadero Beach," Holiday, (February, 1953), pp. 72-74.
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72 Andrew Salkey, Havana Journal (London: Penguin Books, 1971 ),
p. 258.
73 The DuPont's valued "Xanadu" at $2 million. In the 1920s
Irenee DuPont had substantial investments in the Rionda's Cuban Cane
Corporation. DuPont, a major stockholder of General Motors, planned
to use•'xanadu"as a retreat for G. M. executives.

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

25

To the east of Havana was a home more splendid even than
"Xanadu, " a house to challenge the mansions of the Habaneros Ilustrados of the 18th Century, the Aldama Palace, or the Santovenia mansion,
and that was President Carlos Pries' sixty-six acre estate "La Chata. "
Herbert Matthews found it one of the "most beautiful and expensive
prope::::-ties in the Western Hemisphere.

1174

Three years in construction,

the house boasted marble floors and walls of precious woods, a. barber
shop, a children's zoo, three bars, a tea house and a swimming pool
'fed by an artificial waterfall.

Orange groves, a shooting; gallery, and

stables for Arabian horses rounded out the gr·e at estate.
valued "La Cha ta" at $3 million.
is $25, 000 a year.

1175

II

Matthews

.

Toe salary of the president of Cuba

Prio lived in his new mansion precisely seven

weeks before he was overthrown and exiled by Batista in 1952.

The

deer and monkeys from the children's zoo were sent to the municipal
zoo of Havana.
. by the army.

74

"Pigs, cattle, and huge stocks of liquor were taken over

1176

.
The New York Times, April 9, 1952.

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., May 1, 1952. Pr io returned to "La Chata" briefly in
the 1950s during a political truce with Batista. Thereafter he was
again exiled, returning to Cuba after the advent of the Castro regime.
Perhaps his love for "La Chata" was one motive for his temporizing
with Castrismo. Pri'o left again for exile in mid-1960, this time never
to return •.
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Social Clubs
•!

•

The heart of Havana society was the social club.

Five clubs, "the

· big five, " ruled the roost. 77 These wer-e the Havana Yacht Club, the
Havana Country Club, the Havana Biltmore Yacht and Tennis Club, the
Vedado Tennis Club, and the Miramar Yacht Club.

Membership in one

or more of these clubs was for many the culmination of the social process.

They were the center of the habaneros' intensely active social

life, of the endless rounds of parties, cocktails, buffets, canastas, tea
dances and baby showers.

These were family clubs.

Marriages, both

romantic and financial, were contracted there.
To those middle class outsiders who formed the intellectual core
of the Castro revolution, the clubs would seem hymns to waste, triumphs of vanity, foolishness, places for women whose ~ervants had
left them with nothing to do, for men of inherited income.

78

The clubs'

English names were suggestive of the U. S. cultural penetration of Cuba.
At the pinnacle of the clubs was the Havana Yacht Club or "Yate, "
founded by the sea in 188~ by a group of young men who used to go there

77 In 1970, Cuban exiles in Miami began the "Big Five Club" reuniting, perhaps on a more democratic basis, the members of old Cuba's
five leading social clubs.
78 Rufo L6pez-Fresquet, minister of the treasury for Castro in
1959 was a member of the Biltmore. This did not sway him from attacking the clubs or their members, however. See below, p. 509.
Some exiles allege that L6pez-Fresquet was a "resentido" because he
. access to the more e 1egant II Yate 11 or 11 C oun t ry,
. II an d
could not gam
therefore joined the revolution • .
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to fish and bathe.

Carlos Toddy Lobos' grandfather, president of the

Ward Steamship Line, gave the land.

Relatively few Americans be-

longed. 79 Indeed, some detected a mild aura of anti-Americanism
there.

80

The "Yate" was essentially a closed society, the stronghold

of some three hundred old-line families.

Its roster of officials was

studded with names harking back to the 19th century aristocracy: Cardenas, Pedroso,

Arguelles, Herrera.

81

Memberships; at least $5, 000

each, were not inex~ensive. 82 Few politicians gained entry, except by
virtue of family.

Batista once tried to join but was rejected.

His

" s t an d ar d s " were JU
. d ge d msu
.
ff"1c1en
. t • 83 Th e U • S • A m b assa dor h a d an
honorary membership, however •.
The Yacht Club had its own little review which on occasion published anecdotes like that of the yachtsman and veteran of 1898, Enrique Conill.

He recalied t!}at during the Spanish-American War the

American General Brooke, on hearing Conill 's excellent English, said

79Among the U. s.· members were the textile king, Dayton Hedges,
Edward Miller, a vice-president of Atlantica del Golfo, and Philip Rosenberg, president of the Vertientes-Camagiiey Sugar Company. At the
University of Miami, a Cuban exile, when asked his most important
achievement, replied unhesitatingly that he was a member of the Havana
Yacht Club. (Interview with Kessel Schwartz, Hispanic Literature professor, University of Miami. Coral Gables, February 5, 1971.)
80 Comment of "Yate" member Raul b{az Arglielles to his captors
at the Bay of Pigs. See in Lisandro Otero {ed.), Playa Giron: derota del
imperialismo (La Habana: Ediciones R, 1962) vol. 4, pp. 15, 150.
8 l Marla Radelat de Fontanills (ecU, Directorio social de la Habana
(Habana, 19 52 ).
82 Interview with Carlos Todd y Lobo.
83 Interview with Andres Carrillo.

Miami, December 3, 1970.

Miami, March 10, 1971.
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that he cou 1dn I t b e a

cu b an, 'b ecause your
I

. t oo wlu. t e.
s k.m 1s

118

4 N d
ee -

less to say, Conill would hardly have gained entry to the Yacht or any
other of the leading clubs if he had been black.
Second in line of prestige and desirability was the Havana Country
Club, founded in 1912 as part of a real estate scheme by the American
builder and contractor Frederick Snare.
the

11

Part Cuban, part American,

11 •

Country mtroduced Cubans to the game of golf.

85

A livelier

place than the staid "Yate, " the"Country"gave perhaps the most exciting parties of the year, the New Year's Eve Ball and the Baile Rojo or
Red Ball to celebrate the end of Lent.

The'tountry'bffered honorary

memberships to presidents, ministers and members of the diplomatic
corps.

Thus President Batista, blocked from the Yacht Club, might

dance at the "Country. 118 6 Ambassador Smith was a regular attendant;
for a time, U.S. Ambassador Phillip Bonsal also.

Gulf Oil and the

Cuban Electric Company maintained a membership • . In 1959, Alfonso
Fanjul Estrada, son-in-law of sugar patriarch Gomez Mena, was its
1

,
president.

blood.

The

II

Country,

II

,
unl'1ke the II Yate,II was susceptible
to new

When a Spanish immigrant like Menendez of H. U:ppman Cigars

84Gaspar Carbonell Rivero, Enrique J. Conill, soldado de la
patria (La Habana, 1956), p. 27. This is a pamphlet reprinted from
the revista of the Havana Yacht Club.
85 Basil Woon~ When It's Cocktail Time in Cuba (New York:
Horace Liveright, 1928 ), p. 96.
86 n· . d 1 M .
. 1ar10 e a arma.

February 12, 1956.
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had earned his way to prominence and wealth, he was accepted onto
th e

"c ountry ' s "

· b oar ct w1·thou t a smg
· · 1e d.1ssentmg
· · vo t e.
governing

87

Most American of all was the Havana Biltmore Yacht and Counfry Club.

By 1959 several hundred of its sixteen hundred members were

Americans.

88

The "Biltmore" was the work of the Canadian-born pro-

rooter John McEntee Bowman who, upon completing the Biltmore Hotel
in Miami, crossed the Florida straits to build the Biltmore Hotel in

Havana.

89

In 1926 he completed the Havana Biltmore. Club and was

its first president.

The club's first commodore was Jose Emilio Obre-

g6n of the National City Bank. Texaco held two memberships.

Presi-

dent Batista also belonged, being admitted in 1941. In gratitude for that,
during his second presidency, Batista had some $800, 000 in dredging
done at government expense to improve the club's yacht harbor.

Batis-

ta's friends, Andres Domingo, Nicolas Arroyo, Manuel Perez Benitoa,
Masferrer, and the Tabernillas were also members.

90

Anyone who

could pay was welcome, if space were available.

87 Interview with Alonso Menendez.

Miami, March 22, 1971.

88 The New York Times, March 19, 1960. Members of the
"Biltmore had of necessity to purchase at least one share of club stock,
worth about $3, 000 in the late 1950s. (See The New York Times,
April 3, 1960.)
89

In 1972, the Biltmore Hotel in Miami closed down, after having
spent its declining years as a veteran's hospital. The Biltmore Hotel
in Havana is today a social center for workers. Times change.

90 Bohemia, March 27, 1960, p. 67.
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The Vedado Tennis Club (VTC) was founded in 1902 by Cuban
students who, upon returning from the U.S., found no place to practice
1
their newly-learned tennis.£ The VTC also helped to introduce the Cubans

to polo. American officers who were members there taught the game to
their Cuban military counter:parts, as a means of countering the boredom
.

'

of the 1907 intervention.
mit women in 1923.

92

At first strlctly a men's club, it came to ad-

Among its members in the late 1950s were such

patriarchs as Orestes Ferrara, cabinet minister for Machado, Juan Gelats
~

Botet, founder of the G~lats Bank, and Agustin Batista of the Trust Com.
· 93
pany of Cuba.
But there were also younger members, and newer money at the
VTC.

Indeed, the club's ·membership dipped well into the upper-middle

class, including a number of professional men, and especially doctors, .
some of whose sons were avid Castroites.

Jose Llanusa, later Castro's

mayor of Havana.., was a member as were Ricardo Machin and Jorge Gar! B ango o f th e
c1a

n·1rec t or10
. R.evo l uc1onar10.
·
· 94

Clubs in Cuba were not only for millionaires, they were also for
the middle class.

91
92

For the latter, there were the Miramar Yacht Club,

Vedado Tennis Club, Libro de oro (Havana, 1952), p. 7.
Ibid., p. 259.

93 Diario de la Marina, June 30, 1959.
94 Gustavo Ricardo Machin was a close associate of "Che" Guevara, dying with "Che" in Bolivia in 1968. Machin's father was a former
official of the VTC.
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95
,,
the Casino Espanol.
the Casino Deportivo, the Club Nautico, and a

host of others.

For white collar workers in the ba~king and electric

sector, there was th~ Club Bancario and the Cubar..elco Club.

There

was a club for professional men, Club de Profesionales, and downtown
lunch clubs like the American Club (founded in 1901) and tr..e Union
Club.

The military had their Club Militar.

And there was a profusion

.
96
of service clubs, Rotary, L10ns and Masons.

Private Education
Almost without ex·c eption, the Cuban bourgeoisie, high and low,
was educated in private schools.
state of public education.

This owed in part to the disastrous

Not only did the government fail to educate

anywhere from 30 to 50 percent of the nation's youth, but those who
were educated r~"eived mediocre educations.

Ramiro Guerra, the

Cuban historian, recalled in 1959 that he had been fighting for a democratic and equalitarian educational system--without success--since
.
97
1915.

9 5The various · Casino Espanoles, scattered throughout Cuba,

served as centers of Spanish resistance during Cuba's war of independence,. Thereafter, they began gradually to accommodate themselves to the new circumstances qf an independent Cuba. The Havana
Casino had an important night school. Others offered inexpensive
medical care.
96 Some Cubans thought the Lion's Club--especially certain of
its provincial branches- -to be very important forces for improvement.
See · Erna Fergusson, Cuba (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946 ), p. 47.
97 B o11em1a,
.
April 12, 1959, p. 47.
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For the upper class the principal prep schools were LaSalle and.
Belen (1854) for boys and the Sacred Heart (1858) an~ Merici Academy
for girls.

Also important were such foreign schools as the American

·
98
·Ruston Academy (1920),
the Episcopal Cathedral School, Candler
College (1899), the German School (1923) and the British St. George's
School (1936). 99 Many of these schools had that· curiousiy Cuban. blend
of aristocratic and democratic features.
than social status was the key to entry.

For example. money rather
Tuition was about thirty dollars

per month for day hops at the Jesuit Belen.

Scholarships were often

available. lOO Sometimes the poor scholarship student was subtly humiliated before her richer peers. lOl But a scholarship student at ·the
exclusive Merici Academy was permitted to guard her secret, and was
not discriminated against.

In 1959 a ;epresentative of the Catholic High

Schools' Association would condemn the "competition in ~xhibitionism,
luxury and vanity which for some years has characterized certain

98 The inst~ctors at these academies were ~ot always good burgueses. Thus Boris Goldenberg, instructor at Ruston Academy and author of The Cuban Revolution and Latin America (London, 1965) gave
private· classes in socialist thought in his spare time in the 1950s. Among
his students was Lisandra Otero, later author and cultural commisar of
Cuba. (Interview with Dra. Marta Machin, who attended Goldenberg's
classes. Manhasset, New York, September 16, 1970.)
99 Havana's Candler College was organized in 1899 by the Methodist
Bishop Candler, with funds donated by Asa Griggs Candler, the founder of
Coca-Cola.
lOO At Belen about 10% of the students were on scholarships.

Inter-

view with Father Baldor, rector of Belen. Miami, June 10, .1971.
lOl Lolo de la Torriente, Mi casa en la tierra (Havana, 1956), p. 83.
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.
11102
private prep schools.
The private schools were as ambiguous on the nationalist issue
as the bourgeoisie they educated.

Supporters of the public schools com-

plained that the private academies were staffed by foreign teachers,
awash with foreign ideas.

But wasn't that the whole point? The in tel-

lectual Anita Arroyo was pleased that her children had gone to Havana's
St. George's School because one became bilingual--in English and Spanish-there.

Thus her children were perfectly equipped to continue their edu-

cation in the United States in 1960--in exile. 103
The Jesuit's Belen prep school was, in the early republic, so
dominated by Spanish Jesuits that some Cuban parents refused to let
their children go there. ·l 04 In 1919. the Spanish flag still flew over the
main entry.

But at the inauguration of BPlen's new campus in 1924, only

Cuban flags were in evidence.

The creation of a Cuban novitiate for

Jesuits in the 1950s was another step toward the reduction of Spanish
influence.

105

Belen m8:de a democratic gesture by creating a second

"popular school" alongside the colegio.

This was open, without cost,

102 Bohemia, August 16, 1959, p. 76.
103 Diario Las Americas, December 10, 1971.
l0 4 Interview with Ramiro Sanchez. Miami, February 4, 1971.
105 Interview with Father Baldor, former rector of Belen.
June 10, 1971.

Miami

34
to the local public.

,

.

And after World War Two, Belen built the Escuela

,

Electromecanica. a free technical high school.

These developments

were supported by the patriarch and banker Narcisco Gelats and the
Del Valle and Aspuru families. lOB
consignment from the lottery.

The government assisted with a

There was a sense at Belen in the 1950s

of trying to catch up to the times.

There were even regrets that the

students had been taught to share the general bourgeois disdain for
things political. 107

The Ruin of the Aristocracy

I
I
I
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Carleton Beals once observed that the "tragedy and charm II of
the Cuban upper class lay in their emotional and cultural attachment
to an aristocratic past "of velvets and silver bu.ckles not intrinsically
. own. 1110. s Th"
. t ocracy w h ose mores an d t ra d't'
.
. 1s aris
i ions so . inth e1r
fluenced the bourgeoisie of the 1950s had reached its zenith during the
reign of Queen Isabel II (1833-1868).

Then a handful of powerful fami-

lies, a regular sugar oligarchy, dominated the island.

Among these

were the Cardenases. the Alfonsos, the Betancourts, the O'Farrills,
Pedrosos, Ignazas, Arangos, Calvos,Penalvers, O'Reillys and the
Montalvos. 109 They fathered Cuba's great sugar boom, facilitated by

1-06 Interview with Father Juan Manuel- Dorta Duque, S. J •• former
instructor at Belen. Miami, June 13, 1971.
107 Interview with Father Baldor.

Miami, June 10, 1971.

108 The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Company.
1933). p. 67.
109 Thomas, Cuba, p. 152.
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the massive import of African slaves and the coming of the age of
steam: steam for the mills, the railroads, and for the ships to carry

I
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the sugar to Europe and America.

Together they made Cuba into the

richest colony in the world.
Slavery then was the real backbone of the aristocratic tradition.
Slaves were necessary to create wealth, to serve as cooks, gardeners,
housekeepers.

For many rich criollos, the children of the founders,

idleness and conspicuous consumption replaced work and production.
The Cubans had a saying for this: work was fit for blacks, Spaniards,
.
110
and donkeys, but not for the criollo aristocracy.
In 20th century
Cuba, rich burgueses liked to be known as "sportsman" or "clubman, "
that is, a man who did not work.
Wheri a Cuban had acquired a sufficient fortune, he often left the
island to make his mark in the greater world.

Juan Pedro Terry, son

of the· banker and sugarman, built a magnificent mansion at 424 Fifth
,Avenue, ,New York.

111

·
The scions
o f the Drake fami 1y, one o f t h e

richest of Cuba, left for Madrid and the splendor of court society.

112

Almost a hundred years later, another Cuban exile, a fo~mer vicepresident of Cuba, defended the "rich and splendid wedding" at Miami's

110

Bohemia Libre (Miami), January 1, 1961, p. 29. This article
by the intellectual Lino Novas Calvo ("La tragedia de la clase media
cubana ") is one of the few Cuban interpretations of the destruction of
the bourgeoisie.
11 ~ Ely, Cuando reinaba.! p. 415.
112 Ibid., p. 387.
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~

Viscaya Palace of a daughter of President Carlos Prio, saying that "life
.
11113
comman d s, youth does not return, one must 11ve. ; ••

Towards the mid-19th century; certain of the older families,
their entrepreneurial energies having waned, their fortunes depleted,
were displace~ by a new transfusion of immigran~s from Spain.

New

blood: the Aldamas, Zuluetas, Diagos, Torrientes and others rose to
. an d soc1a
. 1 prominence.
.
114
economic

Julio Lobo, Cuba's leading sugarman in the 1950s, had an enormous respect for the entrepreneurial achievements of the founding generation.

Lobo 's favorite _sugar mill, Tinguaro, had been built by the vig-

orous Don Pedro Diago in 1841.

Lobo thought Diago, who had brought

the first steam engine to Cuba in 1818, had all the intelligence and enterprising spirit sacij.y lacking among Cuban sugar men of the twentieth
century. 115

113

see Rafael Guas Inclan, "Una boda del gran mundo" in Diario
Las Americas, February 4, 1972. Guas felt somewhat defensive about
such gaiety, while 90 miles away his fellow Cubans were suffering under
Castro. The Viscaya Palace is a magnificent estate on Miami's Biscayne
Bay built by the developer of Miami, Henry Morison Flc3:gler.
114 Thomas, Cuba, p. 153.

115"Cana y Azucar" in Diario de la Marina, September 30, 1959.
Lobo 's Tinguaro followed a progression of ownership similar to that of
many Cuban sugar mills. After the death of Don Pedro Diago, the mill
passed to his daughter who left Cuba to live in Spain. Following the Ten
Year's War (1868-1878) the mill was sold to an intermediary who sold it
to The Cuban-American Sugar Company, which retained it until 1943 when
it was largely destroyed by fire. The government seized it to force reconstruction. Thereafter, Tinguaro was purchased and rebuilt by Julio
Lobo. It was damaged again in 1957 by a fire set by the Castroites. In
1960 it was again intervened, and renamed the Sergio Gonzalez after a
hero of Castro's revolution.
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· The American hacendado Edward Atkins was impressed by evidences of decadence among Cuba's sugar aristocracy in the late 19th
century.

He observed that "th~· ~ons of the old Cuban planters were

·not brought up to the industrious habits or the care of property; and
.
.
l 1tt
' 1e but the memory o f past g1or1es.
.
;,llB A t k"ms
they had inherited

himself continued resolutely forward.

Almost every year new ma-

chinery was installed at his sugar mi~l, Soledad, to facilitate production and cut labor costs.

Part of the savings went to pay high salaries

·
117
necessary to attract good managers.
As Cuban arist~crats fell by
the wayside, ruined by the war, or a lack of enterprise,
like Atkins bought or leased their properties.

Americans

Other Cuban sugar mills

fell into the h~nds of their creditors who were often foreign banks.

At-

kins' own holdings were,in the early 20th century, incorporated into the
Punta Alegre Sugar Corporation, of which he was president.
· The golden era of the sugar plutocracy was definitively smashed
by Cuba's wars for independence.

Indeed, some Cubans believe that

Castro's revolution succeeded precisely because of this destruction of
the creole aristocracy.

A few aristocratic families survived, but their

class was _irrevocably shattered.
The aristocracy died because it lacked

a common policy;

some

favored independence, some autonomy, some annexation to America.

116

Edward F. Atkins, My Sixty Years in Cuba.
Riverside Press, 1926), p. €5.
117 Ib1"d., p. 109 • .

(Cambridge:
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Only a small number of hacendados in Oriente Province participated in
118 M
. . . 1 uprising
. .
.
th e m1tia
o f 18 6 8 •
ost, fearfu 1 of s 1aye risings
or eco• !

•

nomic loss, sided wit!1 Spain. After ·a time, the rebellious hacendados,
led by Carlos Miguel de Cespedes and Ignacio Agramonte, saw no alternative but to destroy the haciendas of their neighbors.

Cespedes,

himself owner of a small sugar plantation in Oriente (La Demaja~a),
declared in an official circular in 18.6 9 that "the flames of the ?urning
sugar mills • . • will be the beacons of our liberty • • • . Cuba will be
free even if we have to burn every vestige of civilization. from Point
Masai to Cape San Antonio • • • • ,,119
Perhaps the most spectacular instance of the destruction of the
sugar aristoc.r acy was the ruin of Miguel Aldama.

In 1842 Aldama,

with the aid of the Al{onsos and the Drakes, took a proto-nationalist
step by buying the Havana Railway from the Spanish gov~rnment.

He

experimented with an American steam plow on one of his five sugar
'plantations, and he built a splendid home, El Palacio de Aldama, which
has endured to this day in old Havana.

His friendship with the abolition-

ist, Jose Antonio Saco, whom he supported financially, slave revolts on
one of his .own plantations, and a belief that slave labor was economically

118 Almost a century later, a small group of hacend8.dos from
Oriente Province would help to finance Castro's rebellion.

l l 9 Cepero Bonilla, "Azucar y abolicion, " Obras historicas , p.
158. The Spanish replied with equal vehemence that "Cuba will be
Spanish or we shall leave it abandoned in ashes. " See in Lester Lang~
ley, The Cuban Policy of the United States (New York: John Wiley and
Sons, 1968 ), p. 68.
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inefficient inclined him to join the struggle for independence in 1868.
An offer of a marquis ate failed to change his mind.
the rebels proved disastrous.

His union with

Within a year he was driven into exile,

his palace ransacked by the Spanish Volunteers, his lands and sugar
mills seized.
1898.

Once one of Cuba's richest men, he died a pauper in

For the Cuban upper class, ruin by revolution would become a

familiar experience.

Selling Out
Cuba's two wars for independence destroyed the sugar industry
and thus knocked under the chief prop of the colonial aristocracy.

The

planters' slaves were liberated without compensation. The Spaniards
seized some $100 million worth of properties belonging fo Cuban patriots.

Some· aristocrats, anxious to defend thdr interests, remained

loyal to Spain, thus providing evidence for future accusations that the
alta-burguesia criolla betrayed the national interest and the cause of
independence.

120

Many Cuban sugar mill owners adopted U.S. citizen-

ship in the hope of protecting their properties.

In 1902, the owners of

172 sugar estates, totalling some 1. 5 million acres~ presented claims
for damages of over $40 million before the U.S. Spanish War Claims
Commission.

120

Some of these were native Americans; many were members

oscar Pino-Santos, Historia de Cuba (Havana: Editorial Nacional, 1964), p. 233. In damning the old aristocracy, Pino-Santos
fails to take into account families like the Aldamas and Aguileras who
were ruined because they supported the struggle for independence.
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of that ambiguous new tribe, the cub;no-americano.

121

The new bourgeoisie that rose, phoenix-like, from the ashes of
colonial Cuba was preoccupied with reconstruction.

They wanted the

island to thrive again; to recoup old fortunes and make new ones.
They seemed untroubled by nationalist sensibilities.

Cuba's new

president, Estrada Palma, himself a nationalized American, made no
bones about his attitude.

He wanted economic plenty and relief from

Cuba's baneful civil wars--even if it meant political and economic
dependence on the U.S.

122

Thus began an era in which the Cuban bourgeoisie, avid for quick
money, sold out a great deal of their national patrimony.
went very cheaply.

Some of this

Andrew Preston of the United Fruit Company bought

123
almost 200, 000 acres for $400, 000 in Oriente Province.
By 1905,
.
.
124
some 13, 000 North Americans had bought $50 million worth of lands.
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In 1906 the Cuban-American Sugar Company hired the revolutionary

hero, Major General Ma:rio Menocal and the remnants of his army to

121 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 132. Among the cubanoyanquis of the early 20th century were such powerful men as Andres
G6mez Mena, J.P. Baro and Francisco del Valle. See in Oscar PinoSantos, El asalto a Cuba por la oli garquia financiera yan qui (Havana:
Casa de las Americas, 1973), p. 44.
122 Jenks, Our Cuban Co lony, p. 90.
123 Ibid., p. 130.
1 24 Pino-Santos, Historia, p. 250.
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help open new lands in Oriente Province. 125
Not everything was sold for a song, however.

Americans paid

extraordinary prices fer Cuban sugar lands and mills during the rising
sugar market of World War I.

The Cuban Cane Company of New York's

Manuel Rionda ;:i.nd Miguel Ara:r:go bought up fourteen mills "at prices
·. 126
ranging from 60 - 100 percent over their cost before 1914."
Mil· ton Hershey paid whatever the owner asked.

He paid $8 million for

Central Rosario; it was not worth $5 million.

He was criticized for

having paid too much and thereby setting a bad precedent.

127

Such was

the anxiety for profit that in 1916, G_6mez Mena sold the majority interest
in the sugar mill bearing his own name, along with Central Amistad,

to the Warner Sugar Company for $16 million.

128

Of the thirty-

eight sugar mills owned by U. S. interests in 1913..: 1914, only ten
were constructed by American capital.
or otherwise acquired.

129

_

The rest were purchased

In the following decade, the Americans built

1 2 5 Interview with Henry Austin Clark, Jr. Southampton, N. Y.,
June 21, 1974. Clark's father was a founder of Cuban-American; young
Clark, a director. A half-century of good profits from Cuban-American
permitted Clark to indulge.his interest in antique cars. His Southampton
Automotive Museum has one of the best collections of old autos in
America.
l26 Thomas, Cuba, p. 538.
127

Interview with Francisco Rodriguez, president of the Hershey
Group and a vice-president of Atlantica del Golfo. Miami, May 14, 1971.
128 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 221.
129 Pino-Santos, El as alto, pp. 48-49.
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another ten, bought twenty-seven and acquired ten through judicial
process. 130
The Havana railroad, pride of the 19th century habaneros illustrados, was sold to British investors in 1906.

The sellers became

rich, receiving stock in the new railroad plus secl:ts on the board of
t ors. 131
.
d 1rec
The bourgeoisie's anxiety to sell appalled Cuba's· nationalists.
In 1903, Senator Don Manuel Sanguily decried those Cubans who "with- out thinking or because of an ill-calculated anxiety to obtain cash, were
selling o~t their co~ntry. "

13 2

Sanguily drafted a bill prohibiting the

sale of real estate to foreigners, 1:mt it was successfully opposed by
Orestes _Ferrara and ~nzalez Lanuza. 133 Two years later, Gonzalez Lanuza became president of Norman H. Davis' Trust Company
of Cuba.

134

Thtis the comprador bourgeoisie.

wise defeated.

130

The politician Luis Milanes asked in 1915 that

Ibid., pp. 95-96.

131 Interview with Juan Za.rraga, whose grandfather was one of
the sellers. Coral Gables, May 8, 1971.
·

132

·1
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In 1909, Senator Emilio

Arteaga proposed legislation similar to that of Sanguily but was like135

I
I
I

Maestre, El latifundismo, p. 43.

133 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
134 Jenks_, Our Cuban Colony, p. 120.
13 5 Emilio Roig y Leuchensring, Males y vicios de la Cuba
republicana, sus causas y sus remcdios (Havana: Oficina dcl historiador de la ciudad de la Havana, 1959), pp. 303-305.
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purchase of Cuban real estate by foreigners be blocked by legislation.
But the respected Cuban lawyer.Antonio Sanchez de Bm:tamente replied that stories of foreign purchases were exaggerated and that, in
any case, Cuba desperately needed foreign capital in order to grow.
Cuban nationalism melted before the onslaught of prosperity ;

136

The Cu-

bans who owned 93 percent of the island's sugar production in 1895
would sell off or otherwise lose almost half in the first quarter· of the
20th century.

137

The Cuban bourgeoisie lacked the cultural, political, and economic cohesion necessary to resist the Americans.

In Jose Antonio

' Ramos' play Tembladera. (1917), a plantation owner describes the
Cuban panorama:
Here within, a chaos of opposing interest, and none
strong enough to impose itself on the otherE, a truly
savage indifference towards the future, and no action
against events . • . . And outside, the Yankee with many
millions of dollars, and like one man, with a firm attitude toward the future, to which he dedicates half of
the present ••• determined to make the island his. l38

- 13_6 Leon Primelles, Cronica cubana, 1915-1918.
Editorial Lex, 1955), p. 65.

(La Habana:

137 C~rlos Marques Sterling, Histo ria de Cuba (New York: Las
Americas Publishing Company, 196 9 ), p. 323 .
138 Carlos Ripoll, La g eneraci6.n del 23 en Cuba (New York:
Las Americas Publishing Company, 1969), p. 30.
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The Ruin of the Bourgeoisie (1920-1930)
The tremendous surge in Cuban sugar production occasioned by
. World War I was fomented by a cloudburst of bank credits.

Up to $80

millions were lent out on the assumption that sugar prices would hold
·
·
139
at between fifteen to twenty cents a pound.
Prices reached 22. 5
cents on May 19, 1920, but thereafter began to slide, then plummet,
carrying the banking sector and the economy into ruin.

In its reckless

drive for wealth, the ?ourgeoisie was destroying itself.
An instance of self-destruction is evident in the case of Laurentino Garcia, owner of the sugar mills Santa Amalia and Progreso in
Matanzas.

On the eve of the crash, Garcia had 140, 000 bags of sugar

unsold but pledged to Manuel Hionda 1 s ·cuban Trading Company of New
,
York. Rionda, believing the market at its height, telegraphed Garcia,
urging him to sell.
drawn on his cuff.

Garci'a, telegram in hand, consulted a scale he had
He was waiting for the market to hit thirty cents a

pound, which his scale showed equivalent to almost $14 million.

On

,
Friday, Garcia decided not to sell.
gan.

On Monday, the great descent be-

He hesitated, hedged, waited for the inevitable rebound.

It never

came. He finally sold at eight cents, leaving a debt_to th~ Cuban Trading Company of $1. 5 million.
shut-downs, lawsuits, ruin.

Thereafter, bad times: foreclosures,

140

139 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 214.
140 Interview with Antonio ·Barro y Segura: vice-president (in
1959) of the Cuban Trading Company.· Miami, _M ay 25, 1971.
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Along with the collapse of the sugar market--and much of the

,
alta-burguesia in 1920- -public confid~nce in private enterprise also
fell.

Increasingly, the cry was heard that the government would have

to act.

In the fall of 1921, the hacendado Luis Fernandez Marcane de-

clared that "the state cannot permit more Cuban sugar mills to pass
into foreign hands.

11141

The solution, he thought, was for the government

to make loans to the hacendados. This failing, the state s·hould take control of the mills.

142

The collapse of the world sugar market marked the apogee of
U.S. investment in Cuba.
pleted.

In 1926 the last Cuban sugar mill was com-

No more would be built. For the next quarter century Cuban

sugar prcduction--and the Cuban economy in general--remained essentially stagnant.

143

The Cuban ·nationalists, whose voices had been drowned out in the
era of sugar prosperity, now began to be heard.
· intellectual elite, the

11

g.eneration of 1923,

11

A new nationalist and

arose, resuscitating the

,
,
martyr of independence, Jose Marti, from oblivion and shaping him

141 Luis Fernandez Marcane, "La nacionaliza.cion de los ingenios
Cubanos, 11 Revista Bi-Mestre Cubana (July-December, 1957 ), p. 224.
This speech was originally given by Fernandez Marcane on October 5,
1921. Fernandez Marcane was joint owner with the father of Eduardo
Chibas of Central Oriente.
142 Ibid., p. 229.
143

Felipe Pazos, Cuba's leading economist, saw sugar stagnation
at the root of a general economic paralysis extending fr9m 192 5 into the
1950s. See his "Dificultades y posibilidades de una politica de industri:alizacion de Cuba, 11 Humanismo (Mexico) (October, 1954), pp. 135-137.
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into Cuba's national hero.

A new president, Gustavo Machado, took

office in 1925 on a mild wave of anti-Americanism and succeeded in
pushing through a tariff (in 192 7) to protect incipient Cuban industry.
Ironically, it was not a Cuban, but rather the American entrepreneur,
Dayton Hedges, who made greatest use of this barrier, erecting behind
it his Textiles Agriguanabo, the island's largest industrial enterprise
until it was surpassed by Freeport Sulphur's Moa Bay nic~el refinery
in the late 1950s.
Thereafter the bourgeoisie was wrenched by a new and even more
disastrous shock: the depression of 1930.

Unhappily for Cuba, the

most telling blow was struck by its imagined friends and protectors in
Washington.

American legislators, det~rmined on an America-first

policy, passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff which raised import taxes on
sugar and literally destroyed the Cuban economy.

Sugar production

ground to a halt; by 1933 workers occupied the mills.

More burgueses

.fell by the wayside. Young Desi Arnaz and his mother fled their Oriente
plantation a few minutes ahead of a vengeful mob.
emigrated to America.

144
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Thereafter they

Cuba seemed on the verge of ~lass war.

l44 Bohemia, June 19, 1955, p. 31. Young Arnaz boasted that,
by the age of 16, he had a car, a speedboat, and a regular table in the
best night clubs of Havana. In America, he became a TV producer and,
for a time, husband of Lucille Ball. When Arnaz was awarded the Carlos
Manuel de Cespedes medal in 1956, he was seen to kiss the Cuban flag.
The affair took place in the Hotel Biscayne in Miami. (El Mundo, November 27, 1956).
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The bourgeoisie anxiously awaited salvati?n by the U.S. Marines.

The

United States, whose economic policies had helped bring on the crisis,
sent Sumner Welles to mediate Cuba back to tranquility.

Welles asked

for the Marines, but President Franklin Roosevelt would not send them.
President Machado was forced out.
looted and burned.

The mansions of his ministers were

The home of the British Ambassador's neighbor, a

prominent senator, was sacked.

It was "a revolting sight for while

Negroes fought for gramophones and nursemaids for shawls, welldr_e ssed f~milies drove up in Packards and Cadillacs, seized Louis XV
cabinets and gilded chairs. 1114 5 Thus, the opportunism of the bourgeoisie.
The old bourgeoisie suffered a number of near-mortal blows.

I
I

The old army, once led by upper class officers, was destroyed by Fulgencio Batista and his rebellious sergeants.

Out of the wreckage of the

Machadato arose a new, ambitious middle class which, while aping the
old bourgeoisie, simultaneously dreamed of destroying it.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The power

of this new and antagonistic wing of the bourgeoisie was based on a ternporary alliance with labor, but its real power lay in its determination to
use the government to promote its interests and provide ·jobs.
The power of the old sugar magnates, decisive in the early republic, was successfully challenged by the ·emergence of organized labor,
by government regulation, and by the creation of a counter-organization,

145

From the despatch of British Ambassador Grant Watson of
August 21, 1933, as found in Thomas, Cuba, p. 628.
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the Asociacion de Colonos, or sugar planters, whose basic demand was
for a more equal sharing of sugar income with the hacendados.
hacendados--and the entire old bourgeoisie--felt defeated.

The

How could

161 mill owners defend themselves against 60, 000 colonos or 600, 000
organized sugar workers? _The only resource remaining to the hacendados was money.

I-

The _Bou rgeoisie Reborn (1940-1950)
In the 1940s and the 1950s the Cuban bourgeoisie began to buy back

those prop~rties previously sold, lost or mortgaged to the Americans.
The American and Canadian banks which had taken the mills in the 1920s ·
and 1930s did not want them.

I
I
I
I
I

The banks did not know the sugar business

and were often unable to manage the mills profitably. 146 With the sugar

I
I
I
I

prosperity of_the late 1940s, Cuban entrepreneurs could afford to pay,
while the Americans, disenchanted with the ever-more difficult labor
conditions, were glad to sell.

Between 1934 and 1951, forty-seven mills

passed, for $48 million, . back into Cuban hands. 147 By 1959 at least
five more mills were recuperated, the most recent of these being the
purchase of the three Hershey mills from Atla.ntica del Golfo by Julio
Lobo in 1958 for $2 5 million.

146 Interview with Luis Vianello, long-time official of the Royal
Bank of Canada. Coral Gables, June 1, 1971.
147

Philip C. Ne:wman, Cuba Before Castro: An Ec~momic Ap- .
praisal (Ridgewood, N .:J:· :· . Foreign Studies Institute, 1965 ), p. 61.
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By the late 1950s, the sugar sector was managed largely by Cubans.

The chief spokesman for ~h.e American sugar mills was the Cuban

lawyer Arturo Manas. · Only a few American managers, remnants of t.he
sugar boom of the twenties, hung on: Edward Miller and J. D. Stephenson of the Atlantica group; Walter W. Schuyler and William Baines of
United Fruit; Philip Rosenberg of Azucarera Vertientes Camaguey.
The second or third man in all these American companies would be a
Cuban.
Francisco Rodriguez rose through. the ranks to become president
.
,
of the Hershey group. Rodriguez spoke little English, but had worked
for Hershey for fifteen years.

He was a competent administrator, and--

.
148
like Hershey--he was a lV[ason.
Cubans also came to own substantial
shares in such . "American" sugar combines as Atlantica del Golfo, the
Francisco Sugar Comp'a ny, and Vertientes Camaguey.
board of directors included two Cubans~

The latter's

149

Cubanization was also evident at the middle management level.
By 1958 only twelve of the island's 161 sugar mill administrators had
English surnames.

In addition there were only four chief engineers

with English surnames, three chiefs of fabrication, one chief electrician, three 'field superintendents and no chemists.

Of a total of 966

principal positions in the Cuban industry, only about 2 percent were

l481nterview with Francisco Rodriguez, former vice-president
of Atlanti.ca del Golfo, and president of its Hershey group. Coral Gables,
M::,.y 14, 1971.
149Newman, Cuba Before Castro, p. 61.

1 1
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evidently of Anglo-Saxon origin. 150
Three events of critical importance in the Cubanization of the
island's sugar occurred in 1940.

First was the Cuban constitution of

1'940 which forbade the sugar mills to o,vn cane fields--what Cubans
call "administration cane.

11

This clause reflected the growing political

power of the colonos (planters).

This article would have struck heavily

at the American companies which tended, more than the Cubans, to own
their own cane fields.

United Fruit had no colonos at all.

Although

enabling legislation putting.this article into effect was never approved,
it discouraged further foreign investment in _sugar and encouraged disinvestment by the Americans.
Second was the general debt moratorium voted by the Constituent
Assembly of 1940.

Cuban sugar men feared that another devastating

round of foreclosures was in the offing. With their backs to the wall,
Cuban· hacendados, in one of the strongest expressions of economic
nationalism--or perhaps sheer self-defense--in Cuban history, urged
the Constituent Assembly, with every kind of pressure and enticement
(including str?ng financial ~ontributions), to enact that law, against the
most strident opposition of the American and Canadian Banks.

151

campaign was managed by a member of the Aspuru sugar family.

The

152

150 Analysis based on data in the Anuario azucarero de Cuba
(Havana, 1958).
151 Interview with Luis Vianello.

Coral Gables, June 1, 1971.

152 Interview with Angel Fernandez Varela, former editor of Informaci6n. Miami Beach, May 10, 1971.
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The historian Carlos Marques Sterling saw the moratorium as a service to Cuban debtors of all classes, but especially to the rich.

From

this date forward, "Cubans began to r~cover their properties including
many sugar mills that were in foreign hands'! 153 One observer thought
tl:e moratorium might have saved as many as forty or fifty sugar mills
from bankruptcy. 154 This is roughly equivalent to the number of mills
generally thought obsolete and commercially impractical, · many of these
being old mills of small size, yield and quota in Las Villas.

155

Cuba's defensive nationalism yras again evidenced in early 1943
when Central Tinguaro of the Cuban-American Sugar Company was badly
damaged by fire.

Cuban-American was reluctant to repair the mill which

had consistently lost money since the Cuban government's institution of
the sugar quota system--another defense for small Cuban mills--in
1927.

But President Batista was adamant.

In October, 1943, Agri-

culture Minister Joaquin Martinez Saenz temporarily seized Tinguaro,
hastening its repair so as . to be ready for the January harvest.

156

This

153 Diario Las Americas, January 18, 1972. Carlos Marques
Sterling has estimated that in 1940 about 12, 000 Cuban debtors were in
danger of falling victim to largely foreign bank creditors. See in his
Historia de Cuba, p. 497.
154 Interview with Luis Botifoll, former editor of El Mundo.
Coral Gables, January 12, 1971.
155 Interview with Francisco Escobar Quesada, former owner of
Central Salvador. Miami, April 15, 1971.
156 The New York Tim~s, February 15, 1943,• September 22,
1943; October 7, 1943.

52
demonstrated that with sufficient popular pressure- -and in this case
the labor unions were pressing for action--Batista li~e other Cuban
leaders could be a nationalist.
its inconstancy.

The tragedy of Cuban nationalism was

When not under popular pressure, Batista did not

hesitate to yield to the Americans.

157

reorganization of the Asociacion Nacional de Hacendados Cubanos to
,
give more representation to the minoria or Cuban sector. Prior to
1940, key committee posts were distributed on the basis .of sugar production, thus giving the big American mills a ·disproportionately large
The six biggest mills in Cuba- -all American (Jarom.i, Moron,

Vertientes, Delicias, P~eston, Manad)--could each grind at least ten
times as much sugar as each of the six smallest Cuban mills. But the
mino rfa,

in an unusual show of nationalist unity, succ~eded in in-

stalling a one-mill, one-vote scheme.

The Cubans, and especially the

small growers, thus substantially increased their power in the association.

158

I
I
I
.I

The third development of critical importance in 1940 was the

voice.

I

In 1954 the economist Felipe Pazos wrote that control of the

157

A former U.S. Foreign Service Officer, stationed in Havana
during the· Batista era, once asked to see the minister of health about
a projected law which American pharmaceutical interests found unacceptabl e . After explaining his ob jections, the minister s imply pointed
to a typewriter and said.,"Here, you write it. " He did. Some days
later, the law, as amended, was promulgated in the official register.
158 Interviews with Francisco Rodriguez. Coral Gables, May 14,
1971; and Antonio Barro. Miami, May 25, 1971.
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sugar sector had returned to Cuban hands. 1 5 9
The Constitution of 1940 literally codified the results of the
revolution of 193 3, promising in effect to create a middle class republic with important benefits for the working class.

The Cuban in-

tellectual, Fernando Ortiz, thought the new constitution extraordinary
. its
.
d eman d f or " equa1·t
. ·1 eges " an d f or socia
. 1 JUS
· t•ice. 160
m
i y wi"th ou t priv1

In the 1970s, Cubans in exile would plead for a return to ·the 1940 Con-

I
I

upon which all Cubans could rest their faith. • • or was it?

I·

thought it was aimed against them.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

stitution.

It was the respected foundation of bourgeois Cuba, the rock

Many burgueses did not like the new constitution. The upper class

failed to develop Cuba.

In effect, it suggested that they had

Now the state--and middle class bureaucrats--

would assume that responsibility.

Business would henceforth be crip-

pled by an array of re~lat.ions which dismayed the island's entrepreneurs.

The industrialist Andres· Carrillo thought the constitution's

· labor code would effectively kill all incentive among laborers, a view
. l
.
161
wide y shared by his fellow businessmen.
The business consultant

159

Felipe Pazos, "Dificultades y posibilidades de una poli'tica de
industrializaci6n en Cuba," Humanismo (Mexico) (October, 1954), p. 136.
16

°

Fernando Alloza. Noventa entrevistas pol{ticas.
Imprenta Intellectual, 1953 ), p. 214.

(Habana:

161 Interview with Andres Carrillo, former president of the 630
employee Ambrosia Candy Factory. South Miami, March 10, 1971.
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Rufo Lopez-Fresquet thought the clauses on salaries and tenure "an
•

11

•

•

•

absurdity which would handicap the economic development of Cuba.

162

These labor clauses had been pushed through on the eve of the election
of 1940 by a curious coalition of communists , Autenticos and Batistianos,
each eagerly courting labor's vote.

~

The middle class Autenticos and

Batistianos were linking themselves with labor--in order to win their
own battle with the upper class.
The rural bourgeoisie also viewed the constitution with a jaundiced
eye, especially in relation to its agrarian reform clauses.

The agri-

cultural interests argu~d that the Sugar Coordination Law of 1937 gave
sugar cane planters (colonos) secure tenancy on the lands they worked,
and that this was equivalent to an agrarian reform.
In 1946 Agricul~ure Secretary Eduardo Suarez Rivas carried out an

agricultural census which confirmed the general impression that a small
minority owned most of the arable lands.

163

In 1947 the progressive

Catholic senator, lawyer. and professor, Manuel Dorta Duque, chaired
an agrarian reform commission inspired by the revelations of the 1946

162 Lopez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months, p. 6.
l 63 The 1°946 agricultural census showed that something less than
3000 parcels contained about 70% of Cuba's arable land. See in Pablo E.
Veitia, Presente y futuro del agro cubano (Habana: Editorial Lex, 1959),
p. 20. Bu t the census is misleading in that most of thes e large parcels
. were sugar lands worked by colonos who had permanent rights of tenure.
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census.

An advanced refor:m was prepared but was quashed by the

hacendados.
p 1an

II

164

·
One of the hacendados who opposed it thought the

d
,
,,165
an aca em1c dream.
Among those who shared the dream was

.
166
.one of Dorta Duque's students, Fidel Castro.
In the 1940s and 1950s there was significant movement toward
the Cubanization of certain other sectors of the island's economy.

In

1943 the Godoy-Sayan firm took over a great deal of the insurance on
the sugar crop formerly handled by foreigners.

167

The appearance of

the National Bank in 1950 was another decisive nationalist measure, the
Marxist economist Oscar Pino-Santos seeing it as "a great forward
step for the country. " 168 It gave impetus to the growth of Cuban banks,
whose holdings, by 195g-, came to outstrip those of the foreign banks.
The National Bank was perhaps the first respected and efficient government institution in Cuban history.

l64 The Catholic Dorta Duque,
doxos and a strong anti-communist,
ian law at the University of Havana.
Varela, secretary of Dorta Duque's
Miami Beach, May 10, 1971.
165

a founding member of the Ortotaught a famous course on agrarInterview with Angel Fernandez
agrarian reform commission in 1947.

Interview with Francisco Rodr1guez. Coral Gables, May 14,

1971.
166 Interview with Fr. Juan Manuel Dorta Duque, S. J., Miami,
June 13, 1971.
167

Costa, Hombres y destinos, p. 196.

16,,8 Oscar Pino-Santos, El imperialismo norteamericano en la
economia de Cuba (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1 960), p. 45.
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The power of the old pressure groups began to shift: the hacendacbs in clear decline; the industrialists in the ascendancy.

The American

Chamber of Commerce, of great influence in the 1920s, was thought of
relatively little importance in the 1950s.
return to Cuban hands.

169

Communications began to

For $15 million in 1953 th~ government bought

out the British shareholders in the United Railroad of Havana.

170

The

Ward Line, after one hundred years of existence, sold out to the Cuban
Garc{a brothers, becoming the Garc1a Lines.
Company in 1957 became

The Cuban Telephone

a mixed enterprise with the sale of $10 million

in stocks to Cuban purchasers.

171

quired to hire a Cuban president.

The Cuban Electric Company was reIn 1953 Pan American Aviation sold

out the majority of its st~ck to Cuban interests.
Nicaro Nickel mines were up for sale.

172

The U. S.-owned

In the interim the mines wer.e

operated by a Cuban company.
The achievements of Cuba's incipient entrepreneurial bourgeoisie
·in the 1940s and 1950s were shadowed by a major failure: they could
not provide sufficient work for the island's growing population.

169
_:rnt~rview with Angel Fernandez Varela.
10, 1971.

173

In

Miami Beach, May

170Newman, Cuba Before Castro, p. 53.
171Ibid., pp. 57, 109.
172 This included Havana's Rancho Boyeros airport, which was
originally constructed by Pan-Am.
173 Carmelo Mesa-Lago, The Labor Force , Emplo ym ent and Underemployment in Cuba: 1899-1970 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 197 2 ),
p. 24.
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the late 1950s, in the midst of what some thought an. economic boom,
13-14 percent of the island's work force was unemp,loyed: still more
were underemployed.

A substantial part of the half-million sugar

workers labored only during the six months of the harvest.

The

greatest concern of the Cuban working class in the 1950s was unem.
174
ployment.
If the bourgeoisie had to be swept aside to increase employment as Castro would suggest in, 1959 and 1960, then why not?

The Rise of the Middle Bourgeoisie
By the late 1950s the Cuban bourgeoisie, and especially its middle and lower sectors, had grown extraordinarily.

By 1959, between

a quarter and a third of _the Cuban population, perhaps as many as
500, 000 families, were considered to be "middle class.

11175

There was a.n intense~ perhaps a dangerous, pressure in Cuba
of the 1950s to join the bourgeoisie, to get ahead, a desire which the
Cuban economy really could not sustain.

The cronica social, photos

of the parties of the gente dorada splashed about in Bohemia, the
American style advertising, all contrib1lted to the revolution of rising ·

174 Ib1"d., PP• 33
175

I

34 J 39 o

A leading television producer, Orlando Alvarez, used this
figure in c alcu l a ting TV a dve rtising expenses. ( Int erview, San Juan,
Puerto Rico, March 17, 1971.) The Swiss observer and Havana resident Ernest Ha lp erin thought 15-20% of urban Cuba to enjoy a middleclass living standard. (New Republic, August 7, 1961, pp. 9-1 O. )
Hugh Thomas thou ght the middl e clas s "large" though difficult to define.
He thought it included at least 200, 000 petit-bourgeois families plus a
. substantial number of professional and businessmen. (Thomas, Cuba,
pp. 1109-1110.)
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expectations.

176

Fidel would later ~omment disdainfully on those mid-

dle class professional men who "lived with the idea that some day they
.
. ·1 eges o f t h e 11pper c 1asses."l 77
t h e p 1e_asures an..d. pr1v1
t oo wou ld enJoy
For the most ambitious there were names: arribistas, subidores.
The social climber from the provinces was a Harne con corbata, "a
sweet potato with a tie. "
This incessant pressure to rise was fueled by the knowledge that
climbing was quite possible.

The Chilean socialist Juan Noyola was

~urprised by the impressive degree of "social mobility" in Cuba, a view
shared by the one-time provincial politician-turned-millionaire, Eduardo
. 178
Suarez Rivas.
The greatest source of upward mobility was the University of Havana.

•

I

The University was really a government-financed

machine for turning out the middle class.

Much of its raw material in

the late 1950s were poor, anxious young men from the provinces.
Wealthy habaneros sent their sons to Havana's new Catholic University
.or to colleges in America.
open to all.

Admission at the University of Havana was

Fools were simply flunked out in the first semester.

Tuition was modest; for most, no more than fifty dollars per semester.

176 Orlando Alvarez thought the advertising expenditure per
capita in Cuba in the late 1950s almost as high as that of the U.S. Interview, San Juan, March 1 7, 1971.
177 El Mundo, April 11, 1961.
11

178 Julio le Riverend, "Juan F. Noyola, Universidad de la Habana (November-December, 1865), p. 51; Diario Las Americas, September 28, 1971.
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Perhaps 15-20 percent of the twenty thousand students of the late 1950s
could not afford that, and were given state scholarships.
they got by.

179

Somehow

The writer and publicist Jose Suarez N{inez' mother helped

finance her son's education by working as a maid. lBO
The tragedy of the University was that it prepared men for professions in which there was no future.

Cuban society could not absorb

the twelve hundred graduates the University produced each year.

Thus

the "crisis de profes~ionales." In the 1950s, lawyers, ever the most
numerous class, were often obliged to work as typists and secretaries. 181
It was the same for earlier generations.

Anselmo Alliegro and some of

his classmates had tried to set up law offices, but they simply could not
prosper • .One joined a big firm through family influence- -or failed.

Al-

liegro went into politics, became a friend of Batista, then a senator and,
by 1956, premier~

182

'fhe dean of the Havana Bar Association, Jose

Miro Cardona, once urged that the government hire Cuba's excess law.yers, pay them decent salaries, and guarantee their posts by creating
a career civil service. l83

l 79futerview with Dr. Ricardo Machin, long-time professor at
Havana University's Medical School. Coral Gables, December 8, 1970.
180

,
,_
Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 7. Castro would argue for
a time that the University was only for th'e sons of the rich. How then
did his public works minister of 1960, Osmani Cienfuegos, the son of a
humble tailor, manage to win a degree in architecture?
18 l Interview with Augusto Ladesma. Miami, April 9, 1971.
182 Diario Las Americas, November 30, 1971.
183 Bohemia, June 1, 1952, p. 37. ·
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The government was creating burgueses at the University; thereafter the burgueses obliged the government to provide them with respectable work.

Students in commercial sciences at the University of

Havana in 1949 looked forward eagerly to the possibility of jobs at the
soon-to-be inaugurated Banco Nacional, the Tribunal de Cuentas, and
~

the Banco Agricola.

184

The story was much the same for doctors.

In 1956~ a substantial

percentage of the graduating class of the University of Havana's medical
school sought employment abroad; others fought for modest positions in
the decrepit government health system.

Critics argued that the Uni-

versity was ill-attuned to society's needs and should have produced .
more tecl:nicians, but th.e re were no jobs for these either.

The uni-

versity was thus not only a factory for the middle class, but a factory
for discontent. A university graduate wanted a car, a home, a wife of
some background and intelligence, a charge account at El Encanto.

.An impossible dream.

185

One simply could not go back to his provincial

town after four years in Havana.

Thus the university created an un-

easy and potentially dangerous intellectual proletariat.

Fidel Castro

was much aware of the dilemma of these overeducated and under-employed

18 4 Interview with Augusto Ladesma, member of the class of 1949.
Miami, April 9, 1971.
185Interview with Andres Suarez.

Gainesville, June 17, 1971.
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graduates.

After all, he was one of them.

186

Many Cubans, though lacking in all connections, still managed to
get ahead.

For some the Army was an aid.

Prior to the 1933 revolu-

tion, entry into the Military Academy, and hence into the Officer Corps,
was limited to those with money or connections.
many of the old line officers into retirement.

Th·e revolution forced

Some were shot.

In

1935 a new law required that officer candidates be selected from the
ranks, after two years of service as enlisted men.
would suffer such hard service.

Few aristocrats

The door was opened, th~n, for offi-

cers of humbler origin. 187
Toe pressure for jobs, the common belief that Cuba must be industrialized, caused President Batista ~n the early 1950s to encourage
the influx of American capital.

The era from 192 5-1950 had been one of

disinvestment; now, in the 1950s, lured by special tax breaks, loans and
other incentives, American capital began rolling in once again.

This

.time investment flowed not into sugar but rather into manufacturing, oil

186 Castro, after graduating from law school, was reluctant to return to the family farm which was being run by his older brother Ramon.
He set up ·a small and financially unrewarding law practice and plunged into
politics. In his "History Will Ab solve Me, " Castro offered the prospec t of
em ployment to "the ten thousand young professb nals • . . who l eave the
schools with their degrees, willing to fight for a living and full of hope , only
to find themselves at a dead-end alley .... " See in Rolando E. Bonachea and
Nelson P. Valdes (eds.) Revolutionary Struggle (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1972), p. 184.
187 Interview ~ith Major Tomas D. Cabanas, himself a part of the
new military generation. Miami, March 1, 1971.
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exploration, mining and toux.-ism.
Some thought that Cuba could retain control of its economy, especially as much of the new money was flowing into joint ventures.

And

Cuba now had a new, more sophisticated bourgeoisie to defend her interests.

The engineer Manuel Arca, Jr., a graduate of Rensselaer

Polytechnic Institute and the son of an important hacendado, saw himself as part of Cuba's first technically trained generation, a generation
which would now add a new increment of productivity and efficiency to
Cuban enterprise. 188
Even some Marxists believed that Cuba in the 1950s w:i.s developing what Jose Antonio Portuondo called "an ambitious national hour. _- 11189 Th e nove1·1st L'1san d ro O te:ro o b serve d th at:
geo1s1e.
in the 1950s this bourgeoisie began to elaborate a socalled policy of development which led it to acquire
pa.rt of the means of production that previously were
in Yankee hands. They demonstrated an entrepreneurial
audacity that would have brought us, in one or two morm
decades, to the appearance of a national bourgeoisie. O
Others, more pessimistic, saw Cuba on the threshold of disappearance under a threatening tidal wave of American money and influence.

The Cuban leftist,· Ambrosio Fernet, wrote of the American

188Telephone interview with Manuel Arca, Jr.
December 14, 1971.

Coral Gables,

l89 Jose Antonio Portuondo, introduction to Jose Soler Puig's El
derrumbe (Santiago: Universidad del Oriente, 1964), p. vii.
190 Lisandro Otero. "El escritor en la revoluci6n cubana," Nuevo
Pensamiento Cubano (Havana: 1967 ), p. 299.
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financial invasion that "now it was not only the lands. the sugar, the
mines, the electricity, the telephones; now it was also the gas stations,
the automobile agencies, the department stores, the supermarkets, the
publicity agencies ••

~ • " 191 The economist Raul Lorenzo concluded

that by 1955 Cuba was again on the verge of becoming an "economic
satellite of the North American system. 11 192
Nowhere was the pressure for action greater than from that aggressive new clique, the Batista bourgeoisie.

Their venality and cor-

ruption soiled all the hopeful developments of the 1950s, split the bourgeoisie; discredited Cuba's institutions.

The depredations of the Ba-

tista bourgeoisie created a massive demand for change in Cuba.
The Batista Bourgeoisie
Batista's clan of soldiers and politicians were anxious to become
good burgueses.

They wanted merely to indulge themselves, their fam-

ilies, their friends.

But they went too far, their graft reaching, some

thought, up to a quarter of the national budget.

193

The Batistianos'

191Ambrosio Fornet, Antolo gfa del cuento cubano contem poraneo
(Mexico: Ediciones Era, SA, 1967), p. 41.
l 92Raul Lorenzo, E l empl eo en Cuba (Havana: Seoane Fernandez,
1955), p. 6.
l93This is Fidel Castro's own estimate. See in James O'Connor,
The Origins of Socialism in Cuba (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1970), p. 151. Castro's Treasury Minister, L6pez-Fresquet, thought
up to one-third of the annual budget was stolen. Both of these figures
seem exaggerated. The Cuban budget in the 1950s ranged from $200$300 million; 80% of this went to pay the salaries of government workers,
that is, to underwrite the middle class. Some of these bureaucratic jobs
were of course botellas (jobs which required no work), but it would nonetheless seem difficult to steal more than a few percent. Rather, the pro. fits were to be made in kickbacks from private industry.

64
excesses not only cracked the bourgeoisie, encouraging some burgueses
to aid Castro, but also denigrated the entire class in the eyes of the
masses.

The sins of the Batistianos provided Castro a useful weapon

for doing in the entire bourgeoisie.
later comment, was

11

The bourgeois era, Castro would

the era of theft.

11194

Many burgueses were trapped in the Batistianos' net of graft and
corruption quite against their will.
not exempt from such difficulties.
· honest.

Even the powerful hacendados were
It was often too expensive to be

If a rich hacendado refused to pay off the tax in~pector, for-

cing him to spend days examining one's books, he might levy taxes and
expenses far above the rightful amount.
usually futile.

Appeals were expensive and

The smaller hacendados, many perpetually on the edge

of bankruptcy, could hardly afford such expense.
also affected.

Industrialists were

It was essential to maintain two sets of books.

the Americans could avoid this humiliation.

Only

If they were harassed by

.the tax collectors, they could appeal to their ambassador who would
take the matter up with Batista, and inevitably win relief.

For the

Cuban businessman, there was no such alternative.
Bureaucrats were constantly tested by the corruption question.
An official in the Treasury Department in the 1950s was asked to initial government bonds to be issued to three of Batista's friends in exchange for some beaches--which were already state property.

194

El Mundo, December 17, 1960.
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official replied that this was illegal.

The Cuban attorney general was

astonished: "Why are you doing this? Batista won't like it." Thereafter, the protesting official was relieved of his position and sent off
. s t u d"ies. 195
to ma k e some h arm 1ess economic
Graft was encouraged by low salaries.

A former commerce

minister, Oscar de la Torre, recalls that the chief of the Havana customs in the early 1950s received but $37 5. 00 a month, a clear .temptation to graft.

Torre had it raised to $1, 300 a month, a rate equivalent

to that of a minister.
regime.

196

Graft was hardly an invention of the Batista

Indeed, in 1950, the int~llectual Jorge Mana.ch speculated that

. since 1902 perhaps $500 million in government funds had been stolen in
one way or another.

Enough, Manach thought, to have solved all of

Cuba's outstanding pr9blems.

197

Graft and politics went hand in hand.

Most politicians had to finance their own campaigns.
congress might cost $125, 000; the senate, twice that.

To run for the
One could hardly

recoup such expense from his official salary (Senate - $24, 000; Congress-

195

.
.
.
;
;_
.
Interview with Nicolas Muniz. Miami, April 7, 1971.

196 Interview with Oscar de la Torre. Miami, May 17, 1971.
De la Torre (born 1896), a participant in many of Cuba's moat historic
events, says he has resisted a great desire to write his memoirs for
fear of hurting his friends. This seems a common attitude among exiles
of the older generation.
197 Bohemia, April 2, 1950, pp. 65, 114.

66

$12, 000).

198

One had to exploit his office to make money, just as the

Spanish colonial officials who bought their offices had done.
ship was worth a fortune.

A senat~r-

In one case, a Cuban coffee merchant anxious

to finance his senatorial campaign sold two manganese mines near
Bayamo to the American entrepreneur W~lliam Powe for $75, 000.
eventually extracted $6 million worth of ore froi:n the two mines.

Powe

199

In the Batista regime all these tendencies were exaggerated to a

degree that proved intolerable.

Every government activity was milked--

the lottery, the school lunch program, driversl licenses, parking meters, teachersl certificates.

The police routinely extorted millions in

protection money from Havana merchants.

200

Everything, even the .

salaries of soldiers who died in the fight against Castro, was fair game.
All this served the Batista bourgeoisie's desire to live luxuriously,
in the tradition of the colonial aristocracy.

Eluterio Pedraza, one of

Batista's associates in the Sergeants' Revolt of 1933, was by 1958 a

198 L6pez Vilaboy claims that by the .end of the 1950s a campaign
for congress might run to $300, 000; for the senate, $500, 000. See his
Motivos y culpables de la destruci6n de Cuba: un libro hist6rico (San
Juan: Editora de Libros Puerto Rico, 1973 ), p. 407.
199

Testimony of William A. Powe before U.S. Congress. See
in United States Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Claims
of United States Nationals Against the Government of Cuba (Washington,
1964), p. 74.

°

20 For a descripti~n of police bribery~ el forrajeo, see Ram6n
Bonachea and Marta San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, 1952-1959
(New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1974), pp. 31-34.
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. "
genera1 " wh o l'1ve d l"k
1 e a marquis.
and 4, 000 fine cattle.

201

H e owned 2 6, 000 acres of 1and

At his Finca Las Delicias in Manacas, Pedraza

slept on a gold laminate~ bed said to be worth $2 5, 000.

202

Rafael Salas

Canizares, Batista's chief of police, acquired a little "empire" of four
hundred acres.

His "Villa Gloria" included a modern milking shed, a

refrigerated room, an auto repair 1:;hop, storerooms, laboratories and
a plant to bottle soft _drinks under the label "Virgen de Guadalupe." His
neighbors recall Salas was a great party giver, his fiestas sometimes
.
203
lasting several days.

Eusebio Mujal, leader of the CTC under the

Batistato, acquired a 4290 acre Finca La Margarita, estimated to be
worth $4 million.

204

In Santiago, Major Perez Chaumont built an enor-

mous modern home on the cliffs overlooking the Ciudamar Yacht Club. 205
In 1959, when the safe deposit ba.xes of the Bn.tistianos were opened,

fifty-six were found to contain $100, 000 or more in cash, jewels, bonds
and stocks, including seven with a million or more.
. deposit boxes held at least $20 million.

206

Batista's own safe

_Batistianos were also alleged

201 Revoluci6n, November 11, 1959.
202 Ibid.
203 Ib'd
1 OJ February 6, 1959.
20 4 El Mundo, February 16, 1960.
205Granma, August 19, 1973.
2 _0 6 Leovigildo Ruiz, Diario de una traici6n , 1959 (Miami;
Florida Typesetting of Miami, 1965), pp. 2 53-254.
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to have illicitly acquired 150 apartment -buildings, 200 residences, and
200 country homes.

207

A number of fo!'tunes were piled up via graft in the construction

business.

Typical of these was the Italian Giacomo Menasce, a close

friend of Batis~a, who established the Compania M;oderna de Construcciones
in 1952.

By overcharging on street paving and other government con-

struction projects, he allegedly piled up some $6-7 million in illicit profits.

208
Thereafter, Batista commissioned him ambassador to Switzerland.
The greatest profiteer was Batista himself.

By 1959, the one-

time field hand, railroad worker and stenographer had amassed an enormous fortune.

His former press aide estimates it at $300 million.

209

2ff7 Havana Times, December 19, 1959. In early 1959 the Castro
regime established th~ Ministerio para la Revindicaci6n de Bienes Malversados (MRBM). The MRBM's task v/as to bring the Batista bourgeoisie to account. By December 1959, the MRBM had recovered some
$400 million in property of all kinds. Some 6400 persons were affected.
The MRBM's seizures included about 2000 buildings of all kinds throughout Cuba. (See in Bohemia, December 2 7, 1959, pp. 48, 95. ) According to Danilo Mesa, vice-minister of the MRBM, his agency eventually
recuperated a total of $700 million in property of all kinds. (Interview
with Danilo Mesa, Gainesville, June 21, 1971.) Both the $400 and $700
million figures may be somewhat misleading, since when the MRBM discovered a guilty party--whose guilt was often indicated by the fact that
he had fled the country--the MRBM simply took all of the suspect's properties, even though only a portion may have been acquired illicitly . Moreover, at the end of 1959, the MRBM also began to recoup the properties
of counterrevolutionaries, who may, or may not, have been Batistianos.
208
209

Bohemia, September 13, 1959, p. 86.

Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 26. L6pez Vilaboy estimates Batista's fortune at $250 million. See his M o tivos y culpables , p. 12.
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Part of his fortune included $46 million invested in at least sixty Cuban
210
and foreign companies
ranging from the Americ~n .t\tlantica del
.
211
...
Golfo (131, 500 share$)
and Cuban Electric Company($30, 000 in bonds)
· to investments in Cuban trucking firms ($7 42, 000 in Cia. Interamericana
de Transporte) and Cement Companies ($418, 500 in shares of Cemento
· Santa Teresa).

212

He had additional investments in radio statio_ns. pub-

lishing houses, real estate developments. sugar mills.

Batista's ample

portfolio reflects the desire of many Cuban entrepreneurs to have the
president "participate" in their enterprises so as to ensure favorable
treatment by the government.
This is the same Batista who once mouthed the rhetoric of revolutionary equality and distributionism.

In 1934, Batista publicly dE;-

nounced the "rancid social tradition" of Cubans who, previous to the
revolution of September 4, 1933, had put personal and family interests
above those o.f the nation.

213

Prior to 1933, Cuban politics were but a

s _h ameless struggle for power steeped in

210

11

constant corruption.

11

214

Revoluci6n, May 29, 1959.

211 A tlantica del Golfo had about two million shares outstanding in
1958, making Batista owner of about 6% of the company.
212

l .,
Revo uc10n, May 2 9, 1959.

213 Fulgencio Batista, l Revoluci6n social o pol:ttica reformista?
(La Habana: Prensa Indoamericana, 1944), p. 26.
214 Toid., p. 27.

70

Batista declared that his revolution marked the beginnj_ng "of a new era
of political and social renovation ...• "

215

In 1844, after four years as

president, Batista observed with ·remarkable prescience that "great accumulations of wealth in the hands of a few will lead not only to hunger
and misery. but to a state of public desperation of incalculable consequences. " 2 i 6

Forebodings
The moral decay of the Batista administration troubled everyone.
,
Jorge Garcia Montes, once a minister for Batista, said that the drive
for wealth in the 1950s was so intense that "not to be rich was a humiliation.

It was not a scandal to sell oneself. "

217

The stockbroker Julio

Esnard thought that in the late 1950s graft had gotten out of hand: "It
disgusted me. " 218 The heir to the Menendez tobacco fortune thought .
th a t • w1·th h ones t government •

"cu b a

· · d.1se. 11219
cou ld. h ave b een a para

The youth of the 1950s came to think everything corrupt.

Nothing sound.

215 ~ . p. 31.

2.16 Ibid •• p. 213.

217 Jorge Garc1a Montes, Antonio Alonso Avila, Historia del partido comunista de Cuba (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1970), pp. 413414. Garc ia was at one time a lawyer for the Chase National Bank.
218 Interview with the former Havana stockbroker, Julio Esnard.
Miami, January 21, 1971.
219 lnterview with Alonso Men~ndez. Miami, March 22, 1971.
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.
220
Everything rotten.

The young intellectual Luis Aguilar wrote in 1957 that "we are
not only suspicious of the politician and the judge, of the capitalist and
the labor leader; no: we are even skeptical about the very essence of
cubanidad. 11221 Aguilar thought the chief Cuban virtue was "agility in
. unhappy
. . hb
taking advantage o f the wea kn ess o f one ' s ne1g
or. 11222 Tius

characteristic reflected, at least in part, the stagnation of the Cuban
economy.

As long as the economy was not growing faster than the popu-

lation, then one's "progress" was all too often at someone else's expense.
Even certain churchmen were looking askance at the morality of the
bourgeoisie.

In a book directed specifically to the "superior classes, "

the Jesuit Father Freixe·cto cited the Biblical warning that "the root of
. .
.,223
all evil is the love of money.
Freixedo, then serving as advisor to

the Catholic Worker Mo-.rement, complained that the upper classes
cheated and abused their employees, while at the same time they gave
fiestazas (tremendous parties), spent millions on gambling, pleasure
cruises and expensive clothes.

What of that wealthy woman who gave a

220 Garcia Montes, Historia, p. 415.
221

Luis Aguilar Leon, Pasado y ambiente en el proceso Cubano
(La Habana: Ediciones Insula, SA , 1957), p. 74.
222

Ibid.

I

P• 7 5.

223 Fr. Freixedo, S. J., Cuar enta cas os de injusticia s ocia l (La
Habana: Centro de Informaci6n y Acci6n Social ), 1958 , p . 7 . F r eixedo
neglected to mention that his 1:-ook was underwritten by the hacendado
Melchior Gaston, a member of that very class he found so irresponsible.
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generous don.ation for an altar, but who would pay no more than sixty
dollars a month to her company's truckdriver? 224 Cuban society had
to be renovated, restructured.
fare.

"The Church does not want class war-

But social justice must come first ..•• "

225

The conservative Diario de la Marina was also concerned, its
editor Jose Ignacio Rivero lamenting in 1957 that, while the Cuban
economy had grown substantially in recent years, this progress had not
.
226
been matched by moral or political development.
To the contrary,

there was now a real moral crisis, characterized by "the daily breaking of those healthy customs which c<;mstitute our finest ethical tradition.

11227

Rivero was especially dismayed by the failure of Cuba's

conservatives to set proper standards, to help preserve what deserved
to be saved from the turmoil of incessant change.

There was a danger,

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

he thought, that society might come apart, disintegrate.
Evidence of moral and social decay had been visible long before

·1

. Batista's second reign. _A decade before, in the late 1940s, the sociologist Juan F. Carvajal had warned the bourgeoisie that it must either

224 _1_.,
Ib"d
p. 18.
225_
Ib"d
_
1_•

I

p. 51.

I
I
I

22 6 Diario de la Marina, Ante la crisis cubana (La Habana: Edi-

torial Lex, 1957), p. 10.
227 Ibid.

I

P• 9.
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reform, or risk finding itself the victim of a c.lass war. 228 In 1959,
Fidel Castro would foment class warfare, and shat~er the bourgeoisie,
precisely as Carvajal had predicted.·

22a

.
,,
.
.
Juan F. CarvaJal, 0 bservac1ones sobre la clase media en
Cuba, " essay in Theo R. Crevenna, ed •• Materiales para el estudio
de la clase media en la America Latina. (Washington: Union Panamericana, 1950), p. 44.
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What an error we, all
made!'
II
Jose "Pepin Bosch

II.

FINANCING CASTRO'S REBELLION, 1956-1958

Castro's rebellion was largely financed by Cuba's gilded bourgeoisie.

If the rich had remained solidly behind Batista, Castro's re-

bellion might not have succeeded.

2

.
But many men of wealth followed

ap opportunistic dual policy in the late 1950s: public allegiance to Batista; private support for Ca~tro.
debt.

Fidel has never acknowledged this

Rather, he likes to say that his was a popular rebellion, financed

by many small voluntary contributions.

The bourgeoisie shares Cas-

tro's embarrassment, preferring now to think that his rebellion was
financed by Moscow.

Over the years a kind of mutually convenient con-

spiracy of silence developed.

Both Castro and the bourgeoisie have

tried to expunge their former relationship from memory so that each
1 Comment of Jos~ Bosch on the ·s upport of the bourgeoisie for
Castro's rebellion to his friend Ruby Hart Phillips, Havana correspondent for The New York Times. Interview with Ruby Phillips. Miami,
June 6. 1971.
2 The politician Eduardo Suarez Rivas wrote that those responsible for Fidelismo included the Batista dictatorship, U.S. foreign policy
and "the fervor of the middle class and of the rich Cubans of the 26th of
July •••• " (Eduardo Suarez Rivas, Un pueblo crucificado (Coral Gables:
Service Offset Press, 1964), p. 5.) A study prepared by anti-Castro
exiles concludes that "the Cuban revolution was supported by the middle
class with the financial assistance of the wealthy .••. " See in Cuban
Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba (Coral Gables: University
of Miami Press, 1965), p. 630.
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might present the other as an invete:r:ate antagonist.
Castro needed the money of the rich quite simply be':ause revolutions are expensive. As two Fidelistas recently observed: "Money
was needed; it was the bourgeoisie who had it. "3 Though Castro's men
fought without pay, he still needed money--money to ·train his men, to
transport them to Cuba, to arm them.

Jack Youngblood, an American

pilot who flew a number of arms missions for Castro, charged as much
as $7, 500 a flight.

4

Castro needed money for clandestine radio trans-

mitters and publications, money to finance agents and propagandists for
service both in and out of Cuba.

In the Sierra Maestre, money was

needed for food and supplies, especially since it was Castro's policy
always to reimburse generously the peasants there for whatever he received from them.

Towards
the end of his rebellion he needed substan,

tial sums, perhaps as much as $50, 000, to bribe Batista army officers
into inactivity.
Some rich men gave to Castro's cause because that was the traditional mode of operation in Cuban politics.

They paid to get what they

3 s·i m6n Torres and Julio Aronde, "Debray and the Cuban Experience, 11 Monthly Review (July-August, 1968), p. 49.
4 Jack Youngblood, The Devil to P ay (New York:

Coward McCann,
1961). p. 58. Pedro Dfaz Lanz, the ex-copilot of Aerovias Q whom Castro
would promote to chief of the Revolutionary Air Force in 1959, made 13
clandestine flights into the Sierra. See in Bohemia Libre (New York),
February 19, 1961, p. 32. By late 1958, Castro had a miniature air
force including 4 Cessnas, 2 P-51 's, 2 DC-3 's, 1 Kingfisher, 1 T-28,
1 Piper Super Cruiser and 1 Ryan Navion. See in Bohemia, March 8,
1974, p. 90.
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wanted or, as insurance, to be left alone.

If a sugarman did not paY.,

his fields might be burnt, his sugar mill destroyed.

Others gave for

personal reasons.

The businesses of

Some were feuding with Batista.

others were being hurt by the illicit operations of Batista's associates.
Finally, a number contributed for idealistic reasons because they despised the corruption and brutality of the Batista regime and wanted to
restore the main pillar of the bourgeois order: the Constitution of 1940 •

.
The bourgeoisie had no inkling that, in financing Castro's rehellion, they were financing their own destruction.

In general, his

program as delineated in various public statements in the late 1950s
seemed a moderate reformist one, with the emphasis on honesty and
political democracy.

The goals of his rebellion--industrialization,

agrarian reform, honest politics, and jobs were indicated, but the means
were vague.

Nothing y.,.-as said about challenging the economic or politi- .

cal role of the U.S. Occasionally Castro hinted at a more sweeping program, telling Cubans in New York (November 1, 1955) that "Cuba longs
for a radical change in every aspect of its political and social life! 15
The following spring Castro declared in Bohemia that his movement did
not stand for the landlords or the sugar plantation owners, the speculators, the commercial and industrial magnates, but rather it was an

5

Speech in New York, November 1, 1955, from Bohemia, November 6, 1955, as found in Bonachea and Valdes, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 283.

77
organization IIof the humble, for the humble, and by the humble. 116
Those of the bourgeoisie who noted these suggestions of radicalism apparently assumed it was·s{mp~y more of the trauitional political
cant.

They were confident that Castro's bourgeois advisors and their

own influence would be sufficient to moderate Castro's course.

And if

everything turned sour, the United States could be counted upon.
All in all, the bourgeoisie contributed $5 - $10 million
to . Castro's
.
rebellion.

A good portion of this came in the last months of 1958 when

.it became evident that Castro was going to win.

Then the money flowed,

"contante y sonante" from the bankers, hacendados and colonos into
Castro's coffers. 7 In the early stages of his insurrectionary career,

I
'I
I
I
I
I
I.
I
I

Castro had attempted to. raise funds "penny by penny" from small con_ tributors and patriotic associations saying he would neither "rob banks
.
118
nor accept money. !'rom thieves.
He disdained the contributions of

the rich because it would compromise· the revolution. 9 But in Mexico

6 Article by Castro appearing in Bohemia,· April 1, 1956, as found
in Bonachea and Valdes, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 318. Castro later
confessed that in those early days he had shielded his more radical ideas
from public view so as not to scare the bourgeoisie.
7 Cuban phrase meant to suggest that money flowed "singing and
dancing" on its way from the rich to Ca s tro in late 1958.
8 Speech at 'the Flagler Theater in Miami, November 20, 1955,
reproduced in Bohemia, December 4, 1955. See in Bonachea and Valdes,
Revolutionary Struggle, p. 285.
9 Manifesto No. 2 to the People of Cuba, December 10, 1955, reproduced in Pensamiento Crftico (Havana), no. 21, (1968 ), pp. 221-227
as found in Bonachea and Vald es, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 289.
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in 1956 Castro was broke.

There was only $20 in the revolution's

treasury. lO It was apparently then that he decided to be less particular
about his donors.

In Mexico he began to receive important gifts from

wealthy men, including $10, 000 sent by the president of Cubana de Aviaci6n, Jose Lopez Vilaboy, in mid-1956; 1l $50, 000 from ex-President
,
12
Pr10 which helped to buy and supply the Granma.
The ganadero
Manuel Fajardo provided $10, 000 just after Castro arrived in Cuba.

13

These and a few others were the critical contributions.
An official at the Banco Nunez, where the M-26 treasurer Raul

.
Chibas kept part of the rE:volution's funds, recalls that .the account
peaked at about $500, 000.

14

Rufo Lopez-Fresquet claims to have

raised $5, 000 in 1956, $150, 000 in 1957 and one million in 1958, much

I
I

.I
I

,.
I
I
I
I
I

of this from "war taxes" on hac en dados and ganaderos in Oriente

10 Article in Bohemia, July 15, 1956, pp. 84-85, as found in
Bonachea and Valdes, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 320 •
11

Thomas, Cuba, p. 886. Lopez Vilaboy observes that in 1958
Americans and many rich Cubans contributed to Castro's coffers. He
does not mention his own contribution. See in Lopez Vilaboy, Motivos
y culpables, p. 319.
12

-Prfo told interviewers in 1972 that he contribut~d a total of approximately $250, 000 to Castro. See in Bonachea and San Martfo, The
Cuban Insurrection, p. 66.
13

Manuel Fajardo told Lucas Moran, an M-26 guerrilla, of his
contribution. See in Lucas Moran Arce, "Guerrilla Warfare in the
Sierra Maestre" (unpublished MA thesis, University of Florida, 197 0),
p. 72.
14 Interview with Tomas D. Caba;as, former official of the Banco
Nunez. Miami, March 1, 1971.
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Province.
"Pepfn

II

15

Certain of Cuba's multimillionaries like Julio Lobo and

Bosch made their own cont3:'ibutions by safe hand directly to

Castro.
Some men of wealth let the rebels use their properties.

I
I
I

I

The lum-

I
I
I
I

ber mill of the Bahun family in Oriente Province became an important
arms depot for the revolutionaries.

Guevara complained that the Bab(ms,

like other rich Cubans, had aided Castro in anticipation of "great rewards II from the new. state.

The Bab(m's e?(pected to receive "forest

.
,,16
concessions ••••

Financing the Rebellion: Hacendados and Ganaderos
Cuba's sugar mill owners (hacendados) were the prindpal financiers of Castro's rebellion.

For most hacendados, it was a question of

paying up or having one's mill destroyed or one's cane fields burned.

·

1
·1

This kind of extortion was practiced extensively by the Cuban rebels

15 Rufo L6pez-Fr.e squet, My Fourteen Months With Castro
(Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1965), p. 11. The Batistianos
were aware of these contributions. Suarez Nunez, Batista.'s press aide,
thought that by late 1958 the sugar planters and hacendados had given
Castro $2 million to keep him from burning their fields. See in Suarez
Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 113.

16

Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Episodes of the Revolution ary War
(New York: International Publishers, 1968); p. 60. Th e Babuns later
became leading counterrevolutionaries; three participated in the Bay
of Pigs Invasion.
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during the war of independence.

17

The hacendados became involved in Castro's rebellion from the
moment he landed at Belie on December 2, 1956.

When Castro's 82

guerrillas waded ashore .that day, they found themselves in the canaverales of the hacendado Lore Beattie of the Beattie Sugar Company.
A few days later, they suffered their first casualties in a skirmish in
the neighboring fields of Julio Lobo's Niquero sugar mill.
By extraordinary good luck, Castro's redoubt in the Sierra Maestre
· was adjacent to a number of Cuban-owned sugar mills, mills whose
owners proved susceptible to Castro's strategy of charm and force and
who became, for a time, ardent Fidelistas.

Much of this had to do with

the absence of adequate government protection.

So rough and isola:ed

was this southeastern foot of Cuba that six of the ten sugar mills there
did ri~t have direct telephone communications with the outside world.

18

17

In 1894, during the Cuban war for 5ndependence, the American
hacendado Edwin Atkins was told by the rebels to either pay $5, 000 or
have his Central Soledad burned to the ground. He refused to pay, depending on the Spanish military and on his own armed workers to guard
his estate. Atkins, Sixty Years in Cuba, p. 141. There was also a precedent for burning sugar mills as a means of ruining the national economy
in the hope of deposing the reigning regime. See above, p. 3 5.

18 The ten sugar mills in Castro's operating area included Julio
Lobo's Niquero and Pilon (Caho Cruz); Francisco Escobar's Salvador;
Teobaldo Rosell's Sof1a, "Fico" Fernandez's America, Nune z Beattie's
Isabel (Media Luna), Dos Amigos of the Luzarraga family, San Ramon
(unknown ownership), and Palma of the West Indies Sugar Company. See
inAnuario azucar.ero de Cuba(1958), and in _F red I. Meyers (ed.) The
Gilm ore manual azucarero de Cuba (New Orleans, 1959).

. I
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A number of these mill owners already felt a certain enmity to-

wards Batista.

Julio Lobo of the Cabe Cruz and Niquero sugar mills

disagreed with Batista's sugar policies and was personally angry because Batista was blocking the expansion of his growing sugar empire.
"Fico" Fernand~z Casas of Central America, was an Ortodoxo and had
been criticizing Batista's sugar policies for years.

19

Manuel Arca

Sr •• of Central Estrada Palma was a leader of Cuba's middle-sized
sugar men, men who were anxious for a larger voice in sugar affairs
as against the huge and influential American mills whom Batista often
seemed to favor.

But these men did not side with Castro at the outset;

rather, he burned his way into their heart~.
In the fall of 1957. Castro declarEJd "Batista without harvest or

harvest without Batista.

1120

And a month later: "Burn the cane! There

will be no zafra with Batista. "

21

The rebel newspaper Revoluci6n of

January, 1958, declared that cane lands near the Sierra were being put
to the torch.

Fires had been started at Julio Lobo's Cabo Cruz and

19 It is generally believed that the Ortodoxo Party, in which "Fico"
Fernandez was an important member, would have won the presidential
election in 1952 had the elections not been upstaged by Batista's coup.
20Hispanic American Report, October, 1957, p. 530. Castro's
battle cry has a familiar ring. In 1933, Batista himself had said "habra
zafra o hal;:>ra sangre, " that is, harvest or bloodshed, By 1960 Castro
was suffering from the cane burning instigated by counterrevolutionaries.
He ordered that suspicious persons encountered in the fields be shot.
21 Hispanic American Report, November, 19 57, p. 593.
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Niquero plantations.

A fire set on Manuel Arca 's Central Estrada

Palma burned up 25, 000 tons of sugar cane. 22 Nearly all the cane at
Julio Lobo's Pilon plantation was' burned in 1957. 23 The young rebel
Oscar Iborra remembers that his instructions were simply to burn all
the cane in the Guantanamo area.

24

Estimates on the amount of cane actually burned vary widely.
At one point The New York Times thought that up to 50 percent of the
cane b~longing to the ten mills of the Sierra had been burned.

25

One

sugar mill owner claimed that up to 1. 8 million tons (almqst 40 percent
of the average annual harvest of 5 m.illion ton~) had been burned.

26

•

Stewart MacFarlane, the American owner of the largest sugar repair
foundry in Cuba, recalls that while the total loss from Castro's cane
burning was slight, the damage to a few Oriente plantations was so
severe that for a time the mills they supplied had no sugar to grind. 27

22 Revolu ci6n, January, 1958. A photograph of the first page of
this edition appears in Avance (Miami), July 15, 1960.
23

Interview with Francisco Escobar of Central Salvador, a sugar
mill in Castro's operating area. Miami, April 17, 1971.
24

Cartel es, October 4, 1959, p. 54. Sufficient cane was burned
in Or i ente t~ cause Castro to pas s a decree in 1959 compensating those
whose fields had been burned during the rebellion.
25 January 25, 1958.
26 Wall Street Journal, February 6, 1958.

27 Interview with Stewart MacFarlane of Fundicion MacFarlane.
Miami, February 4, 1971.
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Deficits in some mills' production were compensated by increased production elsewhere, a strategy facilitated by the fact . that most Cuban
mills maintained substantial reserve supplies of cane.

Thus, despite

the burning, Cuba achieved its 1957 goal of 5 million tons.
After several months, Castro called off the burning. He may have
feared that burning everything would alienate sugarmen, big and small.
Rather, he had given them a lesson: . they were vulnerable.

That point

established, he now proceeded to levy a revolutionary tax of twentyfive cents for each 250 pound bag of sugar.

In a nation which produced

40 million bags of sugar a year, this could amount to a handsome sum
indeed.
Some hacendados in the vicinity of the Sierra Maestre also suf· fered from the depredations of revolutionary cattle rustlers. According
to Manuel Arca, Jr., Castro's men drove off at least 25_00 head from
.

~

their Ganader1a Arca-Campos.

28

When the Areas complained to the

· Army Chief in Manzanillo, he accused them of giving the cattle to the
revolutionaries.

29

Experiences of this nature disinclined cattlemen--

and others--in the Sierra to report rebel activities to the Army.

The

Lykes Bro.t hers I Candelaria Ranch at nearby Bayamo were relieved of

28 Interview with Manuel Arca, Jr.

Coral Gables, December 11,

1970.

29 1nterview with Mario Leon, official at the Area's Central
Estrada Palma. Coral Gables, December 11, 1970.
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3, 000 head, worth perhaps $ 500, 000.

30

Francisco Escobar Quesada

lost 2, 225 head from his Dos Bocas de Etana. This included two prize
bulls worth $5, 000 each, which we1:e taken in February, 1957, and
eaten.

When Escobar complained to the army, they arrested several

ofhis workers whom they accused of working with Castro.

31

Estimates

on the total number of cattle appropriated by the rebels vary widely.

''che ,, Guevara thought

about 10, 000 had been taken. 32 Escobar thought

the number considerably higher.

He recalls that some of the cattle were

driven up into the hills near Senator Nunez Mesa's Central Media Luna
(Isabel), where they were tended by Cresce~cio Perez.

33

A critical factor in the attitude of the hacendados and ganaderos

of Oriente Province toward Castro was the· manifest unwillingness of
Batista's army to fight Castro.

Mario Le~n of the Ganaderia Arca-

Campos recalls an instance in which a soldier wounded in an ambush
sought aid at the Central Estrada Palma.
the military post at Manzanilla.
sent out to find the ambushers.

30

u. S.

Leon drove the soldier into

After several hours delay a patrol was
But night was falling; the patrol fired a

News and World Report, October 19, 1959, p. 89.

31 Interview with Francisco Escobar.

Miami, April 17, 1971.

32 Ernesto Guevara, "Proyecciones sociales del ejercito rebelde:'
Humanismo (Mexico) (Enero-Abril, 1959), p. 351.
33 Interview with Francisco Escobar.
Perez. Miami, April 17, 1971.

He was a friend of Crescendo

as ·
few bursts into the maleza .(undergrowth) and returned to the safety of
their barracks.

34

The military's reluctance to fight became even more evident in
.the summer and fall of 1958 as Castro's men began to push out from
the Sierra into the llano.

35

In late summer, Charles Fanjul, A dminis-

trator of Central Francisco, was advised that Guevara's column had
encamped near his central in Camagiiey.

He telephoned the local army

garrison, but the sergeant replied he could not act without the approval
of "higher authorities. " The "higher authority" had been bribed by
·
36
Guevara to do nothing.
Camilo Cienfuegos I diary also speaks of this
incident.

Around the 10th of September, Camilo and "Che" rendez-

voused near the Central -Francisco. A soldier they captured there said
the military had been aware of the rebels' presence for three days and
had done nothing.

Cam Ho's column did not suffer a single casualty

during its traverse of Camagi:iey.

37

Further west, in Las Villas, Camilo's encampments were visited
by cattlemen and rich colonos who came to offer their "economic cooperation. " Camilo suggested that they could best cooperate with the

34Interview with Mario Leon.

Coral Gables,. December ll, 1970.

3 5 Llano or plain. Moving into the llano signified Castro's shift
from a defensive to an offensive strategy •
. 36 Interview with Antonio Barro, vice· president of the Cuban
Trading Company which managed the Central Francisco. Miami,
April 27, 1971.
37 From Camilo 's diary as reprinted in Revoluci6n, November 16,
1959.
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revolution by paying their workers an adequate salary.
Camilo's trek recalls a different scenario.

A witness to

One ev~ning toward Novem-

ber, Camile's column_arrived at Marcos Zarraga'e Central Adela and
· politely but firmly demanded $20, 000.

Since the local army garrison

.

had melted away, there was no alternative but to pay.
was a small ventral.

~

But Zarraga's

He asked and received terms, half immed~ately,

half on completion of ·t he harvest.

38

In the latter half of 1958, hacendados as far to the west as Pinar
'del R{o began to feel unsafe.

Jose Manuel Casanova of Central Orozco

at Bahfa Honda recalls that the garrison guarding his hacienda would
disappear at night.

"We knew we could be hit at any time •••• "

39

President Batista was fully aware of the hacendados' fears.
Francisco de Pando, president of the hacendados, had urged Batista to
act decisively against Castro, but nothing was done.

40

.
Batista vetoed

Gene·ral Cantillo's plan in the spring of 1958 .to assemble the Army detachments then performing garrison duty at small towns and centrales
in Eastern Cuba into a joint strike force to attack Castro in his Sierra
hideout.

Batista argued tq.is would leave the isolated sugar mills, then

in the midst of the zafra, wide open to attack.

3 8 Interview with Marcos Za.rraga.

To illustrate this, he

Coral Gables, February 24,

1971.
39 Interview with Jose Manuel Casanova.
40 Interview with Stewart Mac Farlane.

Miami, June 20, 1971.

Miami, February 4, 1971.
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pointed to a wall map to the town of Yara in Oriente where his friend
;

Senator Guillermo Aguilera maintained his Arrocera Tres Rios rice
farm. 41

"Here," said Batista, "is the finca of Aguilera and I can't
.

•

take away the detachment that guards 1t.

11

42

Some weeks earlier the

Arrocera Tres R{os had been attacked by rebels who wrecked the rice
mill and drove a bulldozer back and forth through the Senator's house
.
43
until it was thoroughly flattened.
Sometimes Batista's forces were themselves responsible for
damages to the sugar sec.tor.

Thus. at the end of November, 1958,

Batista's Air Force strafed the Central Manat{ where a number of
rebels had taken shelter, thinking the mill's U. S. ownership would
·
·
44
render it immune to attack.
The damage at Manati' was light. but
the possibility of ser,i.ous damage in such skirmishes became still
another nightmare for the hacendados.
The general impunity of the rebels. the failures of the Army, the·
· burning of the cane fields all aided Castro's scheme to tax the hacendados.
Most important of all was the growing evidence, in 1958, that Castro

41

Aguilera was a member of Batista's inner circle. He was, for
example, among those who contributed towards the purchase of an armored Cadillac for the dictator's birthday. (Revoluci6n, February 12,
1959.) He was also an important contact for U.S. Ambassador E. T.
Smith. See in Jules Dubois, Fidel Castro (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill,
1959). p. 259.
42 Suarez
;
Nunez,
El gran culpable, p. 95.

43 Wall Street Jou rnal, February 6, 1958.
44 Revoluci6n, February 23, 1959.
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.

.

might actually defea~ Batista~ When the initial rebel fax of fifteen

·

cents per bag was applied in 1957, collections were modest.

Fran-

cisco Escobar of Salvador refus-ecl to pay, as did Julio Lobo.

There-

after, a number of fields at Lobo's Pi16n were burned.
year Lob_o paid, Escobar paid, everybody paid.

45

The following

Among the collec-

tion agents were Teobaldo Rosell of Central Sofia and

11

Pastorita II

Nuffez.
Contributions increased substantially in the summer of 1958
when Camilo Cienfuegos, Raul Castro and "Che" Guevara led their
guerrilla columns into the heart of the richest sugar dist;icts.

46

The Fidelista Faustino Perez recalls that among the first to collaborate in Las Villas was Jesus Fernandez Magdal~na, owner of Central
San Pablo.

He not only paid his revolutionary tax, "but he offered us

trucks, jeeps and ta.nks of acetylene .•• which we used to destroy the
b r1.d. ge over th e r1. ver

c amaJuan1.
. . ,,47

45

Interview with Francisco Escobar, Miami, April 17, 1971.
It is probable that Lobo's first contribution to the revolution followed
the explosion of a bomb at his beloved Tingilaro sugar mill on May 26,
1957. Damage was reported to be substantial. Thereafter, Lobo gave
the Castro movement $50, 000. See in Thomas, Cuba, p. 943. One
suspects that this was but the first of a number of contributions.
46

This estimate by Luis Botifoll, lawyer, one-time editor of
El Mundo. Interview, Miami, January 12, 1971. Some lawyers in his
office were Castroites. See in Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 249.
47 Revoluci6n, July 14, 1959.

89
"Fico" Fernandez Casas rtow permitted the Castro guerrillas to
use the machine shop at his Central America to assemhly so.me rustic
armored cars.

"Fico' s" son, Alberto, who spoke good English, helped

to raise funds for Castro in the United States.

48

Alberto was rewa.r ded

in 1959 with command of the all-important Sugar Stabilization Institute.
Teobaldo Rosell and "Fico" Fernandez maintained large colonias (sugar
cane fields) at Manuel Area's Estrada Palma.

Arca, whose sugar mill

was used for a time by the Batista military as a command post, also
joined the Fidelistas.

49

By November, Atlantica del Golfo complained to the Wall
Street Journal that Castro's tax, raised to twenty-five cents a bag in
1958, would cost it $450,· 000.

Lesser firms, such as Cuban-American

50
and the United Fruit Gompany, would have to pay around $200, 000 • .

48 An armored vehicle for Batista's fore es was ~onstructed in the
shops of Senator Tarafa's Central Espa11a. See in El Mundo, September
~5. 1960.
49

Manuel Arca, Sr. had more than twenty conversations with
Castro in 1958-1959. Manuel Arca, Jr., relates one conversation in
which Castro, admiring the efficiency of the Area's rice growing operation, said that in the future he planned to put his own people in charge.
When Manuel Arca, Sr., protested, saying that his workers represented
generations of experience, Castro retorted that his men would undoubtedly
make mistakes, and that it might eventually cost $100 million, but that
was how it was going to be. Phone interview with Manuel Arca, Jr.,
December 14, 1970.
SO According to one account, in 1958 the sugar mills were to pay
fifteen cents per 250 lb. bag, the sugar planters ten cents, making a total
of twenty-five cents per bag. Since the U.S. mills often grew their own
sugar cane, their revolutionary tax would be twenty-five cents per bag.
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The companies declared they would not pay.

The U.S. Embassy

in Havana supported the mills, urging Americans not to pay any rebel
"war taxes. " 52 When United Fruit persisted in its refusal to pay,
Castro's men cut off the water supply to the company's Preston sugar
mill.

I
I
I
I
I

On December 5th, United Fruit's President Kenneth Redmond

appealed to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles for help.

Redmond

asked that U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T. Smith bring about a truce between the rebels and Batista so as to permit an unimpeded ha;vest.

53

But in late 1958 Castro warned that there would be no harvest at all
until Batista was driven from power·.

54

For those who resisted to the end, there was a post-revol~tionary

-.-·, .:-

tax.

Francisco Rodriguez, manager of the three Hershey mills near

lfavana, refused to pay in.1958.

·1
I
I

In early 1959 he was advised by a

militiaman that he cou::..d not begin grinding the new harvest until the
contribuci6n de la sierra had been paid.

55

One needed a receipt as

51
.
. Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1958.
52

Ruby Hart Phillips, Cuba: Island of Paradox.
McDowell, Obole_n sky, l959), p. 370.
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51

(New York:

•"

. ·.~
. .' . .

53 Hispa~ic American Report (December, 1958), p. 669 •
54 This was the message Castro imparted fo the hacendado d.,elegation which visited him in late 1958. Interview with Francisco Rodriguez, vice- president of Atl~ntica del Golfo. Miami, May 14, 1971.
55 The three Hershey mills were sold to Atlantica del .G olfo not
long after the death of Milton Hershey in 1945. Atlantica in turn sold
them to the Chiriqui Sugar Company, a front for Julio Lob:), in late
1958.
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ev1"d ence. 56
Estimates of the total donations of the bourgeoisie to Castro's
rebellion vary widely.

Mario Lazo, lawyer for many large American

interests, says the rebels extorted at least $1 million from farmers in
57

eastern Cuba.
million.

58

Suarez Nunez, a Batista aide, places the total at $2

The hacendado Francisco Escobar estimates $7 miHion. 59

The Cuban historian Carlos Marques Sterling estimates $10 million. 60
In addition to Castro's tax, hacendados in the fall of 1958 had to
pay a war tax to Batista of ten cents per bag, plus a new 5 percent tax
on profits, gross sales and property.

61

Castro had warned oriental es

I
I
I
I

I

I
I
I

that any taxes paid after April 1 to the Batista government would be
subject to re-collection by the rebels.

The hacendados' situation was

becoming increasingly expensive and nerve-wracking.

By October,

1958, some feared Castro's rebellion would seriously disrupt the 1959

56 Int
57
58

59

.
erview

Wl"th

F ranc1sco
.
R o d r1guez.
~

Miami, May 14, 1971. .

·
Lazo, Dagger, p. 205.
.e.

;"'

Su~rez N~nez, El gran culpable, p. 113.
Interview with Francisco Escobar.

Miami, April 17, 1971.

60

Marques Sterling, Historia de Cuba, p. 627, If all Cuba's
hacendados and colonos had paid their revolutionary tax, the total would
come to approximately $10 million.
61 Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1958; The New York Times,
October 8, 1958; Anuario azucarero, 1959, p. 164. The cost of defense
rises everywhere. During Cuba's war of independence, the defense tax
levied on Cuban hacendados was only 3 1 /2 percent annually on all income.
(Cepero Bonilla, Azucar y" abolici6n, " Obras historic as, p. 153.}
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harvest.

The continued c,1tting of communications' links might impede

movement of the crop.

Teobaldo Rosell, were commissioned to visit Castro in October, 1958,
and sound him out.

-1
I
I
I
I
I
I

They returned and made an essentially favorable

report on Castro to the association.

62

A number of cattlemen, headed by the president of the cattlemen's
association, Armando Cainas Milanes, also went up to the Sierra to interview Castro in the fall of 1958.

Like the hacendados, the cattlemen

were favorably impressed by Castro.

During the visit, Cainas Milanes

and Castro worked out~ system of war taxes to be levied on all Cuban
cattlemen.

I
I
I

Several hacendados, including Manuel Arca and

63

Prior to this event, a number of cattlemen had already

made substantial contributions to the revolutionary cause.

64

Maria

Antonia Puyol Bravo, ,owner of the cattle ranch Mangas de Barragua _
and a childhood friend of C2.stro, testified in 1959 that the ganaderos had
given more support to the revolution than any other group. She recalled
that her whole family had participated actively on Castro's behalf, that
dynamite had been hidden on her finca, and that three of her employees
65
had sewn uniforms for the rebels.

62

Interview with Francisco Rodriguez. Miami, May 14, 1971.
Interview with Antonio Barro. Miami, May 25, 1971.
63 See below, p. 221.
64 See above, p. 78. Fajardo, a 1955 graduate of Havana University Medical School, was practicing medicine in Manzanillo when he
joined the M-26. He rose to comanda nt e . He died, apparently by accident, during a fight with counterrevolutionaries in the Escambray in
late 1960. (El Mundo, December· 1, 1960.)
65 Diario de la Marina, September 19, 1959.

93
A few weeks later, in one of the most important, yet unheralded
acts of the revolution, Batista's two closest advisors on the sugar question, Amadeo Lopez Castro and Jorge Barroso, told their chief that the
·hacendados no longer supported him and that the only possibility for a
national solution was his departure.

They warned that with "Che" and

Camilo in Las Villas, the richest sugar provincei very serious damages
66
to the industry might occur if the combat were to continue much longer.
At the moment of his resignation, Batista told his generals that he was
being forced out "by the hacendados, colonos and ecclesiastical authoriti~s at a time when the Army was not winning a single battle.

1167

In

his memoirs, Batista recalls that "panic was growing among the commercial interests.

1168

He was aware t.hat the Chamber of Commerce,

the Association of Industrialists, ganaderos and rice farmers were also
discussing the desireability of his departure in favor of a transitional
government.

69
Zulu eta

Another rich burgues who supported Castro's revolution was the
banker and hacendado Julian de Zulueta y Besson.

Zulueta was president

6 6 Fulgencio Batista, Cuba Betrayed (New York: Vantage Press,
1962), p. 92. Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 113-114.

67 Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 127.
68 Batista, Cuba Betrayed, p. 80.

69

Ibid.
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of the sugar mills Zaza and Fe, had large sugar plantations, and was

president of the Banco Continental.
a "pillar of the revolution.
lineage.

.,70

Zulueta was a man of distinguished .

One hundred years before, another Julian de Zulueta had been

the Marques de Alava, owner of three sugar mills, and one of the richest and most powerful men in Cuba.

I
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In mid-1959 he would be known as

71

The Marques de Alava had been

a principal financier of the counterrevolutionary militia of. Spanish
·
.
72
shopkeepers--the volunteers--during Cuba's war of independence.
Zulueta's motives seem mixed.

His friends say h~ was genuinely

interested in promoting a reformist .regime.
tive was more personal.

1°3 .

Others suspect his mo-

In the 1950s, Zulueta had over-extended his

bank's resources in loans for a twenty-story apartment building and
was thereupon intervened by the National Bank.

This experience rankled.

Zulueta thereafter.persuaded the highly competent professional banker,
Eduardo Benet, then vice-president of the Trust Company of Cuba, to
be president of the Banco Continental.

Benet brcught with him upwards

70 Revoluc i 6n, Augu.3t 10, 1959.
71 The Marques de Alava was one of the greatest slave holders in
colonial Cuba. He maintained 1475 slaves at his Central Alava alone.
He also owned the Central Zaza which the rebel Maximo G6mez burned
down in 1865, and which the Zulueta family rebuilt and retained in the
family until Castro intervened it almost a century later. See in Franklin
Knight, Slave Society in Cuba During the 19th Century (Madison: Univ.
of Wisco nsin P r ess , 197 0), p . 134 .
72

Thomas; Cuba, p. 249.

73 Interview with Danilo Mesa, member of the M-26 underground.
Mesa and Faustino Perez were close friends of Zulueta. Gainesville,
June 2 1, 1 9 71.
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of $20 million in accounts.. This launched the .Banco Continental into a
race with the Trust Company to see which would be the number one
bank in Cuba.
Perhaps it was Zulueta's friend, Faustino Perez, the chief of
Castro's underground, who persuaded Zulueta that, if h·e supported the
revolution, his bank might receive more government accounts.

A

friend estimates that Zulueta gave Castro $200, 000. This, -in addition
,
74
to such services as hiding rebels and helping sell revolutionary bonds.
· Zulu eta encouraged his clients to emulate his example.

75

Batista. was aware of Zulueta 's activities, but what could be
done?

76

The Banco Continental had but $10 million in government se-

.
. f air
. . share.
cur1ties,
far 1ess than its

.

77

If Batista
.
. k e wa.r
were to ma

on the Banco Continental, he might disrupt an already uneasy economy.
Martfnez Saenz, president of the Banco Nacional, was told to give whatever. aid he could to Zulueta's chief competitor, the T.rust Company of
Cuba.
74 Revoluci6n, February 12, 1959.
75 Data on Zulueta fro~ interviews with Father Llorente, S. J.,
Miami, January 13, 1971; Luis Vianello, high-level official, Royal Bank
of Canada, Coral Gables, June 1, 1971; Danilo Mesa; Sr. Cabanas of the
Banco Nunez, Miami, March 1, 1971, and others. Carmelo Mesa-Lago,
an ·official in the· Social Security Bank, over which Zulu eta presided in
1959, recalls rumors among the employees there in 1959 that Zulueta had
contributed $1 million to Castro's rebellion. This seems rather high; a
figure in the range of $100, 000 or $200, 000 seems more likely.
76

For an instance of the government's· awareness of Zulueta's
activities, see the memoirs of Batista's defense minister, Santiago Rey,
Mirando a Cuba (M6xico: Ediciones del Caribe, 1959), p. 2 5.
77
See below, pp. 348-349 .•
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On the day that Castro entered Havana, Zulueta appeared at the
doors of his bank dressed in an M-26 militia uniform.
staff members were dressed in the same manner.
sic case of revolutionary payoff,

78

A number of his
In an almost clas-

Zulueta was rewarded with the presi-

dency of the new Social Security Bank.

Zulueta 1 s friend, Faustino Perez,

now president of the Ministerio para la Revindicacion de Bienes Malver-

I

I
I
I
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sados (MRBM), made the Banco Continental the bank of deposit for his
ministry.

Between 1959 and 1960 no less than $70 million in government

and other public funds were deposited with the Banco Continental.
Zulueta 1 s bank came to be regarded as the banco de gobierno.

80

79
In

1959, the Banco Continental proudly advertised that it was the fastest
.
b ::,nk.m C u b a. 81 .
growmg

II

Jose" M.

llp

·" II
Pepm
Bosch

,, 11
epm
Bosch y Lamarque, president of the Bacardit

Rum Company of Santiago, was one of Castro's most important financial
angels.

Reputable sources allege that he contributed anywhere from $1

78

Interview with Father Armando Llorente, S. J.
uary 13, 1971.

Miami, Jan-

79 See below, p. 348.
80

A number of Cuban bankers actually went to see Treasury
Minister Lopez-Fresquet to complain about this. See in Revolucion,
,May 19, 1959.
~

81 Revolucion, February 23, 1959. Zulueta was ruined along with
his fellow bankers when Castro, who turned out to be more ambitious and
more audacious than all the bourgeoisie, intervened the banking system
in 1960. Zulueta thereafter chose to remain in Cuba.

97
to $3 million.

82

While these figures ar,e probably exaggerated, there·

is no doubt that he made a very substantial contribution.
Bosch's case is of unique interest owing to his leading position
.in Cuban industry and society and to his reputation for honesty and pa-

triotism.

He may serve, t~en, as something of a prototype of all those

decent men of substance and position who supported Castro's revolution.
"Pepfu" Bosch was born in Santiago in 1898.

His father was

president of the Santiago Electric Company~ He was educated at the
Colegio la Salle in Santiago and then at the Riverview Academy in Poughkeepsie, New York, and sul:>~equently attended Villanova University and
Lehigh College.

,

In 1922, he married Enriqueta Scheug Bacardi, a ·

daughter of the leading family of Santiago whose interests included the
Bacard{ Rum and Hatuey Beer plants, extensive land holdings, including

colonias at the Central Esperanza, and the Yateras Water Works ,. which
at one time supplied water to the U.S. Navy's Guantanamo base.

Bosch

worked for a time with th.e National City Bank, moved in 1934 to take

82

Juan Bosch, oresident of the Dominican Republic in the 1960s
and a long time exile in Cuba, has alleged that "Pepin II Bosch of Bacard{
(no relative) personally went up into the Sierra to deliver $1 million to
Castro. See in Juan Bosch, Dictadura con res paldo popular, 2nd edition (Santo Domingo: Publicaciones Max, 1971 ), p. 27. A very reliable
source says that "Pepin" Bosch told him that he had given Castro $3
million. Ruby Phillips, a friend of Bosch, estimates he gave $1 million.
(Interview, Miami, June 6, 1971 ). It was at a Bacardi office where Javier
Pazos arranged the visit of 'The New Yo rk Times reporter Herbert Mat'thews to the Sierra in 1957.
4
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charge of the Bacard{ 's new branch in Mexico, returned later to Cuba
to spur the Bacardi interests and become a multimillionaire in his own
right. 83
Along the way, Bosch became involved in politics.
fluenced in part by his wife's family.

He was in-

Colonel Em_ilio Bacard{ Lay had

been an aide to the legendary Antonio Maceo during the war for independence.

Bof;lch himself disliked dictators, and especially the Dictator-

President Gustavo Machado who had wanted to become an associate of
,
the thriving Bacard{ plant. The Bacardis refused and the plant was shut
down.

In 1931, Bosch joined the fight against the dictator.

Later, from

exile in New York, he served as treasurer of the anti-Machado Revolu-

I
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tionary J1:mta.

His wife was an early and enthusiastic member of the

Autentico Party. 85
In 1943, Bosch got into a fight with then President Batista, os-

.,
tens:ibly over a tax question.
plant.

86

The government intervened the Bacardi

fu 1952 when Batista staged his coup,

11

t

Pepin,

II

who the year

before had served as minister of the treasury for President Prio,

83 Bohemia, January 15, 1950, pp. 64-66, 87.
84 Cuba Internacional (Havana), July, 1970, pp. 56-63.
BS Ibid., January 15, 1950, pp. 64-65.

Also interview with
"Polo" Miranda, administrator of the Bacardi-Bosch Hatuey Beer Plant
in Santa Clara. Miami, January 20, 1971.
86 The New York Times, October 17, 1943.

99
. foresaw a time of troubles. 87 In a brilliant stroke he shifted Bacardf's
headquarters from Havana to Hamilton, Bermuda, and registered the
trademark there.

If any future government confiscated his Cuban plant,

it would be barred from exporting under the Bacard{ label.
,

88

In 1957 the Bosch-Bacardi clan became enthusiastic supporters
of Fidel Castro.

Indeed, it seems all Santiago was helping Fidel.

The

American consul, when asked for a list of Fidel supporters in the area,
simply pointed to the Santiago phone book.

Everybody!

89

Vilma Esp:fu

Guillois, the daughter of one of Bosch's chief executives, was a leading
pa~ticipant in the Santiago underground. 90
·In June, 1957. the Chicago Tribune's Jules Dubois attended a
dinner party of Santiago's leading pro-Castroites.
were "Pep:fu" Bosch and Daniel Bacardi.

Present among others

At the head of the table a chair
-

was left vacant, reserved for the absent' guest of honor: Fidel Castro. 91

87 Bosch was regarded as perhaps the best treasury minister
Cuba ever had. He resigned because of disgust with corruption. See i.ri
Mario Lazo, Dagger in the Heart (Santa Monica: Fidelis Publishers,
1968), p. 84.
88

Interview with "Polo" Miranda.

Miami, January 20, 1971.

89 Interview with Bernard Ferninella, vice-consul in the U.S.
Consulate at Santiago in 1958. Washington, December 17. 1970.
90 Vilma Espin, graduate in chemistry at the University of Oriente,
one-time student at MIT and later wife of Raul Castro. Her father, Jose
Espin Villar, ma.de· a handsome profit selling some -properties to Texaco
for their new refinery. Interview with Carlos F. ·Portela. Miami, April
9, 1971. Portela was an important businessman in Santiago.
91 Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 164.
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Bosch, like many Cubans, believed that Castro wanted to revive
constitutional rule, and to enact

II

a f ew necessary re f orms. 1192 Bosch

began to help finance the rebellion.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Batista, aware of Bosch's activities.

had one of Bosch's sons, an active Fidelista, arrested and held as a
hostage in August. 1957, to ensure that the Bacardi" enterprises did not
join the sympathy strike in honor of the death of the rebel, Frank Pais.
Cuba was becoming dangerous.

93

In late 1957. Bosch left Cuba for Ber-

muda where he remained until 1959.

During his absence, Bosch's twin-

engined Cessna was employed by the rebels t9 airlift arm·s into Cuba.
Bosch's services to the revolution did not go unrecognized.
_bels in Santa Clara Province left a bridge undamaged

94

Re-

so as not to inter-

fere with shipments from Bosch's Hatuey beer plant there.

"Polo"

Miranda, the plant mal)ager _a nd another veteran of the revolution of '33,

I
I
I
I
I

I
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kept the rebels informed as to the timing of the shipments·.

95

By Decem-

ber, · 1958, when all land communications. with western Cuba had been

92 Letter of "Pepfu" Bosch in form of advertisement to The New
York Times, March 24, 1961.
93 Bohemia, January 18, 1959, p. 4.
94 Youngblood, The Devil to Pay, p. 129.
95 Interview with "Polo" Miranda. Miami, January 20, 1971.
Miranda was a close friend of Eduardo Chibas. The anti-Machado Directorio Estudiantil Universitario (DEU) of the 1930s was founded in
Miranda's house. Like Bosch, Miranda soon became disenchanted with
Castro's revolution.

- !... -

-

-
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cut, the Bacard{ plant in Santiago which normally produced 144, 000
bottles of rum a day was forced to shut down.

96

Bosch's competitor in the beer business, Julio Blanco of Cerveceria Tropical, apparently felt obliged to contribute to Castro's war
chest, in part to offset any competitive advantage that Bosch, who already had more than 50 percent of the national beer market, might gain.

97

Similar motives moved a number of businessmen to contribute to Castro's
revolution.
Some businessITI.en supported Fidel because they w_e re being hurt
by the intrusion of Batista and his cronies into 'the private business ·sec-

tor.

Financed by various state credit agencies, and especially by the

Banco de Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social (BANDES), Batista's mafia had
taken over most of the trucking and construction industry.
tistianos' contraband was also hurting.

98

The Ba-

Each time one of General Taber-

nilla's Air Force C-54 cargo planes touched down at the San Antonio Air
Base, loaded with contraband from Miami, some .legitimate business in'terest was damaged.

Contraband was allegedly destroying the textile

industry despite the friendly relations between the leader of the Textile

96 T·.

~·

December 1, 1958, p. 32.

97

Bosch went into exile in 1960 and thereafter bec~me an important financier of the counter r c volution, lending financial support to such
groups as the Truth About Cuba Committee and certain exile commando
groups.
98

,

,-

Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 25.
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Association, the multi-millionaire Burke Hedges, and Batista.
ment stores were also suffering.

Depart-

The National Association of Industri-

alists complained not only about regular contraband but about a special
kind of government contraband

in which the government purchased goods

abroad, directly competitive with goods produced nationally, and brought
them in tax-free.

No doubt the industrialists I advisor' Rufo Lopez-

Fresquet, a fund raiser for Castro, used this argument to encourage
donations from Cuban businessmen and industrialists.

Julio Lobo
Another powerful businessman who came--albeit reluctantly--to
support Castro's rebellion was the sugar magnate, Julio Lobo.

The dy-

namic Lobo, whose trading house annually sold about one-half of Cuba's
sugar, was determined to become a major sugar producer as well.

By

the mid-1950s Lobo controlled upwards of a dozen sugar mills and was
angling to take control of S:uba's largest sugar producing combine, the
American-owned Atla.ntica del Golfo, which then owned nine sugar mills.

I
I
I

I
I
I
I

President Batista and certain sugar mill owners feared Lobo's everincreasing economic power, and determined to block him.

At the request

of Atlantica's owners, Batista, who owned 131, 500 shares of Atla.ntica
stock, blocked Lobo' s bid.

99

This frustration encouraged Lobo' s financial

99 R evolucion, May 29, 1959. Lobo was in competition with the
~Falla Gutie r rez group which had purchased Central Violeta from Atlantica
in 1947 and was seeking, in the 1950sJ to purchase Atlantica's other mills.
Atlantica was the Cuban subsidiary of the U.S. Cuban-Atlantic Sugar Co.
and a corporate descendant of the Rionda's Cuban Cane Corp.

103

support for Castro.

A new administration might be more sympathetic to

. pans.
l
100
h 1s
Batista also managed to antagonize the two giants of Cuba's communications industry, CMQ radio and television and Bohemia magazine.
These enterprises prospered in part as forums for anti-government personalities.

Both had featured Eduardo Chibas in the 1940s and Fidel in

the 1950s.

Batista had attempted to come to terms with both.

He once

sounded out Bohemia's owner, Angel Quevedo. about the possibility of a
partnership in a new m;3.gazine, but was turned down.

101

When his ef-

forts to make a deal with the CMQ's Mestre brothers came to naught, he
began to pursue alternatives, aiding the more cooperative Amadeo Barletta with his rival channel 12, and helping Gaspar Pumarejo to establish
Cuba's first color TV studio in the new Havana Hilton.
fited substantially as a result of Castro's revolution.

102

Quevedo pro-

Bohemia's cir-

culation rose from its normal 400, 000 copies a w~ek to one million in

I
I
I
I
I
I·

I
I

,.
I
I

·1

the first week of Castro's triumph in 1959.

lOO Lobo may also have hoped that a more nationalistic regime
would aid him to expand his. holdings by buying out the Americans. In

1933 Lobo had remarked that "it is far better to be ruined but free, than
to be ruined and subject to the will of a few foreigners." Was he a nationalist? See in Luis Aguilar Leon. Cuba, 1933 (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1972). p. 215.
lOl Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 34.

102 Ib.d
1 •

I

p. 32.
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Among other important businessmen who supported Castro was
Ignacio Mendoza, stockbroker and scio~ of a powerful family.

Mendoza,

a veteran fighter of 1933, permitted his mansion-- "the club on First
103
.
. f or t h e ur b an resistance.
·
A venue " -- t o b e use d as a .meeting
point
The home of Mendoza's brother-in-law, Jose Ferrer, president of the
Concretera Nacional, was used in like manner.

Ferrer's daughter Piedad

served coffee to a band of nervous rebels who were awaiting the signal
for the April, 1958, strike.

104

Other businessmen were literally blasted into Castro's camp.
During the rebellion the Ferrocarriles Consolidados, which served the
eastern half of Cuba, was repeatedly attacked.
.
. .

Ninety-six br~dges were

destroyed, thousands of feet of track tor!l up, 174 kilometers of telegraph posts toppled.

Damages totalled .some $7 miliion.

105

When the

railroad
began to be attacked as far west as Camagi.iey,
. ..
. its president,
Francisco Bartes, threw in the towel and began to support Castro's rehellion.

106

By way of contrast, the Ferrocarriles Occidentales, opera-

ting largely beyond Castro's reach in western Cuba, suffered only

l03·Robert Taber, M-26, Biography of a Revolution (New York:
Lyle Stuart, 1961 ), p. 88.

I
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I

104 Enrique Meneses, Fidel Castro (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1966 ), p. 78.
105 Bohemia, June 7, 1959, p. 64.
106 1nterview with Danilo Mesa. Gainesville, June 21, 1971.
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$250, 000 in damages.

Castro's operations were also causing difficulties in the mining
sector.

The mining engineer Salvador Sotomayor found it increasingly

difficult to visit his company's manganese mines in Oriente Province
near Holguin.

~nd the army was reluctant to let the miners have dyna-

mite, for fear that the rebels would steal it.

107

The situation was more serious at the American nickel mines
and smelters at Moa Bay and Nicaro.
the rebels at the end of March.

Moa had been briefly occupied by

When they left, they took a number of

: h t h em. 108 By N ovember, Moa Bay ca1cu1ated its revo 1uhon.
. 1es wit
veh 1c

incurred losses at $300, 000. 109 Nicaro suffered more severely, being
the actual site of a smali"battle in late October.

Damage

caused by an

aerial attack by government planes on the rebels there was estimated_at
110
.
$2 million. Thereafter the plant was shut down, and the remaining U. S.
personnel removed by an American naval transport.

The aircraft car-

rier Franklin Roosevelt was visible on the horizon.
December found business in Santiago at a standstill, paralyzed
by the rebels' severing of all road and rail links with the west.

l07 Interview with Salvador Sotomayor.

ESSO's

Coral Gables, June 27,

1971.
108

Jay Mallin, Strategy for Conquest (Coral Gables: University
of Miami, 1970 ).,p.887.
109

Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1958.

l lO Hispanic American Report, November, 1958, p. 609.
~

.

..

....

. ... ..

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
·1
I

·1
I
I

I
I
I
I

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

I
I
I
I

106

sales of gasoline were nil. · The Pepsi-Cola and Canada Dry bottling
~

plants were only operating a few days a month.
•!

The .Bacardi plants were

•

closed.
These diverse difficulties were hurting Cuba's economy.

As the

Wall Street Journal put it, "Economic Decay is Weakening Batista's
Chances of Survival."

By Christmas time, it was estimated that

111
Castro's rebellion had inflicted $100 million in damages. If Batista
could not protect the economy--and the evidence was plain--then businessmen would have to accept Castro.

Many pri".:ately opined· that he would be

no worse than the others.
In Havana it was notorious that even some of Batista's close as-

s'o ciates were helping to finance Castro's rebellion.

This made the die-

tator's police chief, Esteba??, Ventura, absolutely furious.

In his memoirs,

Ventura lambastes "those high officials of the government who . • . contributed, for reasons of fear, substantial sums, buying 26th of July bonds,
thinking that this would be in their favor, should ' Fidel be victorious. 11112
Perhaps the best known of these is Jose Lopez Vilaboy, president of

111 Noticias (New York), .January 13, 1959.
rather high.

This figure seems

112 Esteban Ventura Novo, Memorfas (Mexico: Impresa M. Le6n
Sanchez, 1961), p. 130. Ventura does not name many of the important
Cubans who aided Fidel but suggests he will do so in a future volume. In
exile, he was treated badly by Batista. He received no advance notice of
the president's abdication, and left Cuba with only the shirt on his back.
He was humiliated, along with the rest of the police, in Santo Domhlgo,
wnere the civilians among the Batistianos refused to socialize with them,
· and he was denied economic assistance.

107

Cubana de Aviacion. a business associate of Batista, and a true insumergible.

113

As publisher of the newspaper Manana, Lopez Vilaboy

... .

.
114
reputedly received a stipend of $10, 000 a month from Batista.
· But
0

L6pez also sent $10, 000 to Castro in Mexico in 1956.
to Ju~to Carrillo that he was broke and had to accept.

Fidel complained
115

L6pez Vila-

boy and his associates. with the aid of a government loan. were able to
buy 01,1t Pan Am's share of Havana airport.

From this airport Lopez

Vilaboy als<? ran his cargo line Expreso A ereo Internacional which smuggled in arms for FideL

116

Vilaboy once urged Batista to. spare the life

of the captured Pri'o guerrilla and former head of the Havana airport
,
117
labor union, Calixto Sanchez White, but he was too late.

Others of Batista's friends among the bourgeoisie were con.fronted with this same dilemma.

To whom would they be true?

For

some Batistianos, this dilemma was heightened by the fact that their sons
were Fidelistas, attracted by the daring and idealism of a youth of their
own generation.

Some bought Castro bonds with the allowances provided

113 In sumergible. that is, an opportunist.
1 l4 Revoluci6n, January 30, 1959.
115 Thomas, Cuba, p. 886 from Justo Carrillo manuscript.
MSS-18. 19.
116 Ventura, Memorias, p. 289.
117 Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 162.

Eusebio Mujal, the head of
the CTC and presumably Batista's strongest ally, also tried to save the
condemned Calixto Sanchez. Interview with Enrique Baloyra who was
'told this by Mujal. Gainesville, June 20, 1971.
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by their fathers.

The son of .Batista's friend, Senator Tarafa, thought

. that upwards of 50 percent of the sons of Batistiano politicians favored
Fidel, including one or more sons of Eduardo Suarez Rivas, Andrew
Rivero Aguero, Justo Luis del Pozo, Justo Garda Rayneri and Nicolii.s
Castellano.

118

Within a few swift years, some of these would be fight-

ing Fidel at the Bay of Pigs.

119

Towards the end of 1958, Castro was deluged with contributions
from the bourgeoisie, contributions which helped ensure his victory.
Thus his brother Raul might spend $150, 000 in December, 1958, to
operate his northern guerrilla front.

120

A f~w months before, Fidel

had ordered a subordinate to spend up to $500, 000 to purchase rifle bullets, saying: "We can afford it. 11121
In conventional politics, and in Cuban tradition, this financial
aid by the alta:-burguesir1 would have created a sense of debt on Castro ' s
part.

But Castro was not a conventional man; he could not, without ex-

treme difficulty, acknowledge debts to anyone.

He was not interested in

the kind of offE:r of personal wealth which intrigued his predecessors.

118

I
I
I
I
I

Interview with Julio Tarafa, Jr •• Southampton, New York,
November 29, 1971. Andres Domingo del Castillo, Batista's long-time
friend and political associate, was also suspected of having contributed
to Castro's revolution.
119 Among those captured at the Bay of Pigs were Julio Tarafa
and his brother.
l20 Bonachea and San Martin, The Cuban Insurrection, p. 194.
121 Letter of Fidel Castro to Juan Almeida of October 8, 1958.
See in Bonachea and Valdes, Revolutionary Struggle, p. 424.
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Once in power he began to move away from the opportunism of his rehellion, to deny his implicit bargain with the bourgeoisie. He began to
attack them with increasing ferocity.

When the rich came to see him,

he humiliated them by making them wait or by simply disappearing.
The files of the lnstituto Nacional de Reforma. Agraria (!NRA)-the Agrarian Reform lnstitute--are full of letters written in 1959 and 1960
by rural interests seeking aid from the government on the basis of their
financial contributions to Castro's rebellion.

One landowner of Oriente,

who had been a senator during the Batista era, wrote INR.A that he had
contributed up to $1, 000 a month to the rebellion.

Having established his

good standing, he then asked !NRA to permit him to sell his 20, 000 acre
ranch in order to pay his private debts, and to reimburse the government
the salaries he had earned as a senator.

122

Another complained that pe

· had given "money, ·cattle and all kinds of aid" to the rebellion--and was
nonetheless suffering from a land invasion.

123

A big colono at Central

S~n Ram6n in Pinar del Rio wrote that he had contributed to the rebellion.
Now he was being forced to hire more workers than he needed.

124

Would

the government help? Or were the contributions of the bourgeoisie in
vain?

122

Juan Martfnez Alier, Cuba: La revolucion economica y social.
(Madrid: Editorial R.uedo Iberico, 1972 ), p. 155.
123
124

Ibid.

I

P• 182 •.

Ibid., p. 169.
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ill.

HACENDAOOS

On the last night of November, 1956, the tranquility of Santiago
de Cuba. Cuba's second city, was shattered by a series of fierce guerrilla attacks on police.and military installations.

These attacks were

to divert police attention from the larger event: the arrival of Fidel
Castro and _h is guerrilla band from Mexico.

Five hundred miles to the

west, unaware of these events, the leading members of Cuba's sugar-

I·

I
I
I
I

ocracy, the men who dominated the old Cuba, had gathered in Havana's
Centro Asturiano to pay tribute to Fulgencio Batista.

their esteem, and ~s a symbol of their recognition of cis power over
the sugar sector, they offered the President a portrait of his wife,
Marta,

framed in solid gold.

At the bottom of the portrait, on a plati-

num shield, the President's initials were spelled out in diamonds.

The

frame bore the inscription, "To the honorable President of the Republ:lc,
Major General Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar.

I
I
I
I
I

As a token of

colonos and sugar workers of Cuba.

From the hacendados,

November 30, 1956. "

1

They did

not know it yet, but their world was coming to an end.
The Asociaci6n Nacional de Hacendados Cubanos (ANDHC),
whose members represented the island's 161 sugar mills,. was Cuba's

1 Diario de la Marina , December 1, 1956.

111

most powerful private economic organization.

The hacendados were--

economically, socially, politically, psychologically--the core of the
alta-burguesia.

It was the hacenclados who, as the island's richest

men, presided over the fate of the national economy.
social pacesetters.

They were the

Their great sugar mills, those cathedrals of the

fields, dominated the national imagination.

Sugar was the essence of

the old Cuba, and the hacendados were the mandarins who presided
over it.
How strange then that the hacendados of the 1940s and !950s
were unhappy.

Their traditional pleasures and powers of command

seemed increasingly illusory, borne away by the rising tide of government intervention, by rebellious labor, by greedy colonos.

The hacen-

dados feared that.the industrialists were right--that sugar's era had
passed.
But the hacendados were determined to go down fighting.

They

still had power, power in money and in the .American connection: money
to influence government in their favor; the American connection in the
sense that the United States depended on Cuban sugar, a substantial por·tion of which was produced by American enterprise on the island.

This

translated into an unspoken assumption that, in times of trouble, U.S.
power--political, economic, perhaps even military--would be available
to preserve the status quo.
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In 1959, the hacendados found themselves confronted by a revo-

lution whose leaders viewed sugar as an economic disaster and a moral
evil.

Sugar to them was the mainstay of an unworthy past, a barrier to

industrialization, and a major cause of Cuba's dependent status.

The

revolutionaries were deaf to the tr~ditional argument "sin azucar no
hay pals" (no sugar, no Cuba), immune to the lure of personal advantage
and contemptuous of the U.S.

The hacendados were also under attack by

the colonos (sugar planters), sugar workers and sugar technicians, all
seeking to bend, or even dismember, the sugar industry ~o their own
advantage.

And some industrialists and .cattlemen happily anticipated

the shifting of government aid away from sugar to their own sector.
Under attack from every side, the ANDHC began to disintegrate, eac~1
hacendado going his own way, some fleeing, some compromising, some
waiting for the Marines.

First Difficulties
When Castro's revolution took power in 1959, money was the
first great dilemma for the hacendados. True, the hacendados had paid
Castro's revolutionary taxes in 1958, but they had also given generously

I
I
I
I
I

to Batista. · Perhaps $1 million in hacendado money had been collected
to support Batista and his allies in the 1952 presidential race .
hacendados knew Batista; they feared the Ortodoxos.

2

The

Another

2 Cepero Bonilla, "Politka azucarera, " Obras historicas, p.
311. The hacendados feared the Ortodoxos might carry out the constitution's provision for an agrarian reform.

113

substantial sum was raised by the hacendados to support Batista's candidate, Andr~s Rivero Aguero, in the 1958 election.

Thus in 1959 and

1960, when prior support for Batista was considered a criminal offense,
the hacendado leaders lived in terror of prosecution.

This was Castro's

secret weapon, and this was the secret fear that haunted the hacendados

I
I
I
I
I

and, indeed, the entire bourgeoisie, and explains, in part, their failure

I·

to resist the Castro regime.
The first months of 1959 found the ANDHC seriously divided.
Within the association's comfortable headquarters on Zulueta Street
young hacendados railed against the reigning patriarchs; Fidelistas
challenged Batistianos ; reformers denounced standpatters.
On January 1, a group of young pro-Castro hacendados, ineluding Alberto Fowler, G:i:-egorio Escagedo, Jr., Alberto Fernandez
Casas and several others, physically seized ANDHC's offices.

3

A few

days later these young men, joined by Jose M. Casanova, Jr., Teo· baldo Rosell, Jr., and Manuel Valle, Jr., made a statement to Revoluci6n urging "rectifications" in the sugar industry, and especially of the
Sugar Stabilization Institute and the ANDHC.

4

Alberto Fowler told the

rebel leader Camilo Cienfuegos that the ANDHC had been controlled by

3 lntP.rview with the hacendado and owner of Central Adela,
Marcos de Zarraga y Ortiz. Coral Gables, February 24, 1971.

4

The Sugar Stabilization Institute determined how much sugar
Cuba would produce, and then divided this among the 161 mills.
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men "whose only interest has been personal enrichment, " men without
the slightest concern for the national interest.
could hardly be called arribistas.
lished sugar families.

These young men

Some were from the most estab-

Others were successful entrepreneurs, already

ciillionaires in their own right.
At ANDHC's first regular meeting on January 10, 1959, the

former Ortodoxo Senator and Fidelista, Federico "Fico" Fern~ndez
Casas, persuaded his fellow hacendados to extend their support to the
Castro government.

7

Julio Lobo, Cuba's m<?st powerful sugar man and

a lone wolf who often shunned the hacendados'association, extended his
,..

I·
I
I
I

6

5

own fulsome

greeting to Castro, comparing him to the Spanish conquista-

·dor, Francisco Pizarro.· 8
ANDHC's journal, Cubazucar, declared the hacendados "victims
••• as were all the nation I s economic forces" of the deposed regime~
Cubazucar lamented the Batista regime's inattention to ANDHC's complaints about government controls, and noted the hacendados I concern
that unsettled conditions might cause the 1959 harvest to be delayed or
. d• 9
even ru1ne

5 El Mund::>, January 8, 1959.

I
I
I
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6 Arribistas are social climbers, adventurers.
7 Castro was at "Fico's" Central America when he learned of
· Batista's flight from Cuba. See Thomas, Cuba, p. 1028.
8 Diario de la Marina, January 10, 1959.
9 Ctibazucar, December, 1958, p. 27.
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ANDHC nominated

a fifteen-man c9ordinating committee to

"deal with the government. " 1 O On this committee were the ardent
.
.
,
Fidelista Julian de Zulueta, the politically neutral Francisco Rodriguez
.
11
and the prominent sugar lawyer, Arturo Manas. · Mart"as' inclusion

was u.nexpected, since he was already under attack by some hacendados
for having been president of the !CEA during Batista's reign.

Manas

was also the acknowledged chief of the American sector, which, though
diminished in the number of its mills, was still very powerful in terms
of ~ts massive production •.

12

He was one of the few men of sufficient

experience, intelligence and will to have led the hacendados over the
next difficult months.

But,like so many leaders of Cuba's old society,

Manas was "under suspicion" and, hence, effectively eliminated from

· ·r·1cant ro 1~·
any s1gn1

13

Several weeks later, the hacendados elected Amado Arechaga
their new president.

14

Such elections were necessary because ANDHC's

10R.evoluci6n, January 10, 1959.
11 Arturo Manas of Manas, Gorin y Alamilla, Cuba's largest and
most prestigious law firm. In 1959 Manas was 59, a generation ahead of
those impatient young hacendados who were now beginning to empujar
(push) for their place in the sun.

12

See above, p. 52.

13

Manas could influence, but he could never be titular chief of
the hacendados. That position was by tradition reserved only for Cubans
owning or administering Cuban centrales.
14 Amado Arechaga y Araluce, a former colono who became a
hacendado by purchasing the small centrales Jatibonico and Jobabo. In
February, 1959, Arechaga was made chairman of the Banco de Colonos.
In 1970 he was managing several sugar mills in Brazil.
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previous chief officers, President Salustiano Garcia Diaz and Vice
President Francisco Pando, had fled with Batista.
link with the Batista regime.

Arechaga had no

He was also a "small" hacendado.

This

pleased the small hacendados who were anxious for a greater voice within ANDHC

in order to more successfully oppose the Americans and the

big Cuban operators like Lobo, G6mez Mena, and the Tarafa heirs.
The big companies could always protect themselves and make a
handsome profit.

The small operators, already virtual wards of the

government, often hovered close to bankruptcy.

Big efficient operators

like Lobo viewed the small operators with disdain, seeing the protectionism they required as responsible for the stagnation of the entire

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

industry.

Events of 1959 began to bave certain parallels with the "re-

volt of th~ ininor{a" of 1941.

15

The minorfa {s~all operators) proposed

a 'broad reorganization" of the association, demanding equality of treatment in such areas as "orientation, advisement and defense" with the
16
· larger centrales.

...
15 See above p~ 52.
The small hacendados were sometimes referred to as the minorf.a because of their secondary position
within the Asociacion de Hacendados as opposed to the large hacendados ,
or the mayor1a. Of the ICEA's 17 members (8 hacendados, 8 colonos
and a government chairman) only two of the 8 hacendados were members
of the minoria; the other six represented the mayoria. Most of the
colonos 5representatives before the ICEA were also large operators.
Thus the interests of the morE numerous small hacendados and colonos
often received short shrift. From interviews with the hacendados Antonio Barro, Miami, April 27, 1971, and Francisco Escobar, member
of the m ino rfa, Miami, April 17, 1971.
16 Diario de la Marina, January 22, 1959.
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Among the leading critics of previous ANDHC policy was Lincoln
Rod6n, speaker of the House of Representatives und~r Pres.ident Carlos
Prio. 17 Rod6n argued that since 193 6 Cuban sugar legislation had been
dedicated to the protection of a "few powerful interests" and manipulated
18 R d6 ' "
,
gang o f " serv1·1 e a1. d es. "
o n s serv1. 1... e a1. d es " were
b y th e same
widely understood to be Manas, Jorge Barroso--Batista's representative
on the ICEA--and Amadeo L6pez Castro.
To reinforce his arguments, Rod6n cited Raul Cepero Bonilla's
influential Pol{tica azucarera, 1952-1958, which detailed the conflict
between public and private interest in the ICEA.

Cepero charged. that

gbvernment representatives were private speculators.
tion was being bilked.

The whole na-

Batista's sugar policy of limited harvest and his

complaisant acceptani::e of a reduction in the U.S. quota were also
roasted. 19 Cepero noted that the chief critics of Batista's sugar policy
during the 1950s were "Fico" Fernandez Casas and Julio Lobo.

20

Ac-

cording to Cepero, Lobo once attempted--without success--to displace
Manas and Barroso.

21

l 7 The Pact of Miami of 1958, which briefly united the antiBatista forces, was signed in the Florida home of Lincoln Rod6n.
Rod6n was a lawyer for the sugar man Baldomero Cases.
18 Diario de la Marina, January 24, 1959.
19 Cepero Bonilla, "Azucar y abolici6n," Obras hist6ricas, p. 429.
20Ibid., pp. 346, 431, 443.
21 Ibid., p. 317.
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In 1959, the tables were turned.

Lobo and Fernandez Casas were

enthusiastic Fidelistas. and Cepero, thanks to his articles, became not
only minister of the economy, but also replaced Manas as Cuban dele·gate to the London Sugar Conference.

Manas' role as chief of the !CEA

was taken by "Fico" Fernandez' son Alberto.

22

While the hacendados were battling among themselves, a commotion }?egan in an unanticipated sector~
were unhappy.

The sugar engineers of Havana

On January 11, the engineers denounced the "colonial

character" of Cuba's economy, decried thei:r own "under·-utilization"
and offered to support the "agrarian plans of the revolutionary government.

1123

Thereafter the Asociacion de Tecnicos Azucareros (Associa-

tion of Sugar Technicians) reiterated these themes, presenting a ten. point plan for the expansion. and modernization of the sugar industry. 24
The engineers' complaints wer.e echoed in a series of editorials
,
,
in the Sugar Technicians'Boletin. The Boletin demanded that the indus·try's "pocket dictators" be removed, and the whole industry "profoundly
.
reor d ere d • 1125 H ow h um1·1·1at·mg 1"t 1s,
wro t e th e e d"t
1 or, th a t , wh en

22 Alberto Fernandez Echevarria was a fund raiser for the M26 in 1958.
23

n·1ar10
·

d e 1a M arma,
.
J anuary 11 , 1959 •

2 4 Ibid., January 17, 1959.
25 Asociacion de Tecnicos Azucareros· de Cuba (ATAC).
Oficial January, 1959, p. 21.

---J

,

Boletin
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foreigners ask to see our research stations, we must reply, "We don't
have any.

II

Only private research stations existed.

26

Harvest, 1959
Overshadowing these January debates was the anxiety of the
hacendados to commence the harvest.

The hacendados set to work re-

pairing roads and bridges, aided by the new Minister of Public Works,
Manuel Ray, who, only a few weeks before as a leader of the urban resistance, had been blowing them up.
demanding its price.

A new obstacle arose.

Labor was

Like the other syndicates, the sugar workers'

union was seeking wage increases, the repositioning with back salaries

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1·

of workers deposed during the Batista regime, and the restoration of

I

certain 9ther benefits. 27
The harve.st did not begin on time.

At Atlantica del Golfo's

Central Stewart in Oriente, 210 former employees wanted their old jobs
back.

And Stewart's workers demanded indemnification for certain holi-

days eliminated during the Batistato.

28

At Manuel Area's Estrada Palma,

26 Ibid., p. 22. The ATAC bulletin estimated that as little as
$50, 000 a year was spent on sugar research in Cuba, a very modest
sum indeed for an industry that grossed between $500-$700 million a
year. Most research was done privately by the large American corporations. Inexplicably, funds set aside by the hacendados and the government for joint sugar research were used to build the National Library.

27 Sugar workers union: Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores
Azucareros (FNTA).
28 Batistato, that is, . during the Batista era.
February 25, 1959.

Revoluci6n,
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a worker's soviet had to be disbanded by Fidel's personal order.

In

mid-February, six weeks after the zafra had begun, some twenty-one
mills (about one-eighth of the total) were still shut down.

29

The leader of Cuba's sugar workers federation, the "chunky,
swarthy, rough, tough" Conrado Becquer, bore revolutionary credentials
of questionable merit.

30

Becquer, a sometime Autentico and congress-

man, had remained in the Batista legislature until 1955. At Christmas
that year, the !CEA had refused to grant a promised wage bonus.
Becquer, number two man in the FNTA, ordered a strike.
full year before Castro landed in Oriente.
in 1956.

Then

This was a

The FNTA returned to work

Becquer, nonetheless, came to think of himself as a Fideli_s ta,

even thoufh his sugar workers were conspicuously neutral during the
balance of Castro's rebellion.

31

establish his revolutionary merit.

Thus in 1959 Becquer was anxious to
How else, then, but to bloody the

hacendados?
In late January Becquer demanded the confiscation of the U. S. -

owned sugar mills Chaparra and Delicias because of their violation of

29wall Street Journal, February 13, 1959.

I
I
I
I
I

3 o Description courtesy of Carlos Todd, Havana Times, December 17, 1959. Becquer's base was the Azqueta family's Central Trinidad.
31 The Fidelistas were delighted to make it appear that the sugar
and bank workers' strikes of 1955 were "revolutionary actions."
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certain social legislation.

These mills were fair game because they

had refused to pay Cas t ro's tax during the. revolution.

32

A few weeks

later, Becquer was denouncing the Bethart family of Central Macagua
in Las Villas as Batistia:hos and enemies of the revolution.

33

As for

ANDHC, Becquer declared that "its arrogance has no limits;" that it
was opposing the mediation of the labor ministry in the current disputes,
and that it wanted the revolution to fail.

34

This was per~aps the first

public intimation that the ANDHC was counterrevolutionary.
The hacendados, continuing their attempt to appease labor and
governme.nt, made a goodwill visit to the offices of the sugar workers I
retirement fund.

At the suggestion of the Treasury Ministry, the sugar

·
35
companies hastened to make advance tax payments.
ANDHC President Are~haga set the pace by advancing $350, 000,

36

Lobo paid$450,00o
38
and the Cuban-American Sugar Company advanced $1. 2 million.

32 Revoluci6n, January 30, 1959. The two sugar mills, among
· the largest in Cuba, belonged to the Cuban-American Sugar Company.
33 Ibid., February 17, 1959. ·
34 Ibid., February 14, 1959.
3 5 This followed the tradition of 1933, when firms like Standard
Oil and Sinclair were encouraged to pay their taxes in advance. See in
Marques Sterling, Historia de Cuba, p. 423.
36 Revoluci6n, January 15, 1959.
37 Bohemia, April 5, 1959, p. 101.
~8 Revoluci6n, January 20, 1959. The amounts advanced do not
indicate the relative size of the corporations involved.

37
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The government's intentions were a great question mark.

were familiar with Castro's pronouncements on the agrarian question
in History Will Absolve Me or in the M-26 Economic Plan. These docu·ments did not receive wide circulation until after the revolution.
over, these were seen as campaign promises.
action another.

More-

Talk was one thing:

The agrarian law of the Sierra was quite moderate and,

again, subject to change.
program vague.

39

The 'tNall Street Journal thought Castro's

The American Embassy- saw little chance that the re-

114 0
.
. ht swing
.
t owar d s . 11 na t.10na1iza
· t 10n.
.
g1me
m1g
Fidel assured one and all in early January that the agrarian law
"won't be radical.

I
I
I
I

Few

1141

He wasn't going to punish those American sugar

companies that had refus.ed to pay the "revolutionary tax." ·However,
he did feel a special obligation toward Cuba's campesinos.

42

Bohemia

picked up this campesino theme, urging the "revindication of the campe.
~

1143 A
. ·1 victim....
. .
·•• th a t h e 1p 1ess an d perennia
wee k 1a t er th e new
I

f

agriculture minister, Humberto Sori Marin,

44

assured the press that

39 This law was prepared by Humberto Sor! Marin and promulgated
in Octobe~. 1958.
·
4 oWall Street Journal, January 2 and 5, 1959.

I
·1

I
I
I

4l Diario de la Marina, January 10, 1959.

42 Bohemia, January 11, 1959, p. 118.

4 3 Ibid.

I

Po 19.

44 Humberto Sori Marin, lawyer, Catholic, from a family of
political fighters. A bourgeois leftist, he sent his daughter to the Merici
Academy, a finishing school for well-to-do young ladies.

beer baron Julio Blanco lent his La Tropical Stadium to serve ~s a

I
I
I
I
I
I

d epos1"tory. 46

1.
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the agrarian reform law of the Sierra was going to be converted into
reality.

45

In mid-February, a fund raising drive to support agrarian reform, the "Colecta de la Libertad" was begun.
.

.

contribute.

Everyone was urged to

Individuals might give money; companies were expected to

give tractors.

Bohemia volunteered to act as scorekeeper, while the

Hacendados Support the Reform
In March, the hacendados decided to play along, announcing their

support in Bohemia for both an agrarian reform .and industrialization. 47
Cubazucar saluted the idealism of the new regime a?d extended a wistful
hope that the "dynamism and generosity" of the revolution be harnessed
to the hacendados' "enormous experience" to constitute a "triumphant
.
.
1148
~
~ombmahon.
Cubazucar was sure the government understood the

45

Bohemia, January 18, 1959, p. 42.

46 Julio Blanco Herrera, owner of La Tropical ~ewery and one
of Castro's earliest financial supporters.

47 Bohemia, March 1, 1959, pp. 64-65. In fairness to the hacendados, it should be noted that they had long supported the industrialization of Cuba--as long as it did not harm their interests. The hacendados
wanted to develop industries utilizing sugar cane by-products, and had,
by 1959, accomplished a fair amount in this direction, including alcohol
industries, particle boards, newsprint, etc.
48 Cubazucar, March, 1959, p. 7.
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"d e 1·1cacy " o f any re f orm effort.

In any case, the reform should con49
centrate on improving the use of vacant public and private lands.

...

Privately, AND~-IC was deeply divided.

The owners of some of

the smaller mills were ready to play along with Castro.

Some might

sell out; others could live with the one hundred caballeria (3300 acres)
land limit under discussion.

Some big interests like Julio Lobo, who

sold half of the nation's sugar, believed they were untouchable.
tista had left Lobo alone; Castro would do the same.

50

Ba-

Most vulnerable

were the American firms, many of which had large portiops of administration cane (company-owned canefields) which would surely be the first
targets of the reform.
Respected voices spoke out in favor of agrarian reform.

Julfo

Lobo saw the reform ·in terms of technical modernization and an easing
of government controls.

He told a meeting of sugar technicians that

sugar workers' wages were too high in relation to Cuba's competitors,
·and that old mills must be dismantled in the name of efficiency.

51

The

Diario de la Marina conceded that Cuba needed an agrarian reform, but
.

one that respected private property.

52

State lands, idle lands, the Za-

pata swamp, should be exploited before considering intervening private

I
I
I
I
I

49 Ibid .• p. 9.
50rnterview with Carlos Todd, Julio Lobo's nephew and a stockholder in Lobo's sugar enterprises. Miami, December 3, 1970.
51 Diario de la Marina, February 20, 1959.
5 2 Ibid., March 6, 1959.

125

farms under cultivation.

53

The columnist Luis Aguilar Leon of Prensa

Libre had little sympathy for those who would be destroyed ~y the reform: "The cry of •... the broken latifundista, " he wrote in March, 1959,
"is basically an isolated and echoless cry. "

54

The voice of an old re-

former was heard: the Catholic legislator Manuel Dorta Duque told the

I
I
I
I
I

Rotary Club that hacendados, ganaderos, colonos, everyone wanted an
agrarian reform.

To Dorta, the reform had ceased being a utopian

theme; it was now an urgent necessity.
Some distinctly Cuban mills began to sound their nationalistic
horns.

The formerly American-owned Guantanamo Sugar Company,

. S. A.·, operator of Centrales Isabel, Soledad and Los Cairos in Oriente,
announced that, as part of a "revindicaci6n nacionalista, " it was fully
·
55
Cuban owned and manc;ged by Cuban nationals.
Moreover, in the interest of "justice. and the felicity of the campesinos" Guantanamo Sugar

53 Editorial in Diario de la Marina, March 13, 1959.
54 Column in Prensa Libre~ March 21, 1959, in Rolando E.
Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes (eds.) Cuba in Revolution (New York:
Anchor Books, 1972), p. 142. Aguilar Le6n is currently a professor
· of history at Georgetown University.
55 Revoluci6n, March 2, 1959. Under Cuban control, the Guantanamo Sugar Company became the Compari{a Azucarera Guantanamo,
S. A., a small but, its owners apparently hoped, an important difference.
The company's Soledad sugar mill had passed from Cuban hands in the
late 19th century into those of the American entrepreneur Edward Atkins.
It remained in U.S. control until 1959. This kind of progression, from
Cuban to American to Cuban control, by 1959, was typical of much of
the sugar industry.
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promised to undertake various diversification projects to provide jobs
for sugar workers during the dead season.

The great national campaign in favor of the agrarian reform be57
came, by mid-March, something of a national mania. .
The Lyceum
and L~wn Tennis Club gave an agrarian tea.

Those attending contri-

buted inexpensive farm implements, a rake or a hoe.

58

Students at

the Colegio Belen, despite the complaints of some parents. collected
funds for a tractor.

59

.
60
The Aspuru sugar family gave three;
the

Cuban Canadian Sugar Company, two.
family gave $5, 000;

62

61

The prominent Luis del Valle

the Cuban Chamber of Commer~e gave $50, 000.

63

Everyone gave.

56 Ibid. Among these projects was to be the. production of cattle
feed, cement bloc~s. cane carts, carpentry and sewing shops.
57

Checks for the collection were to be addressed: "Fidel Castro,
Revista Bohemia. " Bohemia, March 1, 1959, p. 70.
58 Havana Times, March 26, 1959.
59

Interview with Father Baldor, rector of Belen.

Miami, June

10, 1971.
60
61

I
I
I
I
I

56

62

Diario de la Mar.ina, March · 15, 1959.
Revolucion, March 11, 1959.
Bohemia, March 8, 1959, p. 76.

63 Revolucion, March 18, 1959. For a complete list of donors
. to the Agrarian Reform, see Leovigildo Ru{z. Diario de una traicion, 1959
{Miami: Florida Typesetting of Miami, 1965), pp. 269-272.

127
The Asociaci6n de Ganaderos announced they were giving the
11

colecta

11

•

•

100, 000 pregnant cows, worth an estimated

This took the hacendados by surprise.
viduals~ but not as an organization.

$

.

1, 250, 000.

64

They had contributed as indi-

ANDHC's secretary, Gregorio

Escagedo, who served as a conduit to Castro, reported that Fidel wanted
a donation of sugar. 65 100, 000 tons was decided upon and the news
rushed to Fidel.

He commented to the messenger that 100, 000 tons

was a modest contribution indeed when he had in mind taking the entire
zafra.

66

Was Castro joking?

The hacendados' gift was thereafter amplified to include $2. 5
million in cash.

The 100, 000 tons of sugar were to be given jointly by

.
67
the whole sugar sector of hacendados, colonos, and obreros.
Fidel began to meddle in ANDHC's interpal affairs.

From time

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

to time, Alberto Fernandez, the head of the !CEA, would bring a note

64 Diari0 de la Marina, March 3, 1959.
65

Gregorio Escagedo, cattleman, sugar mill crwner; an extremely able and intelligent businessman. He was an early supporter
of the Castro rebellion. In exile, a counterrevolutionary and successful cattleman in Florida.
66 Interview with Francisco "Pacorro" Rodriguez, vice-president
of Atlantica del Golfo and manager of that company's ''Hershey" sugar
mills in 1958. Miami, May 14, 1971.
.
67 Cubazucar, April, 1959, p. 7. 100, 000 tons of sugar at an
average of five cents a pound was worth around $10 million. An ANDHC
committee, including Manuel Arca, Benito Carballo, Francisco Rodriguez,
Antonio Barro, J.M. Casanova and Estanislao del Valle, was still discus-·
sing the· gift as late as April 27t~. (Revoluci6n, May 9, 1959.)
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from Fidel expressing an interest in various issues.

Fidel was ap-

parently instrumental in forcing the retirement from the A~DHC of such
major -sugarmen and suspected Batistfanos as Manuel Aspuru (owner of
Centrales Toledo, Provendencia, Fajardo) and Jose Gomez Mena.

The

departur'e of these and other patriarchs caused representational difficulties.

Eventually, sons or relatives were called irt to take their places.

But it _was another blow to ANDHC 's power and stability. 68
On April 7, by virtue of Law 215, those hacendados whose cane
had been burned during the rebellion were authorized to grind an amount
equal to their loss in 1 ~57 and 19~8.

69

In effect, this decree compen-

sated those hacendados and colonos who had supported Castro in 1958,
since their cane fields suffered most heavily from Castro's attacks;
that is, until they dec~ded to pay up and become his friends.
The sugar mills belonging to the Batistianos were confiscated by
the Ministry for the Recovery of Stolen Property,_ MR.BM.

By the end

of March, the MR.BM haq. taken six sugar mills, including Batista's
.

~

r

Washmgton, Gaston Godoy's Andorra, and ex-Senator Garcia Herera's
.
70
Mari'a Antonia.
This kind of retribution against the losing side had
time-honored precedent in Cuba. The Spaniards had taken as much as

I
I
I
I
I

68 Interview with Francisco Rodri'guez.
69 Anuario azucarero, 1959, p. 166.
70Havana Times, April 2, 1959.

Miami, May 14, 1971.
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I
I
I

$100 million in properties ~rom the rebellious Cubans during the war

of independence; the idea was considered by the rebels of '33.

Castro

•' .
71
had promised such retribution as early as 1957.
Many hacendados

·I

{eared that government seizure and administra.t ion of sugar mills were
setting a dangerous precedent.

MRBM officials were boasting of their

effici~ncy i~ running Central Australia.

I
I

72

At the end of March, Castro reassured the hacendados, saying

1.

they had "nothing to fear if they collaborate with the people and the
·revolution.

1173

in the ICEA.

Castr<? added that he wanted a representative of labor

And labor most definitely wanted to be included.

FNTA

chief Becquer complained that the hacendados had made $100 million in
profits in 1958, while the workers, thanks to labor-saving improvements,
had been cheated out of $50 million in salaries over the last five years.

74

"Which, " asked Becquer, "of the patriarchs have converted their sugar

7l Ely, Cuando reinaba, p. 670; Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 103.

1959.

72 Interview with Danilo Mesa, vice-minister of the MRBM in
Gainesville, June 21, 1971.

· 73 Diario de la Marina, March 31, 1959.
74 .Revoluci6n, May 7, 1959; May 15, 1959. There was some
truth in Becquer's charges. For example, such labor-saving innovations as chemical sprays to kill weeds; as opposed to weed removal by
manual labor, had cut the need for workers. Becquer seemed unconcerned that by discouraging the use of modern techniques he would make
Cuba increasingly uncompetitive in the world sugar market.
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mills into an industrial enterprise capable of giving year-round work? 1175
Very few indeed.

In a paternalistic society, it was the patron's respon.:

sibility to provide work--for whatever number of children the workers
might have.
With the government's backing, the FNTA forced the hacendados
to agree to super-production payments for 1959.

This was a scheme,

developed in the 1940s, to compensate labor for the loss ·of job-hours
owing to technical improvements.

One hacendado thought the eventual

cost for 1959 would be $25 million. 76 This sum did not include the 830 percent wage increase granted the sugar workers in the 1959 harvest
by law 260 of April 22, 1959.

The cost was born jointly by hacendados
.
\

and colonos.

77

For Central San Antonio, a small mill in Havana Pro-

vince, this meant a bonus totalling $18, 000.

San Antonio's grateful

workers donated $4, 000 to the agrarian .reform fund. '7B
In April the sugar technicians held a series of conferences on

· the agrarian question.

The conferences,sponsored by the Banco Nunez,

concurred on the need for more sugar technicians, land for those who
work it, exploitation of unused land, the establishment of co-ops,

I
I
I
I
I

75 Ibid.
76 Letter from Antonio Barro to "Alfonso, "nom de guerre of
Nicolas Braga, Cuban Trading Co., New York. Havana, January 4, 1960.
7 7 T.
. 1ac1on
. ' R evo 1uc1onar1a,
..
. "
1rso Cl emente, "L eg1s
(Mexico) May-August, 1959; p. 150.

78 R
.,
M ay 19 , 1959 •
evo1uc1on,-

Human1smo
.
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rational planning, the need for industrial diversification and so on.
Nothing dramatic; but an interesting example of the broad support for
·
79
agrarian reform.
A general gloom prevailed at ANDI-IC.

World sugar prices

dropped to 2. 91 cents per pound, the lowest since World War II.

80

And there were disquieting rumbles from Cuba's protected American
market.

While Fidel was asking for a larger U.S. quota, Senator Allan

Ellender of Louisiana was wondering if sugar imports ought to be reduced. 81 Despite these difficulties, by May it was evident that the harvest would reach or even exceed the 5. 8 million ton target set by the
!CEA. And prices for raw sugar rose slightly in the U.S., signalling
.
/

a $30 million bounty for the Cuban sugar iridustr.y.

82

Thus the Cuban

mix-master, alternately blending gloom and hope.
Towards the end of April the Bank for Industrial and Agricultural Development's vice- president, Castro Ferragut, estimated that an

79 Ciclo de conferencias sobre reforma agraria, el desarrollo
y el p rogreso de l a economia nacional (Havana: Banco Nunez; Banco
del Occidente, 1959), pp. 8-10.
80

The New York Times, April 3, 1959.

81 Diario de la Marina, April 22, 1959. Ellender was viewed
by many as Cuba's worst enemy. His Louisiana and Castro's Cuba were
competitors. Both produced sugar and rice. Attempts by Cuba to raise
tariffs to protect her rice industry and, hence, lower rice imports from
Louisiana were met by Ellender's threats to cut the U.S. sugar quota.
· He thought Cuba should diversify, not into rice, but into vegetables and
fruits. Let them compete with Florida!
82 Hispanic Ameri can Repo rt, May, 1959, p. 265.
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agrarian reform would cost . $300 million a year over five years.

83

He

thought private enterprise. private banks and commercial enterprises
would participate.

84

Some had hdped that Castro, during his April

visit to the United States, yrould seek a loan of as much as $500 million
to help finance the agrarian reform.
anything.

86

85

But Castro refused to ask for

The day before the reform was issued, the hacendado Jose

Manuel Casanova, Jr.; had lunch with Treasury Minister Lopez-Fresquet,
one of the "moderates" who, the businessmen hoped, would make the
Fidelistas "listen to r~ason." During the lunch Lopez-Fresquet admitted
he knew nothing of the forthcoming; agrarian reform.

Nonetheless, the

..
d 1"t . ·87
next d ay h e s1gne

Castro's Agrarian Reform
The refor.~ was a bombshell, impacting with stunning force on
the sugar sector.

U~ S. owned enterprises seemed the principal target.

83 Banco Nacional y Financiera Agri'cola y Industrial Cubana
(BANFAIC).
8 4 Havana Times, April 26, 1959.
·85 Noticias (New York), April 14, 1959. One doubts that the
United States would have underwritten agrarian reform in 1959. But
times change. In 1972, the U.S. pledged $40, 000, 000 to help pay for
lands being expropriated under the South Vietnamese land reform program. Vietnamese owners are being paid 20% in cash, the balance in
bonds in eight annual installments. (The New York Times. January 4,
1972. )
86
A number of businessmen became uneasy when Castro failed
to reach some kind of modus vivendi with the U.S. during his April visit.
87

Interview with the hacendado Jose Manuel Casanova.
June 20, 1971.

Miam~.

133

Farms were limited to one thousand acres; sugar companies must have
100 percent Cuban stockholders.

buy or inherit agricultural lands.
sated in government bonds.
Sugar stocks pl1:1mmeted.

88

Foreigners would not be allowed to
Expropriated land would be compen-

A howl of protest arose on Wall Street.

Cuban-American Sugar, . with 365, 000 acres,

dropped 2 3 /4; West Indies Sugar, with 200, 000 acres, fell 3 3 /8.

89

If the law were rigorously applied, it would mean the demise of the en-

tire American sector.
The great question was: how would the reform work in practice?
Everyone hoped for exc_eptions, special considerations, delays, for the
workings of influence.

The Americans speculated that U.S. leverage
-

.

over the Cuban sugar quota would force some modifications.

Some of

the smaller Cuban mills, much of whose cane was held by colonos, thought
they could survive with a thousand acre limit.

9

° Cuban-American Sugar

·
91
offered to sell off unused lands to the government.
In Matanzas, some

sugar men planned to form a cooperative with their colonos, investing
sufficient capital to double sugar yield per acre, then reduce sugar

88 "Ley de reforma agraria de Cuba, " Humanismo (Mexico)
(May-August, 1959), pp. 76-102.
.

89 The New York Times, May 20, 1959; Wall Street Journal,
May 20, 1959.
90 Interview with Jose Manuel Casanova. Miami, June 20, 1971.

9~ Interview with Ernesto Freyre, labor lawyer. Miami Beach,
June 10, 1971.
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acreage by half and plant rice on the remainder.

92

Castro assured the rich that the reform did not reflect any animosity against them.

Rather, the spectacle of rural poverty, "of bare-

·root rachitic children," gave him the "absolute conviction" that the
division of large estates was essential.
be affected.

93

Besides, relatively few would

Only 4, 500 farms exceeded the thousand acre limit.

These

lands might be worth $300 million, but peasant income under the reform
would rise by $400 million.

94

· In the midst of this furor, the hacendados were seeking a new
president to replace interim pres_ident Arechega.
wanted the job.

95

Castillo Pokorny, one of four pro-Castro small-mill

owners known as the
it down.

96

None of the best men

cuatro cartuchos ,

was offered the job but turned

Teobaldo Roseil, described by Revolucion as "very closely

9 2 Interview with Miguel Bretos, formerly of Matanzas. Miami,
February 19, 1971.
93 Diario de la Marina, May 19, 1959.
94Ibid., May 22, 1959.
95 The same retreat of the best men and the pushing forward of
secondary figures in the summer of 1959 occurred throughout Cuban society. The alta-burguesfa would not fight; everyone feared they would be
"burned." Most cf the secondary figures were of course content to "go
along" with whatever the government happened to propose. But perhaps
there -were no alternatives?
96

Castillo Pokorny 1s family-owned Central Habana of Havana Province. Interview with Antonio Barro of the ANDHC. Miami, May 25,
1971. The cuatro cartuchos is a reference to the small size of the proFidelistas 1 sugar mills, cartt1.cho being a term of the colonial era when
sugar mills were numerous, but quite tiny. Actually, the cuatro cartuchos were five: Manuel Arca, Luis de Armas, 'Teobaldo Rosell, Gregorio Escagedo, Jr.) and Castillo Pokorny.
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linked to the revolution," also turned down the nomination. He did,
however, become T reasurer. 97 Another of the

11

cuatro
cartuc h os,

II

Manuel Arca, moved up to third . ~ce- president. 98 Benito Carballo
was the new president.

He was an outsider, a lawyer-become-sugar

I
I
I
I

man by virtue of his marriage into the Berguiristan sugar family.
Revoluci6n noted that ANDHC's new board of directors was composed of
small hacendados, men who "are publicly recognized as persons closely
linked to the revolutionary task. 1199
ANDHC's new president feared the agrarian reform would have
"grave economic repercussions.". He asked for an audience with
. Castro. lOO Cubazucar feared the reforms projected speed and magnitude. If sugar productio'n fell, Cuba would suffer a. further loss of its
1

already diminished sr:are of the world market. Ol The Havana. Times I
Carlos Todd thought the reform a "pink socialist dream.
d a d.os were

11

The hacen-

. th e tu m b re1s 1n
. f rig
. ht ene d s1'l ence. 11102 T
r1;d.mg m
· o dd d e-

II

cried the hacendados as ua bunch of terrified midgets." 103 Todd's

97 Revoluci6n, May 25, 1959.
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid.
100 Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1959.

lOlcubazucar, May, 1959, p. 7.
102 Havana Times, May 23, 1959.
103 Ibid., May 28, 1959.
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uncle, the sugar magnate Julio Lobo, told him to shut up as his comments were making things difficult for the industry.

104

The Diario de la Marina, the sentinel of Cuban conservatism,
took a remarkably progressive position on the agrarian question.

The

Diario agreed that the guajiro's (peasant) situation was wretched and
documented this with photographs of rural misery.

It also denounced

the irresponsible rich, saying that Batista's 1952 coup had increased
"oligarchic dominance at the expense of the nation's fundamental in'terests. " Although the Diario preferred evolution to rev:olution, Castro's revolution was understandable.

The Diario accepted the agrarian

reform, but retained the right to criticize it.

This was clearly the apo'
105
gee of the Diario's attempts to sympathize with the revolution.
The FNTA 's Conrado Becquer applauded the reform, finding it

a fundamental step towards the economic liberation of Cuba. 106 Becquer

104 Interview with Carlos Todd, Miar~i. December 3, 1970. Of
· all the commentators on the revolution, Todd was perhaps the most direct, honest and irreverent. His criticisms sometimes raised more
havoc with the old society than with the revolution. It was he, for example, who helped to remove President Manuel Urrutia from office with
his expose about Urrutia's elegant new Havana home--purchased at a
time when the revolution (i.e., Fidel) was emphasizing an austerity program.
!05 Earlier Diario criticisms of the reform included a fear that
it would destroy the free enterprise system and discourage foreign investm ent. The Diario wanted both hac endados and colonos represented
11
within the !NRA. It wanted a reform that would improve the situation
11
of future generations without penalizing the present generation.
(See
Diario editorials of May 27 and 30, 1959.)
106niario de la Marina, May 31, 1959.
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thought less of the new president of the hacendados, Benito Carballo,
characterizing him as a

II

well-known land grabber.

II

107

Inspired by

the FNTA Congress and elections at the end of May, Becquer continued
to press for more benefits.

At the Congress, the M-26 beat back a

communist challenge, with the sugar worker and the CTC chief David
Salvador shouting "Fu era los comunistas- -que vayan para Rusia. "
(Communists get out--go home to Russia. )108 Conrado Becquer was
re-elected as FNTA chief.

Hacendados as Counterrevolutionaries
On June 9th Castro took a decisive step toward the demise of
private organizations in ~uba.

He announced that he was not going to

accept any of the gifts to the agrarian reform from the hacendados ',
colonos', or ganaderos ' associations.
•
h e1p o. f count errevo 1u t•1onar1es.
attempt to buy the government.

II

"We don't want,

11

he said, "the

109 C t
as ro sa1"d th ese g ift s were

11110

an

II ·

The reason for this change of

heart--Fidel had earlier -encouraged these contributions--lay in a letter from a Havana lawyer to the Francisco Sugar Company's headquarters
at 106 Wall Street, New York.

111

The intercepted letter, written by

107 Revoluci6n, May 29, 1959.
108 Bohemia, May 31, 1959, p. 94.
lOS Revoluci6n, June 10, 1959.
llOHavana Times, June 11, 1959.
111 The Francisco Sugar Company was one subsidiary of the
Rionda-Braga sugar combine.
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Robe.rto Maxwell ~nd dated February, 1959, revealed that the Asociaci6n de Ganaderos was planning to influence the projected agrarian reform, raising $500, 000 to win over the press.

This plan was never put

into action, but Fidel used the letter most cleverly to denigrate the
great interests.
nating letters,

Fidel concluded suggestively that he had many incrimi"

.
.
,.112
some in English, some m Spanish.

Rebellious Clerks
That the Maxwell letter could find its way from private files into
Fidel's hands reflects an important aspect of the revolution: the existence, within many of Cuba's important firms, of young Castroite informers.

Their activities substantially diminished the possibility of

counterrevolution.
The presence of these rebellious clerks in the sugar companies'
Havana offices became evident in early 1959 when they attempted to
organize and link themselves with the FNTA.

The situation was es-

pecially tense in the offices of Julio Lobo's sugar trading firm, Lobo
and Olavarr{a.

Lobo, the sugar baron and collector of Napoleana, was,
..

to his young employees, a fearsome patriarch.

I
I
I
I
I

a Russian czar.

They marvelled at his ability, his audacity, his cruelty.

They trembled when he came in.
sigh of relief.

Some thought him like

When he left, there was a collective

The older workers wanted no part of the planned syndi-

cate, recalling that, in years past, a similar attempt had resulted in

112 Revoluci6n, June 10, 1959.
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mass dismissals.

Once, when Lobo was· confronted with a strike in a

drugstore he owned, he closed the place down--for good. He was not

an

easy man to bargain with.
The young workers, inflamed with revolutionary audacity, none-

theless confron~ed Lobo demanding permission to qrganize.
to their demand.

He yielded

He was a proud man, but he was also a realist.

1959 it was not politic to defy the revolution.

In

Lobo yielded, but not be-

fore humbling the young clerks.

Tapping his head with his finger, he

said with magnificent contempt:

11

.

•

Without me, you are nothing.

The rebellious c.lerks would have their revenge.

,,113

Toward the end

of the summer, Lobo was planning a splendid wedding for his niece,
Virginia ~obo y Menocal, who was to marry the ·son of the sugar man
Aurelio Portuondo.

T}le wedding was to occur, with pomp and circum-

stance, in the Havana Cathedral.

Lobo thereupon received an anonymous

note warning that such ostentation was not in keeping with revolutionary
austerity.

Possible dangers were alluded to.

Lobo reluctantly agreed

to a more modest ceremony in the Hermita de los Catalanes.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

114

Un-

happily, the pair proved mismatched and were eventually ·divorced.
Virginia later married the American Earl "Ted" Williamson, the chief

113 This account from a former official in Lobo's Havana offices.
114 Diario de la Marina, September 2; September 15, 1959. Lobo's
daughter Maria Luisa Lobo y Montalvo married the American millionaire
and banker, John C. Ryan, III.
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·of the CIA station in Havana in 1959. 115
Management at the Cuban Trading Company, one of Lobo's competitors, was surprised when its office workers announced their intentiort to organize.

Company officials thought this foolish since they paid

well, gave a month's paid vacation, sick leave, and had a retirement
fund.

Nonetheless, the young M-26ers not only organized but also

sought, and eventually received, a 30 percent pay increase.

116

When Castro revealed his agrarian reform, he said there would
be no changes, no turning back.

Nonetheless, he did organize a kind of

public consultation, the F6rum de Reforma Agraria of July, 1959. l l 7

1.·

Raul Castro set the tone for the F6rum with the imprecation: "Reform

I
I
I
I

115 In 1971, as chief of the CIA station in Costa Rica, Williamson became embroiled in a minor political tempest; During the presidential election campaign there it becam~ known that the CIA chief's wife, Virginia Lobo, was criticizing President Figuerc:s for his plans
to renew diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. When Virginia's
criticisms became public knowledge, the Costa Ricans became incensed.
This was intolerable even from a Lobo. Williamson and his Cuban wife
were asked to leave the country. See in Miami Herald, February 11,
1971.

I
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116

Interview with Antonio Barro, vice-president of the Cuban
Trading Corporationa Miami, June 24, 1971. There were_also Castro
agents within the law firms which handled the sugar sector's legal affairs. Fidel said he had compromising letters from such law offices
as Manas, Macia and Alamilla, Cuba's largest law firm. Mario Lazo,
whose firm handled many important American clients, had M-26ers
among his staff.
·
117 F6rums were also held on such subjects as industry, recreation, and judicial reform. Most impressive were the truly open--and
effective- -hearings on the tax reform. (See above, p. 279.) Some were
truly open; some for show, perhaps others to discourage or smoke out
counterrevolutionary opinion.
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or Death.

11

11a

.
,
A delegation of hacendados attended the Forum, uneasy

in their summer suits and silk ties next to the olive green uniforms of
the Castroites.

In one session, "'tiie hacendados attempted--without ef-

fect--to make the point that, owing to the 1937 Sugar Coordination Law
guaranteeing the colonos tenancy on the land they tilled, the sugar mill
owners had for all practical purposes already lost most of their lands.

119

But this argument was deceptive since in some cases hacendados were
also colonos.

Years before, foreseeing just such an atta~k, many had

separated their lands from their sugar mills, forming separate corporations or dividing up the land among family and friends.

Jose M. Casa-

. nova's Central Orozco had very little "administration cane.

II

But Jose

Manuel Casanova had, in his own name, no less -than 5. 7 million arrobas,
making him one of the, largest colonos in Cuba.

120

After the fourth day

of debate, the ANDHC repre~entatives withdrew from the Forum.

121

For Cuba's hacendados, colonos and ganaderos the net result of
the Forum Agraria· was nil.

They aired a few complaints, but there-

after reiterated their support for Castro's reform.

All were clearly

intimidated by Castro's brilliant manipulation of public opinion in favor

l lB Revolucion, June 29, 1959.
119
120

· · d e 1a M ar1na,
·
J u 1y 7 , 1959 .
D1ar10

Anuario azucarero, 1958, p. 119.

121 The New York Times, July 14, 1959.
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- ,·
of the reform.

One million ·signatures for the reform were collected.

Mass meetings in the reform' s defense were held in various parts of
the island.

A great peasant march on Havana was scheduled for July 26.

Fidel thought that this latter event. in which the cam p esinos were invited to bring their machetes, "might soften" the illusions of those who
dreamed of paralyzing the agrarian reform. -1 22 But the hacendados were
somewhat comforted.

Fidel gave them a year of grace.

No sugar lands

would be intervened until after the 1960 harvest.
Tile bourgeoisie demonstrated its approval of the ~grarian reform with both cash (for Bohemia's "Colecta de la Libertad") and statements of support.

Many were sincere.

of self-preservation~
not as executed.

Others applauded in the interest

Some say they approved the law as written, bu~:

But the law, as written, would have destroyed most of

the large landholders, including virtually all the American sugar companies.

Fidel confirmed this impression,saying that the only ones to

suffer would be the "foreign bosses" and the big .Cuban latifundistas. 123
Most Cubans were content with Fidel's analysis.

Let the big

latifundistas, Yankee and Cl:lban alike, suffer the consequences of their
greed.

I
I
I
I
I

As the Autentico leader Tony Varona put it, "there are no big

122 Bohemia, June 2 5, 1959, p. 88.
123 Diario de la Marina, July 12, 1959.
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.
·
.,124
land holders m our party.
Thus the agrarian reform became

.

~

anofuer element of what the Cubans would call the revoluc10n del callo;
a revolution in which no one complained until their own corn (or callo)
was stepped on.
Among the most fervent supporters of the agrarian reform were
those who knew least about it.

These included the Catholic Church, fue

Associations of Lawyers, Industrialists, Banks and Textiie Manufacturers, fue Committee of Civil Institutions, the Association of Private
Secondary Schools.

125

Senior state.smen, including ex-Presidents

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

Hevia, Grau, and Pri'o, approved the reform, as did former Vice
President Alonso Pujol.

Before this avalanche of support, the oppos1-

tion was easily swept aside.

Many of the reform 's enthusiasts saw it as

an exercise in justice, an essay _in moral indignation.

Few perceived

its profound economic, social, and political consequences.

124

Bohemia, June 28, 1959, p. 94. Varona said there had never
been a hacendado or colorio with more than 300, 000 arrobas of s u gar cane
in his PRC . 300, 00 0 arrobas is a negligible amount . The Castros had
240, 000 arrobas at their colonia Biran. Varona did attempt to air some
reservations about the reform, but was told by ex-President Prfo to
demonstrate "loyalty to the revolution. 11 Se.e in same Bohem i a , p. 77.
12 5see, for example, the letter to the Diario de la Marina's
columnist Vulcano complaining that "workers from the city who knew
nothing of agriculture "are expressing themselves in favor of the agrarian
reform. 11 Diario de la Marina, June 16, 1959.
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Donors to the Agrarian Reform
In the summer cf 1959 some burgueses demonstrated their sup-

port for the agrarian reform by offering the revolution their sugar mills.
In early ·July the Gomez Mena family gave Castro their sugar mill Santa

Teresa in Camagiiey with no strings attached •.126 The mill and its lands
were valued at $2. 8 million.

127
,
,
. The hacendado Jesus Fernandez Mag-

dalena, a "great friend of the revolution, " donated his Central San
Pablo.

128

These were small mills, San Pablo among the smallest.

But it was the spirit of the gift that counted.
There were substantial gifts of land as well.

Sr. Sierra Chibas

of Naranj0, Oriente, offered his one thousand acre finca, Los Naranjos.

129

The farmer 8;nd lawyer Arturo Bravo Acosta of Oriente gave

lands; the municipality uf Jiguani gave almost 270, 000 acres. 130

126 Revoluci6n July 1, 1959. It was rumored that Julio Lobo ·
had given Ca s tro a mill as a personal present. But there is no evidence
of this.
127 Ibid.
12 8 Ibid., July 14, 1959. Fernandez estimated his mill's value
at $500, ooo."see in Revoluci6n, July 15, 1959. Could it be that these
generous donors were dumping mills which were small, old and unprofitable? Did the G6mez Mena's hope this gift would mitigate their reputation for closeness to Batista and thereby save their other, larger mills?
129

Revoluci6n~ August 19, 1959.

130 El Mundo, January 9, 1960.

I
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.

.

Agriculture Minister Sori Marin asked ~e hacendado Marcos Zarraga
of Central Adela how much land he was going to give.
wasn't going to give any.

131

Zarraga said he .

Nonetheless, the amount of lands freely

given to !NRA was extraordinary.

Some 7. 3 percent of all lands held

by !NRA as of May, 1961 (about 800, 000 acres) were donated, without
compensation.

132

Others voluntarily sold their lands and sugar m~lls to .INRA.
The Menocal family ·sold !NRA their sugar mill, Santa Marta, in Camagiiey. 133 The Hernandez Nieto brothers offered to pass their 4, 500
·
134
acre sugar farm to !NRA in exchange for government bonds.
By

May, 1961, almost 1. 5 milli~n acres had been sold to INRA. 13 5
What was the hacendados I true attitude? Treasury Minister
L6pez-Fresquet assures us the hacendado Jorge Remedios was so enthusiastic about the reform that he joined a peasant rally in the reform 's

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

·1

support and "personally marchep at the head of two thousand peasants

l 3 l Interview with Marcos Zarraga, owner of Central Adela.
Coral Gables, February 24, 1971.

132 Michel Gutelman, "The Socialization of the Means of Production in Cuba" in Bonachea and Valdes (eds.), Cuba in. Revolution, p. 246.
133 Mario Menocal says this is "absolutely false" (Letter to author, Miami, March 27, 1972). However, the account in Revoluci6n,
August 26, 1959, plus the testimony of two eminent witnesses, suggest
that the mill was sold.
134 Revoluci6n, June 30, 1959.

.

135 Gutelman, "The Socialization, 11 Cuba in Revolution, p. 246.
This 1. 5 million acres amounted to 13. 1 % of all lands held by INRA as of
May, 1961.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I

·1

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
1·
I
I
I
I

146
who worked his land~ 136 Lopez-Fresquet neglects to mention that the
following month the Remedios brothers were arrested in a counterrevolutionary uprising 2..imed at knocking down the reform

137

The hacendados were in fact split, divided, coming apart.
had no policy, no leadership, no unity, no hope.

They

The association's

meetings were held with open doors so as to allay suspicion.

Talk of

joint action, of turning the entire sugar sector over to Fidel at a stroke
and drowning the revolution in a sea of sugar, had long been abandoned. 138
The hacendados were afraid.

When they met with INRA official Oscar

Pino-Santos, he glared at Jose Manuel Casanova with such contempt as
.
1113 9
to give the latter the impression that "I had no right to be alive.
.

/

ANDHC 's President Benito Carballo made one last effort in June,
1959, at criticizing tht; reform, saying it would "annihilate the right of
property." He wante:d the reform to include government land, or vacant
and under-utilized land, but never productive farms.

Carballo was also

l36 L6pez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months, p. 173. The Remedios brothers, Carlos and Jorge, were owners of the Central Rfo
Cauto, Oriente.
137Havana Times, August 10, 1959.
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138 Interview with Francisco Escobar, former owner of Central
Salvador. Miami, April 1 7, 1971.
l3 9 Interview with Jose Manuel Casanova. Miami, June 20, 1971.
Pino-Santos himself felt quite lively, having catapulted from a public
relations man under the Batista regime to member of the ICEA. By
August, 1959, he was chief of production at INRA, at 29 in charge of
more sugar mills than Julio Lobo himself.

- -- -

-

-
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against "affecting the American interest" because they had "contributed
notably to the development of the sugar industry in Cuba and because the
security of our American market requires that we maintain good rela.
11140 Thereafter; the hacendados gave up the futi·1 e game of
tions....

public criticism and were described, amusingly, as "in favor" of the
reform.

Such was the confusion and dismay among the hacendados that

their review, Cubazucar, ceased publication for three months.
Even once fervent Fidelistas within the ANDHC began to feel the
bite of the revolution.

"Fico" Fernandez Casas' workers at Central

America were calling for government intervention, alleging their patron
had failed to comply with certain s~cial regulations.

Fernandez tran-

quilized them .w ith an $80, 000 advance and an offer of two thousand
acres of land to grow fruits or vegetables. l4l

I
I
I
I

I
I
1.
I
I
I

The hacendados and the FNTA were ever more at loggerheads.
Labor, sensing its power, wanted the hacendados to spend more, pro'vide jobs during the dead season of late summer. and fall.

The hacenda-

dos, fearing they were about to lose everything, wanted to spend less.
All but the most vital and obvious expenses were postponed.

The FNTA--

noting this:--increased its demands for government intervention.

When

the metalworkers were not invited to begin their annual repairs at the

140

,
Cubazucar, June,1959, pp. 8, 30.

14l Revolucion, June 16; June 20, 1959; July 11, 1959.
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various sugar mills, FNTA chief Becquer saw a "maneuver" by the
hacendados.

142

Bccquer urged the intervention of Central Amazonas

for its failure to pay super-production.
of $3. 14 during the dead season.

144

143

He demanded a daily salary

When the Central Hermita failed

to pay its super-production, the FNTA persuaded !NRA to intervene
it.

145

The next day the FNTA asked for the intervention of Central

Santa Regina as it had gone bankrupt.

146

INRA thought it might buy this

sugar mill which it intervened on August 25th.

147

In December, Santa

Regina's owner, Eugenio Sosa y Chabau, brother-in-law ?f the editor
of the Diario de la Marina, was arrested for counterrevolutionary
. •t1es.
•
148
ac t 1vi
At the _end of August, the Asociaci6n de Colonos sought the intervention of forty-three sugar mills for failure to pay their colonos.

149

The mill owners responded that they were short of cash owing to low

142 Ibid.. July 15, 1959.
143 Ibid •• July 31, 1959.
144 Diario de la Marina, August 5, 1959.
145 Revoluci6n, August 13, 1959.
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146' Ibid •• August 14, 1959.
147 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 161.
148 The New York Times, December 30, 1959.
20-year sentence.
149 Ibid., August 24, 1859.

Sosa received a

149

world sugar prices.

That same day INRA intervened Central Macagua,

charging its owners had refused to plant new cane or cultivate the old
l
150
.
. .
an d were d 1sm1ssmg emp oyees.

Not all hacendados despaired of the future.
that Castro would ultimately change his course.
not yet been heard from.

Some still believed

The United States had

Others thought the sugar industry too big, too

complex for Castro to take over.

Somehow a deal would be str:uck.

ANDHC's Benito Carballo told the director of the Havana daily Informaci6n that the government would not devour the industry because "Fidel
.
11151
cannot make the harvest without us.

Julio Lobo
Julio Lobo, "the colossus of sugar" as Fortune called him,
'
152
thought he would be left alone.
Lobo, who brooded over his sugar

empire from the "Napoleonic room" of his Havana office, told his
nephew, with typical modesty,
market.

11153

II

they cannot touch me, I am the sugar

Lobo told the English writer Kenneth Tynan "that no gov-

ernment would dare to dislodge him, since, if he pulled out, the sugar

150

.
Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1959; Revoluci6n, August

24, 1959.
15 l Interview with Angel Fernandez Varela. Miami Beach, May
10, 1971.
~

152 Freeman Lincoln, "Julio Lobo, Colossus of Sugar,
(September, 1958) p. 150.
153 Interview with c;rlos Todd.

11

Fortune,

Miami, December 3, 1970.
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market would collapse."

154

Lobo not only sold almost half of Cuba's

raw sugar, but had acquired ownership or control of seventeen sugar
mills as the Americans withdrew from sugar in the 1940s and 1950s.
But the Americans had not left fast enough and had blocked his bid to
capture Atlantico del Golfo, the largest remaining American company.
Lobo also resented the American presence within ANDHC and the
ICEA.

155

In the revolution Lobo sensed a major opportunity, a chance

to become the Napoleon of world sugar. The circumstances were not
the prettiest, but as he once told Fortune: "Business is not a kissing
.

game.

156

11

In the fall of 1959, Lobo decided to improve his image then un-

der attack by labor by fomenting a campaign to build rural schools: The
Patronato pro-Escuela Rural.

157

This enterprise was inaugurated with

appropriate fanfare at a cocktail party , in Lobo':;:j Vedado mansion
in Sep.
tember.

Lobo gave $10, 000 and suggested that other Cuban entrepre-

neurs do the same.

Some thought that Lobo would give $10, 000 for each

154 Kenneth Tynan, "A Visit to Havana, " Holiday (February, 1°960),

p. 58.
155

I
I
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Thomas, Cuba, p. 1148.

156 Lincoln, "Julio Lobo, " p. 184.
157 Jn the 1950s, the labor leader Eusebio Mujal called Lobo the
greatest single enemy of Cuban labor. This because Lobo, in his anxiety
to rationalize the Cuban sugar industry, wanted to close down inefficient
· mills, shifting their cane to larger enterprises. This was anathema to the
mill workers and to the towns which depended on these mills. Lobo and
Mujal were engaged in a slander suit in the 1950s, In Octo'..)er, 1959,
Lobo was accused of violating the labor code by workers at his newly acquired Central Hershey., (Revoluci6n, 0<:;tober 13, 1 g59.)

151

mill. · For a man whose net worth was estimated by his lawyers at $200
million,

158

and who had spent an estimated $8 million on his collection

of Napoleana,

159

.
160
$10, 000 seemed a very Scotch sum mdeed.

Waiting for America
.
.
Many hacendados waited confidently for the United States to save

them, to pressure Castro to halt the reform.

The enormous American

investment in Cuba was seen as a hostage which, once interfered with,
would bring intervention • . The soft-spoken and accommodating new
American-Ambassador, Philip Bonsal, was seen as a hindrance in this.
Bonsal was viewed by hacendados and businessmen, Cubans and Americans alike, as a man without honor or character.
old proconsuls.

They pref erred the

Bonsal was the despair of the A:m.erican Club.

161

l58 Statement of Lobo's lawyers during bankruptcy proceedings
in New York. Toe New York Times, July 24, 1964. Fortune thought
Lobo's net worth between $50 and $200 million. See in Lincoln, "Julio
, Lobo, II p. 151
0

159

Cuba (Havana), November, 1965, p. 38. Lobo's collection,
said to be second only to that of the Museum des Invalides in Paris, includes 200, 000 documents, 6, 000 letters of Napoleon. (The New York
Times, July 20, 1958. )
160 Lobo did make other contributions to charity in 1959, including
gifts for the recuperation of war zones in January, 1959, and the donation
of the Galban Lobo Stadium to the Municipality of Havana. (Havana Times,
April 30, 1959.) For information on the "Patronato", see the Havana
Times, September 19, 1959; Diario de la Marina, November 13, 1959.
The project apparently raised several hundred thousand dollars before
dying out in 1960.
161 Interview with Johnny "Huff" Parker, a leading member of
the American Club in Havana. Miami, January 6, 1971.
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'Within the Embassy, his ovvn d,,puty,, Daniel Braddock, was against him.
Bonsal's intention was to intervene diplomatically in the agrarian
dispute only after the affected _\merican enterprises had explored all
legal remedies.

Bonsal's June 11 note calling for "prompt, immediate

and effective compensation" fo1, seized properties offered some hope.
How would the American Congress, and especially senators like George
Smathers and Allan Ellender, leaders of the anti-Cuba block, react?
Smathers was closely linked to the Dictator Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic who sought, at Cuba's expense, a larger share of the United
.
162
States' sugar market.
Elle::1der wanted to reduce the Cuban quota so

as to i:ricrease sugar productior.. in Louisiana.

;

.

Castro's decision to per·mit the sugar industry a year of grace
before intervening their proper~ies was a brilliant stroke, permitting
the 1959 and 1960 har,.rests to p~~ocecd.

This grace period also permitted

the sugar men to incriminate tr-erriselves.

For what hacendado would re-

invest in property he was going to lose? Yet failure to re-invest was
tantamount to economic sabotag_·e, to counterrevolution.

In late sum-

mer, Revoluci6n complained th,at the hacendados were restricting repairs.

A major sugar repair firm, the-- Fundici6n MacFarlane of Sagua la Grande,

I
I
I
I
1·

162 Senator "Gorgeous'' George Smathers' Florida firm also handled
the affairs of Cuba's famous e:x·-minister of education, Jose Aleman, "the
· Count of Monte Cristo, 11 who ar.c:--ived in the United States in 1949 with a suitcase containing $19 million in c,ash. See 1\1iami Herald, September 18, 1949.
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wanted to lay off workers.

163

The FNTA refused, arguing that the

Fundicion ought to make a little sacrifice because it h.ad had so many
• I

•

. . t h e pas t •"164
pro f 1•t a bl e years m
Bankers now became increasingly reluctant to loan the massive
sums 1:equired by the sugar industry to pay its workers, colonos and
suppliers.

In July, they responded to Castro's nudging, agreeing _to ex-

tend credits to finance work on diversification projects needed to keep up
employment during the dead season (July to December).
banks began to balk.

But by fall some

How and under what conditions would they be paid

back? !NRA nonetheless persuaded the banks which previously financed
its five sugar mills (Andorra, Washington, Australia, Purio, Santa Re. )
.
h
..
165
gma to contmue t at service.
At Christmas time a'_loan request by Atlantic.o del Golfo was
turned down by the Chase Manhattan Bank. 166 "Che" Guevara,

president

163R.evo l uc1on,
.,
August 26, 1959 •
164 Ibid.

In Miami exile, a one-time labor leader at MacFar-

lane's fun diclon told his former employer, with some chagrin, that the
pressures for wage increases in the first Castro year were "exaggerated."
The workers had all wanted refrigerators and televisions and had lost
their heads. Interview with Stewart MacFarlane, president, Fundici6n
MacFarlane. Miami, February 4, 1971.
16 5 Revolucion, September 17, 1959 . . Sugar mills came to be
government property in various ways. Some were donated, others
bought. Some were taken directly by !NRA, others by the MRBM. At
least one was recovered by BANDES. Eventually, all the mills would be
passed to !NRA.
·
16 6 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Alfonso." Havana, Decem. ber 30, 1959.
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of the National Bank, refused to lend his ·bank's support, urging the big
American sugar companies to bring in dollars from abroad.

Some of

the smalle:1' Cuban mills were offered loans by Guevara. He offered
Marcos Zarraga of Central Adela $200, 000 but Zarraga was loathe to
accept, seeing it a trick to get his mill into debt, then foreclose.

The

National Bank still owed him money on alcohol produced during the preyious zafra.

167

Certain Cuban financiers, with millions of pesos in hand

and no

way to get them out of the country. turned the hacendados dilemma to
their mutual advantage.

They made substantial loans to the hacendados

with the understanding that they would be repaid in dollars in New York •

.

This sweet scheme enabled a number of Cuban millionaires to make a
smooth transition to exile in Palm Beach, St. Moritz and elsewhere.
Others managed to smuggle money out of the country.

One hacendado,

a man sufficiently close to Fidel to have fl.own around in the leader's
-plane on various occasions during the glorious "first days. "began to
make almost weekly flights to Miami to visit his children.

. and make

substantial bank deposits.
The sugar sector's decline was patently evident in the October

I
I
I
I
I

issue of Cubazucar.
diminished.

The once-thick advertising section had substantially

ANDHC's President Benito Carballo became embroiled in

a petty but revealing argument with the colonos journal, Cana y Azucar.

167
1971.

· ,
· ·
24
Interview with Marcos Zarraga. Coral Gables, ·February
,

155
This latter was a modest propaganda effort, a weekly supplement to the
Diario de la Marina.

It first appeared in September, inspired by the

hacendado and colono Jose Manuel Casanova.

Its editor, Alberto C.

Vila, had asked for the hacendados' cooperation but ANDHC President
Benito Carballo refused, saying the magazine had "nothing to do with
hacendados. "

168

A nice indication of the almost complete lack of co-

operation between hac endado s and colonos, and of the hacendados reluctance to support anything that smacked, even in the most remote way,
169
.
o f counterrevo1u t ion.
Through the fall and into the winter, the FNTA kept up its drum
fire attack on the hacendados.

The MRBM boasted that Batista's sugar

mill, Central Washington, was producing more ~ugar than ever before,
• that the government cou ld b e a
demonstrating

II

' •
"
capa bl e a dmm1strator.

170

In October, the FNTA, in an attempt to guard its flanks, offered Fidel

$30 million (4 percent of its annual income) for industrial development.

171

168 Revoluci6n, October 9, 1959; Diario de la Marina, October 9,
1959.
16 9 The hacendados and ~olonos did collaborate in a minor way in
October, agreeing to jointly fund an experimental station for sugar cane.
See in Diario de la Marina, October 13, 1959.
170 Interview with Danilo Mesa, vice-minister of the MRBM.
Gainesville, Florida, June 21, 1971.
17lniario de la Marina, October 3, 1959.
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By winter !NRA 's seizures of sugar lands had reached what Cana
~
.
172
.
y Azucar thought an alarmmg rate.
In late October, m two days of

furious activity, Comandante Rene Vallejo intervened almost 750, 000
acres.

173

The Castro family's own colonia, the 21, 450 acre Sabanillas

de Biran, was taken, as was that of the father of Celia Sanchez, Fidel's
secretary.

174

Farms belonging to important members of society and

leading supporters of Fidel such as "Fico" Fernandez, "Pep{n" Bosch,
and the Bacardi's were taken.

No one was excepted.

Cana y Azucar

complained that many of these interventions violated the reform law.
·
175
Surely Fidel would reverse these decisions if only he knew.
But perhaps !NRA 's Captain Jorge Enrique Mendoza had a better insight into · the
true motives of the reform.

The idea was to destroy the bourgeoisie,

to "do away with the men of power ••• do away with the vested interests .••
to do away with the families here that thought themselves feudal lords
whom nobody could touch because they had a certain name; now all names
are equal. •••

II

176

172 Toid., December 16, 1959.
l 73 Revolucion, October 30, 1959.
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I

l 74 Bohemia, November 29, 1959, p. 71. Celia's father was a
dentist at Julio Lobo's Central Pilon in the Oriente.
175 Diario de la Marina, December 16, 1959.
176 Revolucion, November 16, 1959. Captain Jorge Enrique
Mendoza became !NRA chief for Camagiiey Province after the resignation of Hubert Matos in Octob.er, 1959.
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In the fall and winter of 1959, the hacendados awaited those de-

velopments in the international sugar market to which Cuba always played
victim.

In October, Cuba sold the Soviet Union 330, 000 tons of sugar at

2. 90 cents a pound.

177

U.S. sugar producers were said to be preparing

to force the Congress to reduce the Cuban quota.

178
. Minister of Eco-

nomics Cepero Bonilla discounted these stories, saying the quota would
not be cut.

179

The Diario de la Marina feared that various Lati.n nations,

. 1uding M exico, were hungermg
.
f or t h e C uban quota.
me

180

ANDHC Presi-

dent Carballo warned that any reduction in the U.S. quota would be an act
of aggression and would only aid "extremists" and result in a comparable
Cuban. cut in its purchases of American goods.

181

The FNTA 's Becquer

carried this argument a few steps further-, telling a sugar worker~ con-

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

vention that, if the U. S,. cut the Cuban quota, he would ask the nationali.
.
.
182
zat10n
o f fore1gn
enterprises.

Bad news always was spiced with happy rumors.

A hacendado

heard from a friend that Foreign Minister Raul Roa foresaw an improvement in U.S. -Cuban relations.

Roa, like Guevara, did not believe the

l 77·niario de la Marina, October 1, 1959.
178 Ibid.
179Ib•d'
1 • ' October 9, 1959.
180 Ibid., October 19, 1959.
181 Bohemia, October 25, 1959, p. 64.
182 Diario de la Marina, December 16, 1959. To what extent was
Becquer encouraged to say these things by Fidel's inner coterie? This
remains one of the mysteries of the revolution.
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U.S. would cut Cuba's quota.

Some thought the American banks might

final'l:ce the agrarian reform, perhaps by accepting !NRA bonds.

And

there was an intriguing tale that France had offered to barter arms for
Cuban sugar if the Cubans would agree not to support Algeria in the
U. N. 183

Mikoyan's Visit
For the hacendados, the great question in the spring of 1960 was:
when will the Americans a~t? In January, 1960, the State Department
strongly protested seizures of American properties by the !NRA "without court orders and frequently without any written authorization whatever.

" 184

The Wall Str~et Journal shared t..1-ie State Department's im-

pression that Cuba's agrarian sector was plunging into chaos.

!NRA

men were making off with equipment at some centrales.

Repair parts

could not be obtained, thanks to mountains of red tape.

There was near

anarchy at the mills.

185

Castro, on the other hand, thought his agrarian

program nicely organized.

186

!NRA 's chief lawyer, Waldo Medina, said

the reform was moving ahead "without any great difficulties or violent
..
11187
controversies. .

I
I
I
I
I

183 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Alfonso." Havana, December 30, 1959.
184 The New York Times, January 12~ 1960.
185wall Street Journal 1 January 18, 1960.
186 El Mundo, January 21, 1960.
187 Ibid., April 1, 1960.
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President Eisenhower'. was said to have barred any reprisals,
military, economic, or diplomatic, against Cuba for fear of a Latin
American backlash.

188

Secretary of State Christian ~erter .told the

House Foreign Affairs Committee that the old policy of sending the Marines wherever there was trouble in Latin America had been abandoned.

189

This view changed rapidly in the wake of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas
Mikoyan's visit in February.
Mikoyan reception.

The hacendados dutifully attended the

There Mikoyan commented that Cuba's landowners

were lucky for, in Russia's agrarian reform, landowners had not received reimbursements of any kinc;i.

190

By March, in the wake of Mikoyan's trade and aid agreements,
there was a decisive shift in Washington.

The U.S., according to Am-

bassador Bonsal, decided to undertake "a series of measures which,
while stopping short of the use of American armed force in Cuba, were
designed to overthrow Castro.

11191

These measures mc~uded cutting the

sugar quota, refusing to refine Soviet oil, and the training and supplying
of counterrevolutionary forces.

192

188wall Street Journal, January 27, 1960.
189

El Mundo, January 21, 1960.

190 The New York Times, February 9, 1960.
191 Philip W. Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971 ), p. 6. Bonsal 1 s
account is singularly mute on many points of .interest.
192 Ibid., p. 151.
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These tactics were undoubtedly encouraged by Guevara's remark that Cuba's sugar relations with the U.S. were a .form of slavery.
This was especially aggravating, to those who regarded the U.S. sugar
policies as benevolent, since the U.S. price generally exceeded the
world price by around $. 02 per pound.

On the approximately three

million tons a year the U.S. purchased from Cuba, this amounted to
$100 to $150 million a year extra.

The 'Times thought this a subsidy;

the Wall Street Journal, an overpayment.

193

Few perceived the recipro-

.cal element involved: that U.S. exporters profited from very low Cuban
tariffs.

Indeed, over the 1950s, the U.S. -Cuban balance of trade was
-

disadvantageous to Cuba to the tune of almost $1 billion.

On the other

hand, Cuba gained a certain stability and protection in its markets.

The

hacen:dados benefited--perhaps all too well--from this, becoming in effeet the wards of t~e U.S. Agriculture Department.
The Cubans
had an extraordinarily
ambivalent view of the Ameri.
.
can quota. While the Guevaristas equated sugar to colonialism, depen.

•

II

II •

dency and subservience, Che is also on record as believing that the
Americans would never cut the quota.

Other revolutionaries thought the

quota essential to Cuba's future, arguing that Cuba, by her loyal provision of cheap sugar to the U.S. during two world wars, had a moral

I
I
I
I

right to the American market.

Some defended both positions: the sugar

tie was equivalent to colonialism, but it .would be economic aggression

193 The New York Times, March 4, 1960; Wall ·street Journal,
March 4, 1960.
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for the U.S. to cut that tie. · The sugar tie posed a critical dilemma
for the revolutionaries.

Cutting that tie, which was the principal feature

of Cuban economic life, implied a virtual recasting of Cuban society.

.

Bu~ events sometimes have a life of their own.

While the strategists

ponde_red, the revolution rolled relentlessly on.
· In March the West Indies Sugar Company decided to liquidate.

194

A few days later, the Guantanamo Sugar Company (Centrales Soledad,
Las Canas, Isabel) was intervened by the MRBM on the grounds that
m~mbers of. the Batista regime might have been shareholders.

195

I
I
I
I
I
I·

I
I

United Fruit
!NRA was now sniping at the ripest. target of all: the United Fruit
Company- - "La Frutera. " .The humbling of United Fruit was a task of
special pleasure for the revolutionary leadership.

Castro had, after all,

growµ up alongside its vast plantations in Oriente Province.

196

Guevara

I
I

had been present in Guatemala in 1954 when the CIA staged a counter-

194

Wall Street Journal, March 8, 1960. The West Indies Sugar
Company later filed a claim with the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement
Commission (F. C. S. C.) for a loss of $62. 8 million. (Claim CU-665.)
195 El Mundo, March 12, 1960. The Guantanamo Sugar Company,
a · minority share of which was still U. S. owned, filed a claim for $17. 6
million with the F. C. S. C. (Claim CU-2683~)
196 One U. s. official speculated that Castro hated America because, as a youth, he had not been allowed to attend the schools at United
Fruit's neighboring plantation.
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revolution there to help save United Fruit's Guatemalan properties
from agrarian reform.

197

"La Frutera 1 s" interventionist history in

Central America was red meat for every anti-imperialist, a legend that
no amount of subsequent good deeds could expunge.

In Cuba, United

Fruit had acquire d much of its almost 260, 000 acres for a song; ten
cents a caballeria (thirty-three acres), according to Bohemia.

198

And

a good part of its lands consisted of administration cane.
In their heyday the United Fruit's great mills, Boston (1901) and

Preston (1904), were triumphs of human enterprise.
the largest in the world.
aster.

They were among

But one generation's triumph is another's dis-

In 1960 the mills were too 1?ig, too American.

The company's

once-adrr..ired workers' housing was denounced for encouraging class
distinctions.

Forgotten was United Fruit's colonization project which

in 1928 gave almost two thousand workers I families six acres each of

.
. 199
subsistence land.
Forgotten were the company's hospitals for
workers.

200

The revolutionary eye could discern only the weaknesses--

197 Guevara once pointedly reminded the U.S. iJ.1 1959 that Cuba
was not Guatemala. Castro I s decision to move the revolution very
quickly, to mobilize and arm the masses, was influenced by the U.S. role
in the Guatemalan episode. American policy makers believed the Guatemalan push-over could be repeated in Cuba.
198April 17, 1960, p. 65.
l99 Foreign Policy Association, Problems of the New Cuba (New
· · York, 193 5), p. 285.
200

-·
Charles Albert Page, "The Development of Org8.nized Labor
in Cuba" (unpublished Ph.
dissertation, University of California,
1952), p. 242.

n:
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past or present- -of the old society.

United Fruit was blamed for the

crowded conditions of worker housing in 1'959.

201

The company replied

that the crowding was oweJ to the insistence of the FNTA on the use of
. trios, that is, three laborers to do the work of one.

And both of United

Fruit's plantations had become home for several thousand squatters who
refus.ed to be evicted. 202
As the harvest proceeded in 1960, !NRA and Army men moved
about United Fruit's properties, appropriatfag equipment and taking title
to the cane land as it was .cut, bit by bit.

2 03

By April, !NRA had taken

·
2M
35, 000 acres and 6, 811 head of cattle.
Bohemia guessed that "La

Frutera," over its life span, might have enjoyed a profit of ten or even
205 Wh
. times
·
· tota1 mvestment.
·
.
. 1an d s were
fifteen
its
en United
Fruit

turned over to !NRA, officials of the two municipalities involved, Banes
and Mayari, declared an official holiday.

Jubilation reigned.

206

How much were United .Fruit's lands worth? There was a difference of opinion. !NRA offered $6, 118, 407 in bonds;2° 7 the company

201 Revoluci6n, March 17, 1959.
.20 2 The New York Times, March 25, 1960.
203 Ibid.
204 Ib"d
i

205

• '

April 5, 1960.

Bohemia, April 24, 1960, p. 53.

206 El Mundo, April 28, 1960.
2 0 7 Ibid., April 6, 1960.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

164

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I.
I
I
I
I ,..
I
I
I
I
I

asked $56, 640, 579 in cash.

208

The Cubans argued, perhaps with some

justice, that the Americans always overvalued their properties in Cuba
to encourage the sale of stocks.

The debate on values never reached

the excitement of the Mexican oil settlement of 1940-1941, for the Cubans had, in fact, no intention of paying anything.

209

United Fruit's management appears to have learned an object
lesson in the Cuban debacle .. · Even as its lands were being confiscated,
President Sunderland announced from Boston a change in the company's
Latin American policy.

Iri order to "keep up with the changing times, "

the company decided to sell off its banana lands in Central and South
America.

In the future, it would purchase the fruit from local growers.
.
.

210

Sunderland denied that Cuban exiles were training on United Fruit's

208Diario.Las Americas (Miami}, May 17, 1960; El Mundo,
March 25, 1960. These amounts were largely for expropriated lands,
and did not include the mills which were not taken till August, 1960.
The "value" of properties interve.ned varied according to time, place and
the parties involved. In 1958, the Cuban Development Company of Phila'delphia, owners of Hacienda Sevilla, that vast estate in Oriente within
whose borders Castro fought much of his revolutionary war, authorized
:its lawyer, Mario Lazo, to sell for $1 million. In 1960, the company
told the Cuban government that the property was worth $5 million. The
Cubans in turn valued it at $172, 000. See in El Mundo, April 13, 1960;
Lazo, Dagger, p. 150.
209

The FCSC eventually certified a los$ for United Fruit of
$85, 100, 147. 09. (FCSC Claim CU-2776; Decision CU-3824.)
210 El Mundo, April 30, 1960. United Fruit's interest in selling
off its lands was no doubt encouraged by an antitrust suit of 1958 charging
it with "unlawfully monopolizing the importation of bananas into the U.S. "
(Portland Press Herald, November 2, 1972.)

165

Guatemalan estates.

He invited Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa to

visit and see for himself.

211

Roa was only partially. mistaken.

The

Cuban exiles in Guatemala were not being trained on United Fruit's
properties but, rather, at the neighboring estates of Roberto Alejo.
!NRA 's interventions continued, hacendados and planters sought
relief in the courts for gross violations of the agrarian code.

But these

attempts were doomed to failure as the courts were already virtual instruments of the revolutionary government.

In November, 1959, Su-

pr.e me Court President Benjamfu Menendez y Menendez issued a circular asking lesser courts to be alert for legal subterfuges designed to
.
212
slow the agrarian reform.
In February, 1960, the Supreme Court

ruled that the commanders of Cuba's twenty-six zones of agricultural
development had the power _and right "to dictate whatever measures
• h t' be necessary to accomp
•
1·1sh th e agrarian
• re f orm. II. 213
m1g

blanche.

c arte

A few days later, the Court of Constitutional and Social Guaran-

tees ruled against the claim of the Compan:i'a Agr:i'cola San Sebastian that

2ll Bohemia, May 8, 1960, p. 66.
212 Revolucion, November 21, 1959.
213 El Mundo, February 27, 1960. Menendez resigned his post
in November, 1960. In his letter of resignation he noted that the Supreme
Court had attempted to support the revolution's efforts to "eradicate certain endemic ills" of Cuba, but that he could no longer serve a regime now
becoming increasingly totalitarian. (See in Ru{z, Traici6n, 1960, pp. 341343.) In exile Menendez confided to a friend. that, in 1959-1960, he was obliged to make many decisions against the law as he knew it.
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!NRA had violated the reform law.

214

fu April, the Compaifa Central

Altagracia, S. A. (Centrales Cupey, Alto Cedro, and Palma) lost its
legal challenge.

215

Indeed, the courts were hardly needed for, as

!NRA executive Nunez Jimenez explained it, "the revolution" itself was
the source of legal authority.

216

And who comprised 11 the revolution"

if not iNRA?
Ca.naverales in Flames
The sugar harvest of 1960 was punctuated by a series of incendiary attacks by counterrevolutionaries on ~e cane fields.
ings were familiar practice in Cuban history.
there was a technological fillip.

Such burn-

fu this case, however,

The fields were burned by incendiary

devices dropped by small planes flying from Florida and various points
in the Caribbean archipelago.

These raids failed to destroy sufficient

cane to harm the economy, while their dramatic nature served as fuel
for C,astro's nationalistic drive.

fu the great columns of smoke rising

over the fields, there was, for the first time, real evidence that Cuba
was under attack.

?17

The hacendados and the colonos found themselves

214 Havana Times, February 29, 1960.
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215 El Mundo, April 9, 1960.
216Ib.d
_1_., April 7, 1960.
217 Burned cane is not necessarily ruined. Indeed, the Australian method of cane harvesting involves burn:i.hg the fields. But the burnt
cane must be harvested immediately, as its sucrose content diminishes
very rapidly.
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in the ironic position of condemning the counterrevolutionaries.

Thus,

in January, 1960, after several large fields were burned by incendiary

I

bombs at Centrales Adelaida and Punta Alegre, ,.\:,;DIIC President Benito
I

I
I

Carballo denounced the raiders as "criminals. " !\lejandro Suero, executive of the mills in question, moved quickly to sal vagc the burned cane.
Carballo interpreted this as evidence of the hacendados desire to cooperate with the government.

I-

218

I
I

Conrado Becquer, the FNTA chief, thought it suspicious that
"all these fires" were occurring in sugar lands belonging to " l:.ltifundis .
tas an d corporations.

mass mobilization.

II

219 The f.ires were asp l end1d
. motive for more

Militias were organized to fight the fires.

ruary, as the fire bombings continued, some hacendados discussed giving their mills to the INRA~

Becquer was unconcerned by the fires'

economic effect, recalling that during the rebellion even more cane_had
been burned without damage to the economy.

220

In the following weeks

the incendiaries buzzed like dragonflies over the fields.

The cariaverales·

at Central G6mez Mena were attacked on February 17th. On the 18th, a
Piper Cub exploded over Gt>mez Mena's Central Espana while attempting
to drop a crude bomb on the mill. The dead pilot's effects revealed him

218 El Mundo, January 30, 1960.
219 Ibid.
2 2 0 Ibid., February 4, 1960.
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to be an American who had flown a number of such missions.

221

This

revelation led to a crack-down on the illegal flights by U.S. authorities
in Florida.

'
Nonetheless, sporadic attacks
continued for the duration of

·the harvest.
If the reform was a nightmare for the hacendados, it was a godsend for the agricultural technicians.

At the Third Congress of Agri-

cultural Engineers in May, . its President Humberto Castellanos Gonz_~lez recalled that before the revolution men with degrees in agriculture
often could not find work.

Now, thanks to the agrarian reform, agri-

cultural engineers had not only jobs but a new prestige, "an importance
which everyone recognizes. "
Jimenez, by the spring

222

According to INRA chief Nunez

of 1960,no less

than one-third of Cuba's agrono-

.
. t"ion.
. 223
mists
were wor k"mg f or h"1s . organ1za

"Dear Nick .•• "
The extraordinary gloom that pervaded the minds of the h1cendados in 1960 is evidenced in the "Dear Nick" letters of Antonio Barro,
hacendado and vice-president of the Cuban Trading Company. 224 In

221lbid., February 19, 1960.

I
I
I
I
I

May 24, 1960.
223 lbid. .
224 "Nick" and "Alfonso" are pseudonyms for George A. Braga,
head of the Rionda group of sugar companies, whose six sugar mills were
managed by Cuban Trading.
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these letters, written to Cuban Trading's New York offices, one sensed
the anguish of a generation, of a society in its death throes.

All the past,

to which men like Barro had given their lives, was being rejected,
destroyed.
The pervasive theme of the "Dear Nick" letters is the everincreasing intrusion of the Castro government into the private sector.
As early as January, 1960, the end of the game was clear: "We are
heading straight to state socialism ••• !' This was related to a comment
by "Che" Guevara that Cuba had no interest in attracting U.S. capital.
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Barro was fascinated by Guevara, whom he sensed was the mastermind
of the revolution.

Barro wrote a friend that Guevara was "a Marxist

revolutionist, but not an economist, that he knows very little, if anything> of banking and finance, is a romantic austere cha.ractE;r ,. of deeply
.
. d conv1c
. t ions,
:
. s h or t , a f anatlc.
. . 11226
mgrame
m

By March, 1960, Barro found all private initiative in Cuba at a
· standstill.

227

The creation of the National Planning Institute was an in-

dication that the "socialization of all the economy" was near to hand.

22·5 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Alfonso.
uary 4, 1961.
. 22 6 Letter. of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nikita.
26, 1960.
227 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nik.

11

11

11
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Havana, Jan-

Havana, January

Havana, March 2,

1960.

228
1960.

Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nik. " Havana, March 11,

. .. .~
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In April he wrote that a Red Chinese theater group had appeared; that

the CTC was losing its independence to the government.
. bunal de Cuentas was looking into ANDHC's books.

229

And the TriBarro saw the

revolution as a "communist cancer. " The need for U. S. intervention
was imperative.
revolution.

The nationalist revolution had become a totalitarian

Castro and his band had a pathological hatred. of the United

States and a massive conten:1pt for the bourgeoisie.
" we Cu bans are doomed .••• 1123 0

II

' k,
Nie

11

h e wrote,

. ··: ::.. ..

By May, 1960, one year after the inauguration of the agrarian
reform, INRA was administering thirty- six of Cuba's 161 sugar mills. 231
_Almost 1400 agricultural co-ops had been established, 1000 of these on
lands confiscated from U ~ S. companies.

These ·co-ops were in turn

being serviced by som~ 2000 peoplP. 's stores.

Twelve hundred and

thirty land titles had been handed out; 6059 more were in process.
than 100, 000 caballerfos of land w·ere marked for expropriation.
was holding some 605, 333 head of cattle.

More
INRA

To pay for this, $96. 8 million

in agrarian reform bonds were committed, as well as $2. 1 million in
.
232
cash.
None of this compensa.tion had yet reached American hands.

229

Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nick." Havana, April 15,

1960.

230Ibid."
231

El Mundo, May 17, 1960.

232 Diario Las 'Americas (Miami), May 18, 1960.
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In a nine-point note of June, 1960, the State Department observed that .

not a single American property owner had been indemnified.

233

By the end of the 1960 harvest, many hacen~~dos were on the
verge of bankruptcy.

Private banks would make no loans and the govern-

ment would not pay what it owed.

On July 14, 1960, Francisco Escobar

of the Central Salvador called the Banco Nunez.

He had a: contract with

them and desperately needed cash to pay his colonos.

But Carlos Nunez

replied that, by Guevara's order, no funds could be loaned for that purpose.

There was noth~g more to be done.

Escobar sou~ht refuge in

the. Chilean Embassy. 234
INR.A 's expropriations precipitate~ events in Washington.

The

counterrevolutionary plan prepared in March, 1960, was now in action.
To some it was high strategy; to others a childish game of tit-for-tat.
Ambassador Bonsal opposed Washington's game, preferring that Castro
be left alone.

He wanted to deny Castro the nationalist argument, deny

him the American pretext.

Bonsal wanted to give Castro room and time

to demonstrate his recklessness without provocation from the U.S.
This, Bonsal hoped, would sway inter-American opinion to the side of
the United States.

Moreover, it might encourage long overdue internal

resistance to Castro.

235

The Cuban bourgeoisie had precisely the

233 El Mundo, June 5, 1960.
bonds were never printed.

The promised agrarian reform

2341nterview with Francisco Escobar.

Miami, April 17, 1971.

23 5 Bonsal, Cuba, p. 138. Bonsal was startled by the "passivity
of the former possessing classes" who remained ·inert while Castro destroyed them. See Bonsal, p. 164.
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contrary view, wondering when the Americans would act, when the
Americans would take the lead.
Bonsal was heard, and turned down.

in America, not a time when any congressional--or presidential candidate-- dared risk accusations of "softness" on communism, or anything that looked like it.

At the end of June, the State Department ended

its policy of "patience and forbearance. " Secretary of State Herter
asked the Congress to give President Eisenhower authority to cut the
sugar quota.

The House acceded to this request.

Castro interpreted this as a declaration of economic war, recalling that twice before the United States had manipulated its sugar
· C u b a.
. ·
po11c1es
to ru1?

236

If Amer1ca
.
cut th e quota--an d t h"1s was now

a foregone conclusion--then Castro would retaliate by seizing the American sugar mills.

A few days later, when American oil refineries re-

fused to yield to Cuban demands to refine Soviet crude oil, the refineries
· were intervened.
Eisenhower retaliated, cutting 700, 000 tons from the Cuban,
sugar quota.

I
I
I
I
I

1960 was an election year

This was an amount equivalent to the remainder of the

Cuban quota for 1960.

Bonsal, who had been notified only a few hours

before, was downcast.

The United States he said has "turned its back

236 El Mundo, June 25, 1960.

173
on thirty years of statesmanship in the Latin American field. 11237 Bonsal thought the cut disproportionate to the injuries received at Castro's
hand.

The cut was an attempt not to discipline, but rather to destroy

the Castro regime.

238

Castro, playing the aggrieved patriot as Bonsal had warned,
declared that "they can take away the sugar quota, but not our liberty.
He prepared legislation to nationalize the American suga~ mills·.

11239

FNTA

chief Becquer thought happily that his FNTA workers would run the
American properties.

240

Castro h~ld off for: several weeks.

interval, the Cuban-American Sugar Company was intervened.

In this

Cuban-

American's management had fled, leaving a Cuban administrator who

237 Bonsal, Cuba, p·. 151. Though Bonsal viewed Washington's
decision to cut the Cuban quota as a major disaster, he did not fight to
stop it. When Ambassador Smith, Bonsal's predecessor, found himself
in disagreement with Washington over Castro in 1958, he at least flew
up to personally argue his case. Bonsal, in a similar circumstance,
wrote a letter. Bonsal's performance contrasts interestingly with that
.of Josephus Daniels, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico when Cardenas seized
American oil properties in 1938. Daniels was able to block retaliatory
moves by Washington and save U.S. -Mexican relations. But perhaps
this was because Daniels was a vigorous politician and 2 personal friend
of Roosevelt. Bonsal, the career man, was more cautious and had no
friend in the White House to appeal to. Moreover, Cardenas was not
seeking a fight with the U.S. Castro apparently was.
238 lbid;, p. 154.
239El Mundo, July 7, 1960.
240lbid., July 6, 1960.
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had no funds to pay the colonos.

241

Indeed, investigation revealed

that, some months before nationalization, Cuban-American_had ceased
paying all taxes and contributions to the social security fund.

242

But,

given the situation, this was to be expected.

American Mills Nationalized
On August 7, 1960, before a crowd of 50, 000 at the Cerro Stadium, Castro announced

the nationalization of the American sugar mills.

The applause was extraordinary.
of independence.

Bohemia called it Cuba's declaration

243

American sugar executives were not surprised, neither were
they entirely discouraged by Castro's declaration.

They had long been

privy to the Eisenhower administration's inten~ion to drive Castro from
power.

Mon~s before, John Loeb, chairman of the board of Atlantica

del Golfo, had told a company official that the Castro government would
.
.
take the mills " but we are gomg
to get them back.. 11244 Loeb promised

241 El Mundo, July 23, 1960. Cuban-American Sugar, owner of
the Chaparra and Delicias sugar mills, which were among the largest in
Cuba, filed a claim with the FCSC for $90, 330, 769. (CU-2445).
242 El Mundo, September 2, 1960.

I
I
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I

243

Bohemia, August 14, 1960, p. 52.

244 Interview with Francisco Rodriguez, vice-president of Atla.ntica del Golfo, Miami, May 14, 1971. John Loeb's Loeb Rhoades in. vestment banking firm held 20% of the shares of Atlantica. Some of
Loeb's confidence may have stemmed from insider contacts. He was an
important contributor to the Democratic party in 1960. Did presidential
candidate John Kennedy prornise him anything?
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his executives iliat they would have a cel~bration in the Floridita Bar
after the 1961 harvest.

245

The freighters 'of the Ga~c!a Line which had

formerly carried sugar for Loeb's Atla.ntica were secretly chartered by
the CIA to carry troops to the Bay of Pigs.

The executive vice...;presi-

dent or' the United Fruit Company displayed equal confidence, telling the
press that "this kind of nutty thing [expropriation of American property]
has happened before. and finally someone with better sense gets control"
and invites the Americans back.

246

Cuban-American Sugar told its stockholders that it had been deprived "at least temporarily" of its Cuban assets, but that c·onditions
might change, depending on the "amount of support the present [Cuban]

.

.

.
t
.
f
.
.
1
.
.
11247
governmen
receives
rom .mternatlona
communism.

cu b an-

American
subsequently sought court orders to block the sale of its con.
.
.

fiscated sugar.

I
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The N. Y. sugar brokerage of Farr, Whitlock & Co. at-

tempted to profit here, arranging .with Castro for the sale of six ship
loads of what Cuban-American believed was its sugar.

Subsequent legal

245 Ibid.
246 Washington Post, August 9, 1960, as found in Frances Neely,
Controversy Over Cuba (Washington: Friends Committee on National
Legislation, 1961), p. 7.
247 Annual Report of the Cuban-American Sugar Company,. (New
York, 1960), pp. 2-3.
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action by Cuban-American eventually resulted in Farr, Whitlock's
destruction.

248

At the offices of the Cuban Trading Company on Havana's Plaza
de Armas, young INRA officials appeared with an acta transferring control of the company's six sugar mills to the government.

Cuban Trad-

ing's Vice President, Antonio Barro, refused to sign, saying that his
firm only managed and did not own the mills.

The rebels were ins is-

tent: "El primer ministro dice que si. " ("The prime minister [Fidel]
says you do own them.

11

)

Barro signed.

On the walls of the Trading

Company offices, there was a photo of the patriarch, Manuel Rionda,
with a legend identifying him as the founder of the company.
neath this, someone had -~cratched: "Se ll~maba.

Under-.

11249

Some of the rebellious clerks at the Trading Company's offices
were delighted to see thdr superiors depart, thinking they would "step
. t o our s h oes. 11250 B u t th ere was a surprise
.
. s t ore.
m
1n

Cuban Trading

248 Interview with Henry Austin Clark, Jr., a director of CubanAmerican. Southampton, June 21, 1974. Cuban-American, having lost
most of its assets, found no sympathy in Washington. Rather, the Internal Revenue Service accused it of owing $19 million in back taxes.
After years of litigation, the IRS settled for approximately $500, 000.
249 11 Se llamaba "- - 11he had it. 11 A terse suggestion that the era
of the patriarchs was over, at least in Cuba. Profits from his Cuban
venture enabled the Spaniard Manuel Rionda to acquire large landholdings in Alpine;, New Jersey. He died at 80 in 1943. His nephews,
Manuel E. Rionda and Bernardo Braga, took over their uncle's interests .
. Manuel E. Rionda was mayor of Alpine, New Jersey, where he owned a
250 acre estate, from 1931 to his death in 1950.
250 rnterview with Antonio Barro.

Miami, June 24, 1971.
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and other sugar firms had been living on New York funds for more than

a year. · With the mills and sugar sales transferred to !NRA, there was
no further need for the young clerks on the Plaza de Armas.
found work as longshoremen at the nearby docks.
persed to the four winds.

Some

The rest were dis-

Revolutions do not carry guarantees- -even

for the young men who make them.
In early autumn, the Tarafa family's three centrales were taken

I.

on the grounds that their manager, Jorge Barroso, had denied aid to
the rebels while permitting Batista's army to repair vehicles at the

I
I

Tarafa's Central Espana. 251 At the beginning of October more mills
were confiscated from "collaborators." These included two centrales
of Francisco de Pando., · president of the ANDHC during the Batista era,

,

and four from the Riva Dominguez brothers who were accused of non252'
.
. quota, an d stoc k man1pu
. 1ations.
.
payment o f taxes, excee d mg
t h e1r

The colono leader Ram6n Castro asked that !NRA seize all sugar mills

· that had failed to pay their colonos. He noted that colonos at mills run
by !NRA had been paid.

253

251 El Mundo, September 15, 1960.
252Ibid., October 1, 1960. The Riva brothers were among
those Cubans who bought up American mills in the 1950s. For example,
they bought Central Hormiguero from the ol? Yankee, Sumner Pingree.
253 Ibid., October 7, 1960.
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Lobo Falls
The great "colossus of sugar,

11

Julio Lobo, began to totter.

September, 1960, after the American mills had been taken, Lobo
chanced to me~t Antonio Barro of Cuban Trading

I

I
I
I··
I

In

think they will take our mills?" Lobo asked.
h e was untouc h a bl e.

11

I am gomg
·
b ac k .••• "

in New

York: "Do you

He still seemed to believe
2 54

In Cuba, on October 11, "Che" Guevara offered Lobo the prize

he had been seeking for a lifetime: command of the sugar industry; a
chance to put to work his dream of centralization and modernization.
But this was to be under circumstances different than Lobo had imagined.
He would be working not for himself, but for a socialist Cuba. He would

I

lose all his mills, but would be permitted the use of the house and gar-

I

.
255
reJected Guevara's offer.
On October 13, all of Cuba's sugar mills

I

were nationalized.

dens at his beloved Central Tinguaro.

After a brief consideration, Lobo

A worker at Lobo's office recalls the patriarch ac-

cepting this news calmly, like a gentleman.
.

Thereafter, he left for

.

exile. On October 24, 1960, by virtue of Law 895, the Asociacion Na-

I
I
I
I

I

cional de Hacendados de Cuba was once and forever dissolved. 256
2 54 Interview with Antonio Barro. Miami, April 2 7, 1971.
255 Thomas, Cuba, pp. 1298-9.
256 The Asociaci6n de Hacendados was reorganized in exile in late
1960 but dissolved after the missile crisis of 1962 when all hope of return 'vanished with the Kennedy-Khruschev understanding that the United
States would not invade Cuba.
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We were born next to three great latifundias,

I
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the United Fruit Company, the Altagracia
Sugar Company and the West Indies Sugar
Company ••• where we learned from our infancy all the troubles of the guajiros in their
colonias of sugar cane.
1
Ram6n Castro

IV.

COLONOS

The Asociaci6n de Colonos, Cuba's sugar cane growers, was
one of the most important fruits of the revol:itionary ferment of 1933.
The government decree which created the association envisioned the
colonos as a social class, "the largest and most clearly defined in our
country and one that forms the most solid structure of our rural popula2
.
tion."
In the ensuing years the colonos made solid gains at the hacendados' expense.

Their numbers increased steadily, climbing to

upwards of 50, 000 in the late 1950s.

The colonos' association was,

Unlike the elitist hacendados, a seemingly democratic organization
characterized by frequent elections and including owners of both large
and small plantations.

The progress of the class, and especially of

1 El Mundo, August 25, 1960. Ram6n Castro Ruz, Fidel's
older brother, managed the family sugar plantation, Sabanillas de
Biran. Their cane was ground by the Central Miranda of the U.S. owned Altagracia Sugar Company.
2

Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba (Coral
Gables: University of Miami Press, 1965), p. 337.

I

I
I

180

the smaller grower, was evidence of the distributive spirit which,
since 1933, had been the dominating passion of government in Cuba.
President Grau had said:

11

to govern is to distribute.

113

I

This distri-

I
I
I
I
I

butive ethic carried the colonos to the point of virtual equality with the
hacendados in sharing the profits of the sugar industry.
But the distributive ethic was not without its drawbacks. The
laws which protected the colono tended to discourage the modernization
of the industry.

The small grower became so protected he had no mo-

tive for improvement in quality of quantity of yield.

By various devices,

hacendados became colonos, thereby benefiting from the government's
protective legislation.

a·

A small group of these larger colonos had long

ruled the association, coming to terms with each successive government as was the traditional practice.

....

None of this wa~ satisfactory to Castro, least of all the size
and political potential of the organization.

The revolutionary govern-

ment set out then to destroy the colonos, · developing the contradictions
within the class, arousing hopes, ranging small grower against large.
By the brilliant employment of these techniques of division, within two
years Castro was able to shatter the "most solid structure" of the
colonos.

3 "Gobernar es repartir." Even the Marxist James O'Connor,
who takes a most dim view of the pre-revolutionary republic, admits
it was a "redistributive state. " Castro picked up that tradition ..• and
ran with it. See O'Connor, The Origins, p. 7.
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Background
Though the colonos were undoubtedly powerful, their power
was exercised within the narrow scope of class defense against their
natural enemies, the hacendados and sugar workers.

Prior to 1933,

the colonos regarded themselves as "serfs or vassals, " trappe~ between the sugar mill" owners who determined the colonos' production
and the sugar workers who were constantly pressing for wage in-

4

.

creases. · But in the years following the revolution of 1933, the
colonos, with government support, won a series of benefits at the
hacendados' expense. In 1937, the Sugar CoordinationLaw assured the
colonos their ·right of "permanency" on the hacendados' sugar lands;
later the small land rent owed to the hac·endado was eliminated and the
right of the small grower (below .thirty thousand arrobas) to grind his
cane guaranteed.

5

The percentage of colono sharing in sugar profits

rose to nearly 50 percent.
of the colono class.

These developments stimulated the growth

The number of colonias rose from 30, 020 in 1939

.
6
to 62, 298 in 1952.

I
I
I
I
I

4 Bohemia Libre (Miami), August 6, 1961, p. 19.

5
6

.
One arroba equals 25 pounds of sugar cane.
Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 522.
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At the same time, acreage in administration cane, once 30
percent of all cane, fell to less than 6 percent of all cane ground in
1952.

7

In part, howevPr, this shift was illusory, since the hacendados,

with a discreet shuffling of papers, became colonos.

Typically, sugar

lands would be divided by inheritance among various members of the
family.

Among the largest colonos in Cuba were hacendados like Sen-

"
ator Sime6n Ferro Martinez
and family, owners of Central San. Crist6bal

with almost 12 million arrobas of cane; the Casanovas, owners of Orozco
with 9 million; Julian de Lulueta y Besson, owner of Centrales Zaza and
F~ with 4 ~illion. 8 Hacendados might maintain colonias at centrales

....

they ~d not own.

Thus "Fico" Fernandez Casas of Central America

maintained about 2 million arrobas at C~mtral Cunagua.
had 7. 4 million arrobas at Central San German.

His son Alberto

9

Hacendados were not the only big colonos·; colonias were, along
with urban real estate, a preferr.ed investment for the alta-burguesia.
"
The Bosch's and Bacardi's
owned substantial sugar lands; the del Valle's

maintained 12 million arrobas at centrales Soledad and Santa Rosa.

7 Martinez Alier, Cuba: La revoluci6n, p. 82.
8 Anuario azucarero, 1958, pp. 119-,133.

The arrobas figure
indicates the amount of sugar the col~ might grind at a particular sugar
mill. A typical medium-sized mill might have several hundred colonos:
a few in the million arroba range; a half-dozen at around 500, 000 arrobas
and more progressively down the line.
9

Ibid.
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Cuba's largest.colono was Julio Lobo's brother-in-law. Mario Montoro
Saladrigas, who maintained upwards of 40 million arrobas at five different centrales, putting him neck and neck with United Fruit's 40
million arrobas of administration cane at Central Boston. lO
· So many hacendados became colonos that some wonder who the

real beneficiaries of the Sugar Coordination law of 1937 were. Today

the law is portrayed by some as a scheme to save the small grower,
an example of social democracy in pre-Castro Cuba.

Others suggest

that the law was designed by big Cuban colonos who wanted to force the
American sugar mills to disgorge their administration cane which the
Cubans might then acquire.

Still others see the coordination law as an

artifice to s?-ve then-bai:i~rupt hacendados .from the hands of the American banks, much like the moratoria of

1933 and 1940.

The banks

might take the mills, but the hacendados lands, in separate ownership,
would be saved.

I
I

Class Analysis
Given the hacendados I infiltration of the colonos' association,
it becomes imperative to know more about the class background of the
colonos.

I
I
I
I·

I

Were they small holders, a rural middle class,. or a front ·

for the alta-burguesfa ? The evidence suggests a melange of all three.
The colonos can be divided into economic classes according to
their annual production.

1 OIbid.

This calculation is based on the assumption

....

-

--
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that in an average year an arroba of sugar cane would net the grower

.

seven cents. 11 Labor and other costs might reduce this by 75 percent,
.

.

or to a profit of something less than two cents per arro}?a.

But since

the small grower did most of his own labor, he would retain the majority of his net.

The following estimate is based on the 1952 harvest,

the largest in pre-revolutionary Cuban history.
TABLE 1
Colonos in the 1952 Harvest 12

# arrobas

.r

total cane ground
millions arrobas

up to 30, 000
30, 001-40, 000
40, 001-50, 000
50, 001-100, 000
100, 001-200, 000.
200,001-500,000
500,001-1,000,000
1 - 2, 000, 000
2 - 5, 000, 000
5, 000, 000

%

- number of
colonias

449.5
164.6
148.4
525. 2
551.0
826.4
758.6
700.3
477.7
337.7

8.59
3.14
2.84
10. 04
10. 53
15. 79
14.50
13.38
9. 13
6.45

38, 135
4, 763
3,326
7, 561
3, 952
2, 685
1, 146
517
166
47

Total colono cane
4, 939. 4
Administration cane 292.8

94.39
5.61
100.00

62,298

61. 21
7.65
5.34
12.14
6.34
4.-31
1.84
0.83
0.27
0.07
100.

11

This estimate is based on a sugar yield of 12 % from the
raw cane, with sugar at 4 cents /pound. According to· a hacendado, the
division of sugar proceeds in the late 1950s was 53 % for the agricultural
side (sugar workers,37%, colono, 16%) and 47% for the industrial side
(23. 4% for labor, 23. 6% to hacendado. From his portion, the hacendado
· had to pay for materials, transportation and taxes. The remainder was
profit.
·
l2 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, pp. 522-523.
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Small colonos comprise those harvesting up to and including
50, 000 arrobas, netting a maximum of $3, 500 a y~ar or around $850
in profit for the owner.

In 1952 small colonias comprised 74 percent

of all colonias, but provided only 15 percent of all sugar ground.
Medium colonos comprise those cutting from 50, 000 to
500, 000 arrobas, with a net ranging from $3, 500 to $35, 000 a year
and a profit of anywhere from a low of $850 to a high of $8, 500.

Me-

dium colonos comprised 23 percent of all colonias, but produced about
39 percent of all sugar cane.
and middle-middle sector.

I·

These colonos can be placed in the lower-

13

The big colonos comprise those between 500, 000 and one
million arrobas, with a net ranging from $3 5, 000 to $70, 000 and an

I
I
I
I

annual profit of perhaps $8, 500 to $17, 000.

These colonos owned but

1. 84 percent of all colonias, but they produced more 1:han 15 percent of
all sugar cane.

These, then, were members of the upper-middle class.

TI:te millonarios, as they were called in Cuba, comprised
all those growing one million or more arrobas. Although colonias in
this class included but a fraction more than one percent of the total,
or but 730 colonias, they grew more than 30 percent of all cane ground

I
I
I
I

in 1952.

Their net incomes would range ·upwards from $70, 000.

A

colono like Julio Lobe's brother-in-law, Mario Montorro, with 40

13 These class rankings are not definitive, since they cannot
account for the possibility of other sources of income.

186

million arrobas, might have a net income approaching $3 million a
year.

A colonia like the Castro's Sabanillas de Biran with 2, 584, 039

arrobas could, if all the cane were harvested, net close to $200, 000.
·wages for sugar workers would reduce this to a profit of perhaps
$50, 000.

14

The millonarios or, less flatteringly, · the latifundistas,

were among the first targets of Castro's revolution.
It is evident then that most of Cuba's sugar growing colonias

were very small and produced relatively little, while a small minority
of bourgeois colonos produced almost 85 percent of Cuba's colonia grown
sugar.

There was thus a substantial gap b_etween the incomes of the

large and small colono, making the Asociaci6n de Colonos a far less
homogeneous organization than the elitist hacendados.

The Colonos'

members ranged from wordly sophisticates on the top to ignorant and
often illiterate mini-colonos at the bottom.
Intra-class warfare between large and small colonos was a
permanent feature of the association.

In the 1940s and the 1950s, it was

the small colono, rather than the colono class as a whole, who sought
government aid.

From time to time the small colonos threatened to

form their own independent associations.

Castro was aware of the

small colonos' interests, promising in History Will Absolve Me to

14 The arrobaje figures for Montorro and Castro are for
1958. A colono's arrobaje could vary substantially from year to year,
changing as much as 30-40% owing to economic, political or other
fa.ctors.
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distribute the lands of the powerful American sugar companies (specifically the United Fruit Company and West Indian Co.) .among small
15
farmers and colonos • .
In 1958, the colonos' association attempted to improve the

situation of the small grower, creating the Corporaci6n Financiera de
Tierras whose objective was to help small colonos to buy the land they
cultivated.

16

·

,

It was one of those signs of hope that flickered tanta-

lizingly but ineffectually in the late 1950s.
.

.

Colonos and the Rebellion
During the Castro rebellion, a number of colonos had pro- ·
·"'

I
I
I

I

vided economic support for Castro.

A writer for the communist daily

. Hoy estimated they gave Castro several millions_.

17

The colonos, fear-

ful of the revolut_ionary war I s threat to the 19 5 9 harvest, were among ·
those who urged Batista to abdicate in. late 1958.

18

In January, 1959, within hours of Batista's flight, the Aso-

· · ciaci6n de Colonos allied itself with Castro's revolution, joining the

15

Fidel Castro, History Will Absolve Me (Havana: Editorial
en Marcha, 1962), pp. 30-31.

I
I
I
I
I

16

Mario Villar Roces, "Cuba, una decada de agrarismo"
Diez anos de revolucion cubana (San Juan: Editorial San Juan, 1970),
p. 9.
1 7Hoy, January 23, 1959.
18 Suarez Nunez, ~l gran culpable, p. 127.
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general strike then in progress. 19 The Fidelista 's within the associa-:
tion demanded a purge.

Many of the association's oldest and most

honored members were Batistianos, some dating from . the 1930s when
-Batista had helped to put over the Sugar Coordination Law which was
the backbone of the colono class.

Gast6n Godoy, former Chairman of

the House of Representatives and Batista's vice-presidential candidate
in 1958, had occupied princ_ipal positions among the colonos for two decades.

The rebels had taken special pleasure in burning Godoy's sugar

.

.

warehouses in Oriente. in 1958. His other properties we:r:e intervened
by mid-1959.

20

remained behind.

Godoy had the good sense ~o flee with Batista.

Others

Of the colonos' six representatives to the all-important

!CEA, five were Batistianos.
In the first weeks of 1959, Castro's intentions were so un-

clear that many officials of th.e Batista era thought they ~ould continue
as before.

Thus, in the colonos' first elections, Julio Ulloa Bravo,

who as colono president

jn

1957 had led a delegation to felicitate Batis-

ta on his survival of the Palace attack, was elected President.

Benito

~

Martinez G6mez, the colonos' new treasurer, had accompanied Ulloa

19 Revoluci6n, January 3, 1959.

°

2 For a quarter of a century Gast6n Godoy y Loret de Mola
served as either an official of the colonos ' association, or as a representative of the colonos before the ICEA. His colonia Jabuco was intervened by the MRBM in July, 1959. In December, other properties,
including his Oriente warehouses and docks, were seized.
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on that visit.

These developments infuriated the revolutionaries and
~

were brought to public attention by a denuncia in Revolucion.

21

Three

of the six "new" colono officials were revealed to be "millionaire"
· growers: Ulloa Bravo with 2 million arrobas, his Vice President Jose
Perez San Juan with 4 million, and the secretary of the association with ·
two.

22

This was clearly unacceptable in Cuba's dawning equalitarian

age. An investigation of former colono officials

23

on suspicion of

malversation was sought by the Fidelista colonos Humberto Ruiz Leiro
(a close friend of Castro), Jose Agustfo Sierra Martfuez and Eduardo
24

Fernandez. ·

The properties of the departed Batistiano colonos were

represented within the association by their relatives.
interests were handled by his brother Felipe.

Gaston Godoy's

25

• b"1g. co 1onos were IIun d er susp1c1on,
. • •
Wh 1·1 e certain

colonos were making new demands.

II

th e sma11

At the colonos' January election,

2l Revolucion, January 17, 1959.
22 _
Ib"d
1_
•• February 12, 1959.

23 The radicals sought the investigation of th e following
Batistianos who had serve d as bo th colono officials and as ministers for
Batista: Amadeo L6pez Castro, Gaston Godoy, P astor Torres, Juan
Aguirrechu, Jacomino Toledo, Gustavo Nordelo. See in Revoluci6n,
January 22, 1959.
24 Revolucidn, January 31, 1959. Humb erto Rui'z Leiro participated with Castro in elections for law school president at the University of Havana in 1947. See in Jorge Garci'a Montes and Antonio Alon. so Avila. Historia del partido comunist a de Cuba (Miami: Ediciones
Universal, 1970 ), p. 384. In 1973, the exiled Rui'z Leiro, then living in
Dayton, Ohio, gav e his daughter Virginia in marriage to the American
Jeff Keyes.
25

·
.Boh emia,
February l . 5, .19 5 9 , p. 8 7 •
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Jos~ Campos, colono from Matanzas, had asked for a new colono leadership that "would know how to achieve a true agrarian reform ••• that
would offer the small colono t.hc chance to work his own land and put
an end to the fantastic profits of the great land owners who grind ten
million arrobas of cane •.• !'26
• "d e d
d 1vi

Campos wanted sugar profits to be

w1"th more equ1"ty. 1127

II

By mid-February, the small colonos, operating in conjunction

" were demanding a
with Minister of Agriculture Humberto Sori" Marin,

I
I
I
I
I
I·
I

25 percent increase in the guaranteed grind (to 40, 000 a:rrobas ) plus

a 10 percent increase (to 55 percent) in their share of sugar income
. .... . th e h acen d a d os. 28
vis-a-vis
The colonos held meetings in Camagii·ey and Las Villas.
Spokesmen demanded ,the realization of an old colono dream: the division of all re~aining aaministration cane.

29

Other small colonos

asked for a purification of the ranks, warning that some small colonos
'were in fact burgueses--_rich cattlemen and apartment owners. 30 The
winds of class warfare began to stir the canaverales.

26

Revoluci6n, January 17, 1959.

27 Ibid.
2 8 Ibid., February 16, 1959.
2 9 Ibid., February 20, 1959; February 25, 1959.
30!bid., March 21, 1959.

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
1.~1
I
I
I

191

Small Colonos Seek Government Aid
In March the small colonos asked the government to prohibit

the grinding of administration cane and to increase their quotas. · At
a meeting in mid-March, revolutionaries among the_small and medium
sized colonos presented a motion to bar all those (large) colonos who
had represented the association during the Batista era from participating in the association's politics for ten years.

All those colonos who

went to the Palace in March, 1957, to salute Batista were barred from
pa-rticipation for one year.

The motion passed by acclamation.

The
32
old colono leadership. angry and frightened, retired from the hall.
Behind the scenes, the go_v ernment was preparing another

line of attack against the big colonos, asking the A~sociation to rewrite
its constitution to give greater weight to. the vote of the small and medium grower.

This tactic, resisted in 1959, would be employed with

crushing force in late 1960.

33

The hopes of the colonos, large and small, were no doubt
whetted by the knowledge that the MRBM was beginning to intervene the
colonias of former Batistianos. In early March "Panchin" Batista's

I
I
I
I
I

3 l Ibid., March 17. 1959.
32 _
Ib"d
1_
•• March 19, 1959.
33 See in Cuban Economic Research Project, Labor Conditions in Communist Cuba (Coral Gables: University o(Miami, 1963 ).
pp. 124-12 5.
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·
·
34
2, 000 acres of canelands at the Central Mercedita were intervened.

Who would benefit from this?
During the early spring, the colonos held a series of elections.35Toe colonos from each mill elected a chief who, in turn, selected a 'provincial representative.
were held in late March.

Elections of a.national president

In Havana, Ruiz Leiro, the revolutionary

colono, urged the presidency of the millonario colono Ramon Castro,
Fidel's brother.
Pina Bermudez.

Ramon declined in favor of the small colono Silvestre
36

Pina had participated in _Castro's rebellion and had

been arrested on several occasions.
. and cut cane himself.

He was truly poor; he had planted
37
He didn't even have a bank account.
And he

was a bon_a fide member of the heroic culture.

Members of his family

had fought with Cespedes in '68~ his father had been a lieutenant in 1 95
and Silvestre himself had fought against Machado in 1933.
cond in command was Anibal Borroto.

38

Fina's se-

Borroto and Pina were colonos

from centrales Delicias and Moron, the two largest mills in Cuba, both

3 4 Revoluci6n, March 9, 1959. "Panchin" Batista, brother
of President Fulgencio Batista, had a quota of 1, 180, 000 arrobas.
35 Ibid., February 26, 1959.
36 Bohemia, April 5, 19 59 , pp. 88-89. Pina is today living
quietly in Miami. He r efu sed an inte r vi ew.
37

El Mundo, December 11, 1960.

38 Martinez Alier, Cuba: La revolucion, pp. 101-102.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
.1
I
I
-.I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

193

notorious for their large quantities of administration c:ane.

39

The election of these small growers suggests that the large
colonos' influence was waning even before the agrarian reform.

Pina

and Borroto would no doubt prove amenable to suggestions from their
new friend and advisor, Ramon Castro.

Their election was owed in

part to the Ministry of Agriculture's revisions of the colonos' electoral procedure. to give more weight to the small growers.

In April at the national assembly of colonos in Havana.
Fidel Castro promised that sugar would remain the main axis of Cu-

.

.

ban economic life.

40

In return, the colono leadership asked that the

agrarian reform provide land for the tiller, that is. the colonos.

41

The assembly approved the development of co-ops to share equipment
42

and make bulk purchases of fertilizer.

Earlier. the colonos had pro-

mised to raise pigs to save foreign exchange formerly spent on lard
imports from the U. S. 43

Not to be outdone by the contributions of

the ganaderos and hacendados to Fidel's agrarian reform collection,
3 9 In 1959 Central Delicias of the Cuban-American Sugar
Company produced 1. ·2 million sacks of sugar, making it the second
largest mill in Cuba. Atlantica del Golfo's Moron was number one •
. 40 n·1ar10
. d e 1a M ar1na,
.
April 5, 1959.
41 Ibid.

42 Revolucion, April 5, 1959.
43 Ibid •• March 25, 1959.
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the colonos' association volunteered $2 million plus important quanties of molasses.

44

Chief among the desires ·of the small colonos was a bank that
would finance their crops, . liberating them from their traditional financier, the, sugar mill owner.

There was, in fact, a Banco de Colonos,

but it was a private bank which lent only to the large growers.

The

chairman of the Banco de Colonos was then Armando Arechaga, who
was also president of the hacendados.

A nice example· of the way the

big interests ran the sugar industry. In April, a delegation of small
'
45
colonos offered to buy out the BanGO, but without result.
Meanwhile, colonos large and small were being harassed by
their own nemesis: the sugar workers of the FNTA.

The colonos were

most displeased when in Aprii the government approved a 12 percent
pay increase for cane cutters.

One-third this amount would later be

reimbursed to the colonos by the hacendados.
salary increase as economic madness.

46

The colonos saw this

They als_o lamented the FNTA 's

island-wide labor pressure against the use of sugar machinery.

The

I
I
I

I
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FNTA wanted "to return to carts and oxen" in order to preserve jobs
for its members.

47

44 Revoluci6n, May 25, 1959.
45 Diario de la Marina, April 9, 1959.
46 Tirso Clemente, "Legislaci6n revoiucionaria cubana,
Humanismo (Mexico), May-August 1959, p. 150.
47 Diario de la Marina, May 22, 1959.
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The colonos were also attacked by the sugar technicians who
complained that the growers "didn't care ~he least about sugar research .••

11

and consistently failed to give financial support, even when

· promised. 48 The colonos' defender, Alberto Vila, replied over CMQ,
blam_ing the lack of research on the government.
colonos were modernizing.

But the sugar technicians I Pedro Puertas

This, from

$100. 00 a year for research.

II

80, 000

II

colonos!

50

The Agrar ian R·eform
The colonos awaited the agrarian reform with the most diverse hopes, the big colonos expecting to lose, the small to gain.
The small growers hoped that the cheap land and ptentiful credit which
they had sought since 1934 would now be theirs.

They sensed they were

a favored class.
But Castro's reform was not what any had anticipated.

The

leadership of the colonos was shocked.

It demanded permanent sessions

until a formal protest could be drafted.

To the colonos I Dr. Felipe

·

I
I
I
I

Vila said the

replied that the colonos were contributing the magnificent sum of

Llano the law was

1·

49

II

.

•

a dagger 1n the heart.

1151

1

It wou d have to be

48 Asociaci6n de Tecnicos Azucareros Cubanos, Boletih
Oficial, January, 1959, p. 22.
49

Ibid., April, 1959, p. 264.

50 Ibid.
51 Diario de la Marina, May 24, 1959.

modified.

Ricardo Sardinas, president of the colonos association for

Matanzas Province, said article 11, which forbade renting or sharecropping, meant a loss of economic liberty.

52

Sardinas thought the

agrarian reform proposed by the communists to be more conservative
.
53
than that of Fidel.
Even the small colonos were unhappy.
going to give them land--but not the land title.
own the land and have the right to sell it.

The government was
The colonos wanted to

They wanted the hacendados'

administration cane for themselves; Fidel planned to distribute it to the
ignorant campesinos.

54

Thus, as against the campesino, all but the

smallest colono considered himself superior, middle class.

I
I
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1·

The

Diario de la Marina argued that the whole colonato was "a kind of rural

I

. middle class" whose survival was in the national inte~est. 55

·1
5 2 Ibid.

53 Diario de la Marina, June 3, 1959. Dr. Ricardo Rafael
.Sardinas y Sanchez had useful credentials. A lawyer and a former vicepresident of the colonos , · he worked for the Department of Rural Justice
where he defended campesinos until fired by Batista in 1955. Thereafter, as ·a lawyer, he defended various Castro revolutionaries. See
Diario de la Marina, December 4, 1959; Avan~ (Miami) September 23,
1960, p. 17.
54

Revoludon, May 25, 1959.

55 Editorial, Diario de la Marina, May 27, 1959. The Diario's
view was supported by the IBRD report of 1950 (cited approvingly by
Thomas, Cuba, p. 1146) to the effect that some 15% of the colonias were
· owned by the rich; 70% by the middle class and 15% by the poo r . See in
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Report on Cuba
(Baltimore: 'The Johns HopkiPs Press, 1951 ), p. 198.

·
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Were the colonos poor farmers or members of the rural bourgeoisie? Kulaks or campesinos?
the Castroites.

TI1is was an important question for

A united colonato of sixty or seventy thousand members

could, if opposed to the agrarian reform, cause severe difficulties for
Castro. ·The revolutionaries claimed most colonos were poor: 70 percent ground less than 40, 000 arrobas.

Juan Perez Ramfrez,

56

leader

of a drive for the democratization of the association, argued that the
colonos "are in the majority campesinos II who work the land themselves
and with their families.

Only 5 percent were thought to be

Large colonos also complained about the reform.

• II
big
co 1onos. 57

II

Humberto

Tarafa, president of the colonos at the U.S. -owned Central Vertientes,
thought the enormous powers being give~ INRA by the reform amounted
to "neo-communism. ".58
Though Castro had promised that his agrarian reform would not
be revised, even if "nails rained down from the sky," he was also quite
aware of the colonos unhappiness.
thought the

11

In an interview Castro said he

40, 000" small colonos would be assuaged by a government

56 .Juan Perez Ram{rez, leader of the colonos at the former
Batista-owned Central Washington. Perez led an evanescent group
called the "Comisi6n Nacional Provincial Pro-Democratizaci6n y Re11
forma de la Asociaci6n Nacional de Colonos.
See in Revoluci6n,
February 12, 1959.
57 Perez I conclusions are supported by my analysis of the 1952
harvest. See above, pp. 184-186.
58 Havana Times, June 8, 1959.

198
gift of free land: "Pagarla,. i para que? " 59

He did not want to give

full title, fearing that the small growers would sell out to the large.
11

The big colonos have always taken advantage of the small •.••

11

6o

And again: "The interests of the small colonos are diametrically op•

posed to those of the big colonos....
were hiding behind the small ones.

116

l

.

The big colonos, Castro said,

Fidel thought Batista elements

were still in the association; they were trying to destroy the revolution. 62
The colono leader Silvestre Pina nonetheless expressed a desire .to buy lands "without .subordinating ourselves" to the control of
any state organization.

63

Pina apparently s~nsed that the colonos were

about to acquire--with full flourish of revolutionary beneficence..;.-an
unwanted new patron.

Sardinas also continued to press the land pur-

chase issue. In late June he visited Nunez Jimenez at INRA headquarters to reiterate the colonos' desire· to buy lands. He argued that,
under certain circumstances, inheritance of plots from sixty-six to
one thousand acres ought to be permitted.

64

59 "Pay for it? What for?" Revoluci6n, June 10, 1959.
6 0Ibid.

61 Diario de la Marina, June 10~ 1959.
62 Ibid.
63 Revoluci6n, June 10, 1959.
64 Diario de la Marina, June 20, 1959.
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At the same time there was some progress towards a compromise on other issues.

By June 11, five of the seven modifications
., ·
·
65
requested by the colonos had been accepted by the government.
By the 20th, the colono executive committee had decided to support

the reform.

66

By July, all colono complaints had ceased.

Ninety per-

cent of the organization's members were reportedly benefiting from the
reform.

67
The colonos' acceptance of the reform marked the beginning

of their association's decline.
now decisive.

INRA's voice in agrarian .matters was

The colonos' only remaining card was the paternal pres-

ence of their fellow planter, Ramon Castro.

By mid-summer, it was

evident that the colonos,. like the hacendados, were also headed for
economic trouble.

S~nce canaverales were now being intervened on

various pretexts, with the remainder to go one year hence, there was
understandably little enthusiasm for investm_e nt by either the hacendados
·or the big colonos. This produced a nice tension between the two. When
the hacendados delayed payments due the colonos, the latter group asked
the ·government, in. late August, to intervene no less than forty-three
Cuban ce~trales. 68

65 Havana Times, June 11, 1959.
66 Revolucion, June 20, 1959.
67 Diario de la Marina , July 9, 1959.
68 The New York Times, August 24, 1959.
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Towards autumn, various large colonias in Las Villas began
to be intervened on grounds of abandonment.

69

The ,colonos then be-

gan the publication of a weekly propaganda sheet, Cana y Azucar, which
"came tucked into the Diario de la. Marina. 70 In tqe first issue, Colonel
Fermfn Fleites, colono of Central Manatf, complained that rising labor
.
71
costs would mean a net loss to the colonos of one dollar per arrol;)a.

Cana y Azu c a r's editor, Alberto C. Vila, decried the appearance of
state organized cooperatives.

72

He wondered if the e~tire colonato

shouldn't join in one giant national private co-op? It would mean handsome savings! 73 The Jesuit Father Jose Llor.e nte wrote in Ca:ffa y
Azucar that each central should have a savings and credit co-op.

74

'

Fidel was quite aware of Cana y Azucar, denouncing it as a little newspaper "paid for by the latifundistas.

117 5

69 Revoluci6n, August 20, 1959.

70 This was unfortunate because the Diario itself was already
under attack for its "counterrevolutionary" posture.
71 Diario de la Marina, September 9, 1959. The Colonel and
his family had the right to grind two million arrobas. See in Anuario
azucarero, 1959, p. 129. ·

72 Diario de la Marina, October 29, 1959.
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73 Ibid., November 4, 1959.
74 Ibid., December 2, 1959.
7 5 "Dis cur so de Fidel Castro Ruz, " Humanismo (Mexico)
September-October, 1959, p. 99.
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The colonos became increasingly concerned with the haphazard
and reckless application of the agrarian reform by some INRA officials.
At a three-day national assembly in November, the colonos asked for
the correct application of the law which they otherwise fully supported. 76
Cana y Azucar said INRA officials were proceeding as they pleased.
Moreover, some workers were said to be encouraging interventions by
false allegations of overdue back wages against the colonos.
One motive for both the haphazard nature of the agrarian
reform and for its intensification in the summer of 1959 was the de.
77
mand of unemployed workers for land.
These workers wanted land
because it guaranteed work.

In 19~9, the workers I expectations had

I·

been aroused by revolutionary rhetoric and the promise of the agrarian

I
I
I

.
,
ployed campesinos wanted to become colonos. At the Central Rio

I
I
I
I
I

reform.

The pressure for employment was intense.

78

Many unem-

Cauto, in August, 1959, fifteen hundred unemployed workers demanded

76 Diario de la Marina, November 24, 1959.
7 7 Other motives for the nature and intensity of the agrarian
reform would include: the desire to destroy the bourgeoisie for social
reasons and also to end their counterrevolutionary potential; the desire of newly-minted authorities to exercise their authority .•• and win
revolutionary merit; the political need to please as many people as possible in order to retain power; and, finally, the desire of the regime to
proceed with the socialization of the economy.

1968.

7 8 This conclusion was based on a study of some INRA files in
See in Martinez Alier, Cuba: La revoluci6n, pp. 174-208.
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' .,,_,.-

that thirteen thousand acres ·of unused sugar lands be opened up.
Big colonos also felt the pressure of the unemployed.

79

A colono at

Central San Ram6n complained that the labor unions there were trying
to force him to employ more workers than necessary.

This was all

the more annoying since the affected colono had contributed economically to Castro's rebellion. BO

Sardinas
On October 21, the colono spokesman Sardinas was interviewed on TV by INRA's Waldo Medina.

81

This was the day the counter-·

revolutionary D:faz Lariz's B-25 had "machine-gunned" Havana.

He

had, in fact, dropped only leaflets. 82
11

Medina:

Weren't you (the colonos) meeting when Dlaz
Lanz strafed Havana?"

Sardinas:

"Yes.

Medina:
Sardinas:
Medina:

II

II

.

And did you make a vote of censure?

II

"No, because we didn't see the strafing • ."
11

·
83
Did you make any protest ••• ? 11

79 Ibid.l p. 169.
80Ibid., p. 169.

81 Waldo Medina was !NRA 's chi~f attorney.
8-2 Di'az Lanz's B-25 confiscated and examined by U.S.
authorities following his raid, was shown to have no provisions for
the mounting of machine guns. Injuries in the raid were caused by
wild anti-aircraft fire.
1

83 Revoluci6n, October 24, 1959.
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In November, S~rdinas was back on television again asking
for correct application of the law.

He noted that in Mata~zas a finca of ·

three caballerias (ninety-nine acres) had been intervened.

84

This was

.clearly illegal.
The colonos association was apparently still too vigorous
to suit the Castroites.

So further splintering attempts were made.

Small colonos visited Revoluci6n to complain that the representation of
the small grower within the association was still inadequate.
ci6n suddenly
-

85

Revolu-

recalled that, as lawyer for the multi-millionaire Ernesto
.

.

Sarra, Sardinas had evicted many tenants from Sarra's apartments.

1·
~

I
I
I
I

Various other charges were rained on Sardinas' head.
to so many others, Sardinas fought back.

86

But, in contrast

Sardinas charged that his at-

tackers, including FNTA chief Conrado Becquer, "were trying to im. . mo ld" on Cu b a. 87 And
. 1n
. C ana
- y .l':zucar
11.
'
.
pose a tota11tar1an
the co 1onos

argued they should be left alone since they were the most Cuban of all
the major elements of the Cuban economy.

84

88

!NRA 's response

Diario de la Marina, November 26, 1959.

85 Revoluci6n, November 24, 1959.

I
I
I
I

,·.

86

Ibid., November 25, 1959, Ernesto Sarra made a fortune
from a chain of pharmacies, the Droguerias Sarra, which the revolution liked to call the "trust del dolor. " Sarra was perhaps the largest
landlord in old Cuba. According to Castro, Sarra 's income from rents
alone was $2 5, 000 a day. (Diario de la Marina, March 14, 1959.)
8 7 Diario de la Marina, December 4, 1959.
8 8 Ibid., December 9, 1959.
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to Sardinas' combativeness was the intervention of his sugar plantation,
La Sierra Maestre.

89

Ram6n Castro
Ramon Castro continued to bumble around the colonos' association in the most curious manner, apparently uncertain whether to
be leader or follower, torn between the interests of his own class, the
millonario(large)colonos, and his brother's evolving revolution, which
.favored the small.

This problem was eased somewhat in late October

when !NRA intervened part of Ramon's colonia at Bira.n, · reducing him
at a stroke to

mediu~ size.

90

Ram6n began to advocate a unique

scheme: a colono gift to the Ministry of Social Welfare to help "end
begging" in Cuba.

Ramon appareni:ly hit upon this idea sometime after
'

Fidel had declined the colonos' offer of $2 million for the agrarian re.form collection.

This gift,

along with one of $500, 000 'for the Air

. Force to buy arms (to shoot down raiders like Dr'az Lanz), was approved by the association in November.
rather bc:.re.

This left the colonos' treasury

91

Shortly thereafter Ramon ran afoul of the revolution owing
to an angry letter he wrote in defense of the newspaper Prensa Libre,

89 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 61.
90 Revoluci6n, October 22, 1959 •.
91 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 202.
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.
. counterrevo l utlonary
then under attac k for its
views. 92 Revoluci6n
replied by denouncing Ram6n as a bourgeois who ha~ failed to wholeheartedly commit him.self to the revolution because of cowardice and
93
· a desire to make money. By early 1960, the colonos found themselves in eco11omic

.

-

distress, squeezed by the increased wages of the sugar workers.

Sil-

vestre Pii'l'.a told an assembly of colonos that, in order to increase
'

workers' salaries, the colonos would need a bigger share of the sugar
profits from the hace11dados.

He asked for 60 percent of. sugar income,

-. -94
as opposed to the current 50 percent, to break even.
Labor unions
L

vs. colonos vs. hacendados vs. the Americans; small against large,
poor against rich, young against old.

Thus did the various compon~nts

of the old society grind one another down.

Coiono Elections
In late sprin~, the minister of agriculture annulled the re-

sults of the colonos' annual elections.

The colonos'national executive

92 Thomas, Cuba, .P· 1251.

I
I
I
I
I

93 .rrhe New York Times, November 25, 1959. No doubt Fidel
either authorized or himself prepared this attack, reflecting perhaps a
touch of sibling rivalry. Ram6n, the oldest child, had apparently inherited the family farm, leaving Fidel, who had dribbled away his
patrimony, with nothing but his political ambitions.
94

El Mundo, March 4, 1960.
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committee, furious at this intrusion, resigned.

95

Ram6n Castro then

urged- -most inexplicably- -the election of Ricardo Rafael Sardinas, a
critic of the agrarian reform, a~·~ unity candidate. 96 This was clearly

a rebuke to the regime.

A few days after his election, Sardinas was

invited to participate in a TV panel discussion.
hand not to criticize the government.

He was warned before-

This convinced Sardiftas it was

97 H
.
. - t? go mto
t ime
ex1·1 e.
e went to M"1am1. and joined the counter-

I.

revolution. 98
The difficulties.of the colonos' association eliciteq no sympathy
from labor.

FNTA chief Conrado ·Becquer continued to press the planters,

warning that !NRA would intervene various colonias if certain tasks were
not accomplished.

99

But !NRA was moving in anyway.

INRA, accusing

the private banks of delaying credits to the colonos, · said it would perform this function if necessary.

To facilitate this, the Bank for Agri-

cultural and Industrial Development was incorporated into the INRA as
a

II

I
I.
I
I
I
I

credit department.

Ill 00

95 El Mundo, June 1, 1960. One worried colono official found
an easy solution to clear himself with the government; vi.ce--treasurer Sebastian Perez simply gave !NRA his colonia of 50 caballerias.
96 _1_.,
Ib"d
June 1, 1960.

97 Avance (Miami), September 30, 1960, p. 17.
98 Diario de la Marina (Miami), ~eptember 24, 1960.
99 El Mundo, June 12, 1960.
lOOibid., June 23, 1960.
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In the summer, the economic situation of the colonos entered

the critical stage.

The hacendados would not, or coµld not, pay the

colonos what they owed.

According to the !CEA official, Enrique Meno-

cal, the American mills stopped paying their colonos around March or
April, 1960. lOl When the American managers of the Cuban-American
Sugar Mills Company abandoned Cuba in July; they left a debt to their
c-olonos of $2, 192, 865. 54.

Cuban-American also left behind more than

$9 million worth of r.aw sugar and $303, 535. 69 frozen. in Cuban banks.

102

Thus the funds would be available to pay the colonos from sugar sales-if the !NRA chose to do so.

cial power over the colonos.

!NRA was now acquiring, by default, finanOther big American companies also left,

owing substantial sums to their colonos: Vertientes-Camagiiey more
than $1 million; the American. Sugar company $719, 000.

103

For these

compani~s, on the verge oflosing hundreds of millions. their default on
debts to the colonos may have seemed immaterial.

But for the colono~

·it was a disaster; one more step in the unravelling of the old Cuba.
The nationalization of all the American sugar mills on August
7th was greeted with enthusiasm by the colono spokesman Ram6n Castro.

I
I
I
I
I

101 Letter to author from Enrique Menocal, an official with the
ICEA till his defection in mid-1960. Philadelphia, April 20, 1972.
102 Data from claim of the Cuban-American Sugar Company
before the FCSC. Claim CU-2622. Cuban-American claimed a total
loss of $114, 003, 157.
103 For Vertientes-Camagiiey, see FCSC-claim CU-0849.
For that of the American Sugar Company, see FCSC CU-2445~
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He thought all colonos favored it.

Colonos who rented er share-

cropped their land would receive land titles.

Rarn6n said the big

American companies had got what they deserved.

Certainly, they had

4
violated all the laws regulating administration cane. l0 · By October,
INRA paid all colonos working its (intervened) properties what was due
105
them.
What of the Cuban-owned sugar mills? Ram6n apparently
favored their nationalization, warning in early October that failure to
finance their colonos within fifteen days would bring intervention.
He was apparently unaware of his brother's audacious plans.
two days Fidel nationalized all the Cuban sugar mills.

106

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Within

Now the colonos

would be obliged to negotiate everything w:ith the government.

Colonos in Trouble
In late 19~0. after the intervention of :fue big American and

Cuban business organizations, the colonos became, by default, the
most powerful independent economic organization left in Cuba.

Thus

the colonos, who liked to think of themselves as the largest association

104

El Mundo, August 25, 1960.

105 Ibid •• October 12, 1960.
106

Ibid. Ram6n had for some time been president of the
colonos at Central Miranda. He was also frequently mentioned as a
dirigente (leader) of the national colonos' association but his precise
title, if any, is unclear.
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(
f·

. th e wor ld , were
. prime
.
t arge t s for government
.
·
l 07
attention.
o f f armers m

i

Members of the newly-formed !NRA-controlled sugar cane GO-ops
sought entry into the association.

Had this infiltration been permitted,

(

the colonos would have soon become the creature of INRA, just like
the new co-ops.

This effort was blocked, but it merely encouraged

government planners to· seek some other way to band the new small

r
r
tr

[.
!

farmers, co-ops and colonos into one coherent government-controlled
organization.
Many of the larger colonos_ were already in exile in Miami.
In November, they joined with exiled hacendados to form the Federaci6n

de Productores de Cana de Azucar de Cuba en Exilio, giving the ap-·
pearance of a unity the t~o groups had never known while in Cuba.

108

To break tl).e colono leadership. !NRA decided to organize
fresh elections.

This time the small colonos amenable to government

direction won out.

These colonos were then to be invited to a sugar

congress at which the two other elements of the sugar game, labor and
mill administration--both already creatures of the government--would
109
be present.
This trio would then determine the future of the colonos'

107 Diario de la Marina (Miami), January 14, 1961.
108 Ibid., November 19, 1960.
9
l0 Conrado Becquer for the FNTA; Alfredo Menendez for
!NRA 's Dept. of Sugar Mills administration. Ram6n Castro referred
to the pair as "two monkeys" who· would perform whatever tricks the
ringmaster (Fidel) directed. . See in Diario de la Marina (Miami),
January 14, 1961.

.
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association.

110

The sugar congress was scheduled for December 19.

But

the associations' remaining mavericks, aware of Castro's plans, called
a national assembly of their own for the 18th. When the anti-government
colonos, tried to place newspaper ads to announce their meeting, they
found that no paper (of the few remaining) would accept them.

Mean-

while, the government sent soldiers, labor and INRA officials to visit
colono leaders and encourage them to sign declarations of support for
the government position. · Colono leaders at Washington, Santo Domingo,
Coraz6n de Jesus, and Santa Lutgarda sugar mills received midnight
visits.

Colono President Silvestre Pina telegraphed Castro protesting

.
111
t h ese tactics.

Some eight, hundred colono representatives attended the meeting of December 18.

Silvestre Pina, himself a small colono, opened

the meeting, raising the chief issue: Why did the government want to
· destroy the colonos? Why were labor and administration ganging up on
the colonos?

The colonos had never interfered in their activities. 4

Pina was followed by Ram6n Castro, who gave a fighting. speech in defense of the association.

With a true Castro flourish he began: "Better

dead than humiliated!" Ram6n then described the association, its
growth, achievements: "We nave never been a parasitical class like

110

O'Connor, Or i gins , pp. 120-121.

111 D1ar10
· · d e 1a M arrna,
·
(M.1am1. ) , D ecemb er 31 , 19 6 0 •
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the one that today strives .to take over the revolution. " He noted that.
the colonos had donated millions to the revolution a~d wer·e paying their
workers high, really uneconomic, salaries.

112

The government could

· ask anything, any sacrifice, and the colonos would cooperate, ''but
what they cannot ask is to turn us into a communal cooperative.
Thunderous and prolonged applause.

11113

The meeting ended with a demon-

stration of support for the executive committee.

All present voted to

boycott the sugar congress scheduled by !NRA for the following day.
Ram6n Castro thought the colonos could trade. cooperation
for survival.

This was a view shared by many Cubans who, as late as

December, 1960, had still not grasped the true depth and direction of
the revolution.

Many felt: I have done nothing wrong, so I will not be

touched. If Fidel's own brother did not sense the nature of events,
how could anyone else?
But" Fidel could not tolerate the existence of independent,
autonomous organizations.
revolutionary.

It was irrational, uneconomic, counter-

The Asociaci6n de Colonos had to die.

Fidel finally destroyed them.

On December 19,

In his speech before the sugar congress

that day, ~astro portrayed the benefits of the revolution for the small

I
I
I
I

colono.

The revolution had ended the colonos' dependence on the

112 According to Ram6n, the colonos were committed to an
annual contribution of $4 million for campesino housing.
113

Diario de la Madna (Miami), January 14, 1961.
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hacendado, eliminated land rents, and made the colono an owner.

The

future was opening up. Great amounts of sugar cane left standing by
previous zafras would, in the first "people's harvest,
implied benefits for the colono~

114

11

be cut, with

The small colonos then presented

their anticipated motion that the Asociaci6n de Colonos de Cuba be disbanded in favor of a new national association for sin all farmers: the
Asociaci6n Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos or ANAP.

Thereafter

Ram6n Castro tried to revive the colonos' association, writing an angry
letter--to no avail--to President Dortic6s. 11 5 The colonos we:re finished.

114 El Mundo, December 20, 1960.
115 Cuban Information Service New,sletter, March 4, 1961. The
net assets of the Asociaci6n de Colonos upon its dissolution were estimated at .$7 million by the colono Alberto C. Vila. See in Bohemia
Libre (New York), August 6, 1961, p. 66.
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V.

GANADEROS

Of all the groups in the agrarian sector in 1959, the future
seemed brightest for Cuba's cattlemen, the ganaderos.

In the 1950s,

Cuban cattle had "fcreased in number and improved in quality.
market potential at home and abroad was promising.

The

Indeed, Cuba

was in the process of replacing the United States as the principal
source of tropical breeding stock for Latin America.

Profits were

good, better than in sugar, and for this reason many hacendados were
diversifying into the cattle business.

And, though a few big ranches

were U. S. -owned, the indust~y was largely controlled by Cubans.
Thus the cattle industry seemed to have little to fear, and much to
gain, from a nationalist revolution.
But, despite its s.t rength and promise, the cattle business was
also vulnerable, more so than most.

Ranching in Cuba was a business

of rapid turnover, demanding substantial capital.

It was a three-

tiered business in which a numerous class of small criadores sold

I
I
I
I
I

their calves to mejoradores who sold in turn to the cebadores, the
fatteners.

The efficient functioning of this cycle demanded business

· confidence, a confidence that was shattered by Castro's rebellion in
1957-1958 and, thereafter, never returned.

...

2i4
During the rebellion, . the gana dcros gave generously to Castro's

ca.u5e. In return, the rebels levied revolutionary taxes on them and
stole their cattle.

Early in 1959, Castro began to move against the

big cebadores, denouncing them as _latifundistas. As the lineaments
of M.5 distributionist revolution became evident, many feared Fidel

would also manipulate meat prices. The cattlemen, uncertain of the

future, were reluctant to invest and the cattle cycle slowed. While the
eebadores and the mejoradores waited, the small ganaderos (the criadores) languished.

Castro interpreted the ganaderos' disinclination

to invest as counterrevolution.

He proceeded to divide the ganaderos

by attacking the big ranchers while cultivating the support of the small.

Moving with extraordinary speed, within twelv~ months he revolutionized the cattle industry, in the process destroying the big cattlemen and
taking the small under his wing.

I.
I
I
I
I
I
I

·1

Brief History
The history of the cattle industry, like that of Cuba, is a rollercoaster affair. 1 Cattle had been the island's first industry until the
19th century when it was replaced by sugar.

I
I
I
I

During the final and cli-

mactic war for independence, Cuba's herds were decimated, dropping

1 Prime sources for this background data include: Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, pp. 67-70; 254-255; 525-529. Also,
interviews with Roberto Paraj6n, in 1958 chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Asociaci6n Nacional de Ganaderos (Miami, May 21,
1971) and Jose "Pepfn" Castellanos, ganadcro, horse breeder, and
owner of Hacienda San Blas (Miami, May 28, 197 l ).
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from an estimated three million head to 800, 000.

After the war, the

cattle industry recovered rapidly, rising with the general prosperity to
almost five miUion head in 1927.

The industry remained frozen at this

level for the next three decades, another reflection of the economic
stagnation which afflicted the. entire island.
.
But numbers do not tell everything. While the number of cattle remained the same, there was an important increase ih quality beginning in the late 1920s.

This was owing to two factors: the tariff of

1927 which protected the tasajo (salted meat) industry.and the beginning
of cattle fairs around 1930. Previous to the fairs, the Cuban cattle industry had been extensive in nature, characterized by unregulated breeding on vast spaces.

Quality was low.
.

When the great cattlemen came to
~

the first cattle fairs in Bayamo, Havana, and Sancti Spiritus in the 1930s,
they were distressed to tind their cattle judged inferior.
improvement begari.

A drive for

Celso Gonzalez Hierro impo_rted Brahma bulls

from India to begin the CE:bu breed which, by the late 1950s, was dominant in Cuba. 2 Ing. Rafael Garcia Escriban imported Brown Swiss milk
cows in the mid-1930s.

Breeders' associations for Cebus,

trudis, Charolais, Holstein and Brown Swiss were formed.

Santa Ger3

The shift

in emphasis from quantity to quality was evident in the family of Alvaro

I
I
I
I

2 Interview with Roberto Paraj6n: Miami, May 21, 1971.
3 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 528.
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Sanchez.

The father was an ·extensive ganadero; the son, a Harvard

4
. t ens1ve.
.
gra dua t e, 1n

These improvements flowed from a growth in demand and from
higher profits.

This encouraged colonos and hacendados , their lands

idled by government restrict.i ons on sugar. planting, to become ganaderos.
By the 1950s, cattle were more profitable than sugar. 5 Cattle and sugar

were mutually supportive, the cattle fattening nicely on sugar by-products
like molasses.

Among Cuba's leading cattlemen of the 1950s in Oriente
;

were Manuel Area's Ganaderia Arca-Campos at Central Estrada Palma
with 5000 head; "Fico" .Fern~ndez of Central. America, 10, 000; Francisco Escobar of Central Salvador, 5, 000.
Fruit Company had 7, 811.
dairy cattle.
5, 000 head;

8

7

6

To the west, the United

Atlantica del Golfo's H~rshey mills kept

In Pina:r; del Rio, the hacendado Casanova of Orozco kept

.

;

Gustavo de los Reyes of Central Bahia Honda, 4, 000; and

,

Central Santa Lucia, 10, 000.

9

·1

4 Interview with Roberto Paraj6n. Miami, May 21, 1971.
5 Interview with Antonio Barro. Miami, June i4, 1971.
6 Interview with Francisco Escobar~ Miami, April 17, 1971.
7 United Fruit claim before the U.S. FCSC.

a Interview with

Jose Manuel Casanova.
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Claim CU-2776.

Coral Gables, June 11,

1971.
9 Letter to author by Gustavo de los Reyes, Compania Venezolana de Ganaderfa, Valencia, Venezuela. August 2, 1972.
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The biggest cattlemen were the Infantes with 30, 000 head and .
Remigio Fernandez with 20, 000, both of Oriente.
cattlemen were ·from Camngiiey.
· he~d; Eugenio Fernandez 1 o.

Many big Cuban

There Bernabe Sanchez had 14, 000

ooo· head;

Jose Sosa Cabre.ra 8, 000. 1 O

Other big owners were the Batistiano Jos~ Eleuterio Pedraza with 4, 600
.

'

head of Cebu at Manacas and the hardware magnate Francisco Cajigas
with 5, 000 head in Havana Province.

11

Cattle was largely a Cuban business.
involved.

A few Americans were

Some of these, like the Bostonian Sumner Pingree, had very

large modern ranches.

Under Pingree's :resident direction, in two de-

cades his herd expanded to 15, 000 head.
delaria Ranch ran 5,

oo·o

head.

13

12

The Lykes Brothers' Can-

The A~erican Ezra Barker had 7, 000

cattle on Turiguano island off the Ca~agiiey coast~

Barker thought there

were only fifteen or twenty herds in all of Cuba as big as his. 14 The
best American spread was the King Ranch's Ganadera Becerra with

10 IbM.
11 Revoluci6n, July 28, 1959.
12 Ibid.; July 7, 9, 1959. To escape the intense heat of the Cuban
summer, after the sugar harvest the Pingrees would migrate to their spacious cottage on North Haven Island in Maine.
13 Ibid., August 20, 1959. The Lykes Brothers of shipping line
fame were reputed to own 2. 5 million acres in Florida. See in Miami
Herald, October 16, 1971.
14

Havana Times, September 11, 1958.
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7 ~ 600 head.
Manat!.

15

This was a mixed operation in conjunction. with Central
Other big American ranche:r:s were Jack

~all Everhart of

'
the San Marcos Land and Cattle Company in Pinar del Rio
with 5, 500

Head. 16 The American-owned Cuban Trading Company ran 12, 000 head

at the sugar mills Francisco and Elia. 17
By the late 1950s, Cuba was exporting Cebu stock to Venezuela,

Honduras, and the Dominican Republic. Cuban cattle were sent to Tru' Agricola
'
jillo's Feria
in 1957.

I·

Roberto Paraj6n sold a bull there for

·
18
$15, 000.
The Cuban. entrepreneur Jose Antonio L6pez Serrano created

his modern slaughterhouse, the Matadero Industrial, in Havana.

Aided

by a revised tariff, he began shipping frozen meat to the United States. 19
.,,..

The cattlemen felt relatively secure.

Labor was no particular

difficulty; ~ few vaqueros (cowboys) could handle thousands of cattle.
And the vaqueros were not unionized like the sugar worke_rs.

Their wage

15 Charles J. V. Murphy, "The King Ranch South of the Border,"
Fortune (July, 1969) p. 132. Murphy describes ·the Kleberg family of
King Ranch as the largest landowners 4i the world.
16

I
I
I
I
I
1·

U.S. News and World Report, October 19, 1959.

I

17 Manuel Arca, "Influence, "p. 44.
18 Interview with Roberto Paraj«;m.

Miami, May 21, 1971.

l9 L 6pez· Serrano 's other entrepreneurial activities included the
building of the Hotel Commodoro; the c reation of Editorial Cultural,
Cuba's l argest book publisher and one of the larges t in Latin Americ a :
Laborat ories Lex; fis h and lobster canning operations. Mos t fam ous of
all was his L6pez Serrano bu ilding whose t o we r apartment was long the
hvm e of the Cuban politician, Eddy Chibas. (Diario Las Americ as ,
. June 1, 197 2. )
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was $2. 60 a day.

Though the ganaderos were not subject to extensive

government regulation--as was the sugar industry--meat prices were
controlled. kept down by the politicians to please the electorate.

The

ganaderos complained that such controls discouraged quality production
and encouraged black marketeering.
The ganaderos sometimes thought themselves a superior breed:
real farmers as opposed to the lawyers who ran the sugar indus'try.
Their future seemed bright.

One ganadero. Jose "Pepin" Castellanos

of Hacienda San Blas. a Luxembou~g-sized enclave in the Zapata Swamps.
wrote hopefully in his ranch book in 1958 that the future might bring
a true rural aristocracy. r(?ot and branch of a new race.
that lives far fro:r;n the vulgar crowds of the great cities,
ir.. the tranquil refinement of their country\ lands. tending
their land with loving care ..• renewing the primitive union
that exists between masters and their fields •••• 20
Then came Fidel."

Castro's Reh ellion
For the ganaderos. Castro's rebellion followed the time-honored
pattern of all guerrillas and rural bandits.
cattle they could get their hands on.

The rebels stole whatever

Cattle rustled from the big ran-

I
I

chers and hacenciados in the vicinity of the Sierra. from the Areas,

I·

20 Jose Castellanos, Administraci6n de la hacienda de San Blas,
leather-bound typescript, 1958. Castellanos grazed 1, 500 head. He
and his brother Federico were breeders of fine Arabian horses.

I
I

Escobars. "Fico" Fernandez, from Sumner Pingree. led to a growing

220
concern among the cattlemen. 21 By the fall of 1958, the big ranchers,
unnerved by fears that a victorious Castro might force down meat
.
.
22
' prices to win popular support, stopped buymg cattle.
The whole

.cattle industry was coming to a standstill.

The situation further de-

teriora.ted when the rebels cut the Central Highway.
of Oriente could no longer reach the Havana market.

The ganaderos
In late November

1958, Armando Camas Milanes, president of the Asociaci6n de Ganaderos and owner of a dairy farm in Bayamo, Oriente, went up to th·e

Sierra to see Castro. 23
Camas Milanes was no novice at the 'game of political maneuver. His brother Luis had been a powerfui politician in Oriente.
Armando himself had been a congressman from 1938-1948.

25

In 1959,

Camas Milanes was a middle-sized dairyman, with

2l For details on cattle rustling, see above, pp. 83-84.
22 According to James O'Connor, about 250 cebadores (big
ranchers) owned 43% of the islands 5 million cattle, including almost
all of the 500, 000-800, 000 slaughtered every year. The 1952 cattle
census showed 1, 050 ranches with more than 500 head. (O'Connor,
The Origins, pp. 57, 99.)
23

Diario de la Marina, March 3, 1959. Interview with Roberto
Paraim, Miami, May 21, 1971.
24 o· . L
t. •
J anuary 8 , 1972 •
1ar10 as A mer1cas,

25Revoluci6n, August 17, 1959.

1·

24

he lived in Havana, commuting weekly by air to Bayamo to visit his
Finca Pitucha.
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but six workers, something over one thousand acres and about 7 50 milk
cows whose production went in part to Nestle's powdered milk plant.
In addition, he had 150 bulls at Finca Chivirico.

He ~lso gr~w rice.

26

His election as head of the ganaderos was the fruit of a long struggle.
Dairymen were not particularly admired by the beef cattlemen who had
long controlled the association.

27

In the Sierra, Castro told Cainas that cash contributions from

.
28
the cattlemen would be most useful.
A formula f_or ·such contribu-

tions was devised.

Castro also mentioned his interest in buying forty

thousand cows to give to the campesinos who had no milk for their
children.

Camas kept this in mind: within three months, the ganaderos

offered ten thousand as

a gift.

Most importantly, Cainas came away

from his interview convinced that "Dr. Castro is not" a communist." 29
Thereafter, Cainas reported back to the A sociaci6n de Ganaderos.
.
.
.
30
Virtually everyone agreed that Castro ought to be supported. ..

26 Ibid., August 20, 1959.
27 Interview with Roberto Paraj6n. Miami, May 21, 1971.
28 Diario de la Marina, June 14, 1959. According to Luis Mas
Martin, the Asociaci6n de Ganaderos agreed in November, 1958, to
collect a tax of $1 per head in Oriente and $2 per head in the other provinces. (Hoy, January 23, 1959.) (Courtesy Nelson Valdes.) Roberto
Paraj6n does not think that all contributed; rather, a limited number in
Oriente, Camagiiey and Las Villas paid up, usually upon suitable encouragement by the guerrillas.

,

I
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I
I

29 Diario de la Marina, March 13·, 1959.
3 o Interview with Roberto Paraj6n.

Miami, May 21, 1971,
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Immediately after Castro's victory, the ganaderos , along with
th-e rest of Cuba's economic elite, publicly expressed their support for
the revolution.

Camas Milanes promised that the ganaderos would main-

tain present prices.

.
31
Would the government do the same?
The gana-

deros were also concerned about the forthcoming agrarian reform.
What would the land limits be?
needed big ranches.

To operate profitably, the cebadores

Thus they were automatically members of that

new criminal class: latifundistas.
In February a number of large ranchers, members of the Corporaci6n de Ganaderos de Cuba, a small, private organization, met to
discuss the land reform issue.

The Corporaci6n's president, Roman

Nodal Jimenez.saw the ri.eed "to act int2lligently against the threatened
. . 1132 Various
.
.
f resh
.
f rom a m ·eetmg
.
. h th e
ganaderos,
wit
1an d 1imits.

,

,

minister of agriculture, Sori Marin, reported that Emits as low as
1, 000 acres were being considered.

33

The Corporaci6n de Ganaderos

decided to create a $500, 000 propaganda fund to secretly influence the
press to favor the ganaderos' position.

Meanwhile, the Asociaci6n

Nacional de Ganaderos appointed a committee, including the F i delista
"Fico II Fernandez to confer with government officials in order to avoid

31 Revoluci6n, January 10, 1959.
32 Ib"d
i •

'

June 10, 1959.

3 3 Interview with Roberto Paraj6n.

Miami, May 21, 1971.
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11

,

excessive measures.

11

34

Part of the press, or at least the Diario de la Marina, was
already well disposed to the ganaderos.

Perhaps this reflected the

3
fact that Eugenio de Sosa y Chabau, 5 owner of Central Santa Regina
and one of Cuba's leading ganaderos, was also the brother-in-law of
Di.aria editor, Jose Ignacio Rivero.

For a time, Sosa y Chabau had ac-

tually been editor of the Diario.
In January a Diario editorial noted that 147, 000 persons de-

pended on income from the cattle industry.

The industry had been

destroyed once before, eaten up in 'the wars of independence.

By the

1950s, 500, 000 sugar workers needed meat to give them sufficient
strength br the grueling zafra. 36 .The Diario's agricultural columnist,
. Pe~abad Fraga, saw the ganaderos as allies of the M-26 movement.
Had not rich ganaderos, like the multimillionaire Francisco Vincente

34 Revoluci6n, June 10, 1959. The Corporaci6n de Ganaderos 1
· President Roman Nodal later stoutly denied that any such propaganda
fund had actually been employed. See above, p. 138.
Ironically, the
minister of the treasury, L6pez-Fresquet, had urged businessmen to
make press propaganda campaigns to defend their sectors. But L6pezFresquet intended these campaigns to inform the public, not to bribe
editors. As of 1972, Nodal remained in Cuba, apparently imprisoned~
3 5 'sosa y Chabau soon ran afoul of the revolution. His sugar
mill went bankrupt in August. In December he was arrested, accused
of being a member of a counterrevolutionar·y group, Masferrer's "Tigers."
He received a 20-year prison sentence. (The New York Times, March 30,
l960.)
36 Diario de la Marina, January 13, 1959.

- - - - - -- - -- - - - - -
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Aguilera, sacrificed everything in the name of Cuban independence in
'98? Most of Cuba's great heroes had been ganaderos: Tomas Estrada
Palma, Agramonte, Cisneros Betancourt, Manuel de Quesada, Sanguily,
Pozos Dulces.

The ganaderos had always been patriots.

earned the right to be treated decently.

They had

37

The Asociaci6n de Ganaderos began to place its own propaganda.
"Did you know,

11

asked one ad, "that if the Cuban cattle industry were

destroyed it would cost an additional $113 million a year to import the
same amount of beef from the U.S.? The cattle industry_is not lati38
fundist. ·11
The average ranch was only about 6, 500 acres; there were
only 114 estates in all of Cuba with more than 5, 000 hectares (12, 3 50
.
39
acres ) and 53 of these were sugar estates.
The ganaderos were among the first targets of the revolutionary
press.

Revoluci6n's Oscar Pino-Santos accused the big ganaderos of

reducing production so as to raise prices.

He warned ominously that

I
I
I
I

·the agrarian reform (which he was helping to prepare) would know how
'
to handle the situation. The ganadero Roberto Paraj~n retorted that
the Asociaci6n Nacional de Ganaderos had voted to support an agrarian
reform.

40

. To demonstrate the ganaderos' good will, Camas Milanes,

37 Ibid., January 25, 1959.

1.

38 Ibid., February 24, 1959.
39 Diario de la Marina, February 24, ·1959.
40 Revoluci6n, February 26, 1959.
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in line with his conversation with Castro in November, 1958, offered

the government's agrarian reform collection 10, 000 pregnant milk
cows, a donation which the ganaderos estimated worth $1. 25 million. 41
Despite these efforts. the uncertainties over meat prices and
land reform remained..

ln mid-March, Cainas Milan~s told Minister

of Agriculture Sor! lVIarin that the cattle industry was virtually paralyzed, and would rernaln so until these uncertainties were resolved. 4 2
If the goverriment would only freeze current prices for the next eighteen

months, the iudustr:y wquld return to normal in short order.
wise, what ganadero would risk buying cattle ?

43

Other-

In late February, the

ganaderos told Castro that 100, 000 acres of vacant land should be opened
to cattle raising.

On these new lands, a million head could be produced

for export and Cuba would earn $3 oo million a year in much needed
dollars.

44

These and other approaches by the cattlemen to the government
proved fruitless.

The ganadero Gustavo de las Reyes complained to the

Diario de la Mar:ina that no Cuban government--revolutionary or otherwise- -had ever troubled t? give "effective backing" to the cattle

I
I
I
I

41 Diario de la Marina, March 3, 1959.
4 2 Ibid., March 19, 1959.
43

Bohemia, March 29, 1959, p. 72.

44 A proposal by the cattleman and colono, Trina Alejo Padr6n.
See in Diario de la Marina., March 2 5, 1959. This solution would, of
course, be at the expense of small colonos and other agricultural workers
who wanted these lands for themselve::.. .
·

~

-.
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industry. 45 The cattlemen's views were amplified in a half-hour
television program on CMQ, paid for by the ganaderos.

46

Privately, Cainas Milanes concocted a plan to head off the
anticipated land limitation feature of the agrarian reform.

He per-

suaded the ganaderos to offer the government--free of charge--all
,
,
land over ten thousand acres. Minister of Agriculture Sori Marin was
pleased with this proposal, calling it "the salvation of Ctipa.
when Sori Marfu presented the plan to Fidel and "Che,
uninterested.

11

11

·

But

he found them

Sori Marin was shocked, his confidence in Castro

undermined. 47

The Agrarian Reform
In May, a few days before the unveiling of the agrarian reform,

the ganaderos invited Fidel to a cattle fair.

Ca:inas saluted their honore~

guest: "One has to feel great pride in this Cuban that we affectionately
call Fidel." He explained that cattle was Cuba's second industry and
that with government aid it would become the most important.

Fidel

responded most pleasingly, saying that the possibilities of the cattle

45 Diario de la Marina, April 26, 1959. Gustavo de los Reyes y
Delgado, ganadero and owner of Central Bahia Honda in Pinar del R.io.
His daughter married the sugar magnate Alfonso Fanjul G6mez Mena.
4 6 Interview with Abel Mestre, owner of CMQ.
JWle 8, 1971.

Coral Gables,

471nterview with Roberto Paraj6n. Miami, May 21, 1971.
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industry were "unlimited" and wondering why past governments hadn't
done more.

The yield per acre had to be. intensified .•••

48

Two days later the agrarian reform was anncunced.
deros found it a disaster.

Meat prices were to be reduced.

The ganaA maximum

of forty-three cents a pound in urban areas would be permitted.

49

Their worst fears realized, the ganaderos responded with heated argument.

Cainas Milanes said the agrarian law would cause "irreparable

·
50
damage. " He pleaded with Fidel to give the ganaderos a hearing.
The association met, five ·hundred strong, to approve a twenty-point
resolution rejecting the law because it would destroy private property,
.
. cr1s1s
. . • 51
arum1 f ree ent erpr1se,
an d cause a na t•1ona1 economic

The

law would "strangle the principle of freedom for the productive classes
and convert them into one more regime of enslaving and controlled pro.
52
duction, contrary to the democratic system of our nation •••. 11
The ganaderos insisted upon modifications.

As the law had not

yet been published, this was thought possible. At a televised round
table, Camas Milanes decried the reform as a most cruel and unjustified treatment of an industry which provided a million h~ad a year for

I
I
I
I
1·

48niario de la Marina, May 17, 1959.
49 ·Revoluci6n, May 23, 1959.
50 Diario de la Marina, May 26, 1959.
51 Havana Times, June 1, 1959.
52 Diario de la Marina·, June 2, 1959.
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the meat market--the cheapest meat in the world--and 890, 000 gallons
of milk besides.

Didn't they understand that cattle needed great spaces ·

for grazing? Why hadn't the "moderate II ministers Felipe Pazos and
Justo Carrillo done something?

53

The revolutionary government responded angrily to the ganaderos' complaints, denouncing them · as counterrevolutionaries.
Revoluci6n warned of a ganadero plot to cut off the nation_'s me~t supply.
On June 4th, the gana.deros were attacked as :the "most rooted and reactionary class in all countries in the world. 1154 On the 6th, Revolucion's "Jacobino" reported that he had attended a ganaderos ' meeting at
which a million dollar fund was proposed to fight the reform.

"Jacobino"

said one ganadero wanted to stage a protest in a Havana park, but Camas,
. fearful that Castro might loose the masses against them, said no.

55

Castro himself joined the debate: revealing that he had intercepted the Maxwell letter on the .ganaderos' plans to resist the reform.
. Castro rejected the ganaderos' offer of ten thousand pregnant cows and
rebuked them for asking for four hundred caballerias (thirteen thousand
acres) for each male heir.

Referring to the cattlemen's land titles as

"scraps of paper, " Fidel threw down the gauntlet: "We see this as a

53Ibid., June 3, 1959.
54 Revoluci6n, June 4, 1959.
55 Ibid., June 6, 1959.
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life and death struggle.

1156

If civil war were to begin--and it seemed

close then-- "all the guilty will pay, not ~rily the physical participants,
but the intellectual authors as well.

1157

This was a clear warning to

the press, and especially the Diario de la Marina, which had been support:!,ng the ganaderos.
The cattlemen replied to Castro's challenge in a full page ad in
the Diario de la Marina.

At a tumultuous meeting of cattlemen in

Camagiiey, one ganadero declared that the only land left by the reform
w~s the tomb.

58

And at the Havana Rotary Club on June 11, Camas

Milanes reiterated the ganaderos' twenty objections to the reform.

59

If Castro intended to install a communist regime in Cuba, then the·

ganaderos

11

would fight to the death to resist it. 1160

56 Ibid., June

::.o, 1960.

57niario de la Marina, June 10, 1960.
58 Bohemia, June 14, 1959, Supp. 4.
59 The ganaderos twenty objections were as follows: the
agrarian law violates the Constitution of 1940, destroys private property, annuls free enterprise, ruins the economy, transfers lands to state
rather than individual control, makes INRA a super-state, unhinges the
national economy, creates economic insecurity, destroys extant contracts, confiscates honestly acquired property, ignores real land values,
makes campesinos into state employees, subdivides producing units,
ends the right to hire labor at the ganaderos' discretion, creates class
resentments and fails to except the small land holder from all of the
above. (Diario de la Marina, June 12, 1959.)
60Havana Times, June 13, 1959; Diario de la Marina, June 14,
1959.
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Not all the ganaderos were spoiling for a fight.

The cattleman

Roman Nodal, subject of the Maxwell letter, wrote to Prensa Libre
in June, denying everything •. si ·· This brought an angry response from
Maxwell who assured Fidel that he was telling the truth.

Maxwell ad-

mitted, however, that he didn't know if the ganaderos' proposed propaganda campaign against the agrarian reform had been carried out.
Maxwell suggested that Nodal was lying.
II

Had not Nodal been elected

•
1 .
1162
·.
senator m the e ectoral farce of 1954?
Thus the unhappy spectacle

of the Cuban bourgeoisie, stooping at a critical moment .t o fight one
another, rather than the common enemy.
Cainas seemed now to waiver, telling a CMQ television interviewer that the ganaderOS had 11f elt proud II to pay their Cattle tax during
Castro's rebellion.

Caina.s said he was not a latifundisia and that the

ganaderos really only objected to three or four :1.rticles of the reform
law.

63

Castro responded that the big cattlemen had only posed as

friends of the revolution to safeguard their estates. He then cut to the
bone:

11

They talk ••• about property rights.

the people to live?

,,64

And what about the right of

It was increasingly evident that Castro held the

private er:iterprise system and the bourgeoisie responsible for Cuba's ills.

61 Diario de la Marina, June 14, 1959. See above, pp. 137, 138.

62 Revoluci6n, June 15, 1959.

63 Diario. de la Marina, June 14, 1959.
64 Ib.d
l ••
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,e~w~s Milanes came under personal attack.

The M-26 co-

Q:rginator in Cainas' home town of Bayamo told Revoluci6n that the
~~~ der? leader was a vulg8:r manengue, that is. a crooked politician.
e;.~~a,s wal3 accused of using lands of the Hospital Milanes in Bayamo

wlthqqt_ p,?.,ying_ :re~t. of improving his finca with materials and labor
{~Q:ffi

~ -e.

~a.ti~~~

J;lu,blic Worl{s Department, and of being a servile follower of

a,nd J;lis cl.~que •.

65

The. columnist Raul Quintana accused Cainas

"!f Q~~~ ua,qdi.cted to t_h e latest types of English clothing. 1166 There were
th.at "the revolution" was ~ontemplating Camas' assassination. 67

~I~.1,Q~~

fige.l. :in Camagiiey
'fQ;w.~_
r q the. end of June Castro flew to Camagiiey to confront the
-~~tt.l e barons.

He ordered Province Commander Hubert Matos to inter-

ve.I.:1e all ranches_. of over 3, 300 acres.
~troyE:d·

The latifundi8tas would be de-

In Camagiiey on June 23, Fidel charged that some forty big

g~ ~cle ros practically e>wned the whole province.

These latifundistas

w~~e yiqtimizing _the small ganaderos by refusing to buy their cattle in
Q];'der to

11

.

produce hunger,

--- ·--· ss·rlevoluci6n,

11

June 15, 19 59.

ij~ Ibid., June 18, 1959.

67 Dia rio d e l a Marina, June 20, 1959.
··.1,.

•

and destroy the revolution.

~8 Revol u c i6n , June 24, 1959.

68
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The properties intervened belonged to the cream of the bourg.eo:i~:i.e: Mor1talvo, Arango, Arteaga, Rionda, Betancourt, Cortina,

'l'ara!a, Iznaga, Velasco Sarra, Sanchez, del Valle, Castellanos.
.

Cer-

.

.t9-in Jands of the great sugar companies in Camagiiey, Atla.ntica del
~

GQlfp, Verti<:ntes-Camagiiey, the Manati Sugar Company and_others,
'-

.
69
were affected.

Comandante Hubert Matos' exuberance and efficiency in this

ta$~ wa$ formidable. Some ganaderos thought him another Castro, or

~t least a good imitation. This was, Matos had said in May, a "revoluti.on o! the humble" and he went about humbling the rich of Camagiiey,
t~P-'ring c;lown fences, intervening ranches with impressive speed. 70 _
Within a few weeks, four hundred ranches, the property of 131 owners,

had been taken. 71 Matos noted with satisfaction that he had seized
seventy thousand ~aballerfas (2. 3 million acres) without having fired a
73
single shot. 72 He considered the big cattlemen destroyed.
"Hubert

69 lb'l <.,
l June 25, 1959.

70

-

Ibid., May 5, 1959. Hubert Matos, the former rice grower
and school master, the re9el who captured Santiago, became something
of a hero to the democratic left because of his break with Fidel over the
communist issue. But to the bourgeoisie, Matos the intervenor was
just as dangerous, if not more so, than the most loyal Castroites.

71 The New York Times, July 4, 1959.
72 Diario de la Marina, July 3, 1959.
July 4, 1959.
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Matos is a model military and revolutionary leader, " said Revoluci6n. 74
Six months later, Matos complained that the reform was wrecking the
cattle industry!

75

By then it was too late, since Matos was under ar-

rest as a counterrevolutionary.

Yankee Ranches Intervened
Big American ranches were among those intervened, the best
known being the Be~erra Cattle Company.

This was a joint venture

between the Rionda group of New York and the Texan Robert Kleberg's

I
I

I·
I
I
I

King Ranch.

Like many large Cuban-American enterprises, it had a

clouded beginning.

The Castroites claimed that in 1952, to open its

lands, the King Ranch's Neil Alderman ha_d directed the bulldozing of
a squatter village, Las Maboas, while Batista's soldiers held the

residents at bay.

76

The residents argued that. Las Maboas was a

realengo- -communal land.
on private land.

77

The Americans thought the squatters were

King Ranch went ahead.

$3 million were invested

in Santa Gertrudis stock and ranching facilities.

By the late 1950s,

the ranch had 7, 600 head grazing on 26, 000 acres of land, an operation

74 Revoluci6n, June 29, 1959.
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75

The New York Times, November 16, 1959.

76 Lisandro Otero, Cuba, ZDA (La Habana: Ediciones R, 1960),
pp. 162-163.
77 Interview with Antonio Barro, vice-president of the Cuban
Trading Company which managed the Rionda interests in Cuoa. Miami,
June 24, 1971.
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worth $8-9 million.

78

In 1958, the company began to export cattle to

the U.S., earning its first profit.

79

A ye~r later, it was intervened.

The intervenor was a Sr. Espinosa, a dental technicia.n.
Intervention did not mean a complete loss.

80

The owner of the

property ,might remain, but all his decisions relative to the intervened
assets were subject to the intervenor's approval.

Intervention thus was

a kind of limbo which often preceded complete expropriation. Many
Cubans were confident in those early days that their intervened assets
would be returned.
The Becerra-King Ranch, whose lands were to be sharply reduced, began selling off cattle. !NRA offered to buy some: 50 per-

.~-

cent in cash, the rest in _.twent:y-year 4 1 /2 perc_ent bonds.

81

In mid-

November the King Ranch was seized. Amidst shouts of "Victory or
Death,

11

it became the Camilo Cienfuegos Co-operative, in honor

of the missing revolutionary hero.

82

Years later, travelers to

the Soviet Union told the King Ranch's Bob Kleberg of seeing° a herd of
''broad hipped, cherry red cattle bearing the King Ranch's running W

78 The New York Times , July 4, 1959.
79 Freeman Lincoln, "What Has Happened to Cuban Business? 11
Fortune, September, 1959, p. 112.
80

Interview with Salvador Sotomayor, mining engineer and
businessman. Coral Gables, June 27, 1971.
81 The New York Times, July 4, 1959.
82 Revoluci6n, November 16, 1959.
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Other American ranches in equivalent situations were also in:..
tervened.

In Pinar del R1o, Jack Fall Everhart's 19, 847 acre San Mar-

· cos Land and Cattle Company was taken.

The intervenor, one Gil Vidal,

chief of the mi~itia in the area, had form_erly worked on the ranch as a .
day laborer.
to take over.

84

Vidal appeared with a rebel army official on October 14

Everhart could not understand why.

up him$elf, carving it out of the jungle, had turned squatters there into
workers and given them eight acres each.
had increased his herd to 5, 500 head.

I
I
I
I
I

After twenty years labor. he

He _thought he had treated his

wor~ers decently, paying them good wages.

I
I
I
I

He had built the ranch

Nonetheless, in early 1959,

Everhart's workers demanded wage in8reases on the threat of government intervention.

Everhart was accused of "oppressing, mistreating

and abusing" his workers. 85 !NRA offi~ials offered Everhart the use of
his house and 1, 650 acres should he care to stay on.
. revolutionary officials began to improve the ranch.
they were wrecking it.

Meanwhile, the
Everhart thought

Defeated, he decided to leave Cuba.

86

. 83 Murphy, "The King Ranch ••.. ", p. 132.
In materials
presented to the FCSC, the King Ranch claimed a loss of $2, 831, 638. 62
(CU-1507). while the Companfa Ganadera Becerra SA claimed
$5, 719, 714. 24 (CU-726).
84 u. S. News and World Report, October 19, 1959, p. 88 •
. 85Ibid., March 7, 1960, p. 51.
8 6 Ibid., pp. 48-51. Jack Fall Everhart and family presented
a claim to the FCSC for a loss of $1, 711, 000. (CU-3717). The FCSC
nawarded" $1, 898, 475. (Award CU-3832.)
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The largest American ranch in Cuba was Sumner Pingree's
55, 000 acre San Andres in Oriente Province.

87

The ranch, nurtu~ed

by three generations of Pingrees·, was begun as an adjunct to the Central Ermita built in 1914 by John Randolph. 88 The cattle operation
eventually outstripped the sugar operation. Indeed, the sugar mill
there had failed to earn a profit since 1956.
The Pingrees' experience suggests the whimsical and p~rsonalistic nature of the agrarian reform.

Their ranch was first intervened,

· to the inevitable cheers of the workers, by the militiaman and colono
Rogelio G6mez Benitez on July 8, .1959. 89

Afew weeks later,

Castro

ordered the ranch to be returned to its owners. !NRA promised Pingree that he ~ould keep the ranch for a few years on the condition that
he would replenish the herd.

Pingree took out a bank loan of $60, 000

to buy six hundred new head of cattle.

90

By October, !NRA had changed

its mind; the entire property was seized and all cattle branded.
denied all responsibility for the bank loan.

!NRA

The sugar cane belonging

87 The number of cattle on the ranch fluctuated owing to annual
sales of 6, 000 head. The maximum herd was 18, 000 head.
88_John Randolph had been chief engineer in the construction of

the Guantanamo and Western Railway. Upon completion of the railroad,
he decided to stay in Cuba and began to build Central Ermita. (The
New York Times, March 29, 1960.)
89 Revoluci6n, July 9, 1959. · Workers, when depicted in Revoluci6n, always cheer.
90 Cattle in Cuba would typically cost, in this final stage of their
growth, around $100-$125 per head.

I
I
I
I
I
I

I.
I
I
I
·1
I
I
I
I
I
I

•1
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

.I
I
I
I
I
I

237

to the mill and its colonos were seized.
colonos' cane was returned.

Upon his departure, Pingree said he hoped

that the'government has technicians who know how to operate this ranch
.. t"1c .••• 1191
• • • b u t I am. no t t oo op t"1m1s
Pingree's cowboys were also to be disappointed.

They had

originally been assured by IN"RA officials that the ranch would become
a co-op in which they would share the profits.
came a state farm.

Instead, the ranch be-

The cowboys' salary of eighty-five dollars a month

was cut, and other benefits they formerly enjoyed--a free house, food,
a garden, and equipmez:it- -were eliminated.

92·

Ganaderos Libres
In a masterful strok~~ Castro. determine<;i to ..create a rival to
the Asocfa.ci6n de Ganaderos: the Ganaderos Libres, or liberated
cattlemen.

The Ganaderos Libres would include all the small and medium

ranchers who had never found adequate defense in the old cattle associa-.
tion.
catt~e.
rect.

I
I
I
I
I

But after reconsideration, the ·

Castro said that the small ganaderos were desperate to sell their
Now INRA would replace the big cebadores and buy the cattle diFidel promised $12 million for this and, with his usual flair for

91 The New York Times , March 30, 1960. The total claim for
the Pingree prope rties before the FCSC was $15, 356, 481. 00 (Claims
CU-2269, 2275).

92 Lazo, Dagger, p. 199.
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the dramatic, presented a · check for $4 million to Hubert Matos for
.
di a t e pure h ase o f a "'""
.
unme
noJOS.

93

The Ganaderos Libres would include all ganaderos of up to
,
fifty caballerias (1, 650 acres). · The association was founded because
"thi~ is the moment for union.u. until now, we have been managed like
marionettes by the big ranchers ••• represented ••• by elements· who,
like Cainas Milanes, have only thought of their own selfish interests •••• 1194
Five thousand small ganaderos joined at once.

Castro observed with

Sc!,,tisfaction that the big ganaderos "were alone, without lands. 1195
The big ganaderos now agreed to go along with the land holding

....

limitations of the agrarian reform.

Speaking at the Forum on the Agrar-

ian Reform, ganadero delegate Gustavo de los Reyes said that the correct application of the law would bring "an immediate upsurge in the
.
.
economy. 1196 He observed that the catt1e mdustry
had more orders
than

it could fill.

Spain's order for 25, 000 boned carcasses was turned down.

Reyes thought concentration of excessive wealth in a few hands was bad,
but this should be avoided by progressive taxation.

93 Revoluci6n, July 2, 1959.

The state should

Anojos are yearling calves.

94 Statement of the Ganaderos Libres in Revoluci6n,
1959.
95 n·1ar10
. d e 1a M ar1na,
.
July 7, 1959.

96 Ibid., July 8, 1959.

July 2,
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never limit income.

97

An M·-26 delegate to the forum thought this a

welcome "rectification" of the ganaderos' previously intransigent
pos1•t•ion. 98
On July 23, Camas Milanes visited Premier Dortic6s to assure him' of the ganaderos I support for the revolution. 99 But like so
much of Cuban life and politics, this was but an illusion.

In fact,

Cainas Milanes and a band of cattlemen were about to launch an armed
counterrevolution.

The Trinidad Plot
For some time, perhaps since the publication of the agrarian
,.,.

reform, Camas Milanes had privately believed that Castro was a com-

I·
I
I
I

munist. lOO Hubert Matos' massive intervention of the big Camagiley
,

.. · :

.-,

... cattle ranches confirmed this impression and c:::-eated a host of angry
allies, including Gustavo de los Reyes, who had just lost almost 4, 500
acres,,

Alvaro Sanchez, the Remedios Brothers ~nd Roberto Betancourt. ~Ol

These ganaderos joined such hacendados as Antonio Mendoza, president

97 Ibid.

I
I
I
I
I

98 Revoluci6n, July 8, 1959.
99 Ibid •• July 23, 1959.
lOOinterview with Roberto Paraj6n.

Miami, May 21, 1971.

lOl Gustavo de los Reyes' family owned property in Camagiley
adjoining the King Ranch. Following his release from prison in 1963,
he became manager of the King Ranch's operation in Vene:wela.

240
,
102
of Central Cunagua. and Ram6n Mestre of Central Nela.
Other
plotters included the multimillionaire contractor and rancher Alberto
Vadia and Luis Pozo, son of the former mayor of Havana.
torial meetings were held.

Conspira-

Alonso Menendez of H. · Uppman Tobacco

was invited to 9ne meeting at a church in the exclq.sive Miramar section of Havana, but when Cainas brandished a list of plotters. Menendez
. 103
left, warned off by this elementary lack of caution.
The action men in this rebellion were former leaders of the
Second Front of Escambray, including the American adventurer William
Morgan, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Armando Fleites.

104

These Se-

concl Front leaders enlisted the ai~ of various ex- Bat istiano military
.....
officials ~nd, most especially, of the dictator Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, who was to supply the arms and money for the adventure.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

'Ihe plotters haggled over who among them would be president of Cuba.
Arturo Hernandez Tellaheche, an experienced plotter (he had once been

l02 Ram6n Mestre had enjoyed a meteoric career, rising from
orchid vendor in the streets of Havana to millionaire, hacendado, and
senator-elect in the 1958 elections. (See Bohemia, Feb~uary 21, 1960,
Supp.12.)
103 Interview with Alonso Menendez. Miami, March 22, 1971.
104

One of the guerrilla groups that fought against Batista. Their
effectiveness is a matter of debate; they were not liked much by the
Castroites who saw them as competitors. In the awarding of offices
in 1959, the Second Front got virtually nothing. This may have motivated
their participation in the Trinidad adventure.
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Prio's minister of labor) was proposed, but Cainas Milanes opposed

.

.

him." Eventually, Caifias himself was proposed.

He accepted, depart-

ing thereafter in a green chauffeur-driven Cadillac.

105

The plotters were betrayed by the Second Front ieaders.
motives of the betrayers remain unclear.

The

Were they just good revolu-

tionaries, loyal to Castro, or did they suspect that Castro had gotten
wind of the plot, and thus found it opportune to betray their allies?

106

In any case, Castro allowed the game to proceed for a time, especially
in the hope of embarrassing Trujillo .- On August 9th, Castro closed the
net.

Several thousand alleged conspirators were arrested.

Many of

these were former Batista soldiers whom Castro had picked up on suspicion.

A number of the ·principal plott8rs were arrested at Alberto

Vadias' apartment building.

U.S. embassy personnel had been invited

to attend this session, but had wisely declined.

107

0~11ers were nabbed

personally by Fidel at an airstrip in Trinidad following the arrival of a
planeload of arms from the Dominican Republic.

105 Revoluci6n, August 11 and 17, 1959. The debate on who
would occupy what office was apparently never settled. According to
Bohemia, · Hernandez was to have been -president, Armando Fleites
prime minister, and Cainas vice-president. (Bohemia, August 23,
1959, p. 62.)
106 Hugh Thomas raises this issue • . See his Cuba,· p. 1238.
Alonso Menendez, a member of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE), thought the Second Front's Eloy Gutierrez to have been involved 'in a whole series of betrayals, including the palace attack of
1957 and the Trinidad affair of 1959. Interview, Miami, March 22, 1971.
107

Bonsal, Cuba, p. 84.
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The Trinidad affair was a warning to potential rebels within the
bourgeoisie.
escaped.

According to Castro, not a single counterrevolutionary

Over the next months, the plotters were tried and sentenced.

Camas Milanes protested his innocence, saying he was visiting friends
in Oriente at the moment the Trinidad plot was supposed to hatch.

He

· d a nme-year
.
t erm. l 08 All h.1s proper t;1es were m
. ·t. ervene d •
receive
The ganaderos were shaken and left without a president.
The political insensitivity revealed by the ganaderos and their
allies in the Trinidad affair was extraordinary. How did the ganadero s

I
I
I
I
.I

I

I.

imagine that the Cuban populace, then enthrall.e d by Castro's nationalist

I

and anti-dictatorial revolution, could be attracted by a plan involving

1·

foreign dictators and the remnants of the Batistato? Did the latifundistas
involved think they could turn back the general desire for agrarian reform?

Just two weeks before, on July 26, Castro had to~d a million

cheering, machete-waving peasants that the agrarian reform was un·stoppable.

Cainas Milanes and his associates were behaving like Cuban

plotters of the past, when governments without broad popular support
were toppled by small bands of revolutionaries.

Hernandez Tellaheche

had been involved in such a plot against Batista in 1953.

109

They really

did not understand that the nature of the game had changed, that they were

u. s.

108 Camas Milanes served his full nine years, arriving in the
in 1969.
..

109

Martino, I Was Cas-cro's Prisoner, p. 95.
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the old association in any way. 114 Four days later, Ganaderos Libres
from Oriente occupied the offices of the old ganade.ros' association in
Havana. At{a Barquet complained--without result--to the Ministry of
Agriculture.

Thereafter, the Ganaderos Libres, meeting in their new

quarters, elected Fernando Perez Infante of Oriente as their new
. f • 115
c h 1e

Reviewing these developments, the Diario de la Marina· 1s agricultural columnist, Penabad Fraga, suggested that the old ganaderos'
association had gotten what it deserved. It had never been very democratic.

Rather, the old association maintained a democratic facade

while backstage politicking assure_d that the same old gang remained
in power.

,,._

.

Penabad thought that

11

.

everyone is to blame.

,,116

The worst

abuse was in Camagiiey where, in the last elections (und~r the Batist~
regime}, the winning candidate went so far as to employ ~e police to
assure h,is election.

The ganaderos had aided the revolution; most

were willing to come to terms with the agrarian reform.

According to

Penabad, in the past the large cattlemen had generally by-passed the
ganaderos' association to "personally resolve" their problems with the
appropriate government officials.

But worst of all was the most recent

ganadero leader, a kind of "little Louis XV" who wanted to ensure a

114 Ibid., September 19, 1959.
l l 5 Diario de la Marina, September 22, 1959.
116 lbid., September 27, 1959.
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,
400 caballeria (13, 200 acre) limit; a person who fell into a "stupid
conspiracy" and thereby succeeded in burning up whatever moral
authority the old association might have had.

117

Thus did the con-

servative Diario de la Marina's columnist tear into Cainas Milanes,
one of the few men who had done anything, however unsuccessfully,
.
C
to stan d agamst
astro. 118

In October, 1959, the Ministry of Agriculture appointed Rafael

Anido Coya as intervenor of the old ganac;leros' association. l 19 Thereafter, the association faded into obscurity. In mid-January, 1960,
INRA's Nunez Jimenez proudly announced that his organization had
liberated almost 10 million acres.
expropriated.

All Cuba's cattle lands had been

.
·
120
The ganaderos were destroyed~

117 Ibid.
118 Camas Milanes is today viewed with respect by many exiles
.as one of the few who did anything to resist Castro.
119Revoluci6n, . October 3, 1959.
l20Havana Times, January 14, 1960.
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So each one went his own way. And ·
one by one, they lost their businesses
to the government withotJt having made
a cone erted protest.
Rufo L6pez-Fresquet

1

I don't believe anybody ••. would have
conceived at the time I went to Cuba
that the United States would allow the
communists ... to walk into that country
so close to our shores and take over all
the properties of all the Americans
there •••. "
An American investor in Cuba

·VI.

2

BUSINESS*

From the beginning, Cuban businessmen were of a divided
opinion about Fidel Castro.

Some were hopeful; some were not.

None

expected to be victims of a distributionist revolution.

Rather, most

seemed to anticipate a moderate nationalist regime.

And after a time

business would work its wiles, and Fidel, like other presidents, perhaps like th~ once "revolutionary" Grau, would be domesticated.

Most

businessmen had done nothing wrong; therefore they had nothing to fear.

I
I·

I
I

.

,:cThis chapter deals with the non-sugar, non-agricultural sector.
1 L6pez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months, p. 143.

2 Testimony of John H. L. French, distributor in Cuba of LincolnMercury automobiles and owner of Tropicream, a chain of ice cream
stores, before the House Sub-Committee on Inter-American Affairs,
July 29, 1964. U.S. Congress, Claims, p. 81.
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And the private contributions· by many to Castro in the Sierra were
thought a further guarantee.

Thus, in the first mon_ths of 1959, business

unfolded impressive plans for the future.
This era of hopefulness was short-lived.

The revolution in-

clined ever more to the left; labor's demands became ever more difficult to handle and the government controls on the economy ever tighter.
.Within six months, business had lost confidence and began to reduce
spending and inventories, to skimp on repairs, to withdraw into its shell.
What to business was common sense procedure in a time of uncertainty was, to Castro, "economic sabotage, " counterrevolution.
. Rath~r than reply in unison, each businessman nourished a private hope
that his sector, his business, would be left alone.

Most counted on Fi-

del's ultimate "reaso1;ableness, " and failing that, on U.S. intervention.
But Fidel did not change, and the marines did not come. Within two
years, the Cuban business class·was destroyed.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

·1

First Days
The general pattern of interaction between business and the
revolution was set within the first few days of January, 1959.

The

Castroites would challenge the honesty and competence of the business
class; business would respond by praising Fidel and offering to cooperate in every possible way, while · privately praying that the Castroites'
b~rk was worse than their bite.

The businessmen who had hurried to

pledge their undying loyalty to Batista in 1957 and 1958 would now do

I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
I
I

the same for Fidel.

it reflected a recognition that the Palacio Presidencial was tl_'le key to
Cuban economic life. One had to ensure presidential favor, or at least
indifference; few businessmen could withstand presidential enmity.
When Castro arrived in Havana in January, 1959, businessmen

I will never forget the callers I received the first days
that followed victory ••• bankers, tradesmen, enterprise managers .••• They didn't come just once ••• they
came the next day and the day after that~ ••• I said to
myself: let them think as they please. The more they
believe they can count on us, the more they will be
. d •••• 3
surprise

I

I
I
I
I

Even Castro was a little stunned by it~ _

flocked to his side.

I

·I

There v,as more than a little hypocrisy in this, but

The press was replete with salutes to the revolution from the Cuban
.

;

Chamber of Co_mmerce, Concretera Nacional, Cerveceria Tropical,
the Association of Dep~rtment Stores; everybody.

ESSO announced that

it "shared the popular jubilation" and was eager to participate in Cuba's
II

· "d
rapi
recupera· t•ion. 114

Sometimes the cordial salute was accompanied by a bit of special pleading.

The insurance industry complained of burdensome regu-

lations imposed by Batista. 5 Shell Oil Company, whose chief administrator had been a fervent Batistiano, declared itself "the most Cuban"

I
I
I
I

3 Jacques Arnault, essay in La nouvelle critique (Paris) #139 ·
(September-October, 1962), as translated in JPRS Translations on
Latin America #16, 130, p. 14.
4

Revoluci6n, January 10, 1959.

5 Toid., January 7, 1959.
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of companies.

6

Though Shell's capital was entirely foreign, all but

three of its workers were Cuban.

7

There was a regular stampede to

.place ads in Revoluc i 6n, the government's official newspaper.

Even

such staid American firms as the Reader's Digest and the Cuban Electric Company appeared there.

Paul Heilman, president of the American

Chamber of Commerce, declared that American businessmen were
''highly pleased" with the new government.

8

Later, he argued t~at

9
"everyone knew" that ·F idel had always been a communist. ·
But praise was not enough.

Castro's government was broke;

the war, graft, and bad financial practice had drained the exchequer.
Castro's government turned to an expedient employed by President
.
10
Machado in 1933: the encouragement of advance tax payments.
This
was but the first of many revolutionary measures which, while surprising foreigners; were old hat in Cuba.

Rent cuts, interventions of fac-

tories, the freezing of bank accounts, the employment of communists,
t}le manipulation of utility rates--all these seemingly novel developments
had honorable precedents in Cuban history.

Castro merely pushed these

tactics further than any of his predecessors.

6 Shell's president, Julio Iglesias, had been closely associated
with Batista.
7 Diario de la Marina, January 17, 1.959.
8 Revoluci6n, January 16, 1959.
9 Interview with Paul Heilman.

I
I
I
I
I

Miami, February 2fi, 1971.

10 Marques St~rling, . Historia de Cuba, p. 423.
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The great corporations paid their taxes promptly and without
complaint.

"Pepin" Bosch's Bacardi rum and beer combine .paid in

$550, 000; the lesser beer. companies, Cervecerfa Polar and Julio
Blanca's La Tropical, $100, 000 and $150, 000 respectively.

11

The

Cuban Telephone Company advanced $500, 000; International Harvester,
$150, 000; Proctor and Gamble's affiliate Crusellas, $300, 00.0 .

12

Day-

ton Hedges I Textilera Ariguanabo paid $140, 000. 13 Diego Trinidad, of
the Trinidad Brothers' Cigar Factory, would soon tell his workers that
he could not afford a wage increase, since all available cash ($400, 000)
had been paid as a tax advance. 14
In the early days. of the revolution, a number of businessmen

offered their services to Castro, or were drafted into the Castro
government.

Jorge Cubas, of the prestigious law firm Lazo y Cubas

which represented almost one-third of American enterprise in Cuba,
conferred with Castro on January 9th.

Lazo y Cubas subsequently

loaned the government some lawyers to help "sanitize" f~rmer Batistiano

11 Diario de la Marina, January 23 and 25, 1959;· Revoluci6n,
January 20, 1959. These sums are not necessarily indicative of the
relative size of the companies involved. Some paid more, some less,
of their future tax than others.
12 Revoluci6n, January 15 and 22, 1959.
13_
Ib"d
_
1_•• January 22, 1959.
14 Ibid., January 23, 1959.
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· ministries. 15 "Pepin" Bosch of Bacardi became director, without pay,
of the Hanabanilla hydroelectric project.

Banker Julian de Zulueta be-

came president of the Social Security Institute.
former Belen classmate of Castro, Federico
over management of the INRA building.

16

11

A businessman and

Ficote" Lindner, took

The radio and TV merchant

Danilo Mesa agreed to become the vice-minister of the Ministry for the
·
17
Recovery of Stolen Property.
These men, unlike the c~reer govern-

ment officials, were not job-seekers.

They were businessmen who,

for various reasons, agreed to work--for a time--for Castro.

The National Association of Industrialists
Within the Cuban business sector, the Asociaci6n Nacional de
Industrial~s de Cuba (ANIC) was the organization most favorably

· l 5 Lazo, Dagger, p. 190. Mario ·Lazo y Guiral is himself a
reflection of the extraordinary ambiguity and duality of the Cuban bourgeo1s1e. Born in America of Cuban parents, a graduate of both Cornell
and the University of Havana, Lazo came to dislike Batista when the latter arrested his cousin, Carlos Marques Sterling, and murdered his
friend, Pelayo Cuervo. Nonetheless, Lazo did nothing to oppose Batista,
apparently because he was making a great deal of money from his American clients. Rather, Lazo, believing Castro to be a communist, passed
intelligence about him to the FBI. Lazo, despite his suspicions about
Castro, offered to collaborate with him. Even more curiously, Lazo
remained in Cuba until April, 1961, when he was arrested during the
Bay of Pigs landing. Lazo is a super-Plattista, believing that Cuba is
America's ward. That Cubans might have some responsibilities for af-:
fairs on their island never seems to have occurred to him.
16

Interview with Federico Lindner.

17 Interview with Danilo Mesa.

Miami, May 2, 1971.

Gainesville, June 21, 1971.
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disposed to the revolution. .T he association's leaders saw a close correspondence between the developmentalist nationalism of Fidel's economic plans, as revealed in the rvr:.25 program, and ANIC's position.

18

The industrialists dreamed. of a thriving and economically independent
Cuba, of a final victory over their enemies, the hacendados, and of a
golden harvest of profit for the·m selves.
The ANIC was founded in 1923, in the wake of the "dance of
the millions, " when the sugar industry was lapsing into the first of three
decades of stagnation. _ANIC was a fruit of the anti-sugar mentality of
that era, so assiduously pI'omoted py the historians Ramiro Guerra,
Herminia Portell-Vila and others.

19

ANIC urged the government to

raise a tariff wall to encourage .and protect non-sugar industry.

These

efforts were consistently opposed by the powerful Asociaci6n Nacional
de Hacendados (ANDHC) which argued that tariff increases would spur
disastrous U. S. retaliation.

Talk of tariff walls in Cuba inevitably

brought immediate pressure on the U.S. Congres_s by American exporters to cut the Cuban sugar quota.

Cuba's powerful hacendados would -

.
The M-26 program was prepared by the M-26 economists,
Felipe Pazo.s, former president of the National Bank, and the Harvard
student, Reginio Boti. See in Political, Economic and Social Thought
of Fidel Castro (Havana: Editorial Lex, 1959), chapter II . .
18

I
I
I
I
.1·

19 Herminia Portell-Vila, historian and once a bitter critic of
TJ. S. Foreign Policy. Later, head of the U.S. Cultural Affairs Center
in Havana. In exile, editor, Radio Free Amer:ica of the American Security Council, Washington, D. C.
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then pressure their government to forget the idea of tariff increases. 20
ANIC saw this yielding to U. ~· pressure as shameful, reflecting a situ., ·
21
ation of excessive, almost colonial dependence.
The industrialists

argued that the sugar industry, with its long dead season in which
500, 000 workers might go unemployed, was not only socially antiquated
.

.

and uneconomic, but inhumane as well.

22

There were other reasons for the enmity between suga.rmen
and industrialists.

Some sugarmen feared that the gro.w th of industry

with its higher wages would mean demands for higher pay_in the agri1

cultural sector.

The industrialists countered that the hacendados were

too foreign-oriented.

Aber' Mestre, president of ANIC in 1957 and co-

owner of CMQ, Cuba's leading radio and TV chain, complained that
hacendados did not adv~rtise in the electronic media because they had
nothing to sell there.

"Sugar was not our client.

11

But domestic

20 Among those who sympathized with ANIC in its struggle with

the ANDHC was the communist intellectual Carlos Rafael Rodr{guez.
See, for example, his pamphlet A prop6sito de "El em pleo en Cuba"
(Havana: Editorial Piramide, 1955), p. 9.
, 2 l This view was put forward very strongly in interviews with
two former presidents of ANIC: Abel Mestre (Coral Gables, June 8,
1971} and Tulio Diaz Rivera (Miami, April 8, 1971).
2 2 Ibid.
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manufacturers were. 23
A number of factors militated against the industrialists.

They

lacked the kind of dynamic leadership which Jose Manuel Casanova had
given the hacendados in the 1930s and 1940s.

ANIC's prestige was di:-

minished by the existence of a welter of parallel organizations such as
the Association of Executives, the Catholic Businessmen's Association,
and the Cuban and American Chambers of Commerce. Attempts·to establish nationalist positions were inevitably weakened because the most
powerful firms within ANIC were North American: Cuban Electric,
Cuban Telephone, Coca-Cola, Canada Dry, Portland Cement, and Continental Can. 24

23

1nterview with Abel Mestre, owner, along with his brother
Goar, of CMQ. Coral Gables, June 8, 1971. Goar Mestre studied business administration in t:i.1e U.S. He became convinced that Cuba's high
illiteracy rate would m ake radio an important advertising medium.
With the aid of 11 Pepin 11 Bos.ch and other wealthy santiagueros , he bought
CMQ radio. H e later established a similar communications company in
Argentina. In 1951, as President of the Inter-American Association of
Broadcasters, he was urging U.S. companies in Latin America to increase their advertising budgets. This would stimulate demand, permitting the Americans to establish branch factories in Latin America.
Goar Mestre's personal fortune was estimated at $20 million. See El
Mundo, February 18, 1961; The New York Times, July 24, 1951. In
1974 the Peron government nationalized G<:>ar Mestre's Channel 13 TV
station.
24 ANIC Boletin, January 19, 1959. In some cases the only way
the Cubans could begin to produce a certain item was to invite a U.S.
firm in to do the job. If, for example, a U.S." tire-producing firm were
· invited in, it would thereafter welcome and collaborate with Cuban efforts
to raise tariff barriers against tires imported from the U.S. If a purely
Cuban firm attempted tire production based on a protective tariff, it would
find the U.S. tire-exporting firms lobbying in Washington for a cut in the
Cuban sugar quota.
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The industrialists also suffered a lack of public and political
support.

The hacendados, the colonos and the sugar workers had enor-

mous resources in men (votes) and money to defend their position. Industry had relatively few workers (votes) and the ownership of Cuban
corporations was not widely distributed.

The most widely floated issues

on the Cuban stock exchange were generally those of the Cuban-based
subsidiaries of American firms.

Purely Cuban firms like Bacardi

tended to be family-held and controlled.

Business as Theft
The Achilles' heel of Cuban business was its low esteem in the
public eye.

Business was widely regarded as an elegant form of theft in

which insider deals at the Presidential ~al.ace rather. than honesty and
hard work were the. keys to success.

In the early months of 1959, the

press, both revolutionary and conservative. began to play on this theme
with devastating effectiveness.
of fact and distortion.

The charges were often wild mixtures

But there was enough evidence of illicit activity

to cast a long shadow over the entire business community.

In the eyes of the revolutionaries. any businessman who had
signed a contract. received a concession, accepted a loan during the
Batista era was a virtual criminal.

The contract for the U. S.- owned

Moa Bay Nickel Mining complex. Cuba's largest industrial installation,
was thought irregular.

Bohemia said Batista had given Moa special tax

breaks to please Ambassador Smith, who had a personal financial
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interest in the company. 2 5 .This charge, . echoed by the Cuban banker
Alberto D1az Masvidal in the conservative Diario de -la Marina, achieved
wide currency in Cuba.

26

The Catholic La Quincena denounced Moa as

an "empresa latifundista • ." 27 Moa, of course, denied everything.

No

specifics were eyer proved.
Cuba's largest industrial employer, Burke Hedges, came under
attack for accepting loans from Batista. 28 Hedges' .father, Dayton, had
begun a textile empire (Textiles Ariguanabo) in the 1920s with enormous
success.

His sons atte.mpted to expand into rayon cord (La Rayonera)

in the 1950s--partially to supply Cuba's new. tire factories--and ran into

economic difficulty.

Their friend Batista had the government buy out

I
I

the Hedges at an exorbitant price.

I

Texaco, ESSO and Cubana de Aviaci6n all received loans from Batista?

I

This, at least, was the _allegation in

Bohemia. 29
Almost every major firm in Cuba was under suspicion.

What of the rate increase granted the Cuban Telephone Company?30
Public works contractors were the most suspect of all.
25 .
, Bohemia, January 11, 1959, p. 77.

I
I
I
I

,.

Had not

26 Diario de la Marina, January 28, 1959.
27 La Quincena, February 29, 1960.
28 Bohemia, January 18, 1959, p. 149.
2 9 Ibid., November 13, 1960,pp. 68-69.
3 o See chapter on Utilitie·s, p. 368.

In mid-1959,
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the Castro government revealed a study showing that contractors in
twenty major public works projects had benefited from excess payments
ranging from 14-71 percent. 31
Why hadn't the business class done anything to end the corruption which was undermining the republic? One Cuban businessman responded that doctors and professionals could protest the Batistato--for
their capital was in their heads.

But businessmen. whose capital was in

their warehouses. could not. 32 The American businessman John Johnson. a close friend of Batista. thought the dictator too proud to ever have
yieided to business pressure.

33

Paul Heilman, president of the Ameri-

can Chamber of Commerce (1957-1959) and another friend of Batista.
agreed that graft and corruption were getting out of hand in the late
1950s.

But nothing could be done.

One had to stay close "to the ones

.
.
1134
on top so you could get by •
. . Castro shared the general Cuban distrust of business, both
foreign and domestic.

In January. 1959, he announced that all "onerous

concessions" made by the dictatorship to "foreign monopolies II would be .

31 R · 1 "6
.evo uc1 n. Ju1·y 1 • 1959
· •
32 Bohemia, April 12. 1959, p. 92.
33 futerview with John Johnson, son-in-law of the one-time
Cuban millionaire. Martm Rubio. Miami, January 15, 1971.
34 Interview with Paul A. Heilman.

Miami. February 25, 1971.
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revised or annulled. 35 He was also adverse to the power and influence
of Cuban business, having written in his History Will Absolve Me that
"the future of the nation and the solution to its problems cannot continue
depending on the selfish interests of a dozen financiers, on the cold
computation of ~refits which ten or twelve magAate~ make in their airconditioned offices .•..

1136

In the first months of 1959, Cuban businessmen were generally

optimistic.

They were comforted by the fact that the government's chief

economic posts (the Nation.a l Bank directorship and the Treasury Ministry) were in the hands of the responsible moderates, Felipe Pazos and

I ··
I
I

I
I

Rufo L6pez-Fresquet.

The majority of businessmen, who had made no

deals with Batista, thought that they would be left alone.

Premier Jose

Mir6 Card~na assured business that capital would have every guara.n'tee.
Plans for an improved and modernized stock market were discussed.
When a businessman queried Fidel on the nature of coming reforms,
Fidel asked: "Do you own any lands?" "No. " "Then you have nothing
to worry about~;3B Apparently, Castro's reforms would inconvenience
only the agricultural sector.

I
I
I
I
I

35 Diario de la Marina, January 22, 1959.
36 Fidel Castro, "History Will Absolve Me," The Political,
Social and Economic Thought of Fidel Castro, pp. 65-66.
37 Diario de la Marina, February 6, 1959.
38 Conversation of Fidel Castro with Abel Mestre.
Coral Gables, June 8, 1971.

Interview,

37

I
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The most worrisome factor in early 1959 was not government,
but labor. Workers in virtually every industry were seeking pay hikes.
' candy factory, workers wanted a 100 percent inAt the Ambrosia

.crease. 3g The girls at Havana's El Encanto department .store were
forming their first labor syndicate.

I

At the Hatiley beer plant in Santa

Clara, workers sought $2. 50 above their current $8. 50 daily minimum.

40

_Diario de la Marina thought these demands worrisome and urged business
. th e revo 1u t.ion:
not to 1ose con f..1d ence rn

And perhaps there was:r;i 't.

11

Th ere 1s
. no reason
. f or f ear
· .•••1141

After all, there was nothing new about strained

relations between capital and labor in Cuba.
the government.
·•'

Capital expected no help from

' and Batista, the governAs under Presidents Grau, Prio

ment would inevitably take labor's side.

I
I

1·

.,

The Rent Reform

I

The first major reform of the Cuban revolution, the first blow
against the bourgeoisie, and the first great step ih income distribution
was the Rent Reform Law of March, 1959.
from 30-50 percent.

At one fell swoop it cut rents

Treasury Minister L?pez-Fresquet gave the offi-

cial calculus of the affair: ·20, 000 would suffer; 500, 000 would benefit.

39 Interview with Andres Carrillo, former president of the
Ambrosia company. South Miami, March 10, 1971.
II

40 Interview with "Polo Miranda, former manager of the
' Hatiiey plant. Miami, January 20, 1971.
41

Diario de la Marina , February 13, 1959.

42 Ibid., April 30, 1959.

42
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Tinkering with rents was no novelty in Cuba.
form of rent control since 1939.

Havana had suffered some

In the 1950s, the laqor leader, Jesus

Artigas, had sought 40 percent rent cuts. 43 Castro had promised a 50
percent cut in his History Will Absolve Me.

44

Now he was delivering.

The reform was a brilliant political str:oke, a gift to the urban
small bourgeoisie and the working class.

The bus driver Jesus Diaz

told Revoluci6n the rent cut was a marvel.

"After God, Fidel Castro. " 45

But it was a heavy blow to the middle and upper bourgeoisie which derived a substantial part of its income from rents.

46

Castro admitted

.
t o th e " economic
. c 1asses " t o sacr if"ice f or th e goo d
as muc h , appea1mg
of the country.

47

Many renters, se~ing the government on their side,

refused to pay any rent at all.

By July, in Havana alone there were more

than 50, 000 court cases involving rent delinquency.

48

A yea~ later

there were more than 25, 000 instances of non-payment of .rent in just
49 Q"
•
•
one o f H avana I s . severa1 districts.
iven t h'is non-payment o f rent,

. ·:..;.

43 Alloza, Noventa entrevistas politicas, p. 24.
44 Castro, History Will Absolve Me, p. 34.
45 Revoluci6n, March 9, 1959.

I.
I
I
I
I

46 According to the 1953 census, fully one-third of the income
of the middle class was derived from rents. See in Thomas, Cuba,
p. 1096.
47 Havana Times, March 12, 1959.
48 Bohemia, July 19, 1959, p. 86.
49 Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1960.
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many apartment owners were forced to the .wall.

The government did

make one concession to the landlords, placing a 6 pe.rcent ceiling on
mortgage interest rates. Nonetheless, real estate values began to fall.
One could find $3 50, 000 apartment buildings advertised for $220, 000;
$28, 000 residences for $14, 000.

50

By December, the owner of a

$130, 000 residence in Miramar was asking $75, 000; a $230, 000 building was selling at $108, 000. 51 The landlord class was being destroyed.
The rent cut had a devastating effect on the once-flourishing
construction industry.

In Havana P~ovince, construction permits fell

63 percent for the period January-May, 1959, compared with the 'p re52
vious year. Cement sales were down 50 percent.
Most lawyers
thought the- law confiscatory.
.

11

53

The Diario de la Marina said merely

•

that this was not the law we had hoped fo_r.

1154

But some business sectors benefited.

The salesmen on Havana's

famous Muralla Street were pleased; the extra income of the masses
·
would
mean more sales for them. 55 L6pez-Fresquet assured the nation that the government knew what it was doing.

The rent law, he

50 Diario de la Marina, June 16, 1959, May 23, 1959.
51

Ibid., December 6, 1959.

52 Noticia s, July 14, 1959.
53 Interview with Pedro Mendive, pr~sident, Colegio de
Abogados de la Havana en Exilio. Miami, May 4, 1971.
54 Diario de la Marina, March 8, 1959.
55 Interview with Antonio Barro.

Miami, April 27, 1971.
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thought, would help to head off salary demands and serve as a stimulus .
' dus t ria
. 1·1zat'10n. 56
to m

ANIC's Industrial Plan
In January, a group of younger men at the Association of In-

dustrialists demanded a new board nf directors, one composed of men

woo fully supported the

revolution. A committee of "clean hands" headed

. t e d t o reorgan1z
. e th e associa
.. t'ion. 57
,:,.y Tullo Di~az R..1 vera was appom

1i..

" Rivera also directed the preparation of an ANIC position paper for
Diaz
Fidel: Informe y Plan de Desarrollo Industrial.

The plan, prepared

1argely by ANIC's economic advisor, Jose Alvarez Dfaz, demonstrated
that business--or at least some businessmen--welcomed Castro's eco. nahona
.
1'ism. 58
nom1c

Specifically, the ANIC plan supported Castro's drive for "the
economic liberation of Cuba II and provided a long list of imported products

56 Diario de la Marina, March 22, 1959.
57 Diaz Rivera was one of the hard-working "small millionaires"
who abounded in the old Cuba. He owned a lithography plant and was participating in a joint venture,with the U.S. Champion Paper Co. A moderate
nationalist, he did not fear substantial state intervention in the private
sector.
58 Jose Alvarez Diaz of the consulting firm fusua, Fernandez y
Alvarez Diaz. Accountant, head of the commercial sciences faculty at
Havana University, minister of the treasury for Frio in 1952. His firm
· advised ANIC after its earlier advisor, L6pez-Fresquet, became minister
of the treasury for Castro. Alvarez would later say that, of all Cuba's
private institutions, it was ANIC that "best understood the mentality of
the moment. " (Revoluci6n, .September 3 0, 1959.)
~
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59
(mostly from the U. S. ) which could be produced in Cuba.
Funds to

finance these new industries could be raised in part by· selling industrial
bonds..

ANIC itself offered to purchase five or sL-x million dollars' worth

a-year of these bonds.

Companies which raised their employment by 5

percent per year would be exempted.

Companies would promise to spend .

at least 10 percent of their annual advertising budgets on "buy Cuba" camgaigns. Unspecified aid was also to be given to technical training schools
an.d to fairs and exhibitions.
ANIC propose~ a planned economy. like that in the M-26 ecor::omic document, but a planning compatible with "individual liberties."

Foreign capital would be permitted and even encouraged, but preference
would go to small Cuban manufacturers producing for the domestic rr,.arket.

60

Industries requiring permanent ·subsidies we-r~ to be discouraged,

but some necessary industries might be encouraged by temporary tax
relief -or export support.

New industries would benefit from free im-

portation of capital goods and a tax holiday for one or two years.

Capi-

tal sources would include international banks like the IBRD, workers I
pension funds, and a revitalized Havana stock exchange.

59

61

ANIC, Informe y plan de desarrollo industrial (Havana, 1959),

pp. 1, 38.
60 _1_.,
Ib'd
p. 11.
61

Ibid., pp. 27-28. According to ANIC, some $175 million in
new investments, foreign and domestic, were then committed or under
active consideration.
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ANIC's report plac~d the major burden for Cuban development
on the government.

The government would have to r:aise tariffs and

hence do battle with the U.S. --and bring rampaging labor under control.
Tariff levels on raw materials might be raised 10-20 percent; on semifinished goods, 20-40 percent; and on finished goods, from 40-80 percent.

63

The report observed that the Batista regime had ignored the

ANIC's numerous requests for tariff modifications.
As for labor, ANIC asked the government to grant industry

I

the right to fire workers or to transfer them to other industrial areas.

I

More jobs, rather than higher pay, was ANIC's goal.

1·

by men linked to foreign totalitarian regimes (i.e., communist) would
not be tolerated.

I

I
I
I

62

64

Control of unions

Labor should be educated to appreciate the need for

profits in a nation where some $10, 000 ·to $15, 000 in capital was required to create one new job.
ANIC asked the government to improve public transport, lower
port costs, and create cheaper sources of energy by building more hydroelectric plants and helping in the search for petroleum. 6 5
62Tulio Diaz thought the U.S. would be agreeable to tariff modifications in 195~. See in the ANIC Boletin, February 11, 1959.

I
I
I
I
I

63 ANIC, Informe, p. 17.
64 Ibid., p. 30.
65 Ibid., p. 34. This must have been unwelcome news to the
Americans who were then investing millions--without result--in petroleum exploration. Some Cubans believed that the Americans had discovered petroleum--but for unknown motives were hiding it. In subsequ~nt years, extensive exploration by the Soviets has also yielded nothing.
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Tur:i;iing to agriculture, ANIC gave full support to the agrarian
reform, seeing it as a key r~quirement for the industrialization of Cuba. ·

I
I

I

Fully one-third of ~e nation (most of the agrarian sector) was outside
the market economy.

66

If industrialization were to succeed, these po-

tential purchasers must be brought into the national market.

The middle

I
I

men who bought the poor farmers' produce at "ridiculously low prices II
were roqq:µig agriculture of all incentive and would have to be suppressed. 6 7"

.A:NlG's plan elicited the most diverse reactions. Raul Castro
thought :i,t demonstrated ANIC's faith in the revolutionary government,
1168
•
•
and ther~{ore IImerited
the app1ause o f a 11 Cu bans.
Treasury Minis-

.t er L6pe?o ... :fresquet was less pleased.

He scol?ed the industrialists .f or

their 11ti_m idity" and for looking to the government for help "like a child
to its father. 1169 Most importantly. there was apparently little support
'

within the ANIC for the new plan.

The former ANIC President, Abel

Mestre., commented that Tulio Diaz was offering proposals which the
ANIC had always opposed in the past.

70

How could an organization whose

principal members were foreigners approve a nationalist program?
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66 Ibid •• p. 34.
67 Ibid •• p. 36.

-------68

ANIC Boletin, July 15, 1959.

69 Diario de l a Marina, May 8, 1959.
7.0 Interview with Abel Mestre.

I

Coral Gables, June 8, 1971.
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The ANIC plan slipp~d into oblivion.
failed to dramatize its position.

It was the students at Havana Univer-

spirited and well-publicized "Buy Cuba" campaign.

The students pre-

pared an elaborate display of Cuban products at the medical school.
.. · : .. .·: .· .

The

_display wa~ _mounted in a train which whistle-stopped across Cuba for
•,:·,· ..:. ·· .·:· \:··

:-:: ··:\:.<·

·. .

, ,l

.

•

almost a year, arousing considerable publicity and excitement, if nothing
else.

71

~rofit and Loss
The early months of the revolution presented the most diverse

I
I
I

. ·and contrary economic pi~ture.

Some businessmen moved smartly ahead,

others began almost at once to be ruined.

Among this latter group were

Cuba's auto importers; who in a good year might import as much as
$10 million worth of autos.

I

72

The auto, and especially the Cadillac·--the beloved cola de pato-....... ·

.was symbolic of the bourgeoisie in its freedom and power, its ostentation and wastefulness.

73

Yet the auto was the basis of much. of Cuba's

economfo boom of the 1950s: tire factories (Firestone, Goodyear),

I
I
I
I
I

.

sity's Medical School, and not tli.e'ANIC, who launched a rustic but high-

-I
I

The organization, divided,

7l ANIC Boletfu, June 17, 1959.
some financial support.

ANIC did lend the exhibit

72 Interview with Raul Shelton Ovich, president of the Auto
Importers Association in 1959. Coral Gables,. May 9, 1971.
73 Cola de pato, or duck's tail, a reference to the upswept tail
lights of the Cadill::i.cs of that era.
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gasoline refineries (Texaco, Shell, ESSO), the Rayonera for tire cords,
public works road projects--all these things in the name of the automobile.

Cuba was thought to have more autos per capita than any Latin

American nation other than Venezuela, and more Cadillacs per capita
than the U.S. itself.

74

Julio Lobo's Cadillac was equipped with a bed,

so that he might sleep while his chauffeur whisked him from Havana to
his country retreat at Central Tinguaro.

When Batista's cronies. sought

an appropriate gift for their chief, they settled on a $55, 000 armored
.75

Cadillac. ·

In 'early 1959, there were seven hundred autos sitting on the
Havana docks, fresh from the U.S.

Customs refused to release them.

In late February, the Auto Importers Association, which once had considerable political leverage, telegraphed Castro that their "legitimate
businesses" were faced with ruin unless they received :::-elief from the
government.

7
Nothing happened. ~ In May, the government created a

new license plate tax to discourage large automobiles.

The tax on cars

worth less than $2, 000 was $50; the tax on cars worth more than $3, 000
was $5, 000.

77

The Cadillac republic was over.

In July, two hundred

74Havana Times, December 22, 1958.
7 5 Revoluci6n, February 12, 1959.

76 Ibi d.~ February 27, 1959.
77

.

.

Havana -T imes , May 30, 1959. In December, 195 2, when the
Batista governm ent proposed a tax of $74 to $187 on luxury automobiles ,
the impor.t ers raised a hue and cry sufficient to defeat the measure. Hispanic American Repo rt, Vol. V, #12, p. 14.
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.

big cars were shipped back ~o the U.S.

78

Some thought Cuba would manufacture its own automobiles.

In November, 1959, Mercedes Benz expressed an interest in establishing an automobile assembly plant on the island.

But the economist

Reginio Boti told the Mercedes representative that Cuba was not interested. Cuba planned to develop ii:s own auto using old jigs and dies
from the U.S.

Castro, said Boti, had revolutionized Cuban politics;

.
t o " revo 1u t·10n1ze
. 1n
. dus t ry. 1179 F our mo d e 1s o f th"1s
now h e was gomg

indigenous auto were p~anned: the SIEMA, the !NRA, the NANA, and
the FIDEL.

80

This plan never advanced beyond the talking stage, and

was later referred to by Fidel with some scorn.
The offers of other automobile companies were also turned
down.

Volksvyagen reportedly was cons.idering a $24 million assembly

plant.

With proper tariff arrangements, Volkswagen hoped to. sell cars

in Latin America and perhaps even in the U.S.

This proposal was re-

jected by Minister of Industries "Che" Guevara on the grounds that Cuba
was going to build its own."

81

78 Havana Times, July 6, 1959.

I
I

79 Interview with Raul Shelton, former sales representative in
Cuba for Mercedes Benz, Simca, Renault and Jaguar. Coral Gables,
May 9, 1971.

I
I
I

Bl Interview with Tulio Diaz Rivera. Miami, April 8, 1971.
In 1974 VW of Mexico began exporting jeeps to the U.S.

80Havana IT'imes, September 21, 1959.
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Lord Rootes of the great English motor establishment .visited
Cuba in May.

Economics Minister Boti said Rootes' Leyland division

would establish a factory in Cuba't°o manufacture trucks, buses and
tractors.

82

Nothing more was heard of this proposal, although years

later Cuba did import a number of fully assembled Leyland buses.
Meanwhile, Cuba's auto importers were running into more
trouble.

When, in February, 1960, the government seized the proper-

ties of Amadeo Barletta, Cuba's largest auto dealer, there was consternation within the Auto Importers Association.

83

Barletta, who sold

Cadillacs and Chevrolets, was the first member of the association to be
done in by the revolution. Association members wondered: Who would
be next? Some thought Barletta a special case owing to his notoriously
close relations with Batista.

The idea of closing down all the auto dealer-

ships at once as a signal of protest to Fidel was considered but discarded,
one member commenting that Barletta "deserved" his fate.
man was the next to be intervened.

That same

84

In the spring of 1959, there was evidence of business enthusiasm

in other areas.

The young managers of Santiago's brand new $3 million

8 2 .Revoluci6n, July 28, 1959.
83 The Italian immigrant Amadeo Barletta was one of Cuba I s
wealthiest men, having acquired 9y the late 1950s a forty million dollar
empire, including the newspaper El Mundo, the TV station Telemundo,
and various other properties. In 1972, Barletta was operating an auto
dealership in the Dominican Republic.
84 Raul Shelton interview.

Coral Gables, May 9, 1971.
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· flour mill, Molinas Harineros de Santiago, were planning a mill in
Matanzas to serve central Cuba. An indus"trial consultant in Havana told
them that inquiries relativl::! to new investments in Cuba were ten times
those of the last months of 1958. 85 According to the Diario de la Marina,
the number of requests for licenses for small businesses was up 400 per-:
cent in May, 1959, over a similar period in 1958.

86

Insurgent Labor
Businesses I most urgent and difficult problem in the spring of
195.9 was that of insurgent labor.
had fled or retired.

Many of the old Batistiano labor leaders

Communists, Castroites and the remaining mem -

hers of the old order were competing for power in a series of labor elections.

Lal;>or wanted not only pay increases, but back .pay for certain

salaries not paid dt~ring the Batistato.
Some companies were pushovers.

In February, Shell, in trouble

for its close relations with Batista, agreed to wage increases of up to
100 percent for the lowest salaried workers; less for higher paid employees.

87

George "Jorge" MacDonald, the American president of In-

dustria Pr.oductora de Superfosfatos, Cuba's largest fertiiizer factory,
was accused of evading payment of $1 inillion in wages during the

I
I
I
I
I

85

Interview with Carlos Portela Guti~rrez and Augusto Ladesma,
manager and assistant manager, respectively, of Molinos Harineros de
Santiago. Miami, April 9, 1971. Portela and Ladesma today operate a
small canning plant, Productos Ancel, in Miami.
86

Diario de la Marina, June 11, 1959.

8 7 Revoluci6n, February 7, 1959.
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Batistato.

88

The Nickel Processing Company, the Cuban operator of the

Nicaro nickel operation, was accused of saving $100, 000 pesos by robbing workers of their rightful paid vacations.

9

° Four hundred previously-

dismissed workers were demanding their old jobs at Cuban Land and
Leaf's cigarette factories.

H. Uppman's workers wanted a 30 percent

wage increase. 91
Small industries were the hardest hit by the combined effect of
labor's demands and revolutionary reform measures.
dustry suffered badly.
minished substantially.

The furniture in-

I
I
I
I
I

Following the rent law, house construction diFurniture purchases fell accordingly.

companies began to lay off workers.

Furniture

At Camilo L6pez y Hermano, one

of Cuba's largest furniture factories, forty workers were dismissed.
They reacted by threatening to " take the factory. 1192 Another hard-hit
business was that of the American film distributors.

93

Workers there,

led by a communist union chief, had begun a slow-down on April 1.

They

88 Ibid~, February 19, 1959.
89 Ibid., February 20, 1959. ·wages in Havana were higher
because the cost of living there was higher. Once Havana wages were
raised, however, provincial workers demanded equiparaci6n, or equal
wages for equal work. Thus the Cuban escalator.

go Ibid., March 2, 1959.
91 Ib"d

--2-.!.· March 7, 1959.

92 Ibid., March 23, 1959.
93

I

U. S. distributers handled most of the films shown in Havana.
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w.ere ckmanding a 20 percent wage increase, plus 2 5 percent of all profit::., thC' use of Cuban nationals as theater managers, reinstatement of
tho.Sl' fired since 1952, double pay for Saturdays retroactive to 1951, a

one-month Christmas bonus and other benefits.
as "excessive and literally confiscatory.

Management saw this

1194

Even Havana's shop owners, initially enthusiastic over the increased sales spurred by the rent reform, were, by late April, having
second thoughts.

At a meeting of the Association of Havana Shop Owners

(dcpcndientes), Manuel Cadavid, who supported the revolution, expressed concern over the workers' . demands for 20 percent wage hikes. 95
Thereafter, CTC chief David Salvador accused Cadavid and his associates of trying to "ignore labor laws and exploit .the workers." A CTC
demonstration was held near Cadavid's store.

96

A number of plans laid prior to 1959 now went forward.

Fran.:.

cisco Bartes of the Ferrocarriles Consolidados took delivery of several
million dollars worth of new railroad equipment.

97

The owners of the

94 Havana Times, April 9, 1959; The New York Times, April
29, 1959.
95 Cadavid was an Ortodoxo, and had voted for Eduardo Chibas
in 1950. (Havana Times, April 26, 1959.) ·
96 Havana Times, April 26, May 14; 1959.
97 Francisco Bartes, President of the Consolidated Railroads of
Cuba says that this equipment was purchased from Fiat of Italy in 19561957, was delivered in 1958, but could not be put into operation owing to
the Castroites 'destruction of the railroad system. When tracks and
b:a.'idges were restored in 1959, the new equipment Wi3-S put into use. Let. ter to author. Metarie, Louisiana, July 6, 1972.
·I
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,

~

Regalias El Cuno cigar C-::>mpany spent

a:

like amount to expand facili-

ties. 98 · The Cervece/ia Criolla sold 100, 000 shares of stoc.k at twenty
dollars each in its new beer operation.

Construction began in April.

99

Criolla's president, Ignacio Abalia Joaristi, said the plant demonstrated
faith in the future of Cuba. lOO Freeport Sulphur's $100 million Moa Bay
nickel plant was nearing completion.

General Electric was discussing

.a pump factory; former President Carlos Prio and his America? business
associates were anxious to install a glycerine plant.

The vice- president

of BANFAIC returned from a visit to the U.S. in mid-April to report
that Phelps Dodge, Gen~ral Electric, and B. F. Goodrich were all interested in expansion. lOl Grace Lines decided to re-establish Cuba as

I

a port-of-call."
Great sums ~ere bandied about.

Some Canadian businessmen

were reputedly thinking of investing $80-100 million in rural housing. 102
The Uni6n Nacional de Importadores wanted to spend $10 million on industry to replace U. s. imports.

103

I
I

INRA's Nunez Jim~nez said he had

98 Interview with the lawyer and newspaper publisher, Luis
Botifoll • .Coral Gables, January 12, 1971.
·
99 Diario de la Marina, September 9, 1959.
lOOHavana Times, April 26, 1959.
101 Thid., April 13, 1959 • .
102
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I

Ibid.; February 2, 1959.

103 El Mundo, January 24, 1960.
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arrangctl for $100 million in credits from European sources.
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104

The

incurably optimistic minister of the treasury, L6pez-Fresquet, said
that in 1950-1960 a total of close to $1 billion in foreign and domestic

Some Cuban businessmen were encour~ged by special treatment they received from the government, vis-"a-vis the Americans.
Public Works Minister Manuel Ray channeled business to Cuban firms.
like Ccmcntos Artemisa of Pinar del Rio, in preference to Lone Star
Cement.

Ray also helped the Artemisa plant to solve its labor

problems.

106

. L6pez-Fresquet .
For business, the key man in government was L6pez-Fresquet,
minister of the . tre~sury, or the "good Rufo" as ~e was called by his
,

admirers at the Havana Times.

Lopez-Fresquet was relatively young.

and had been~ respected president of Cuba's Bank for Agricultural and
Industrial Development.

He quit the Bank upon Batista's coup and be-

came an advisor to ANIC, a position which he used as a cover to help
raise a million dollars for the revolution. lO? His wife and education

I
I
I
I
I

104 The New York Times, December 5, 1959.

l05 Bohemia Libre (Miami) December 11, 1960, p. 24.
106 Interview with Harvard professor Jorge Dominguez, whose
family owned Cementos Artemisa. Garden City, New York, October 29,
1973.
107 The New York Times, April 24, 1959.
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were both American. lOB His moderate economic views were well known.
He had been an economic columnist for a decade in the Diario de la
Marina . Many young businessmi:fri, scions of important families, had
been his students at the University of Villanueva.
L6pez-Fresquet was not loathe to criticize Cuba's businessmen for their abdication of political responsibility, and their profitable
coexistence with Batista. He was constantly baffled by the. "negative reporting" on Cuba's economy in the American press.

He told one re-

porter, in a burst of exasperation, that "we've just had the only noncommunist revolution of the 20th CE:ntury,

11

and that the U.S. ought to

h e1p 1't • 109
L6pez-Fresquet was also on the make. He wanted to be president and, in the eyes of some, lost his head while serving as minister
·
110
of the treasury and came to exaggerate his own importance.
Businessmen liked L6pez-Fresquet because he was accessible.
~e paid attention to them.

This was important, for many businessmen

l08L6pez-Fresquet met his wife, the daughter of a U.S. -born
Korean missionary, at Columbia University where he spent a year
(1942-43) on recommendation of the Chase National Bank.
109

Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1959.

llOrt is co mmon knowledge that L6p ez - Fresquet want ed to be
president, and that on the day Castr o demote d President Urrutia, L6pez.Fresquet and his associates were anxiously a waiting Fidel' s c a ll. This
ambition for office has t raditionally m a de the Cuban bur eaucracy into a
II
regular c oc kpit. Thus " Rufo found it difficult to coope r ate with National Bank President Pazos, who also wanted to be president.
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felt uneasy because their access to the peripatetic Castro was limited;
their influence on him was very small indeed.
• !

Many of the civil ser-

..

vants whom business had cultivated in the ministries for two decades
,'1cre gone, replaced by new men--unknown quantities.

The president

of CMQ radio and TV enterprises took the young communications minister and his wife out on his yacht and "gave him the works." Business
in the old style.

But the minister didn't seem to know anything.

111

Only Fidel and his tiny guerrilla coterie knew what was going to happen.
But to the moderates, L6pez-Fresquet provided the illusiqn of access
and influence.

And L6pez-Fresquet, as minister of the treasury, often

seemed a veritable whirlwind of activity, the center of action in government.
In February, he launched Ley 40, a clever scheme to collect

delinquent income taxes.

Taxpayers were given a sixty-day grace period

in whieh to pay 50 percent of their taxes due for 1956-57, and 100 percent for 1958.

L6pez-Fresquet dubbed his plan "operaci6n honestidad.

He warned violators that he would "bring them cigarettes at Principe
112
Prison."
In this way. some $100 million was collected within two
months, a s.t riking testimonial to the level of tax evasion of previous

I
I
I
I
I

l 11 Interview with Abel Mestre.

Coral Gables, June 8, 1971.

1~2 Diario de la Marina (Mi~mi), December 3, 1960.

11
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years. 113 Honesty under the Batistato had been difficult since many
tax collectors wanted to be paid off.
might claim an enormous tax.

If one refused to pay, the collector

To fight this, one had to go to court,

posting a sum equal to the one in question.
to face such harassment.

Few businessmen wished

Many paid off, but in doing so they became

in a sense accomplices of the Batistato.

Thanks to their admissions

under Ley 40, the government knew of their past sins and might, some
feared, turn this against them.

In March, L6pez-Fresquet took twelve of Cuba's leading industrialists and sugar planters--"the billion dollar group"--comprising
Julio Lobo, Agustin Batista, Alejandro Suero, Ignacio Mendoza, Julio
Blanco Herrera, Abel Mestre, Domingo Mendez, . Manuel Arca, Ibrahim
Bah~n, · Francisco Bartes, Andrew Duany, and "Pepin" Bosch to Puerto
Rico in order to look into government-industry cooperation there, with
an eye to repeating this in Cuba. 114 Some of his troupe were not at all

113 Ibid •• May 9, 1959. Finance Minister "Pepin" Bosch used
similar tactics in 1951, causing income tax returns to quadruple, corporate taxes to increase almost three-fold. Bosch also attempted to
curb graft in government, but was harassed by Congress and eventually
resigned. See in Time, March 19, 1959, p. 44.
114 All of these men were at first favorably disposed to Castro;
a number made financial contributions to Castro's rebellion. Barte's
writes that "Everyone was anxious to have Batista overthrown, unaware
of their (the Castroites) intentions •••• If Castro would have taken power
raising the red flag as his true symbol, he would not have lasted a week."
'Letter to author. Metairie, Louisiana, July 6, 1972.
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impressed, finding Cuba's economy far more developed and sophisticated than that of :puerto Rico.

115

In the late spring of 1959, L6pez-Fresquet's Treasury labored
at a frenetic pace to produce a completely new and modern~zed tax code:
Ley 447 of July 14, 1959.

This law, the Ley de Reforma Tributaria,

was the most important work . of the moderates .in the Cuban revolution. 116
The new tax favored Cuban non-sugar agriculture_ and ~dustry.
The days of king sugar and of equal treatment for foreigners were over.
Law 447 was canted against the less progressive of the old families;
against inheritances, against great incomes, against all forms of conspicuous consumption.

It was a nationalist document, taxing most

heavily the large (i.e., U.S.) sugar mills and the electric and telephone
services.

It encouraged development outside of Havana province in fish,

poultry, industry, .- mining and non-sugar agricu:i.i;ure.
The personal income tax provisions of the new code were progressive but moderate: $540 in tax at $10, 000, $2, 940 at $15, 000,
$9, 440 at $ 50, 000, $219, 440 at $500, 000. 117 A modest rate by American

115 Interview with Abel Mestre, Coral Gables, Junes; 1971.
Interview with Nicolas Muniz, treasury official who accompanied the
"billion dollar group" to Puerto Rico. North Miami, April 7, _1971.
116 For a description of Ley 447, see the pamphlet Sintesis de
la reforma tributaria, presented by the Banco Garrig6, Havana, 1959.
See also Tirso Clemente's "Legislaci6n revoiucionaria;" in Humanismo
.(Mexico), Vol. 57 (June-July, 1959), pp. 141-150. Ley 447 has many
obvious parallels with the ANIC 's industrial plan·.
117 Banco Garrig6, .Sintesis, p. 12.
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standards, but a substantial increase for Cuba, where personal income
taxes had always been low and rarely paid.· And there were penalties,
'fines, and jail sentences awaiting scoffla~s.
The small businessman was especially encouraged and protected.

There would be no tax at all on agricultural or industrial units

earning less than $5, 000 per year.

L6pez-Fresquet. explained that his

tax was an attempt to balance the distributionist impulse with incentives
for the creation of new wealth.

118

The law was thus a kind of last hurrah

for the production men. In the future the distributionists would hold full
sway.
Law 447 was also important because it was a democratic document, reflecting over one hundred changes suggested by businessmen,
a procedure in distinct contrast to the agrarian reform law which Castro

presented as a simple fait accompli.

It was also an evolutionary rather

than a. revolutionary document, aiming to discourage rather than destroy
industries in the less desirable sectors.
The Association of Industrialists was pleased with Law 447 for
it made them the favored sector.

The importers were unhappy, since

they were among the least favored.

Mario Lazo, lawyer for many Ameri-

can firms, was distressed, seeing ''income and excise taxes .•• increased
exorbitantly. 11119 But Fortune said businessmen found the tax "quite

118 Bohemia, December 20, 1959, p. 104.
119 Lazo , Da gg er, p. 205 •
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acceptab1e. 11120 Toe economist Jose Illan told a meeting of the Association of Executives that the re~orm was a good law, one that would stimu.
121
late mvestment.

L6pez-Fresquet himself said the law was the realization of a
dream.

When he first began work for the Treasury Ministry in 1935, he

had promised himself that someday he would be minister and would make
the tax reform which Cubans had sought for decades.

Noting a letter of

congratulation from Raul Prebish, L6pez-Fresquet told the Diario de la
Marina that he and Felipe Pazos represented a new generation of economists, deeply influenced by :P+ebish and his United Nation's Economic
.
f or L atin
. A.mer1ca..
• • 122
C omm1ttee

These were heady times for L~?ez-Fresquet.

So great was

ANIC's satisfaction wit.h the new tax law that its new president. Emeterio
Padr6n (elected April, 1959), wanted to offer a lunch ill L6pez-Fresquet's
honor. with the whole business community in attendance.
Fresquet was pleased by this. but he was also a realist.

L6pezHe warned

Padr6n that homage to anyone other than Fidel. or the whole government,

120 Lincoln. "What Has Happened to Cuban Business?," p. 272.
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121 Diario de la Marina, July- 23. 1959. Illa.n was then undersecretary of the treasury. Later he would write: Cuba, Facts and
Figures on an Economy in Ruins, (Miami: Editorial AIP, 1964).
122 Diario de la Marina, July 26. 1959.
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was both dangerous and impossible.
honor.

123

Fidel thus became the guest of

On J\ugust 27th, J\NIC celebrated its "agape cordial" at the

Hilton Hotel with some 1, 500 businessmen in attendance.

In his luncheon address, ANIC's President Padr6n said the affair was necessary "to ratify in a clear and sincere way the posture of
businessmen toward the revolution." He praised the government's courage in going ahead with the execution ~f war criminals despite the international outcry.

He praised the government's encouragement of in-

dustrial development, approved the agrarian reform, and regretted that
Cuba had suffered in the past from .regimes in which "only the rich, the
influential and. the unscrupulous could get ahead. "

124

L6pez-Fresquet

told the audien~e that this lunch demonstrated that the government was
not anti-business.

Fidel spoke briefly, and then departed !o attend a

meeting of schoolteachers.

Padr6n recalls that Castro seemed uneasy

1 2 3 Interview with Emeterio Padr6n.. San Juan, Puerto Rico,
March 18, 1971. Padr6n was a founding member of ANIC and a firm
supporter of its developmentalist philosophy. He was a medium-sized
retailer of petroleum products for Mexico's PEMEX, and in no sense
an industrial leader like th0 men comprising L6pez-Fresquet's "billion
dolla·r group. 11 The more important men refused the post. They were
adopting a low profile, and were content to use Padr6n as a lightning rod.
The same policy of putting up innocuous front men was adopted by other
organizations, such as the hacendados. Thus, at a moment of maximum
danger, sugar and industry would not be represented by its maximum
leaders. Lat er on, from the comfort of golden exile, some of the larger
interests rained most cruel abuse on the heads of their stand-ins.
124 Diario de la Marina, August 28, _1 959.
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in the presence of the full flower of the business community.

125

Business and Nationalism
The nationalist component of the Cuban revolution was quickly
recognized by Cuban and American businessmen.

Everyone, even the

Uncle Sam Insurance Company, tried to wrap themselves in the Cuban
flag for whatever defense it might afford. 12 6
Among the first foreign industries to suffer the nationalist onslaught were the U.S. cigarette importers.

This was a small affair,

involving perhaps a few million dollars a year (not including a substantial flow of contraband cigarettes). It was symptomatic of a greater
·problem: Cuba's traditional spending of vast sums on imported consumer goods. 127 Cars, refrigerators, washers·. ai; conditioners--all
those symbols of bourgeois status, of contemporary comfort and convenience--came largely from tbe U.S.
Raul Castro wondered why Cubans wanted U. S. cigarettes when
Cuba grew the best tobacco in the world. 128 We~e American cigarettes
milder, or was it, as Fidel suggested, a psychological phenomenon?
"We were living, " Fidel said, "with the sensation that everything here

I
I
I
I
I

125

Interview with Emeterio Padr6n. San Juan, March 18, 1971.

l26 Uncle Sam Insurance Co. was a Cuban firm.
127

According to the Roberts Tobacco Company, Cuba spent
about $1. 5 million a year on American cigarettes.
12 BH

.
F e b ruary 16 , 1959 •
avana T 1mes,
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was bad. 11129 Oscar Pino-Sa!}tos thought the bourgeoisie's preference
for foreign products reflected a kind of "intellectual colonialism, " a
negative cultural conditioning.

130

An ad a;peared in Revolu~i6n: "When

you smoke Cuban cigars, you are helping to make the revolution.

11131

';['he Roberts Tobacco Company, the prin.cipal importer of American cigarettes, responded that 96 percent of the cigarettes consumed in
Cuba~ Cuban, and that from a forty cent pack only nine cents went
to . the U.S.

Eighteen cents went for taxes and the remainder for adver-

tising in Cuba. At the same time, Cuba exported $32 million in tobacco
products to the U.S.

132

Nonetheless, the government continued its ''buy

Cuban" campaign to the point that many feared to be seen smoking U. s.
brands.

133
Fidel said he didn't want to ruin the American importers:

"But before they ruin us, we would prefer to ruin them, if that's necessary. We have to defend what's Cuban ••••

11134

Castro saw little future
.
.
f()r foreign cigarettes in Cuba. And he was right. In the first quarter

129

Ibid., April 6, 1959.

130 Revoluci6n, February 28, 1959.
131 Ibid •• February 18, 1959.
l32 Diario de la Marina, March 8, 1959.
l33 Havana Times, April 9, 1959.
l34Habano, April, 1959, p. 4. Cuba's own tobacco men foresaw a happy future for their product: "los barbudos fuman, " that is,
the revolutionaries- -and especially Fidel- -like to smoke.
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of 1959, U.S. exports to Cuba declined 35 percent. 135 American cigarettes were among the principal casualties.
Some U.S. firms saw the handwriting on the wall and moved
quickly.

In mid-May, Procter and Gamble sold their interest in the

Sabates Soap Company to a group of Cubans headed by Jos~ M. Vidana.

136

Bohemia was delighted: "This deal puts one of the most ~portant industries into national hands.

11137

This development came just iri the

nick of time since a few weeks earlier, Fidel, while visiting the Cuban
Products Exhibit, had been most displeased to find a large box of Tide
at the Sabates display.

Tide was thereafter Ctibanizeci, being renamed

"Ola." 138 Sabates' chief competito_r, Crusellas, suffered fewer difficulties since it was a mixed venture: 51 percent Colgate-Palmolive,
.
·139
49 percent Crusellas family.

l35wall Street Journal, June 24, 1959. U. s. cigarette exports to Cuba were $149. 5 million in the first quarter of 1958; $96 mil~ion in the first quarter of 1959.
136 Sabates, founded in 1860, employed some 600 workers in
1959. Jose M. Vidana was for many years head of the Rotary Club in
Cuba. When relations between the U.S. and Cuba became strained in
1960, Vidana himself went to the airport to welcome U.S. Ambassador
Bonsal back from a visit to Washington.
137

·
Bohemia, May 31, 1959, p. 84.

l 38 Ola, or wave.
.
l39Newman, Cuba Before Castro, pp. 62-63. Crusellas, begun
in 1863, employed 900 persons in 1959. It was a wholly-owned Cuban
company till 1929, when it sold a majority interest to Colgate-Palmolive.
See in Newman, p. 63.
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The claims of other American companies to Cuban status were
less convincing.

Coca-Cola said it was "a· Cuban industry." It claimed

to employ some 1, 300 Cubans, used a great deal of sugar, and paid $4
million a year in local salaries, $1 million in taxes, and bought $2 million worth of local products a year.

Coca-Cola promised that once the

new Owens Illinois bottle plant was completed, it would not import one
more bottle from the U. s.

140

Companies like MacGregor Sports Wear and Sterling Drugs declared they were Cuban.

Libby's Tomato Juice helped sponsor the tele-

vising of debates on the agrarian reform.

Moa Bay argued the benefits

its nickel mining and refining operation would soon bring: nickel would
become Cuba's second most important export industry.

ESSO continued

an advertising campaign linking itself to national development and to
businessmen of modest resources.

ESSO was now a friend of the hum-

ble fisherman, the small farmer with his ancient truck.
In mid-1959, the views of American businessmen on the revo-

lution were quite divided.

ESSO's Cuban manager, O. W. Potts, denied

rumors that his company was planning to pull out. 141 Bu~ ESSO was
privately unhappy because Castro, in order to save foreign exchange,
was not paying the oil companies. Was he m _e rely delaying payments,
as other regimes had done in the past, or had he decided not to pay at

140 Bohemia, March 29, 1959, pp. 100-103.
141 Ibid., April 12, 1959, p. 90.
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all? No one knew.

Freeport Sulphur's Moa Bay felt more secure.

Fortune said Moa Bay "appears to be safe from interference" because
it was providing the kind of diversification that Castro wanted.

Many of the America.n businessmen at the Havana Toastmasters Club
in early 1959 thought the Castro government w.as on the right track.
They would pay their taxes, obey the laws, and ride out the storm.

I

143

Thus the U.S. business community did not organize a united front against
Castro's revolution.

Rather, it was a question of waiting Castro out and

of taking advantage of fortu.n e's turn.

When Coca-Cola suffered a slow-

down strike in May, its competitors (Pepsi, Orange Crush, Canada Dry)
were not unhappy, seeing a chance to increase sales at Coke's expense. 144

Cuban Entrepreneurs
Many of Cu?a's leading businessm-en were initially quite enthusiastic about the revolutionary government.

Alejandro Suero of the

powerful Falla Gutierrez group wrote the Havana Times in February that
under the Batista regime "we saw no future for our children." He thought

142 Lincoln, "What Has Happened to Cuban Business?:•

I
I
I
I

142

p. 113.

143 Recollection of Wayne Smith, an American Foreign Service
Officer and member of the Toastmasters Club in 1959. Interview,
Washington, D. C., September 3 0, 1970.
144 Interview with Carlos Todd, formerly of the Havana Times.
· Miami; December 3, 1970. The head of Pepsi-Cola in Cuba, Robert
Geddes Morton, was later accused of counterrevolution, for which he
spent several years in prison. See in John Martino, I Was Castro's
Prisoner (New York: Devon-Adair, 1963), pp. 139, 198.
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the disagreeable spectacle of Roman coliseum trials and executions part
of a mass hysteria that would soon pass.

145

Goar Mestre of CMQ told

The New York Times that summary justice was sav:ing lives, preventing

Many businessmen saw in the revolution a chance for increased

I
I
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Ru!z Alv~rez del Corral, president of the Association of Cu-

·1

the public from itself seeking justice. 146 A British insurance agent,
present at Castro's address to the Havana Rotary. Club (January 15, 1959),
recalls the extraordinary, almost frightening attraction Castro seemed
to have for some of Havana's businessmen.

One Rotarian· actually

jumped up on a table to touch the hero, who arrived late in his rumpled
fatigue jacket.

147

The Fidelista Lisandro Otero conclud~d, after a

series of interviews, that Cuban business supported the revolution.
Cuban businessmen, he said, ha,d a "i:nature vision of the future and a
. respons1
.
"bil"t
c 1ear sense of . th e1r
1 y. 11148 .

profits.

I
I
I

ban Advertisers, thought the "buy Cuban" campaign might mean more
"ad~ for Cuban products, and more profits for Cuban advertisers.

149

145Havana Times, February 5, 1959. Alejandro ("Alin")
Suero Falla was manager of the $200 million Falla Gutierrez interests.
146 Cited in Revoluci6n, February 6, 1959.
147 Interview with John Wheeldon, former Havana representative of Lloyd's of London. Miami, February 10, 1971.
l48 Bohemia, April 5, 1959, p. 48.
149 Ibid.", April 5, 1959, p. 49.
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This theme was later echoed by another Cuban advertising man, Augusto
Godoy.

150

Advertis"ing revenues--at least those in the electronic media-did not suffer in 1959._ Though some businesses reduced their advertising budgets towards the end of 1959, this sl.ack was taken up by public
.
. .
b y th e governm~nt. 151 Cub an newspapers, an d esservice
a d vert1smg
pecially the bourgeois pres_s, began to suffer a drop in ad revenues in
the latter part of 1959.

'rl:te bourgeois press depended heavily on ad-

vertising from the big department stores--El Encanto, Fl?gar, and Fin
del Siglo--who~e stock in trade was imported luxuries. 152 But imports
were cut back in the second half of 1959 owing to the foreign exchange
shortage.

Moreover, the nationalist and Spartan nature of the revolt·,.-

tion contrasted dangerously with the sterling silver swans advertised

I
I
I

in the Diario de la Marina.
would·be suicide.

To cease advertising and selling these items

But it was also suicide to continue.

In the midst of

Castro's "buy Cuban" campaign, Fin del Siglo was advertising Italian
sport shirts and El Encanto Teen-Form Brassieres.

153

· 1501?id., April 20, 1959, p. 92.

I
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151 Interview with Orlando Alvarez.

San Juan, March 17, 1971.

152 El Encanto, which had branches in Havana, Camagiiey and
Varadero Beach, was, according to the exiles, equal or superior in the
quality, diversity and elegance of its goods to any American department
store in the Miami area. El Encanto also suffered, like much of the
bourgeoisie, a certain involvement in the moral laxness of the 1950s.
A customs inspector of that era recalls discovering bolts of silk, destined for El Encanto, entering the Havana port labeled "cotton goods."
153 Revoluci6n, March 28, 1959; Diario· de la Marina, August
26, 1959.
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There were profits to be made in 1959, but these were increasingly in cheap consumer items: cigarettes, textiles, shoes, beer._
;

In March, "Pepin

II

Bosch, whose Hatiiey beer controlled half the Cuban

rparket, told a TV interviewer that his company was enjoying the best
beer sales since 1952.
visit to Washington.

154

In April, Bosch accompanied Castro on his

Bosch's competitor at La Tropical, Julio Blanco

Herrera, was also doing well.

La Tropical's advertising reminded

readers that it had sponsored the great drive to collect agricultural
equipment for the agrarian reform. 155 In August, at an auction to benefit the agrarian reform, Julio Blanco paid $300 for a baseball mitt once
used by Fidel. It had Fidel's autograph as well as those of Raul Castro

'

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1·

· and President Dortic6s. 1,56 The sugar magnate, Julio Lobo, whose
collection of Napoleana included the Emperor's death mask, offered a
king's ransom to Fidel for his beard.
it~

But Fidel declined to part with

F~r a time, Burke Hedges, the textile magnate and close friend of

Batista, sported a "gracias Fidel II sticker on his Cadillac.
Business courted Castro, as they had courted other presidents,
because they were afraid.

They were pathetically vulnerable to govern-

ment manipulation of taxes and of import and currency controls.

To

154 Ibid., March 25, 1959.
155 Bohemia, July 26, 1959, p. 67. More than 120 tractors
·were eventually collected for the agrarian reform.156 Revoluci6n, August

10,

1959.

I
I
I
I
I
I
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fall out of favor was to risk r1:1in.
nesscs I courtship.

I
I
I
I
I
I
1·
I
I
I
I

But Castro proved immune to busi-

Thus, despite the generous aid ,~hich the beer and

rum bo.rons Julio Blanco and "Pepfo"
Bosch provided to Castro's
revo.
.
lution, on October 1, taxes were increased 25 percent on beer and 100
percent on rum.
percent.

157

Sales of beer had increased 42 percent, rum 300

158 S ,h
.
. consonance
.
. an ausuc consumption
was h ar dl y 1n
with

.
159
tere and moralistic revolution; ergo, Castro's consumption tax.
This new levy violated the tax reform (Law 447) which L6pez-Fresquet
had just completed.

ANIC and the beer and liquor interests complained

_vigorously, but to no avail.

160

Cutting Imports
The new liquor taxes also affected imports.

The price of

Spanish brandy, Cuba's largest selling imported liquor, more than
doubled.
case.

161

Scotch whiskey rose from forty-eight to sixty-five dollars a
These new liquor taxes were part of a program to use fiscal

157 Havana Times, September 17, 1059. The beer companies
also feared import and foreign exchange controls. Every component of
Cuban beer; malt, hops, corn extracts--everything but the water--was
imported • .
158 Bohemia, October 4, 1959, p. 84.

I
I
I
I
1·

. I
L 6 pez-Fresquet was also disturbed by the proletariat s bad
habits. On a field trip in late summer, he and other cabinet members
were distressed to find that many of the workers at the Charco Redondo
mines were wasting their new purchasing power on liquor. See in Diario
de la Marina, September 29, 1959.

159

160 Diario de la Marina, September 26, 1959.
161 The New York Times, September 17, 1959.
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devices to improve Cuban customs and save foreign exchange.

Accord-

ing to Castro, the middle and upper classe~ had the habit ~f "living like
millionaires."
realities.

162

This era had ended.

Cuba had to face economic

One of these realities was an impending balance of payments

I
I
I
I

1·

deficit estimated at $17 5 million.
On September 24, the Castro government imp.osed an ad valorem
tax of 30-100 percent on imports.
proved.

The International Mone_tary F:tind ap-

Pazos was said to hope that imports of durable goods would be

cut from $140 million in 1958 to $50 million in 1959.
percent drop in luxury imports.

163

He forecast a 3 5

. The government also moved (Law

568, September 29, 1959) to tighten exchange controls.
The most persuas'ive weapon forged by the Castro administration to discourage imports was non-payment.

For example, on Septem-

ber 1, 1959, the Schwarzenbach Huber Corporation of New Jersey sold

$1, 591. 06 worth of goods to the Havana department store, Tiendas
;Flogar.

Tiendas Flogar received the shipment and paid the appropriate

sum to the Trust Company of Cuba for conversion into dollars and forwarding to the U.S.

But the National Bank, to save dollaz:-s, declined

to approve the transaction, and Schwarzenbach Huber was never paid. 164
Law 568 created a brilliant snarl of red tape_that, according to the U.S.
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, "effectively precluded not only

162 Ibid., September 19, 1959.
163

Revoluci6n, September 26, 1959.

164 FCSC, Claim of Schwarzenbach Huber Corp •• CU-0019.
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202

the transfer of funds to creditors abroad, but also payment to creditors
within Cuba by numerous unreasonable and costly demands upon the
•

consignees •••.

II

165

This regulation als? affected Cuban e::-..-porters.

In late 19 59,

the H. Uppman Cigar Company, which exported about one-half of all
Cuban cigars, found it increasingly difficult to send its American agents
their commissions.

And the company could no longer import aluminum

166
.
. l .
tub es to pac k age its specia cigars.
Cuba's foreign exchange crisis brought the most varying reactions from the Cuban citizenry • . One famous baseball player voluntarily turned in a sheaf of new dollars to the National Bank.
woman just returned from a Eurol?ean trip did the same.

A young

Felipe Pazos

spoke of really "massive" voluntary cooperation by Cubans turning in
1
dollars for pesos. · 67 Others were less enthusiastic.

The Diario de la

Marina's editor, Jose Ignacio Rivera, said the new import regulations
would destroy the bourgeoisie.

He posed th~ question of luxury vs.

revolution:
It's true that it is not necessary to write with a typewriter, nor ride in automobiles, or have a refrigerator
•••• But the fact is that our people are accustomed to

I
I
I
I
I

165 FCSC, Claim of James Talcott, CU-0495. The FCSC concluded that Law 568 constituted an improper intervention cf the Cuban
government into the contractual rights of the claimants. FCSC Decision CU-21.
166 Interview with Alonso Menendez whose family owned H.
Uppman. Miami, March 22, 1971.
167 Diario de la Marina, September 2 5, 1959.
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use these conveniences which are appropriate to a
highly civilized country as Cuba undoubtedly is. The
level of civilization of a human community is not measured only by the satisf?,c.tion of prime necessities.~.
but also by the use and enjoyment of certain technical
advances that, · if you wish, can be called lmnirious,
but that indicate a · high level of individual and collective well-being of a nation. 168

.

Rivera argued that, rather than increase taxes on such "luxuries" as
radios and televisions, taxes should be lowered so everyone could en.
;
169
JOY them.
Pazos quickly answered the Diario, accepting full responsibility
for the new tax measures.

He suggested that the Batista dictatorship had

accustomed Cuba to a level of luxury--base_d on imports--which it really
could not afford.
Fidel himself entered the debate, challenging Rivera's criteria
for determining the "level of civilization II of a country.

If, said Fidel,.

one were to m~asure Cuba by the level of unemployment, · of tuberculosis,
of illiteracy, of children stricken by parasites, then the Diario de la
Marina would have to conclude "that this is an uncivilized country ••• ;
One cannot measure the level of civilization by the standard of little
groups ("grupitos 11 ) who live well." Payments for the bourgeoisie's imported "comforts and conveniences," said Fidel, were bankrupting Cuba.
Why, he asked, hadn't the big interests done something to rein in Batista's
168_2_:,
Ib'd
September 26, 1959.
169 Ibid.

I
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spending?

"Cubans lived with more luxury than Americans and had more

170
.
"_
A f ew wee 1(S 1ater, C astro
Catlillacs per cap1"t a tlrnn A mcricans.

noted ominously that those firms which advertised in the counterrcvolution~ry press (like the Diario) would only win public enmity.

171

When "Che II Guevara took over as president of the National
Bank in November, he set up a system of import licenses.

The impor-

tation of all non-essential goods was stopped. 172 By mid-December,
the Wall Street Journal reported that six importers had recently gone
out of business. 173 Guevara thereafter told a delegation from the Cuban Chamber of Commerce that all wholesale importers would disappear
in the near future. 174
fo January. 1960, the Chamber of Commerce requested that

Guevara modify his bank's procedures to facilitate payments for imports.

.
175 A month 1ater, Guevara warned
. request was denied.
'Th 1s

Cuba's importers that if their "sabotage" of the economy continued, the

170Ib"d
_ 1 _•• September 29, 1959.
171 Ib"d
_1_
•• October 20, 1959.
172 Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba
(New York: Monthly Review Press. 1968), p. 27.
173 Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1959.
174 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nik, " Havana, January 8,
· 1960 • .
1750 1connor, Origins~ p. 244.
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state would take over the entire import sector.

176

Trading With America
. Castro's plans to trade less with the United States and to shift
the emphasis of that trade away from consumer items was greeted with
dismay in America.

At U. S~ congressional heariz:gs considering a pas-

sible change in U.S. -Cuban tariff arrangements, much of the comment
was unfavorable to Cuba.

Dewey Bond of the North American Meat

Institute raised the old bogey of retaliatory cuts in the Cuban sugar
quota: "The American meat industry is just as anxious to maintain its
market for lard, pork and other livestock products in Cuba as is Cuba
.
. its
. mar k ets f or sugar in
. t h e U n_i. te d. States. 11177 G eorge
to maintain

Blain of the Association of American Rice Growers echoed this argu-

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

ment and asked the. Congress to facilitate increases in U.S. rice exports to Cuba.

178

.
. .
The American Tobacco Merchants Association fol-

.
f
. .
179
l owed suit, as k ing f or 1ower barriers or American exports.

Not all American companies agreed.

Eugene Stewart of Owens

Illinois Glass, which had just inaugurated an $8 million bottle plant in
Cuba, approved of the receht increases in import duties on bottles saying that "without benefit of the tariff ••• it would be impossible for us to

176 El Mundo, February 5, 1960.
177 Havana Times, September 17, 1959.
178

carteles , October 4, 1959, p. 21.

179 Diario de la Marina, November 15, 1959.
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.
. 11y. 11180
.
cont inue
pro ducing
econorr..1ca
The possibilities of renegotiation of Cuban-U. S. trade arrangements were. of course. reduced when Cuba began to rearrange matters
unilaterally with her new "temporary" tariff hikes.

Ambassador Bon-

sal. who was favorably disposed to a new tar:i,ff arran.gement. told the
American Chamber of Commerce in April. 1960, that the Cuban government had failed to present any specific proposals relative to a new tariff arrangement.

181

1

Had they done so. he thought that the American

negotiators would have . demonstrated a "constructive understanding" of
.· •t•1at•1ve. 182
th e C u b an 1n1

Rents and Renters
The situation of Cuba's landlo:r:ds. buffeted

?Y the

rent reform

of March, 1959. continued to decline in the second half of 1959.

In

August, the Council of Ministers gave Cuba's renters an additional
thirty days to pay before they could be evicted.

183

Given the great pop-

ularity of the rent reform, the government was disinclined to evict anyone.

Non-payment of rent reached epidemic proportions.

The Diario

de la Marina said that if renters would not pay, the government should

I
I
I
I
I

180

181

Bohemia, October 4, 1959, p. 82.
Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the United States, p. 41.

182 Havana Times, April 21, 1960.
1 8 3 By virtue of law 503 of August 2 5, 1959.
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·declare a moratorium on taxes affecting the property owners.

When

representatives of the Union of Srna.11 Property Owners app·roached the
courts seeking aid in collecting rents, the courts responded by giving
delinquent renters two additional weeks of grace.

This so infuriated the

small owners that on October 22nd their president, Juan Orta Romero,
led a demonstration of some four thousand small property owners at
the Presidential Palace.
strike.

Orta remained there a few days on a hunger

After that, he gave up.

But the government did riot.

Orta, a

bricklayer by trade, was a<?cused of being an apartment owner--one of
the most terrible accusations possible in the revolutionary era.
end of the year, he had received several death threats.
The vacant lots' law was also having its effect.

By the

184
Mrs. Florence

~teinhart, 'widow of the man who had helped establish the Cuban Electric
Company and the Havana streetcar system, complained that the Army
was building a barracks on her property at Cojimar.

Castro had set a

top price of four dollars per vara (about a square yard) on urban land.
Some lots in Havana had been valued at $500 per vara prior to the

.

revo 1u t ion.

185

l84Havana Times, January 7, 1960; Diario de la Marina,
November 22, 1959.
185

.
The New York Times, October 19, 1959.

·1

The land, pur-

chased by her husband for $5, 000 fifty years before, was worth $100, 000,
but the revolution was offering only a fraction of that.
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The rent reform continued to have a devastating effect on the
construction industry.

In Havana Province, construction dropped from

0

$61 million in 1958 to $20 millio~

in

1959.

186

The U.S.-owned Otis

Elevator Company, faced with a loss of business, tried to release sixty
unneeded part-time workers.

But such dism~ssals were not permitted

and Otis was intervened by the Labor Ministry. 187 Its intervenor was
a twenty-three year old youth from Guatemala.

188

The construction slowdown continued to hurt the furniture industry.

In November, _1959, the Furniture Workers Union, complained

that,in the space of a month, eighteen furniture manufacturing shops had
shut down.

189

When Muebles Salazar of Havana, in debt for $50, 000,

closed down, its twenty-six workers defiantly locked themselves into
the shop, remaining there for seven weeks until the fi~m was intervened .
by the Ministry of Labor.

Then, with a loan of $20, 000 from INRA,

Muebles Salazar began fabricating desks for Castro's school construction
program •

190

186

H avana T"1mes, J anuary 25 , 1960 •

187 Noticias, Janu;ry 26, 1960.

I
I
I
I
I

188 Wall Street Journal, April 21, 1960.
venors, see appendix.

For a list of inter-

189 n· · d 1 M .
1ar10 e a ar1na, N ovem b er 13 , 1959 •
190 Bohemia, August 14, 1960, pp. 42-43.
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ANIC Going Down
The Association of Industrialists' August banquet for the revolutionary government proved to be a turning point for ANIC. but not in
the hoped-for direction.

"Che" Guevara. president of the National Bank.

told the ANIC men that the government wanted complete. or at least
preponderant, control of all important industries in Cuba. Was private
enterprise to disappear entirely? No,· replied "Che. "private manu.
191
fr;l,cturers could still make items like women's handbags.
The
Guevara interview so alarmed the ANIC men that some wanted to warn
Fidel that "Che" was preparing to betray the revolution! ANIC President Padr6n urged that all the members sign.

But they would not.

And

·
192
so nothing was done.
In subsequP.nt 'months. ANIC kept up a hopeful public front to
shield its private despair. In December, 1959, an ANIC commission,
,
including Padr6n, Diaz Rivera and several others ·asked Treasury
Minister L6pez-Fresquet if an offer by ANIC to create an industrialization fund based on a 4 percent profit tax to be levied by ANIC on its members would mollify Fidel.

L6pez-Fresquet replied that Fidel was a

19l Interview with ANIC President Tulio Diaz Rivera. He was
present at this meeting. Miami, April 8, 1971. On an earlier occasion,
Guevara told a group of Cuban businessmen, anxious to know their role
in the new society, that there were plenty of sidewalk curbings to be
painted. (Interview with John R. Wheeldon, marine surveyor, representative of Lloyd's of London. Miami, February 10, 1971.)
192 Interview with Tulio Diaz Rivera.

Miami, April 8, 1971.
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communist and that he was going to take not 4 percent but 100 percent.193
L6pez-Fresquet said the situation was hopeless and that he was remaining in office only in order to sabotage the r.evolution.

194

Padr6n, who

shared L6pez-Fresquet's views, likewise remained in his post waiting
for the counterrevolution.

Like L6pez-Fresquet, he thought the most

honorable response to Fidel was to keep one's post, even if that required
saying things one didn't believe in.

For to oppose Fidel openly meant

.
d estruc:tion.
.
195
instant
ANIC's annual report for 1959 concluded that the first year of
the revolution was, on balance, "fa.v orable. " The big interests had accepted the agrarian reform; labor was becoming an extremely difficult
problem; the free enterprise system should be permitted to function
· freely.

196

But at the "First Forum of Industrialists 11 (January 17, 1960)

at the University .of Lafl Villas, the industrialists were conspicuous by
their absence.

Only ANIC President Padr6n attended.

At a dinner

l93 Interview with Emeterio Padr6n. San Juan, March 18, · 1971.
According to L6pez-Fresquet, this conversation took place in early January, 1960. He then urged ANIC to get businessmen to put all of their
profits into a public development fund as a means of holding off Castro.
But no one could agree and so nothing was done. See in L6pez-Fresquet,
My Fourteen Months, p. 143.
194

Padr6n says he lost all confidence in Castro by August, 1959,
11
the very month of the "agape cordial.
Interview, San Juan, March 18,
1971.
195 Interview with Emeterio Padr6n.
196 Bohemia, January 3, 1960, p. 59.

San Juan, March 18, 1971.
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given by Padr6n, Ing. Cesar Rodriguez, INRA 's chief of industrialization, declared that private industry had failed to act decisively in 1959.
The "revolution itself" wo11ld have to accomplish the industrialization of
Guba. 197
Industry in Trouble
Perhaps the first large enterprise to fall was Burke Hedges'
Textiles Ariguanabo.
trial plant.

With 3, 000 workers, it was Cuba's largest indus-

The Hedges family had, perhaps by choice but certainly by

necessity, been close to Batista.

The father, Dayton, had been buried

. .
198
in Cuba. His sons, James and Burke, had become Cu b an citizens.
·

In the 1950s, Burke had been Cuban ambassador to Brazil.

Batista had

helped to nurse the Hedges' struggling rayon plant along with government loans.

Despite this, the plant had closed dowri for a time in 1955,

the Hedges claiming that La Rayonera could not compete with other textile sources which were receiving special tax benefits.

La Rayonera

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
·1

was eventually sold to thE: Batista government and then leased back to
the Hedges.
profit.

The Fidelistas claimed the Hedges had reaped an enormous

The Hedges replied the factory had been sold for a fraction of

197Ibid., January 17, 1960, p. 60.
198 Dayton Hedges' sons were also aplatanados, i.e., Americans
who had, by virtue of long residence, become Cubanized. Burke had mar. ried a Cuban girl; James was a member of all the Cuban Clubs, including
the exclusive Yacht. See in Anglo-American Directory of Cuba (Almendares, Cuba, 1960), p. 52. Burke Hedges now lives in Spanish Town,
Jamaica. He calls his home there Ariguanabo, in memory of his Cuban
factory.
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its value and not for cash, but for government bonds.

199

Profit or

loss?
In late Novemcer, 1959, Bohemia called Textiles Ariguanabo

"a hymn to the high ideal of the industrialization of Cuba. 112 9° In December, the plant w?-s nationalized, along with twenty-<?ne other enterprises
of the Hedges family worth a total of some $50 million.

201

Though the

Hedges were charged with various crimes, the government app~rently
could prove nothing, for James Hedges, then in Cuba, was allowed to
leave without difficulty.

Moa Bay
Freeport Sulphur's Moa Bay nickel and cobalt mining complex,

I
I
I
I

potentially Cuba's most important single industrial installation, also

came under fire.

The project, begun in 1956, was on the verge of com-

pletion when, on October 28, 195~. the Cuban government announced a
substantial increase in mineral taxes.

Under previous regulations, Moa

was to pay a 20 percent tax on all earnings until certain tax exemptions
expired.

Then it would pay 45 percent on earnings.

Under the new law,

inspired by "Che" Guevara, Moa would pay 5 percent on all mineral

I
I
I
I
1·

199 Diario de la Marina, March 1, 1959; Bohemia, November
13. 1960, pp. 68-69.
200 Bohemia, November 22, 1959, p. 89.
2.01 Diario de la Marina, December 23, 1959; New York Times,
December 23, 1959.
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production, plus 25 percent on all mineral exports. 202

It was ru-

mored that an additional tax of 45 percent of all profits was forthcoming.
U.S. mining interests complained that the new tax was "almost
prohibitive. 11203 The

U.S.

banks and mineral consumers who were fi-

nancing Moa Ba~ refused to loan the $13 million required to complete
the $75 million project.

Moa President Richard Colligan was hopeful

that something could be worked out. 204 He held some important cards.
Only a special plant could refine Moa 's nickel ores and that plant was in
Louisiana. 205 Once Moa's· production hit full stride, nickel mining
would become Cuba's second biggest income earner, outdistanced only
by sugar.

In time, Cuba could be the largest nickel producer in the

western world.
Moa was used, to political harassment.

In March, 1958, dur_ing

Castro's rebellion, the Rebel Army ~fficer, Efigenio Almeijeira.s, had
liberated a number of motor vehicles from the plant. 20

°

Following

202 Wall Street Journal, October 29, 1959; Havana Times,
July 9, 1959.
203 The New York Times. October 29, 1959.
204 Richard Colligan had for many years been a mining superintendent for Moa 's neighbor, the Nicaro mining operation. He had lived
19 years in Cuba, was married to a Cuban girl, and was, in 1959, chief
of the mining division of the American Chamber of Commerce in Cuba.
205 The nickel refining process used by Moa was said to require
large quantities of natural gas, which were readily available in Louisiana.
206 Raul Castro, "Operation Anti-Aircraft!' in Jay Mallin's
Strategy for Conqu est: Communist Documents on Guerrilla Warfare
(Coral Gab les: Miami University Press. 1970), p. 287.
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Castro's victory, military headquarters for the Moa area was set up
within the plant's grounds.

faction in harassing Moa's operations.
ganfae Moa's workers.

,·
I

Attempts were also made to or-

Some workers thought the pay rather low by

U.S. standards. 207
For several months the plant went forward on accumulated
momentum.

The first two shipments .of ore were actually made.

Moa 's

neighbor, Nicaro, decided to suspend shipments until the tax situation
was clarified.

Nicaro _itself was already up for sale.

Castro was con-

sidering purchasing it from its owner, the"'£.!. S. General Services Administration. In June, 1960, he even sent a delegation to Washington
to discuss the matter.

208

Moa defended its concession, saying that its mining rights
"were originally granted more than 50 years ago in stric~ accordance

with the laws of Cuba.

11209

As construction of the Moa project neared

completion, five hundred construction workers (many employed by the
U.S. -owned Frederick Snare Construction Co.) denounced Moa for leaving them without work!

I
I
I

The district commander took a certain satis-

210

There were complaints about insufficient

207 Inter view with Carlos Martinez, a worker at the Moa plant.
Coral Gables . February 6, 1971. Martinez, a graduate of the University
of Havana, operated a spectrometer at Moa for $17 5 a month. A friend
had told him that workers in the U.S. performing similar tasks would
receive $450-$475. This difference was always a source of agitation and
frustration in the old Cuba.
2 08 El Mundo, June 28, 1960.
209 Havana Times, October 1, 1959.
210Revoluci6n, November 21,. 1959.
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,

housing for workers.

The Catholic La Quincena accused Moa of block-

ing workers' attempts to build houses on company land and forcing them
to live in a shanty town built on.a. swamp.

211

The N'eV1.• York Times

found that the company had built homes for 270 families along with excellent supporting facilities.

212

In February, 1960, Guevara attacked both Nicaro and Moa. saying they left behind only salaries and holes in the ground.

"We maintain, "

said "Che, " "that foreign investment in Cuba constitutes a fine business
,for the investors and a bad business for the country."

213

On March 9th,

work stopped at Moa for lack of further capital; 891 workers were dismissed.

The workers refused to leave.

They _interpreted the shut-down

as a power play by Moa .t o force a revision in the mining tax law~

214

Indeed, Freeport's President J.C. Carrington thought there might still
be a chance of making a deai'with Fidel.

215

Moa's workers adopted the

211 La Quincena, February 29, 1960, p. 3.
212 March 27. 1950. Moa was designed to employ about 1, 000
Cuban workers and 14 American supervisors. Since it was in an uninhabited
area, living conditions were difficult. The· possibilities of finding work
there attracted a large population--far larger than the company could
support.
213 El Mundo, February 5, 1960. Commerce Minister Raul
Cepero Bonilla thought the special tax breaks arranged for Moa (by the
lawyer Mario Lazo) would result in a $40 million loss to the Cuban exchequer. See in Bohemia, October 9, 1960, p. 61.

215Ibid., April 19, 1960.
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21 4 El Mundo, April 17. 1960.
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slogan "Victory or Death.

11

They demonstrated their determination to

hold out by dining on fried malanga (weeds):

II

Malanga con honor.

r,216

Moa was then "provisionally intervened" by the Castro government.
One of the company's two ore ships, operating under Norwegian flags,
was seized.
Louisiana.

The other, en route to Cuba, was ordered to return to
Moa's two cargo planes managed to escape.

plant was taken over by

11

In April the

Che's" aide, Pedro Miret. Man~geme~t turned

over the keys to the intervenors.

All equipment was sealed and in good

order. 217 Matters thereafter drifted until August 16, 1960, when the
Moa complex was definitively seized by the Cuban government. 21 8

Mikoyan's Visit
In February, 1960, members of the Association of Industrialists were asked by Minister of Commerce Cepero Bonilla to attend a
dinner honoring the visit of Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan who
was coming to Havana after visits to Washington and Mexico City.

In a

command performance reminiscent of those during the Batistato, the

I
216 Ibid., April 22, 1960.

I
I
I

I
I

21 7 The American managers of Moa- -and other U.S. owned plants-seem to have resisted the temptation to sabotage their installations. Perhaps this is because they thought they would soon be back.
218 Moa 1s American managers were quite certain that the Cu. bans, without benefit of the smelter in New Orleans, could never make
.Moa function. However, with the aid of Russian technicians, Moa was,
by 1970, in full operation. Following its nationalization, Moa filed a
claim for a $98 million loss with the U.S. FCSC. (Claim CU-2619.)
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entire business community-:-tobacco men, hacendados, colonos, even
the American Chamber of Corrimerce--was marshalled to salute the
Soviet visitor.

219

ANIC president Padr6n was called upon to propose

The Mikoyan visit unnerved many Cuban businessmen.

It

proved fatal for Cuba's largest communications b~siness, CMQ, when

it refused to grant Mikoyan extensive air time. 220 CMQ's relations
with Castro had been uneasy from the beginning.

On New Year's eve,

1959, Abel Mestre, co-owner with his brother Goar, of CMQ, had attempted to del;:i.y the broadcasting of news _relative to Batista's flight in
the hope that some provisional non-Castro gov~rnment might take po_wer.
Thereafter, Guevara took over CMQ to broadcast government messages
It was almost a week before the Mestres recovered

full command of CMQ from the Fidelistas.

The first time Castro ap-

peare<l on CMQ's "Ante la Prensa II program, the Mestres cut him off
after two hours.

This was interpreted as an unfriendly gesture.

They

219 The Menendez family of H. Uppman Tobacco received a
telegram from the Pr~sidential Palace stating simply "you will be present. 11 (Interview with Alonso Menendez. Miami, March 22, 1971.)
Fidel once condemned the business community for playing up to the party ·
in power, saying they would "grind their faces in the dust" to please the
. president. Needless to say, ,v:hen Fidel himself arrived to power, he
also demanded the same obeisance.
220

rnterview with Abel Mestre.

1·
I
1·

a toast to Mikoyan's health.

and instructions.

I·

Coral Gables, June 8, 1971.
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did not dare to repeat it.

Because CMQ had no contact man within the

new government, the Mestres decided, on Fidel's recommendation, to
hire commentator Luis Conte Agilero, a close friend of Castro.

221

The

station adopted a strategy of caution; its radio editorials ceased.
Within ClVIQ, there was a division between the technicians,
many of whom were Fidelistas, and management.
problems.

CMQ also had labor

In April, the CMQ union had made certain demands.

were settled in a new contract signed in November.

These

But Augusto Mar-

,

tinez Sanchez, who bec.ame labor minister in October, encouraged the
.
· . o f negoha
. t.10ns.
re-openmg

2 2 2 Wh
. . d M artmez
e
S.l.a.nen Ab e 1 M estre v1s1te

chez' office in December, he found the minister had prepared a new
labor contract for Mestre's signature.

"I was so mad I walked out. 11223

After that CMQ's Jorge Manach prepared a speech for Abel Mestre,
·.
224
condemning the tactics of the Castro regime.

221 Conte Aguero published a number of favorable articles about
Castro in Bohemia in the 1950s. A collection of his newspaper articles
eulogizing Castro ( "Like Fidel Castro's own life, the life of a hero is a
charge of light and glory")may be found in Conte Agtiero's Heroes y
martires (Havana: Editorial Cuba, 1960). A few months hence, Conte
Aguero would shift from terrific praise to terrible denuncia. Thus the
fate of the tremendistas. ·
222

One demand was for the reimbursement of salaries lost by
those who had left CMQ to participate in Castro's rebellion.
223 Interview with Abel Mestre.

Coral Gables, June 8, 1971.

224 The speech was given by Mestre over CMQ on December 31,

1959 • .
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A campaign then began against CMQ.

The Mestres' decision

not to give Mikoyan airtime exacerbated affairs.' CMQ's Conte Aguero
began to criticize Fidel.

:rn March, 1960, Conte Aguero told ~e Lions

Club that the communists were trying to take over the revolution.

He

was attacked as a "divisionist" by his rival, commentator Jose Pardo
Llada. 225 Conte Aguero was then denounced by Fidel himself as a .
terribly vain fellow whose ''great personal frustrations had created this

Cfa 1se ) pro bl em

11 2 2 6
.
.
C onte A gli. ero
.
o f communism
an d anti-communism.

replied that only a few years before Castro had called him "the young
leader with the most prestige and intellectual capacity in r~cent republican history. 11227 Castro had the whip hand.
exile.

Conte AgUero went into

Follo:wing the aHeged discovery o{Batista investments in CMQ's

channel four, the government froze the station's bank account. 228 Abel
Mestre denounced Castro over CMQ and went into exile.

Cuba's largest

communications enterprise passed into the hands of the government. 229

225Pardo Llada and Conte Agiiero were both Ortodoxos. Both
regarded themselves as friends of Fidel, both had political ambitions.
226 Leovigildo Ruiz, Diario de una traici6n, 1960 (Miami: The
Indian Printing, 1970), p. 98.

227

Ibid., p. 99.

228

Conte Agiiero's services were rejected by the chief counterrevolutionary group in Florida, the Frente Revolucionario Democratico.
The Frente's leaders may have believed that the popular and dynamic
Conte Agliero threatened their own positions. Conte therefore formed
his own organization, the Christian Anti-Communist Front.
!
229 CMQ had about 620 employees.
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Going Broke
By the spring of 1960, 1?:u.sinessm.en, both Cuban and American,
were increasingly pessimistic.

The Wall Street Journal thought only a

small minority of businesses could survive Castro's distributionist revo-

.1

lution.; 230 Sears-Roebuck thought that, . thanks to its policy of encourag- .

.

ing local manufacturing, it would weather the storm.

,

firms were less optimistic.

I

I
I
I
I
I

·1

Most U •.S •

The U.S. oil companies complained that

i;hey were losing $7 million a month.

232

By June they were owed some

$60 million by Castro'~ govP.rnment. 233 Other Cuban agencies were
said to owe their U.S. creditors a~ additional $90 million.

234

Most successful were the middle and small-sized Cuban firms
producing cheap items for the domestic market. ·. The managers of these
businesses were delighted by the government's suppression of foreign .·
(U.S.) competition.

At Creaciones Originals SA, a wom·en's wear manu-

.
.
facturer with 123 employees, management was
content that "foreign

competition is practically non-existent ••• " and contraband clothing
eliminated. 23 5 Similar reports were made by the L6pez, Paz y Cia.

230 February 24, 1960.

I

231

231 Havana Times, March 24, 1960.

I
I

232 Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1960.

I
I

235 El Mundo, June 7, 1960.

233 Ibid., June 13, 1960.
234Ibid., October 20, 1960.
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(men's underwear), 236 El Espejo (glassware}~ 37 and Conservas SM
Darias (food products). 238 The zipper .industry was zipping along "at
a fine rate.

11239

-J ugi Fruta (fruit· juice) which opened

1959, was expanding rapidly.
by the workers.

::..n November,

Thirty percent of its shares were held

It reported that foreign competition was "disappearing. 11240

Herrero & Bulnes Brothers, which manufactured ·120, 000 pairs of shoes
annually, also announced a profit-sharing (25 percent)scheme.

An ad-

ditional 3 percent of profits was to be set aside to help finance the education of workers' children. 241
Not all small businesses were thriving.

The American Luis

Boeri opened a small automobile muffler factory in 1959. Protected by
Cuban tariffs, he planned to export to the entire Caribbean.

But he soon

found it difficult, then almost impossible, to import steel for his mufflers.

When the tY. S. Embassy closed down in January, 1961, Boeri ·

gave .up and went into exile.

242

237 Ibid •• July 2 .. 1960.

~·

239

July

a,·

I
I
.I
I
I
I
I
I

236 _
Ib"d
1_
•• June 19~ · 1960.

238 Ib"d

I
I
I
I
I
1·
I

1960.

El Mundo, July 22, 1960.

240 Ibid., July 24, 1960.
241 _1_
Ib"d •• May 13, 1960.
242 Int

.
. B oer1.
.
erview
w1"th L u1s

Miami, February 1, 1971.
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Jii 1:he spring of 1960, many firms were going broke. Among
the principal sufferers were Cuba's hotels, the heart of the tourist industry which had aspired to become Cuba's second most important sector.

U, S, and Cuban businessmen had made substantial investments in

hotels in the 1950s, thanks to Cuban government loans and a special tenyear ta~ ~~emption,
rate,

After that, taxes would be but one-half the U.S.

~tquo:r taxes were also lower. In 1958, four tower_ing ne-y, hotels

increasetj. °Ul$ f:.i:rst-ciass rooms available in Havana from 890 to 2360. 243
$Qm,~ of these new hotels never earned a penny in profit.

early 195~, the anxieties caused by Castro's rebellion had caused a substantial tj.:rqp in tourism.

Thus in 19 58, the International Hotels Cor-

poration, lessees of Cuba's Hotel Nacional~ registered a loss of
$456,468.26.

244

:(nearly 1959, :o ingratiate themselves with the new government, Havana's hoteliers readily agreed to play host to Castro's Rebel
,Army.

Julius Shepard, owner of the newly-opened {November, 1958)

nineteen-story Hotel Capri, was asked by Fidel to put up two hundred
soldiers.

The soldiers remained for several months, without any re-

imbursement by the government.

I
I

I
I
I

By

$25, 000 a month to run the hotel.

Meanwhile, it was costing Shepard
245

Castro himself lived for a time

44 -3 Wall Street Journal, February 3, 1958.

2.44 Claii:n before the FCSC. Claim CU-2521.
245

u. S.

Congress~ Claims, p. 35.
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in the Havana Hilton.

While the rebels were presumably enjoying these

accommodations, other revolutionaries were attacking the new hotels
. ...lilSO 1ent 1uxury. 11246
f or th e1r
All through 1959, Havana's hoteliers waited--in vain--for an
improvement in the tourist trade.
Havana's hotel rooms were empty.

At midsummer, 60-80 percent of
247

Some hoped that the October

convention of the American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) in Havana
might signal an upturn.

Great preparations were made.

Castro seemed

genuinely enthusiastic.

But during the convention, the counter-

,

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I I

1i

_revolutionary Pedro Diaz Lanz raided Havana and an angry Castro
launched a new diatribe against the U.S.

In December, the MRBM in-

tervened -::en hotels and motels on suspicion of their owners I connections
with Batista. 248
By the erid of 1959, most hotels were going broke.

The Hotel

Nacional showed a loss of $825, 367. 78, almost double that of 1958.

249

"The Hotel Association approached Guevara at the National Bank to seek
relief.

II

"Che told the hoteliers that the government would provide the

necessary funds. 250 But the promised aid never materialized.

246 Bohemia, March 1, 1959, p. 44.
2 4 7 Noticias, July 14, 1959.
248 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 23 5.
249 FCSC Claim CU-2521.
250u. s. Congress, · Claims, p. 33.
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hotel owners knew that failure to pay their idle staffs would bring intervention.

$100, 000. His Capri limped along until May, 1960, when it was intervened.

I
I
I

Toe hotel's new manager demonstrated his revolutionary ef-

ficiency, charg:ing Shepard thirty dollars for spending the night in his
own hotel.

251

A month later the Hotel Havana Hilton, the Nacional, St. Johns,
Rosita de Hornedo and the Cabaret Tropicana were all intervened.
haps their owners were relieved.

Per-

l!l 1960 the Hilton and the Nacional
252

were losing $50, 000-$100, 000 a month.

The minister of labor said

that the hotels were seized because . their operators had failed to encourage tourism.

He also blamed foreign campaigns of lies against the

revolution. 253 Almost immediately after the seizure, the Castro government began to lay.off workers at the Havana Hilton in order to cut costs.254
At the end of 1959, the advertising industry began to suffer both
economic loss and revolutionary attack.

Castro happened to see a tele-

vision program in which four of the five ads were for foreign products:
11

I
I

Julius Shepard of the Hotel Capri flew to Miami and borrowed

This has to be stopped, "he said.

255

Several months later, the cabinet

2 51 Ibid. I Po 34.

252 Havana Times, June 13, 1960.
253 El Mundo, June 12, 1960.
254wan Street Journal, July 14, 1960.
255 Revoluci6n, November 7, 1959.
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issued a decree banning all foreign-origin commercial advertising from
use on television orin movie theaters.

Only ads prepared in Cuba would

25
• agencies
• were accuse d o f ser10us
•
b e perm1•tt e d • B· p u bl.1c1ty

fogical, social, educational and cultural damage

"

II

to the nation.

psyc h o257

By

early 1960, a drop in the advertising revenues of the Havana Times
obliged it to retrench, becoming a bi-weekly publication.

When the

Diario de la Marina finally expired, it was losing $20, 000-$30, 000 a
month, largely because of a decline in advertising revenue.
II

258

I
I
I
I
I
·1

I

You Are the Enemy II

In the spring and summer of 1960, businesses were falling one

by one into the government's control.

Businesses were seized for the

relations of their owners with Batista, _for discharg~ng workers, for
"abandonment, "for bankruptcy, or because some government official
decided to take it.

There was no resistance to this process.

Paul

Heilman, president of the American Chamber of Commerce until May,
1959, confessed he didn't do a "damn thing" about Castro's takeover.

Would could one do? Call the police? Part of the problem lay with
Ambassador Smith· "who didn't have the slightest idea about what was

256 The New York Times, February 20, 1960.
257

Havana Times, July 18, 1960. To save money, advertisers hustling American merchandise often used U.S. -made ads in
both the electronic and printed media.
2 58 When the newspaper El Pais was shut down, it had a debt
of $500, 000. See in El Mundo, August 8, 1960.
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going on." Heilman thought Castro should have been stopped in 1958.
By 1959 it was too late.

259

In Santa Clara~ in the spring of l 960, workers at

II

,

Pepin

II

Bosch's

Hatuey Beer plant denounced their one-time friend, plant manager "Polo II
Miranda,· as the enemy, a "capitalist. " Miranda, who had fought in the
revolution of 1933 and aided Castro in 1958, once again returned to the
conspiratorial task, joining the counterrevolutionaries in Las Villas Province.

Towards summer he was spirited out of the country by the CIA.

.
d 260
Thereaf ter, t h e p 1ant was intervene •

In Santiago, the enthusiastic young entrepreneurs of the new

.flour plant, the Harinera Oriental, shelved their expansion plans upon
news that "Che" Guevara. had taken the National Bank.

When asked for

foreign exchange in or,der to import wheat, Guevara was reluctant,
granting only a part of the sum required.

Guevara began to inquire into

'

the possibility of their grinding Russian wheat.

The Harinera' s managers

replied that Russian wheat was too coarse and that its protein content
.
261
I
was inadequate.
When the Harinera s managers asked the chief of

2 59 Interview with Paul Heilman. Miami, February 25, 1971.
Heilman was a close personal friend of Batista. When Heilman left
Cuba in mid-1959, his friends and business associates called him ''chicken"
for not having sufficient courage to wait out the Castro revolution.

260

1nterv1ew
·
. . J anuary 20 , 1971 •
w1th "p o1o "M·1ran d a, M 1am1,
0

261 Russian wheat was eventually ground at the Harinera. By
1970, the mill's capacity had doubled, but after 10 years this was to be
expected under any management.
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industrial operations in Oriente what he would do if the revolution went
communist, the chief replied simply: "I am with Fi~el.

1126

Life at the Harinera became increasingly difficult.
guard one's opinions.

~
One had to

The mill's president, Carlos Portela, found he

could only speak comfortably with his wife and closest friends.

Every-

one else was suspect. When the Harinera was intervened, its managers
were driven out and the clerks took o_ver. Within three years, many of
the clerks also chose exile.

By the mid-1960s,

the factory was run by

a new generation of teclmicians, educated often in Russia or elsewhere
.
263
in the East, men whose_loyalty to Castro was absolute.
At summer's end, the revolution prepared to devour the tobacco industry. At the Menendez' H. Uppman cigar factory, the senior
Menendez was still op,timistic, telling his sons not to worry because Fidel and his associates were, after all, Cubans.

Things would work out.

The older Menendez could see no reason to intervene his factory, since
under the revised tax laws of August, 1960, the government was taking
all the profits anyway.

264

Moreover, the Menendez's were certain that

the Americans would soon be coming. If the Marines could land in Leba-

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I
I

I
.I

non in 195~. surely they would land in Cuba in 1960.

I
2 6 2 Interview with Carlos Portela and Augusto Ladesma, founders
and form er managers of the Harinera Oriental. Miami, April 9, 1971.
263 Ibid.
264 Interview with Alonso Menendez.

Miami, March 22, 1971.
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In September, the government accused the tobacco industry of
cutting back its investments and deliberately reducing purchases of raw
materials in order to force prices up.
dez's factory was taken.

On September 14, the Menen-

The intervenor, a clerk from another tobacco

firm, declared that the Menendez family--w}lo were all present at the
time--had "abandoned" their factory.

There was nothing to be done.

Men.endez's son Alonso joined the counterrevolution, was detected, and
left the country on January 1, 1961.

Even then some company officials

were still hopeful, saying that the factory really wasn't confiscated,
only intervened, and that once things straightened out it would be returned. It was like a dream.

I·
I
I
I

265

266

Technicians Leavin g
As the _old elite of entr~preneurs and managers were driven
from the country, Castro became increasingly dependent on the loyalty
of the men of second rank, and especially on the technicians., to fill their
shoes.

In 1959 and 1960,· Castro and Guevara repeatedly emphasized

the revolution's need for technical help. , After all, the whole point of
the revolution was to replace the indolent, avaricious and incompetent

I
I
I
I
I

bourgeoisie with an elite of modest, self-sacrificing technocrats.

How

else to build the new state?

l
265 Bohemia, September 2 5, 1960, pp. 59-60.
266 Interview with Alonso .Menendez.

Miami, March 22, 1971.

I
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"Che" Guevara, then minister of industries, foresaw the need
for at least 15, 000 technicians for Cuba's coming industrial revolution.267
Fidel was concerned that he could not find "adequately prepared" individuals to fill positions in the ministries.

268

A few months later Gue-

vara observed that "we lack technicians in virtually every branch of
industry. " He noted that techniciar..s from variou's Latin American nations were being contracted as a stop-gap measure.

269

Towards the

summer, technicians from the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia were
invited to Cuba.

Thes~ foreigners were needed because more and more

270
of Cuba's own technicians and professional men were leaving for Miami.
As Castro's one-time friend, Bohemia editor Angel Quevedo, observed:
"the best of the country is going into exile. ·112 7 1
Some American firms invited ·their Cuban managers and technicians to come to the U.S.
couraged this.
technicians.

272

The U.S. Department of State quietly en-

The revolution attempted to bar the departure of

Students in technical fields at the University of Havana

267 El Mundo, January 2, 1960.
268 Havana Times~ December 19, 1959.
269R ~

UlZ,

Traici6n, 1960, p. 66.

270

Paradoxically, Castro's nationalist revolution increased
Cuba's need for foreign technicians. The revolutionaries viewed this
as a temporary expedient, prior to the training of their own generation
· of technicians.
271 Bohemia Libre (Miami), October 9, 1960, p. 105.
272 Interview with Dr. Arnoldo Odio.

Miami, April 6, 19'll.
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were forbidden to leave.

By the summer of 1960, Havana students

were being offered scholarships for technical training in Poland.

273

Attempts were also made to apply psychological pressure on
technicians and professional men.

In November, 1960, the government

organized a torchlight conclave of professiol)als and technical men at
the University of Havana.

Those present took an oath declaring that

technicians and professional men
••• have an historic responsibility to place their knowledge at the service of the nation •.•. for the first time it
is now possible for technicians and professionals to lend
their services with both dignity and great effectiveness
•••• abandonment of the ranks in this moment of struggle
for shameful personal interest, or to participate in imperialism's aggressions against Cuba, constitutes a vileness, a desertion .and a treason to the country that can
never be forgiven~ 274
The swearing-in made good theater, but it failed in its goal.
Technicians continued to leave Cuba.

Castro began to denounce them.

i

Under the old system, said Fidel,· technicians and professional men had
hecome exploiters. 275 Those foolish men dreamed "that someday they
too would enjoy great social privileges!

11

They were leaving, Fidel

273 Interview with Carlos Martinez. Coral Gables, February 6,
1971. Following the shut-down of Moa Bay, he went to the University
of Havana to continue his technical training.
2 74 Obra Revolucionaria, November 9, 1960, pp. 6-7.
275El Mundo, April 6, 1961. In 1970, Fidel allegedly sent
his friend, Chilean President Allende, some advice based on the Cuban
experience. The second of Fidel's five points was "don't let your
Chilean copper industry technicians get out of the country. 11 See in
Time, October 19, 1970, p. 3 O.
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declared, because the revolution had denied them that dream.

·1

276

Castro warned that Cuban doctors, engineers and technicians who fled
to the United States would lose their citizenship and could never return
.
277
·
to Cuba.
But neither soft words nor threats were effective.
greatest persuader was Castro I s own revolution.

h
T e

Many technicians and

professionals simply did not like it." By mid-1961, close to one-half of
Cuba's technical personnel had chosen exile.

278

Urban Reform Law
S~ultaneous with the sweeping laws of October 1, 1960, which
nationalized almost all remaining medium and large-sized private enterprises, the revolutionary government launched its urban reform
law.

279

·

.

It made the government the nation's landlord and every renter

an owner.

It was :;mother of Castro's brilliant political strokes.

I
I
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·I

The

upper bourgeoisie might be destroyed, the middle alienated, but by such
devices as the urban reform he would maintain the loyalty of the proletariat and the petite bourgeoisie.

276 El Mundo, April 11, 1961.
277 The New York Times, September 7, 1961.
278 O'Connor, Or i gins, p. 260.
279

I

The revolutionary go~ernment promised on August 24, 1959,
(See in Revoluci6n) that there would be no reforma urbana, But then
Castro also guaranteed in October, 1960, that his program of interventions was over, and it was not. {See in Bohemia, October 23, 1960, p. 46)
Interventions continued periodically till 1968 when all small commercial
establishments, down to barber shops, were intervened.
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The urban reform ruled that rents would be paid to the state
and that over a period ranging, as appropriate, from , five to twenty years,
renters would automatically become owners. All eviction suits were
shelved, all mortgages cancelled, all rental contracts null and void.
Landlords would be reimbursed, receiving up to a maximum payment
.
280
<Jf $600 a month from the state.
The rationale for the urban reform was said to be Cuba's housing crisis.

There was no inexpensive housing.

Investments in housing

~ere based on profit, '.'with a total disregard for the social functions of
property. "
world.

281

11282

Cuban rents were said to be "among the highest in the

Some workers were said to be paying one-fourth to one-

.
· third of their income in rent,
a thing "unheard of in"industrial society.

This should be reduced to one-tenth. Private speculators were responsible for slums and urban decay.

Against this, the government promised

a "suitable abode" for every Cuban family.
The urban reform was a tremendous blow to a bourgeoisie
dependent on rents.

About 39, 000 former owners began to receive checks

280

I
I
I
I
I

Previous to th~ urban reform, landlords had to go to court
to secure evictions of non-paying tenants. Under the reform, the government extracted the overdue amount from the renters I wages. See in
El Mundo, February 26, 1961.
281 The Urban Reform Law.
phlet, p. 11.

Undated Cuban government pam-

282 Ibid., p. 3. Middle-class exiles interviewed by the writer
thought housing both availablE: and reasonable. But for Cuba's poor, t..l-ie
· situation was difficult.
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for the amortization of their properties.

Another 49, 300 who had al-

ready received the full value of their property were entitled to lifetime
pensions not to exceed $2 50 a month.
was being destroyed, but gently.

283

The bourgeois renter class

The slow ruin of one such rentier J

his aimless despair and dreams of a luxurious past are brilliantly por-

.

trayed in Edmundo Desnoes' novel, Inconsolable Memories.

284

Such bourgeois pleasures as vacation houses were also eliminated.

The dentist Arnoldo Odio found a note on the door of his beach

house: "This house is confiscated.

11285

The Havana apartment of the

American Jack Moss, who had left Cuba some months before, was
. sealed by the Urban Reform Department in December.
1961, Moss' furniture ha.cl been disposed of and

a

By February,

286
new tenant installect.

The Cuban Senator Tarafa had earlier rented his mansion to the Chilean
Embassy.

287

Indeed, there was a regular avalanche of ~equests by

wealthy Cubans to have some diplomatic personage, no matter how modest his rank or position, occupy their big houses.

One U.S. Embassy

code clerk lived for a time in a twenty-room mansion with three cars
and ample servants.
283 Ib'd
_l_•

I

288

P• 7 •

284 (New York: New American Library, 1967.)
285 rnterview with Dr. Arnoldo Odio.

Miami, April 6, 1971.

286 FCSC Claim CU-0225.
287 Interview with Julio Tarafa.
ber 29, 1971.

Southamp~on, N. Y •• Novem-

288 Interview with Wayne Smith, Foreign Service Officer at U.S.
Embassy, Havana, 1959-1961. Washington, September 30, 1970.
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El Encanto Falls
Another main prop of the Cuban bourgeoisie which fell before

I
I

the Castroites in late 1960 was the department stores.

I
I

were organized for the first time; their markets were disappearing.

·I
I

I·
I
I
I

ready suffered considerably under the revolution.

·1

Their ability to im-

port was at first curtailed, then virtually eliminated.

Their workers

By the middle of 1960, department stores were finding their greatest
market in items selling for $2 or less.

No one wanted the more ex-

pensive goods traditionally favored by the bourgeoisie. 289 Workers in
the department stores wanted to share both profits and administrative
authority.
When the governmen_t intervened the department stores on
October 14, 1960, . the girls at El Encanto flourished signs approving
this step.

A black housewife, Sra. Prudencia Segundo, told an inquir-

ing photographer that "it's really exciting to think that for the first time
. shops belong
. equal1y to a 11 c 1asses. 11290
these elegant
A few weeks later, the counterrevolutionaries bP.gan to attack
the department stores.

I
I
I
I

They had al-

The bourgeoisie was destroying its own cita-

dels, demonstrating a kind of compulsive urge to self-destruction. On

289 The New York Times, August 30, 1960. A great deal of
, jewelry was bought at this time as a hedge against devaluation or confiscation of cash.
29 0 El Mundo, October 19, 1960.
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December 28, a bomb went off at Flogar.

On New Year's Eve, La

Epoca was almost completely destroyed by fire.

In April, the most

famous emporium of all, El Encanto, was burned do·wn by a young man
.
1·1ve p h osph orous. 291
usmg

Cubans used to say that "if El Encanto goes down, the country
goes down.

11

292

Now it was down.

Months before, following the great

October wave of nationalizations, Castro had proudly announced that
the first chapter of the revolution was complete.

"In twenty months

the revolutionary government has fulfilled and, in many cases, sur11

passed, the program promised at Moncada.

293

The communist leader

2 4
. Blas Roca declared Cuba was free at last from foreign domination. ~
Bohemia said the nationalization of private enterprise was designed to
eliminate a chief source of finance for counterrevolution.

295

Presi-

dent Dortic6s ·thought nationalization would permit "the increase and
p:r;-ogre~sive rationalization of production. "

2 96

order, the bourgeois order, was destroyed.

By April, 1961, the old

Emeterio Padr6n, the

president of the National Association of Industrialif:!ts, remained in

291

El Mundo, April 14, 1961.
was caught and executed.
292

Interview with Lilly Vila.

The saboteur, Carlos Galvez,

Coral Gables, January 24, 1971.

293 El Mundo, October 15, 1960.
294Ibid., October 27, 1960.
295 Bohemia, October 23, 1960, p. 48.
296 El Mundo, October 14, 1960.
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Cuba until December, 1961.

Then, carrying the books and flag of the

association, he sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy.

297

297 When Padr6n went into exile, about 120 of ANIC's 600 mem. bers remained in Cuba. Padr6n complained that the revolution was
most cruel to those who had the greatest confidence in it. Thus, the
smaller~ mor<=; nationalist-minded Cuban busines~men, believing Fidel's promise to leave them alone, continued to invest almost to the
day of their nationalization. The big interests, with more liquid assets, had long since left for Miami and Palm Beach.

-l
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Bac kground
The war of independence, which destroyed much of _the Cuban
economy, destroyed many banks as well.

By the end of the colonial

era, the major banks were the Banco Espanol and the Banco de Comercio.

Among the smaller remaining banking houses were Gelats y Cia~,

Pedroso y Cia. ,Zaldo, Upmann, Sim6n and Cortes. 1
In the wake of independence, the banking sector grew rapidly,
its growth paralleling that of the sugar industry.

During this era, some

of the great U.S. and Canadian banking houses established branches in
Cuba.

The Royal Bank of Canada arrived in 1899, the Bank of Nova

Scotia in 1902.

For a time, American banks were forbidden by law to

establish branches overseas.

But U.S. manufacturers were insistent

on the need for U.S. ,branch banks to promote foreign trade.

In 1915,

Frank A. Vanderlip, president of the National City Bank, succeeded in
getting the Congress to pass a Federal Reserve Act approving foreign
·branches.

That same year, the National City Bank established its first

branch in Havana, buying out the Banco de la Havana.

In the boom year

of 1919, Vanderlip opened a record of twenty-two branches in Cuba.

2

The First National Bank of Boston, sometimes called the "United Fruit

1 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 31.
2 Robert Mayer, "The Origins of the American Banking Empire
in Latin America, " Journal of Interamerican Studies (February, 1973 ),
pp. 60-61, 70.

.. ... . ·. .·. .
. ..

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

329

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I~
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

Bank" because of the close alliance between the two, arrived in 1923; the
Chase National Bank in 1925. 3
When sugar prices skyrocketed after World War I, the banks
poured an enormous volum.e of capital into the sugar sector to finance
new sugar mills and plantations.

Since there were no banking regula-

tions. the more ambitious banks became seriously, perhaps recklessly,
overextended.
was optimistic.

Everything was based on sugar optimism and everyone
A report by the National City Bank in 1919 on the sugar

s'ituation concluded that "enlarged demands upon Cuba will continue
.
4
indefinitely:•
The City Bank's "indefinitely" lasted only a year.
to world overproduction, sugar prices collapsed.

In 1920, thanks

When a run on the

banks began, the American banks called on their home offices; emergency funds were flown over from Miami.

The smaller Cuban banks,

lacking such support, were forced to the wall.

Rather than cooperate

defensively, some Cuban bankers hoped for the destruction of their

3 Interview with Luis A. Vianello y Garcfa, a supervisor of the
Royal Bank of Canada and p,resident of the Havana Clearing House. Coral
Gables, June 1, 1971. See also, Cuban Economic Research Project, A
Study, p. 234.

4 Robert F. Smith, What Happened in Cuba? (New York: Twayne
Publishers, 1963 ), p. 150. By 192 0, the National City Bank had loaned
$42 million to sugar interests in Cuba. See in Pino-Santos, El asalto,
p. 108.
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.
5
.
competitors.
Nor did the Zayas government take any vigorous steps to

rescue the situation.

No less than eighteen Cuban banks failed. leaving

a debt of some $130 million. 6 Deposits in Cuban bank's foll from $352
million in 1920 to $24. 8. million in 1921, while deposits in foreign banks
dropped from $88 to $55 million--stabilized--and then recovered rapidly.
Foreign banks had 20 percent of the nation's deposits in 1920.

By 1923

they held 76 percent. 7 The American and Canadian banks came willynilly to dominate the banking sector, with the National City Bank leading
~e pack.

This began the era· in which the City Bank. in the words of one

sugar planter. "cort6 muchas cabezas.

118

Loans to the sugar sector were traditionally based on mortgages
on the sugar mills.

When sugar prices declined to unprofitable levels.

the mill owners were unable to repay their loans and the banks foreclosed.
By 1923-1924 the City Bank had acquired ten Cuban sugar mills and had to
form a separate firm, the General Sugar Company. to administer them.
By 1925, the City Bank was estimated to control, directly or indirectly,

I
I
I
I
I
I

I·
I
I
I
I
I

5 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 230. This inability to . cooperate is
one of the .saddest--and most salient--features of the Cuban bourgeoisie.
Even in the security of Miami exile, the Cuban bourgeoisie finds itself incapable of agreeing about anything.

6

.
Ibid., p. 245.

7 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 232.
8 "cut off many heads, "that is, destroyed many burgueses. Interview with the hacendado Marcos Zarraga. Coral Gables, February 24.
1971. Some interviewees condemned the City Bank. Others did not, seeing it me.rely playing by the rules of the game.
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thirty-two sugar mills, or about one-quarter of Cuba's total sugar
production. 9
The crash of 1920 was a disaster for some, but a blessing for
others.

With the collapse of the Banco Nacional (a private bank), the

owner a;nd neighbors of the Santa Lucia sugar mill had nowhere to put
their money.

They asked Carlos Nunez to guard it in a trunk.

became the mills banker, loaning them money. and eventually created his
own Banco Nunez.

·,.
I
I

By the 1950s, Nunez, a sugar worker with a salary of

eighty cents per day in 1901, had become a

multimillionaire. lO

American dominance of the banking sector precipitated a naiionalist attack that endured unabated into the 1940s.
banks had no desire to hold the Cuban mills~
could not make a profit either.

Ironically. the Amer:ican

With low world prices, they

Many mills were closed down.

thirty-five of the mills that had ground in 1920 were inactive.

In 1925,
Other mills

were sold off to their former Cuban owners at bargain prices.
A number of prominent burgueses became closely related to the
U.S. banks.

In 1920, Porfirio Franca was a director of the National

City Bank. 11 President Gustavo Machado was a close ally of the Chase
National Bank.

I
I

He soon

Chase came to Cuba under Machado's presidency in 1925

9 Pino-Santos, El asalto, pp. 109; 122.
10 Diario Las Americas, June 9, 1974.
11 Jenks, Our Cuban Colony, p. 244.
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and ingratiated itself by making controversial public works loans to his
government.

By 1931, Chase had extended $131, 000 in personal loans

to Presiden~ Machado.
public relations agent.

His son-in-law, Jose Obreg6n, was Chase's
12

The Cuban bourgeoisie--and especially the hacendados--resisted
foreclosure by the American banks with a series of moratoriums.

When

the bourgeoisie 1 s back was to the wall, it could organize to resist American pressure.
it was too late.

President Menocal invoked a moratorium in late 1920, but
Other moratoriums were more successful.

President

Machado "suspended" interest and mortgage payments for all Cuban companies in 1933.

In 1934, the Mendieta government extended Machado's

moratorium to 1942 in order to forestall "a~ auction sale, under cata-

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1·

.
. ,113
strophic conditions, of a large share of Cuban property.
Mendieta

I

also declared a moratorium on interest payments on the foreign debt.

·1

Most important was the moratorium of 1940, which the hacendados literally forced on the Constituent Assembly. despite the vociferous complaints
of the Cuban and American banks.

The moratorium of 1940 saved many

Cuban sugar mills till they could recover, thanks to the general sugar
prosperity that began with the onset of World War II.
The Cuban banking sector grew substantially in the 1940s.

12
13

New

Smith, What Happened in Cuba?, pp. 179-180.

Henry C. Wallich, Monetary Problems of an Export Economy:
The Cuban Experience (Cam~ridge: Harvard University Pre:ss, 1950),
p. 106.
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Cuban banks appeared, their staffs trained at the foreign banks, a nice
example of the classical teaching role of f~reign capital.

14

The pro-

fessional competence of this new generation of Cuban bankers won public
respect.

By the end of the decade, they had drawn abreast of the Ameri-

can banks in total deposits.

15

Cuba's private banks were given a further

powerful boost by the creation, in 1950, of the Banco Nacional.

The Banco N acional
The crac

bancario (bank crash) of 1920 demonstrated--at least

to some e~lightened citizens--the need for a central or national bank to
stimulate the recuperation of Cuban banks and to regulate and def end the
banking industry.

Vario\1.S plans for a national bank were introduced in

the 1920s and 1930s but without success.

Some recalled that the Banco

E~panol, Cuba Is national bank of the col(?nial era. had ruined many when.
in 1898, its bills declined to 7 percent of face value. 16
United States and foreign banks were opposed to the creation of
a national bank, fearing it would interfere in their operations.

A national

14

For example, the original staff of Agustin Batista's Tru5t Company of Cuba had been trained by long service at the Royal Bank of Canada.

I
I
I
I
I

15

American banks did not necessarily benefit from the difficulties
of the Cuban economy. Some Arrn~rican banks operating in Cuba are reputed not to have turned a profit for the entire 192 0-1950 period. See in
Wallich, Monetary Problems. p. 165.
l6 Charles P. Le6n, "The National Bank of Cuba: A Study in Institutional Change" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Department of
Economics. New York University, 1964). p. 123.
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bank would also permit Cuban banks, which

after 192 0 kept large re-

serves, to loan more, thus creating more competition.

The Foreign

Policy Association's investigators of 1935 concluded that a central bank
"would not only be costly but would probably endanger or destroy the
whole monetary system.
view in 1942.

,,17

Both were concerned with Cuba's past record of graft and

administrative inefficiency.
future.

Ambassador S.pruille Braden echoed this

But there were also those who looked to the

In that same year, an American technical mission, invited down

by the Cubans, recommended the establishment of a central bank as well
as an independent monetary system.

18

Meanwhile, influential burgueses were pressing vigorously for a
national bank.

19

Among them were the lawyer and politician Joaquin

Martinez Saenz and the young economist Felipe Pazos, both eventually

,
presidents of the National Bank.

Martinez Saenz thought his father's

small rural bank, which went bankrupt in 1920, might have survived if
it had been backed up by a national bank. 20 He made the creation of a

17 Foreign Policy Association, Problems, p. 341. Eduardo
Suarez Riyas, the Autentico politician, thought the Foreign Policy Association's report was instrumental in delaying the formation of Cuba's national bank. See in Suarez Rivas, Un pueblo crucificado, p. 99.
18 Le6n, "The National Bank of Cuba, "p. 126.

l9 See.,for example, Jose Alvarez D1az, Cuba geopolitica y pensamiento econ6mico (Miami, 1964), p. 321.
20 Joaquin Martfnez Saenz, Por la independencia econ6mica (La
Habana: Editorial Cenit, 1959), p. 49.
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national bank a major objective of the middle class ABC party which he
founded in 1931 to help defeat President Machado.

He urged the creation

of a national bank in the ABC Program of 1938-1939.
new constitution called for_a national bank.

In 1940, Cuba's

The following year. Felipe

Pazos raised the idea in his El problema·monetario de Cuba, which attacked the

u·. S.

Foreign Policy Association's negative view. 21

Cuba's postwar sugar prosperity increased the need for a national
bank.

By the late 1940s, the idea was receiving wide support.

The chief

of the hacendados, Jose Manuel Casanova, thought a national bank would
facilitate Cuba's economic diversi.f ication and was as necessary "as the
flag and the anthem. 1122 By the fall of 1948, the Autentico leader, Senator Antonio Varona, was· already envisioning co:r;npanions to the Banco
Nacional, satellite banks to finance agricultural and industrial development. 23
The law creating the National Bank was signed by President Prio
in December, 1948. It was based in good part on a bill presented to the

Senate in 1944 by Martinez Saenz. 24 The Bank opened its doors in April,

21 Byron White, "Cuba and Puerto Rico: A Case Study in Comparative Economic Development Policy" (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation,
Department of Economics, University of Texas, 1959), p. 27.
22 Revista nacional de ciencias polftico-econ6mico-sociales,
November, 1948. p. 11.
23 Hispanic American Report. November, 1948, p. 29.
24 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 463.
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1950, with Felipe Pazos as its first president.

It was a happy example

of an idea whose time had come, a demonstration that reform and improvement were not impossible 1ri the old Cuba.
The Bank proceeded to function in an efficient and honorable
manner.

It assembled, under Julian Alienes, the first capable and

serious staff of economists in Cuban history making, for example, the
first estimate of Cuban national income. 25 The Bank had real an.d independent power, forcing some banks to reform, others to close down
'entirely. 2 6 Five satellite banks were created to spur the national economy. 27 These institutions were financed by selling bonds to the public.
This was another first in Cuba: an effort to mobilize idle capital.
monies were heretofore the despair of Cuban ec.onomists.

These

Several hun-

dred millions were estimated to be idling in safe-deposit boxes.

Indeed,

for a time, the banks were so choked with capital that they refused to ·pay
interest on savings deposits; some even charged depositors for the service.
When Felipe Pazos quit as bank president in 1952, following Ba- ·
tista's coup, Mart:fnez Saenz, then an advisor to the Banco :Nacional, was
approached by a committee of commercial bankers who urged him to take

2 5 Le6n, "The National Bank of Cuba, "p. 162.
26 Ibid.
27

I

P• 6.

The satellite banks were: Banco de Fomento Agrfoola e Industrial de Cuba (BANFAIC-1950), Financiera Nacional (1953), Fondos
de Hipotecas Aseguradas, Banco Cubano del ·comercio Exterior {BANCEC1954), Banco de Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social (BANDES-1955).
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the post.

He was reluctant because he was doing satisfactorily as a

lawyer for the National City Bank.

But the bankers were concerned

that the Banco Nacional might fall into unscrupulous hands.

They in-

sisted and Saenz gave in.
Martfuez Saenz typified in many ways the ambiguities of the
Cuban bourgeoisie.

In the late 192 Os, following his graduation from

Havana Law School, he became a lawyer for the General Sugar Company, a branch of the National City Bank which managed Cuban sugar
· 28
estates that had defaulted in 1920.
He quit this job to found the antiMachado ABC party, a middle-class nationalist organization.

Mar-

t:inez Saenz participated in the mediation efforts of U.S. Ambassador
Sumner Welles.

The day Machado fell, a jubilant Mart:!nez Saenz ap-

peared on the balcony of the American Embassy waving the ABC flag. 29
Thereafter he served, ::i.t age thirty-three, as minister of the treasury
for the short-lived Cespedes government.

Martinez Saenz was hounded

into exile under Grau in late 1933, then returned as finance minister for ·
Mendieta in 1934. In 1943, he was agriculture minister for Batista, his
enemy of 1933 and a man whose regime he would denounce in 1959.

30

..

Martinez Saenz accepted the presidency of the Banco Nacional

I
I
I
I
I

on Batista's promise that the Bank's independence would be respected.

28 Martinez Saenz, Por la independencia, p. 46.
29 Thomas, Cuba, p. 624.
30 Mart:!nez Saenz, Por la independencia, p. 32.
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His performance there is controversial.

,

tinez Saenz put in a brilliant seven years.

To most businessmen, · MarHis creation of the satellite

banks (only BANFAIC was created by Pazos) and his liberalization of
credit spurred the economic boom of the 1950s.

Some thought him a

fiscal revolutionary. seeing Pazos' reign. by way of contrast, as quite
conservative.

31

But Martinez Saenz, while successfully guarding the

National Bank and the BANFAIC, permitted the BANDES--without public
protest--to be turned into a private instrument for the enrichment of
the Batistianos.

32

The revolutionaries of 1959 would call Martinez

Saenz the "financial wizard of the dictatorship. 1133 Believing he had
acted honorably, Martfuez Saenz remained behind when Batista fled.
He was arrested by the Banco Nacional's own M-26 militia men on
January 1, 1959.
The Fideli~tas thought Martfnez Saenz I s failure to protest the
milk~g of BANDES was related to the $400, 000 _in cash found in his

31

Interview witl~ former Cuban correspondent for The New York
T imes, Ruby Hart Phillips . Miami, June 6, 197 1. Interview with
Salvado r Sotomayor, · Cuban mining engineer. Coral Gables, June 27,
1971.
32 Charles P. Le6n concluded, on the basis of interviews with
bankers in Cuba in 1960, that the National Bank and BANFAIC had enjoyed true independenc e during Martinez Saenz 's rule. See Le6n, "The
11
Nat ional Bank of Cuba , p. 239.
33 Bohemia, May 24, 1959, p. 84.
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safe-deposit box in early 195~.

34

But the Castro government's charges

,
against Martinez Saenz could not be proved and he was released from
prison in poor health in 1963.
to Ruby Hart Phillips.

In exile, he showed his personal books

She thought they demonstrated his honesty.

35

,
In his prison cell in 1959, Martin.ez Saenz composed a vigorous
self-defense: For the Economic Independence of Cuba.

He saw his life

as that of a "hero and martyr, " arguing that, under his stewardship, the
National Bank had opened the road to Cuba's structural transformation
and hence to her economic and eventual political independence. 36 As for
Batista, Martinez Saenz added lamely that he was not "correctly informed" about what wa~ going on! 3 7

Labor and the Banks

In 1959, Cuba',s bank workers (bancarios), like the electric and
telephone workers, were members of the labor aristocracy.

The

34

Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 253. Martinez Saenz's holdings in
1959 included a home wo.rth $100, 000, an apartment, a beach house, two
country houses, $25, 000 in a Palm Beach bank, an $80, 000 holding in the
Companfa Jorva, in which Batista also had an important interest, and a
part ownership of a ranch. Propertie3 of this magnitude do not seem out
of order for a man of his position. Only the $400, 000 in cash raised eyebrows. (See Bohemia, December 13, 1959, p. 74.)
35 Interview with Ruby Phillips. Miami, June 6, 1971.
Saenz died in April, 197 4.

,

Martinez

36 Martinez Saenz, Por la independencia, p. 6.
37 Ibid •• p. 10. Martfuez Saenz's successor in the Treasury also
claimed ignorance about affairs within the government. Rufo L6pezFresquet wrote from exile that he was so busy in the first nine months of
his ministry that he hadn't noticed the leftward drift of the Castro government. (L6pez-Fresquet, My 14 Months, p. 131.)
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bancarios, though numbering no more than 5, 500 nationwide, were rich,
well-organized and powerful.

38

They enjoyed good wages and working

conditions, a dependable retirement system, and their own elegant Club
.
.
•
39
Bancario by the sea at Santa Maria del Mar.
The bancarios had not always enjoy_ed such comfortable circumstances.

In the 1930s when the syndicate was first organized, wages

averaged no more than twenty-five or thirty dollars per month.
power of the patr6n was absolute.
sion to get married.

40

The

One had to have the bank's permis-

The workday was as long as management re-

quired, while the workweek extended into Saturday afternoon.

Most of

the banks then were American; most of their clients were rich.
In 1933, the bank workers tried unsuccessfully to organize a
union.

The troublemakers were fired.· But events rnoved, if slowly, in

their favor.

In 1938, the banks grudgingly agreed to e;ontribute to a

retirement plan.

Unionization, however, was still barred.

To outflank

this ban, in 1942 bank workers founded the Club Bancario Nacional,

38

Letter from Alberto Guernica, formerly of the Royal Bank of
Canada, a leader of the ba11:carios and president of the Club Bancario.
Hialeah, Florida, June 20, 197 2 . There were 3, 800 bancarios in Havana.
39

The book value of the Club Bancario in 1959 was $1. 2 million.
The club was located adjacent to similar clubs for other "professionals"- in this case the Contadores Publicos and the Medicos. Interview with
Alberto Guernica. Hialeah, February 4, 1971.
4 oInterview with Francisco Garcia Garbalena, former employee
of the Royal Bank of Canada. Miami, January 18, 1971.
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ostensibly for social purposes.

The banks were unhappy about this,

'
correctly fearing the club would be the source of future syndical activity~
In 1943, the bancarios , encouraged by the constitution of 1940

which specifically permitted unionization, demanded to be recognized.
The bancarios were aided by the commuuist Lazaro Peria, chief of
Cuba's principal labor confederation, the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores
Cubanos (CTC), as well as by Angel Cofi.no of the stoutly anti-communist
electrical workers.

The banks, pointing at Pena, charged "communism!"

The fight was carried to the Labor Ministry and the workers carried the
day.

There remained the question of organization.

Pena wanted a na-

tional syndicate controlled by one man, but the democrats won out, organizing as a federation· after the electrico model.

Pefia had also in-

sisted on the title "trabajadores" (workers) for the bancarios.

But the

majority preferred "empleados" (employees), signifying their proud
white collar status.

Thereafter_, the bancarios won improved conditions

. including a forty-hour week, a regular promotion and seniority system,.
41
. .
.
a munmum
wage sch e du 1e an d a wage mcrease.
In 1947, there began within the Federaci?n Bancario that drama

which ended in 1960 with its destruction.

I
I
I
I
1·

In that year, President Grau,

encouraged by the U. S. , decided to break the communist leadership of

4 l Most of the data on the growth of the bancarios is from interviews with Alberto Guernica on February 4, February 11; April 22, 1971.
Lazaro Pena was elected chief of a revived CTC in 1973. He died in
i974.
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the labor movement.

The GTC leader Lazaro Pena and his communist

associates were shunted aside.

One of Pena's associates was the young

and ambitious Jose Marfa de la '.Aguilera, an organizer of the banking
syndicat~ within the Chase Manhattan Bank.

42

In 1954, Aguilera was back with Cr:ase Manhattan.

His criticism .

of the older syndical leaders made him a darling of the youth sector.
Aguilera was then closely associated with Reinol Gonzalez, chief of the
bancario syndicate at the Banco Continental, and Jose Planas.

Both were

leaders of the Catholic. youth organization Juventud Obrera Cat6lica (JOC).
In 1955, these young workers elected Aguilera chief of the bancarios for

Havana Province.

As chief, he demanded a 20. percent wage increase. 43

And, in view of strong bank profits (an estimated $10 million a year
from 1952-1955), the bancarios wanted to introduce ·profit sharing.

These

demands were made against the will of the then secretary-general of ail
the bancarios, Carlos Manuel Brito, a founder of the federation.

Defy-

ing Brito, Aguilera called for a general stri.Ke of the bancarios in 1955.

42 Aguilera's political career is a classic model of opportunistic
behavior. He shifted as the times demanded from communist to Autentico
to Ortodoxo to Pelayista (followers of Senator Pelayo Cuervo), thence a
Catholic worker, and, in the late 1950s, to a Fidelista. By 1960 he was
socialist; thereafter, a communist. Full circle~ For men like Aguilera,
the strivers of the pequena-burguesia, there was but one guiding principle: onward to fame and power, and the devil take the hindmost.
43 In Havana Province in 1955, 1, 300 bank workers made (per
month) less than $200; 700 less than $140; 240 more than $300. (Bohemia, July 31, 1955, p. 50.) Though modest by American standards,
these wages were a quantum increase over those of 1930.
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Aguilera was aided in this strike by the leaders of the electrical and
· telephone syndicates, Cofifio and Rubiera, who were also interested in
removing CTC chief Eusebio Mu'jal.

Cofifl'.o apparently had hopes of re-

turning to the CTC leadership which he held from 1947-1949.

Cofifio

was a close friend of R.ubiera, the two having formed the Comision
Obrera Nacional Independiente (CON!) (Commission of Independent
Workers), which aided Prio in displacing the communists in 1947·.

44

Bankers and the Rebellion
After a month, the bancarios' strike fund ran out ·and the strike
collapsed.

Its leaders went into hiding.

Sixty-five strikers were fired

· and the bancario local intervened by CTC chief Mujal.

45

The ousted

bancarios, Aguilera and his associates, Od6n Alvarez de la Campa,
Jesus Planas, and R.einol Gonzalez, joined Castro's rebellion.

The

bancarios' internal power struggle would, in the future, .be viewed as
a revolutionary strike against the Batista regime.
Od6n Alvarez became a leader of Castro·•s underground.

In

September, 1957, Alvarez's hands were mangled when a bomb he was
preparing along with Aldo Vera, another rebellious bancario, exploded

I
I
I
I
I

prematurely.

46

Nonetheless, Alvarez continued in the fight.

Cofino

44 Garcfa Montes, Historia, p. 382.
45 Revoluci6n, July 26, 1959.
'

46 Ibid., February 2 5, 1959.

. .., .
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made only a half-hearted effort from exile; Rubiera lapsed into cooperation with the Batista regime.

The failure of Cofino and Rubiera

to aid Castro would, in 1959, be used aga1nst them.
The Aguilera group used their bancario friends to sell victory
bonds for Castro and to pass out the revolutionary newspaper Sierra
Maestre.

47

At one branch of the Royal Bank, the bank guard, a former

Batista police officer, merely turned his head to evidences of the
bancarios Castroite activity.

48

Most of the bank workers, disliking

the dictatorial nature _o f the Batista regime, favored Fidel.

49

When it

became evident in 1958 that Castro might win, a number of bankers contributed substantial sums to Castro's treasury.
The largest contributor to Castro's rebellion was Julian de
Zulueta y Besson's Banco Continental which, in the late 1950s, was
engaged in a neck~and-neck race with Agustin Batista's Trust Company
of Cuba for the position of number one bank in Cuba.

50

The Banco Con-

tinental's astonishing growth reflected the impressive expansion of the
Cuban banking sector in the 1950s.

By 1951, the total deposits in Cuban

banks began to edge ahead of the Americans.

By 1958, Cuban banks had

47 The victory bonds, about the size of a dollar bill, came in
denominations ranging from $1 - 100.
48 Interview with Alberto Guernica.

Hialeah, April 22, 1971.

49 Ibid.
5 o In early 1960, the Trust Company had assets of $22 5 million.
See in Wall Street Journal, August 9, 1960.
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captured 60 percent of the isl_and's total deposits of $1 billion.

The

National Bank encouraged Cuba's commercial banks to liberalize terms,
set up provincial branches, make loans to non-traditional sectors and
purchase and sell the bonds of the government development agencies.

52

The banking sector suffered only minor inconvenience during
Castro's rebellion.

The bankers. adhering to the bourgeois policy of

humoring the government in power, hastened to offer their sympathies
to Batista after the attack on the Presidential Palace in March. 1957.
In June, a bomb went off at the Havana offices of the First National

Bank of Boston, doing considerable damage.

53

only bank bombing of the revolution, however.

This was apparently the
In August. 19 57, when

a national strike threatened to develop following_the shooting of the rebel
Frank Pais, the president of the Bankers' Association, Jose Ignacio de
la Camara. urged respect for law and order. 54 In April, 1958, the
Fidelistas attempted to provoke a run on the banking sector and especially to punish banks, like the Godoy-Sayan Bank, which had close relations with Batista.

The underground leader Faustino Perez estimated

that $125 million had been withdrawn.

55

The New York Times thought

I
I

51 Le~n. "Toe National Bank, " p. 198.

1·

54

52 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Stud;, p. 467.
53 The New York Times, August 6, 1957.
El Mundo, March 13, 1957.

55 Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 2 57.
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the figure closer to $25 million. 56 Many of the withdrawals reflected
not so much sympathy with Castro as fear, stimulated by rumor, that
the government might ~eize certain bank·funds.

In any case, the Banco

Nacional stepped into the breach--as it was designed to do--and no banks
collapsed.

Ind~ed, total deposits in Cuban and foreign banks increased

by over $120 million in 1958.

57

Castro in Power
On January 1, 1959, the president of the Bankers' Association
fled into exile. 58 Martinez Saenz, the president of the Banco Nacional,
was arrested by militia men.

Julian Zulueta of the Banco Continental

put on an M-26 militia uniform and made a fiery_speech in favor of the
revolution.

In mid-January, the entire banking establishment, led by

·the new president of the Bankers' Association, Vfotor Pedroso, offered
Treasu_ry Minister Rufo L6pez-F_resquet their "most ample support" for
the revolution.

59

The banking sector was clearly nervous.

The week

before, the National Bank had infringed one of the bank's most sacred

56

The New York Times, April 8, 1958.

57 Le6n,

11

The National Bank, '' p. 198.

58 Jose Ignacio de la Camara had studied at the Packard Business
School and Fordham University. He was an official of the Trust Company
of Cuba.
5g R.evoluci6n, January 15, 1959. Victor Pedroso, then of Banco
Pedroso, in 1972 vice-president of the International Division of the Bank
of America, New York.
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rights, placing a temporary-freeze on all safe-deposit boxes in an attempt to seize misappropriated funds.
In February, the banks yielded to the bancarios' demand for a
pay increase and for the rehiring and reimbursei:nent of workers fired
during the 1955 strike.

Back wages totaied some $450, 000, with the

heaviest amounts falling on the Trust Company of Cuba ($120, 025) and
the Banco Nunez ($139, 174). 6 0 Jose Maria de la Aguilera and Od6n
Alvarez de la Campa, the two Fidelistas cf the Chase Manhattan Bank,
were reimbursed $13, 200 and $13, 600 respectively.

61

The widow of

Education Minister Armando Hart's brother received $7, 384.
Things began to change. An official at the Royal Bank noted that
em_ployees no longer stood up when the Bank's supervisor passed by.

.
62
Indeed, some of the bancarios were putting their feet up on their desks.
The expectations of some young bancarios were dizzying.

Fidel told the

journalist K. S. Karol that some bank clerks thought that after the revolution they were going to become bank executives.

63

Reinol Gonzalez,

heretofore a modest bank clerk, was in Mexico participating in a labor

60

I
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I
1·

·These figures su~gest that the largest number of strikers, and
perhaps Fidelistas as well, came from the Banco Nunez and the Trust
Company of Cuba.
61 Revoluci6n, February 14, 1959.
62

Interview with Luis Vianello of the Royal Bank. Coral Gables,
June 1, 1971.
63 K. S. Karol, Guerrillas in Power (New York: Hill & Wang,
1970), p. 479.
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conference as the CTC's director of international relations.

64

Every-

where ambitions were stimulated.
And there was a payoff for those who had helped finance Castro's
rebellion.

Julian de Zulueta's Banco Continental became the bank of

deposit for the new Ministerio de Bienes Malversados (MRBM) whose
chief, Faustino Perez, was Zulueta's friend and former contact in the
underground.

65

Th.e Banco Continental soon became the fastes~ growing

bank in Cuba, its deposits rising from $95 to $110 million in the first
three months of 1959. 66 Much of this increase was owed-to government
deposits.

In June, 1958, the bank had approximately $10 million in govern-

-ment funds; a year later it had more than $20 million; by mid-1960, it had
$80 million.

By mid-1960 some 40 percent of the bank's total depooits

were government funds. 67

The Banco Continental' s president,

Eduardo Benet, thought this a legitimate share.

Since t]ie Banco Con-

tinental held about one-quarter of all private deposits in Cuban banks, it

64 Serafino Romualdi, Presidents and Peons (New York: Funk &
Wagnalls, 1967), p. 205.

6 5 Interview with Daniio Mesa, a close associate of Faustino Perez
in the Havana underground. Gainesville, June 21, 1971. See above pp.93-95.
According to Carmelo Mesa-Lago, an official in the Social Security Bank
which Zulueta briefly headed, it was rumored among Social Security Bank
employees in mid-1959 that the Banco Continental's chairman had given
$1 million to the revolution. (Letter to author. Pittsburgh, May 24, ·
1972.)
66 Estimate based on graph in Bohemi.a, April 19, 1959, p. 29.
67 Banco Continental, bforme a nuestros cltentes y amigos,
June 3 0, 1960, p. 8.
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had a right to 25 percent of the $300 million in government funds being
held by Cuban banks.

68

Jose Maria de la Aguilera: was elected, without opposition, as
leader of the Havana bancarios.

In a victory address, Aguilera said

he would not seek "revenge" against the-bank managers who fired him

.I

I
I
I

I~
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I
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in 1955.

69

·The elections were followed by a dance at the Club Bancario.

There were two orchestras and a night club show~ 70
Don Julian Zulueta gave another demonstration of revolutionary
·zeal, inaugurating a profit-sharing scheme modeled after that of the
Bank of America.

Twenty-five percent of the Banco Continental's an-

nual profits would be shared with its eight hundred workers.
this would mean a bonus. of $125 per worker.
was

11

For 1959,

Zulueta, said Revoluci6n,

revolutionizing" the banking sector. 71 Bank employees at the First

National Council oI Revolutionary bancarios in March asked for a similar
profit-sharing plan for the entire banking industry, along with a six-hour
day. 72
In April, Zulueta accepted the presidency of the newly-created

Banco de Seguridad Social Cubano (BANSESCU), a social security bank
which unified the retirement funds of Cuba's unions and worker associations.

I
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I

68 Letter to author from Eduardo Benet, president of the Banco
Continental, 1956-1960. Key Biscayne, May 26, 1972.
69 Revoluci6n, February 20, 1959.
70 Diario de la Marina, February 22, 1959.
71 Revoluci6n, February 12, 1959.
72 Ibid., March 17, 1959.
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Some thought the presidency of a respected banker would inspire public
confidence in the new institution.
port of Castro's rebellion?

Or was it another payoff for his sup-

The Banco Continental became the bank of

deposit for the nation's social security funds.

In May, the Banco Con-

tinental floated a loan of $1 million to the hard-pressed Ferrocarril Occidental, then being managed by the former M-26 treasurer, Raul
Chibas.

73

A committee of bankers, disturbed by these evidences of

government favoritism toward the Banco Continental, called on L6pezFresquet at the Treasury Ministry.

He assured them "that it was not

government policy to favor any particular bank.

1174

In early 1959, a number of Cuban bankers exhibited a confid~nt
and energetically nationalist attitude.

In March, the executive vice-

president of the Banco de Colonos, Oswaldo Saura Nodal, expressed
satisfaction ~ith the dorninant role of Cuban banks.

75

He fully supported

the government's plans for the economic liberation of Cuba.

He saw no

·need for foreign aid; Cuban banks had sufficient resources to assure the
island's development.

Foreigners might invest in Cuban industry, but

only if Cuba maintained control.

76

The Banco N~rfez urged hacendados

73 Revoluci6n, May 19, 1959.

74 Ibid.

7 5 Oswaldo Saura Nodal had worked for the Royal Bank of Canada
for 26 years, beginning as a typist.
76 Bohemia, March 15, 1959, p. 109.
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to do business with Cuban banks controlled by Cubans "like you.

1177

In April, Vfctor Pedroso, president of the Banco Pedroso, said

I
I
I
I
I
I
I.

I·
I
I
I

Cuba was heading for an era of "greater well·being." He approved of
the new government's honesty as well as its "buy Cuban" program.
Antonio Rangel of the Trust Company was pleased with the rise in local
consumption.

Carlos Nunez of the Banco Nunez thought it important to

block losses of foreign exchange and expand the role of Cuban banks. 7 8
Julio Lobo expressed his confidence by buying the Banco de Fomento
Comercial and merging it with his Banco Financiero.

79

new bank had thirteen offices and $22 million in deposits.

By June, Lobo's
80

Towards the end of May, the bancarios, some of whom had not
received their sought-after wage increases~ began to pressure their em,

ployers.

Complaints were made to Revoluci6n.

SinceFidel had asked

for a moratorium ·on strikes, the bancarios evictenced their displeasure
in a playful but annoying manner by occasionally blowing police whistles
.inside the banks.

Some of the men wore sweaters instead of jackets;

some women neglected th~ir makeup.

81

The bancarios wanted salary

77 Ad in Revoluci6n; March 23, 1959.
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78 Bohemia, April 5, 1959, pp. 48-51; 101.
79Havana Times, February 23, 1959.
80 Revoluci6n, June 22, 1959.
81 Bohemia, May 31, 1959, p. 83.
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increases and profit sharing.

The Catholic labor leader, Reinol Gon-

za.lez, said that capital and labor "ought to have the_same rights and
respons1"b 1·1·t•
1 1es ••.. 1182
The demands of the bank workers--and of petit-bourgeois
workers everywhere in Cuba--suggests that an important factor in the
development of the Cuban revolution was pressure from below, pressure
for more jobs, more responsibilities, and a better distribution of profits. This parallels similar discoveries made by Mart:fnez Alier in the
rural sector, and suggests a need to modify the usual interpretation of
the Cuban revolution as something imposed entirely from above.

83

The

demands of the ambitious and rebellious clerks unquestionably helped
to destroy the Cuban bourgeoisie.

First Difficulties
Towards summer, clouds began to appear on the bankers' horizon.

Jose Garriga of the Banco Garriga complained of a mild economic

slump and warned that the revolution's success depended on a "vote of
confidence" by capital.

Eduardo Benet thought the contraction merely

a passing -phenomenon, urging businessmen to support the revolution
and spur the economy in order to permit elections.

84

The Diario de la

Marina thought the banks were suffering from the disruptive effects of

82 Revoluci6n, May 9, 1959.
1
83_ M ar t mez
Al"1er, C u b a, econom1a
.
~ y soc1e
. d ad, chapter 5.

84 Bohemia, May 3, 1959, pp. 46-48.
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MRBM's freeze on Batistiano accounts. Tens of millions were suddenly
immobilized; bills could neither be paid nor presented.

85

At the end

of May. the volume of loans of Cuba's fifteen leading banks crested at
$581 million and then began falling off

slowly. declining to $552 million

by year's end. ,I n 1960, total b3.nk loans fell off to _$ 529 million in January and $369 million by the time of the bank nationalization in September. 86
There was a growing series of limits on the banking function.

In

January, 1959, the use of $500 and $1, 000 bills was restricted and mild
ex~hange controls established.

In late spring, exporters were compelled

to surrender all foreign currency. Import licenses were required. Banks
could not process checks, drafts or payment orders issued from abroad. 87
In June, 1_9 59, the Banco Nacional limited the interest payable on savings

accounts to 2 percent.

88

Through the summer. the bankers gave every evidence of con-

tiiming their support of the revolution.

The banking sector promised to

finance activities during the slack season in preparation for the 1960

85 Diario de la Marina, May 23, 1959. By 1960, this difficulty
was app arently alleviated. · The Banco Continental's. report of June 30,
1960, said that less than 1 % of its total loans were affected by the
MRBM's interventions, and that most of the affected loans had sufficient
guarantees to make collection likely.
86 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 641.
87 Noticias (New York), May 5, 1959; Cuban Economic Research
Project, A Study, pp. 633-640.
88 Havana Times , June 20, 1959.
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harvest.

89

In late July, fue bankers, led by their newly-elected presi-

dent, Juan M. Pujols Balmaceda of the Banco Pujol, reiterated their
support for the agrarian reform·,' pledging their readirn:ss to finance
new sugar and tobacco growers and cattlemen who might be created by
the agrarian reform. The banks offered to lend the government fiscal
experts to aid in preparing economic plans.

go The Banco Garriga pub-

lished an elaborate pamphlet explaining the functioning of the new· tax
laws.

The pamphlet ·noted approvingly that government spending was

to be canted in favor of economic development. 91
By fall, there was a growing divergen~e between the banking
sector's public pronouncements and its private misgivings.
was cooling off noticeably.

Business

A few loans were still being made, the Banco

Pujol advancing $644, 000 for a new beer company and the Banco Pedroso
loaning $200, 000 tu the Detallistas (shopkeepers' association) for a new
building. 92 But otherwise, business was drying up. The. banks were
. beginning to lose money and, despite earlier assurances, were increasingly reluctant to finance the 1960 harvest.

89 Diario de la Marina, June 20, 1959.
90Havana Times, July 25, 1959; Revoluci6n, July- 10, 1959.
g1, 1Sintesis de la reforma tributaria" (pamphlet). (Havana: Banco
Garrigo, 1959). The Banco Garrigo, one of Cuba's smaller banks, had
$13 million in deposits as of February, 1959. See in Revoluci6n, February 15, 1959.
92 Revoluci6n, September 3, 1959; October 5, 1959.
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Julian de Zulueta of the Banco Continental began to have problems at the Social Security Bank.
tongued. introverted, unwilling

Zulueta was a difficult man, sharp

t~ ·take

advice;, he was a patron on the

old model. At the BANSESCU he became involved in a series of fights
with his subordinates.

He wanted to do everything at once; when prob-

lems came up he would knock over his opponents by citing the magic
word: "Fidel! " This little drama climaxed when a young BANS~SCU
official. Carmelo Mesa-Lago, presented a study showing that. once
the unification of the nation's fifty-five different social se~urity systems
was complete. almost half the BANSESCU's personnel would be superfluous, while two-thirds of the remainder would require technical training.' When the three thousand BANSESCU employees learned of this.

I
I
I
I

they staged a mass protest, boycotting the bank.

Everyone wanted

revolutionary efficiency- -but they also wanted jobs.
the workers.

Zulu eta sided with

In the resulting imbroglio Zulueta suggested that all the

·administrators quit.

Most did.

BANSESCU in mid-September.

Zulueta resigne.d as president of
He was replaced by the rebel army of-

ficer. Comandante Enrique Luss~n. 93 The first declaration of BANSESCU's
new chief was that no one who worked in the social security system would

I
I
I
I
I

lose his job. 94
93 Information on the bureaucratic war at BANSESCU is from the
Cuban economist Carmelo Mesa-Lago, then secretary-general of BANSESCU.
Letter to author, Pittsburgh, May 24, 1972.
9 4 Carteles. October 4, 1959, p. 30.
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Zulueta also suffered · embarrassment from another quarter.
His friend Fidel was going around the country writing checks for huge
amounts against !NRA accounts being administered by Zulueta's Banco
Continental.

Observers noted that Fidel rarely troubled to fill out the

stub of his checkbook to keep tabs on his spending.

95

The unhappiness of the bankers in the fall of 1959 was not shared
by the bancarios, or at least thei_r leaders.

On the Dia del Ban_cario

(Banker's day). bancario Secretary Aguilera reiterated the bancarios'
support for the revolution and presented Fidel Castro with $250, 912 for
the agrarian reform. 96_

: Guevara Takes Over
In late November, the roof fell fa.
'

Felipe Pazos, the "sound money man,

11

National Bank president,

the man the bankers viewed as

their protector, was replaced by the Marxist revolutionary "Che"
Guevara.

According to the Havana Times, "the move stunned business

and banking circles.

1197

.Pazos' removal was linked to Cuba's seemingly

unstoppable ''hemorrhage" of foreign exchange. In the early fall, Castro
told Nicolas Muniz, an aide in the National Economic Council, that he
suspected Pazos was deliberately permitting the "hemorrhage" and was,

95 Lincoln, "What Has Happened to Cuban Business? 11 , p. 274.
96 Ru{z, Traici6n, 1959, p. 186.
97 Havana Times, November 26, 1959.
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I

I

in fact, a traitor. When Muffiz alerted Pazos to Castro's su_spicion,

Pazos reportedly replied that Fidel was his friend, that Fid.e l visited

I
I
I
I

him every Tuesday evening for economics lessons, and that "I control
.

hnn.

,.98
Interestingly, Pazos did not retire to private life upon his dis-

missal, but rather accepted a post as Cuba's roving economic ambassador in Europe.

I
I

Pazos later explained that he quit the government be-

cause of the Hubert Matos affair and because of Fidel's violent and irrational attack on the U.S. following the Diaz Lanz ''bombing of Havana.

11

Pazos saw no chance to. convince Fidel about anything owing to his great
. and continuing popular support. 99

I

With tongue-in-cheek, the Banco Naciona.l's new president, "Che"

I·

Guevara, assured a n~rvous public that he would continue the policies of

I
I

his predecessor. 10

° Fidel explained that Guevara's job was to stop the

outflow of foreign exchange. It was, said Fidel, .like a guerrilla battle

in which "Che" occupied ."the first trench.

I

. .· .
'.

98 Interview with Nicolas Mufiiz.

11

lOl Muniz gave "Che"

Miami, April 7, 1971.

99

I
I
I
I
I

Ibid. Pazos, the theoretician, belonged to a school favoring
the reduction of economic links with America. Muniz, the practical
economist, saw closer economic ties with the U.S. as the only realistic
course for Cuba. In 1971, Muniz was vice-president for Finance of the
highly successful Cuban-owned Suave Shoe Corporation of Miami. Pazos
worked (in 1971) for the OAS Economic Council.
100 One motive for the much-lamented outflow of foreign exchange
was Castro's decision--towards the end of 1859--to buy arms, for cash,
in Western Europe.
101 Revoluci6n, November 27, 195·9.
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'mathematics lessons.
president.

Such knowledge was deemed useful for a bank

"El Che" knew nothing of economics either, but he was

02
w1·11·mg t o 1earn. l
The public found "Che's" reassurances unconvincing and a run
on the banks began.

One Cuban banker estimated that within a few weeks

$50-$60 million.was withdrawn. 103 Guevara began· to clean house at
the National Bank, dismissing its respected administrator, Jose
.Antonio Guerra.

In late November, the Chase Manhattan Bank informed

Atlantica del Golfo, Cuba's largest sugar producer, that it would not
finance the 1960 harvest. 104 Guevara, perhaps unaware of this, was
proceeding on a contrary tack, urging American sugar firms in Cuba to
bring in dollars; to get all their financing from abroad.

105

The situation in the labor sector also began to turn sour.

At

the 10th CTC congress in November, the· more moderate and democratically inclined bancario leaders witp.in the CTC were replaced by radicals.
Reinol Gonzalez was replaced as chief of the CTC's foreign relations
.
106
branch by Od6n Alvarez de la Campa.
Jos~ Planas lost his post as

l02 Interview with Nicol~s Muniz.

Miami, April 7, 1971.

l03 Wall Street Journal, December 18, 1959.
l04 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Alfonso." Havana, December 30, 1959.
105

Wall Street Journal, January 18, 1960.

106 Reinol Gonzalez had favored maintaining relations with the
ORIT labor syndicate. The CTC, however, decided to break with ORIT
owing to its connections with the ·AFL-CIO.
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I
I

chief of the CTC's legal affairs division. _ In February, 1960, the radi-

I

I
I
I
I
1-

.

.

cal bancarios Aguilera and Alvarez were members of a committee which
began to purge the CTC of Mujalistas and anti-communists.

107
-

Despite these difficulties, 1959 had been a profitable year for
the banking industry.

Even the American banks did well.

The First

National Bank of Boston, which had six branches in Cuba, reported that
for 1959 it earned a 2 O. 6 percent return on equity, slightly less than its
24. 5 percent average earnings in Cuba for the years 1955-1959.

Thus

the Boston bank's Cuban branch was more profitable than its domestic
- t b ut
. th'is was necessary owing
.
t o th e "inh erent ris
. k" o f operat"mg
paren,
in a country like Cuba. 108

The bancarios were also happy, throwing a splendid bash at their

I
I
I
I

club to make up f9r all -those cancelled during the ~atista era.

dicate leader Aguilera, reviewing the year's developr:ients, agreed that
1959 _had been a fine year, a year in which "great and beautiful achievements " had been rea1·1zed. 109

Banking, 1960
For the bankers, 1.960 was one long downward slide.

I
I

I
I

I

The syn-

Guevara,

meeting with the Bankers' Association in mid-January, asked them to

107 The New York Times, February 2, 1960.
l08 FCSC, claim CU-2268.
109Bohemia, January 3, 1960, p. 59.
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tighten the tourniquet on credit.

No credits were to be given to luxury

goods importers, nor for the U.S. petroleum refineries.

The total

loans of each bank might rise no more than 10 percent above the preyious year. 110 This was ironic, since the demand for loans was rapidly diminishing.
also disappearing.

Moreover. some of the. funds available for loans were
Certain public monies previously held by private

banks were transferred to government banks.

111

Thus, in January,

1960, following the cooling of relations between Zulueta and the Castro
government, the Banco Continental lost custody of the funds and properties it was guarding for the MRBl\'.(.

112

The Banco Continental assured

its customers that it was quite prepared to endure "any eventual loss of
(government) deposits, "without injury to normal banking operations.

113

The revolutionary government was thus stea,dily eroding the private sector, creating a climate of uneasiness which reduced demand on
the one hand and cut away the private sector's access to money on the
other.

BANFAIC and INRA credits were, of course, ready to take up

the slack.

When the priyate banking sector's activities began to de-

celerate noticeably, it was accused of counterrevolution.

I

I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
llOEl Mundo, January 27, 1960.

111 U.S. News and World Report, March 28, 1960~ p. 65.
112 Banco Continental, Informe, p. 14~
113 Ibid •• p. 3. The Banco Continental's president, Eduardo Benet,
says that MRBM funds were assigned "in competition" with other banks.
Letter to author. Coral Gables, April 20, 1972.

.I
I

I

I
I

I

362

In June, this rumor was given some substance with t~e creation of the
Banco de Comercio Exterior Cubano (BANCEC), which was designed to

I
I

.·
120
take over all private banking related to foreign trade.
The banking

I

sector was accused of refusing to make loans to the colorios.

I

bravely promised to fill that gap.

INRA

121

In early summer, Carlos Nunez' son-in-law Tomas Cabanas
announced he was leaving Cuba in order to join the counterrevolutionaries
then training in Florida.

Nunez replied that his bank had nothing to fear

from Castro, since it had committed no crime, had done nothing wrong.
Moreover, it was a Cuban bank.
favorable outlook.

122

The Banco Continental shared this

Its report of June 30 concluded that "we are confi-

dent that, once the difficulties inevitable in"a process of such profound
reforms are overcome, the nation will develop in a manner economically
balanced, politically free and socially content. 1;123

121

El Mundo, June 24, 1960.

122 Interview with Major Tomas Cabanas. · Miami, March 1, 1971.
Cabanas retired after 2 0 years in the Cuban army to work with his fatherin-la w, Carlos Nunez. Cabanas estimates that Carlos Nunez lost $40
million when his bank was confiscated. fu exile in late 1960, N~fl'ez remained confident that the U.S. would soon deal with Castro.
123 Bance Continental, Informe, p. 20. The Bank's president,
Eduardo Benet, says that the Castro government found this conclusion offensive because "it implied the feeling that political independence, freedom and happiness were in danger." The Bank was thereafter asked to
halt distribution of the report. Letter to author. Key Biscayne, May 26,
. 1972.
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American Banks Nationalized
By July, 1960, Guevara was prepar~g to move in for the kiU.
The banks were ordered to extend no further loans to the sugar industry.

124

A month later, the American sugar mills were nationalized.

Their bank deposits were transferred to INRA 's Central Agricultural
Bank, causing a crisis in certain smaller banks in Oriente and Camaguey,
which were, in turn, forced to call in loans.

Camaguey's banks were

also in trouble because of defaults on loans by cattlemen whose livestock had been expropriated, without payment, by INRA.
bank run began.

125

Another

One U.S. bank reported it had lost 15 percent of its

deposits. 126 But this agony was not to endure.

On September 18, .

Guevara nationalized the three major U.S. banks: the First National
City Bank, the First National of Boston and the Chase Manhattan.

As

of December 31, 1959, the three banks had a total of $2 07 millions in
d epos1•ts. 127

The resolution nationalizing the banks (Law 815)·related the

I

seizure to America's cutting of Cuba's sugar quota.

The American banks

124 Interview with Francisco Escobar. Miami, April 17, 1971.

I
I
I
I
I

12 5 Wall Street Journal, August 24, 1960.
126 Ibid.
127 El Mundo, September 18, 1960. The National City Bank in
Cuba then had 11 offices, Chase 4, First National Bank of Boston 6.
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were denounced as a "decisive factor in the deformation of our economy"
and "an obstacle for national liberation. "
depositors that their funds were safe.

128

Guevara ass.ured the bank's

Bohemia was entranced, seeing

~'imperialism I s financial chains" destroyed by a "vigorous stroke of the
pen. "

129

Bancario chief Aguilera helped· organize the takeover, which

he thought would accelerate "the progress of the revolution.

11130

Od6n

Alvarez of the Havana bancarios almost missed the excitement, returning just in time from a visit to Russia. l3 l
By some extra~rc:linary power of self-delusion, Cuban bankers
still thought themselves safe. When, in late September, Alberto Guernica
approached the Bankers' Association for a loan for the Club Bancario,
the secretary of the Bankers' Association, Gregorio del Real, assured
him that intervention of the Cuban banks was either unlikely or far in the
f u tu re. 13 2

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

"Everyone
.
· ;
. th e c. l ou d s. 1113 3
was 11vmg
1n

· On October 13, all the remaining banks, Cuban and American,
were nationalized.

Guevara explained that the banks had been seized

128 Ibid.
12 9
· Bohemia, September 24, 1960, p. 60.
130 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 283; The New York Times, September 16, 1960.
131 El Mundo, September 15, 1960.
132 Gregorio del Real y Alonso was also a member of the Directive
~ouncil of the Banco Nacional.
133 Interview with Alberto Guernica, former president of the
Club Bancario. Hialeah, April 22, 1971.
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because their failure to provide sufficient credits was impeding Cuba's
economic development.

I
I
I
1·

He neglected t~ mention that his O\vn policies

at the Banco Nacional had squeezed the private banks to the point where
all were losing money and most were on the verge of bankruptcy.

135

TABLE 2
·claims of Loss by U.S. Banks in Cuba l36
Institution

Claim#
1976
3656
2684
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
3425
2268
2626
2628
2629
2805
3552
1901
2498
•1594

Amount of Loss

Bankers Trust Co.
Bankers Trust Co. as Trustees
Chase Manhattan Bank

4, 344, 362. 50
1. 081, 531.18
6, 171. 230. 22
II
II
II
a. 604, 206. 83
II
II
3. 702. 3 oo. 00
"
II
n
3, 702. 300. 00
"II
II
ll
793,350.00
II
II
II
793, 3 50. 00
Chemical Bank, N. Y. Trust
8. 196, 100. 36
First National Bank of Bosto:::i
12, 496, 000. 00
· First National City Bank
3, 699, 417. 79
II
II
II
II
12. 899. 142. 30
II
II
II
II '
218. 110. 282. 59
Irving Trust Co.
3. 633. 352. 56
II
II
II
1. 017, 935. 58
Manufacturers Hanove·r Trust Co.
44, 059, 000. 00
Mellon National Bank
1, 737, 745. 00
Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. as Trustee · _4; 957. 740._00

Two banks were left untouched: The Royal Bank of Canada and
the Bank of Nova Scotia.

I

134

These, said Guevara, were the qnly banks that

134 Bohemia, October 30, 1960, p. 68.
135 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nick, 11 Havana, . June 30,
1960; Letter of Eduardo Benet to author., Key Biscayne, May 24, 1972.

136

Data as compiled from the logbook of the FCSC. Washington,
D. C., November, 1970. The total claim of American banks before the
FCSC is more than $340 million. All banks suffering losses may not have
filed with the FCSC; thus the actual total could be higher.
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had not attempted to sabotage Cuba's overseas credit. 137 Guevara
.

again assured depositors. saying that accounts up to . $10, 000
would be
.
left untouched. Amounts exceeding $10, 000 would be redeemable in
fifteen year government bonds.

138

The exception of the Canadian bariks was designed to assure
Cuba at least two credit channels to the outside world.
both banks sold their interests to the Banco Nacional.

In December,
The Nova Scotia

Bank's president, F. William Nick, thought arrangements "satis·fac~or:y-. 1113 9 But the special treatment accorded the Ca:r;iadian banks
angered some exiles. 140 The economist Jose Alvarez Diaz promised
that the traitorous Canadian banks would never be permitted to return
to a liberated Cuba. 141 · Royal Bank President H. M. Grindell wrote
one former employee~ assuring him that the bank had received no spe-

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

. l
.
142
c1a concessions.

137

Bohemia, October 23, 1960, p. 45.

138 Ibid.
139 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 379.
14 0 British insurance companies also received special privileges.

The Union Assurance Society Ltd., Century Insurance Company Ltd. and
the British Commonwealth Insurance Company Ltd. maintained offices in
Havana till the fall of 1968. (Diario Las Americas, October 22, 1968.)
141 Trinchera (Miami), August 19, 1962.

142

Letter of H. M. Grindell to Luis Vianello. Montreal, September 25, 1962. The Nova Scotia Bank had 8 branches and an estimated
$57 million in deposits. The Royal Bank had 24 branches in Cuba.

I
·I
I
I
I
I
I
II

I
I
I
I
.1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

367

The nationalization of the banking sector gave the bancarios,
or at least their leaders, enor~9':1s satisfaction.

"The jubilation of

-

the bank workers is complete, " they declared. 143 Fidel extended a
personal salute.

The bancarios were a_privileged sector he said,

''but they have marched well because they have had good leadership.
. 11144
In the first week of November, the _bancarios' Aguilera announced defiantly that "we are marching inexorably toward socialism •••• Every
~uban who truly loves his Motherland need not fear this, because a

· 1·1s t regime
·
soc1a
means th e comp1e t e era d.1cat·ion o f exp101·. t a t·ion •••• 11145
At year's end, Aguilera and Alvarez were re-elected to their respective

positions without oppositton.

On January 1, 1961, the Council of Minis-

ters ordered the dissolution of the Association of Banks.

Od6n Alvarez became 'a vice-president of the Banco Nacional, not a ba.d
rate of advancement for a man who a few years before had been an unemployed bank clerk.

.
·
146
He defected from Cuba in 1964.

143 El Mundo, October 15, 1960.
144Rufz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 377.

I
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I

Subsequently,

145 The New York Times, November 8, 1960.
146 Thomas, Cuba, p. 1292.
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But we managed and we all wore shoes and
clean clothes that were decent and my aunt
finaUy bought a frigidaire and before she died
she had a washing machine, a television set
and a blender ••••
A Cuban woman of the 1950s

VIII. UTILITIES
Cuba's two principal utilities, the Cuban Electric Company
(CCE) and the Cuban Telephone Company (CUTELCO), were intimately
connected with the growth and sustenance of the Cuban bourgeoisie.

I

I
I
I

2

.

Their workers--almost eleven thousand--comprised a labor aristocracy,
receiving good wages and extensive benefits.
vored investments of the rich.

Both companies were fa-

The possession of a telephone, or the

ownership of an electrically-powered ref!'igerator or air conditioner
was an important symbol of bourgeois status.
Curiously then, :qeither company was much appreciated by the
b_ourgeoisie.

Both were attacked by those they served and scarcely de _-

fended by those who worked for them.

I

1

Both were constantly suspect,

1 Torre Mulhare, "Sexual Ideology, " p. 67. . ,
2 In the 1950s, CCE supplied about 90% of Cuba's electric
power. The CUTELCO had a near monopoly on Cuban telephone service.
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denounced by politicians of both left a~d right.

3

Both utilities were

continuously accused of having rates too high, and service too urbanoriented.

4

Like so many enterprises in Cuba, both suffered from shaded

pasts. Both were also impossibly foreign, subsidiaries of U.S. -owned
mu 1 tinational h?lding companiP.s.
Thus, when Castro appeared he found these issues ready-made.
the table set.

The bourgeoisie, by and large, anticipated that the two

utilities would be nationalized~
pectations.

Castro proceeded to realize their ex-

The companies' labor aristocracy reacted

ferently to this.

almost indif-

By the time they realized that they, too, were going

to be destroyed--and indeed that the whole bourgeoisie was going down-it was much too late.

Cuban Telephone
The Cuban Telephone Company was incorporated in Delaware
in 1908.

In 1909, it received a fifty-year operating franchise from Presi-

dent Jose Miguel G6mez under circumstances generally regarded as

3 CCE commissione~ at least two studies of its im·age in Cuban
public opinion in the 1950s. See in Jurgen Kuczynski, "Investigando los
archivos de los monopolies nortearnericanos en Cuba, " Cuba Socialista
(January, 1966),p. 97.
4 Cuban utility rates were a subject of acrimonious debate. Some
though~ them "the highest in the world." See in Warren Miller, Ninety
Miles from Home (Boston: Little, Brown & Co~, 1961),p. 50.
The
Cuban economist, Jose Alvarez Diaz, thought they were lower than in
the U.S. Interview, Miami, November 9, 1970~
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"shady~" 5 With_~n a year, 1;.'1e company fulfilled its contract to create
a unified nat~onal telephone system.

In 1916, Cuban Telephone was bought out by Sosthenes and
Bernand Behn.

The Behn brothers, owners since 1914 of the Puerto

Rican Te~eph_o ne Compa,ny, proceeded to link the two islands' telephone ~y~tem~ to the

lJ. S.

by submarine cable.

In 1920, using their

Cuban aI1:tj Puerto Rican telephone companies as a base, tpe Behn
broth~~~ lauriched th_e lpternatioilal Telephone and Telegraph Company
(ITT) wh_~9h became, by thg 1970s, one of the world's largest corporations.

QµJ:>_an_'I_"el_ephon~ r:-emained.a property of ITT until its nationaliza-

tion by t~e G~str:o regime ir1 1Q59.

6

'JJt_~ 1_~20s were profitable for the Cuban Telephone Company.

By 1930, CUTEL_CO had iristalled 75, 000 telephones· arid sold more than
$6 miHion in stock--mostly to Cubans who liked its 6 - 7 percent annual
dividend ..

7

In the 1930s, the telephone company, like the electric,

~i:6pe;~·Fresquet, My Fourteen Months, p. 26; Hudson Strode,
The Pageant of Cuba (New York: Random House, 1934), p. 232. Perhaps it is only fair to add t~at Cubans tend to regard all ~usiness transactions as shady; the bigger the deal, the more notorious the imagined
graft. The image of "fre e "enterprise" was always tarnished.
6 T~lephone service began in Havana in the 1880s. The Spanish
Overseas Ministry then accepted private bids to establish service, with
the understanding that after twenty years the equipment would become the
property of the state, a 19th century version of the "fade-out" investment.
See in C~ban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 274.

'1. "ITT Ends a Brilliant Decade, " Fortune, December , 1930,
p. 42.
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~ega,?: ~o e~r,erience serious difficulties.

In 1931, CUTELCO installed .

the f!~~t pay phones ("traga-nickles ") in commercial . establishments,
endi.ng the practice of free local calls which shopkeepers had used as

a. sales
enticement. 8
. .

-

.

~~

0,e economic crisis of the early 1930s developed, telephone

~~b~~~~lH~~8:
!~o~~

clropped by 50 percent.

In 1933, CUTELCO lost $37 .mil-

Wages were cut, workers fired.

This hardship stimulated the

gevelopment
the telephone workers union, the Sindicato de Obreros y
- . - -. . ·- . - of
~mp~~~~'?~

de la Cuban Telephone.

Under the sympathetic eye of Presi-

dent
government, the telefoneros struck on Novem..... -· ·- . G:rau's.. revolutionary
.
.._ . _

~~~ ~~~

\,.•'

~933, demanding higher pay, lower telephone rates and an end

~C? th~ n_i.cl_{el pay stations-.

To emphasize these demands: sabotage.

':fele.e~one c.ables were dynamited in Havana.
dreds of thousands of dollars in losses.

Such attacks cau.sed hun-

Most of the company's eleven

htmd!e~ employees, fearful of losing their jobs, returned to work after
t\Vel):ty-:~C?ttr hours.

They were harassed by three hundred radicals who

wanted to continue the strike.

clid

When the strike was settled, the moderates

not want the radicals to return and walked out, ending all telephone

service in Cuba.

On August 8, President Mendieta intervened CUTELCO,

returning it in October.

9

--- ---~ ~ ore~gn Policy Association, Problems, p. 420.
9= Ibid. , p. 421.
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This intervention by Mendieta, a conservative, established a
precedent "that is viewed with considerable alarm by American interests. ,.lO The Foreign Policy Association saw then (1935), as would
Ambassador Bonsal in 1959, the need for a "competent and independent
. u t"l"t"
. . •. " 11
pu bl1c
1 1 1es commission

Cuban Electric
The Cuban Electric Company was incorporated in Florida on
December 13, 1927.

The following year, it consolidated fifteen small

Cuban-and American-owned electric companies into the Cuban Electric
Company, a subsidiary of Electric Bo.nd and Share of New York. 12
This piecing together had begun just after World War I.

It was then

that Electric Bond and Share acquired the Santiago Electric Company,
once owned by th~ father of the nationalist politician, Eduardo Chibas.
The politician Gerardo Machado helped Cuban Electric' s founder,
Henry Catlin, to assemble still other pieces.

When Machado was min-

ister of the interior under President Jose Miguel G6mez (1910-1913),
he had handled all light and power concessions and had been awarded
"promotion shares." In this way Machado became half-owner of the

I
I
I
I
I

10 The New York Times, August 9, 1934.
l 1 Foreign Policy Association, Problems, p. 440; Bonsal,
. Cuba, p. 44.
12 Foreig~ Policy Association, Problems, p. 399.
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Santa Clara Light Company.

13

In 1925, CCE President Catlin helped

to finance Machado's presidential campaign. 14 When Machado became
president (192 5-1933 ), Catlin reaped a generous reward.

Machado

permitted Catlin to purchase the Havana Electric Light Company.

In

exchange, Catlin bought the two power plants owned by Machado in
Las Villas at a handsome price.

15

The cronyism of Machado and Cat-

lin was sufficient to draw an envious comment from a vice-president
of the Chase National Bank.

16

In 1926, Catlin's group purchased the generating plant of the

Havana Electric Railway and Light and Power Company.

He now had

control of most of the public utilities in Cuba, including several small
plants scld him by the f~ture American te~tile king, Dayton Hedges.

17

In 1928, this conglomerate was baptised as the Cuban Electric Company.

Its enemies called it th~ pulpo electrico: the electric octopus.

13 Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia: J.B.
Lippincott Company, 1933), p. 242.
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14

Teresa Casuso, Cuba and Castro (New York: Random House,
1961), p. 51.
l5 Bohemia, September 6, 1959, p~ 88.
16 Smith, What Happened, p. 181. The Chase official wrote in
February, 1931, that Catlin "runs in and out of the palace every little
while and is trying to get his own taxes reduced •.•• "
17 Hedges used the proceeds of the sale--in 1929--to purchase
the land for his Textilera Ariguanabo. See in Octavio R. Costa, Hombres
y destines, p. 96.
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In the early 1930s, Cuban Electric began to have problems.

The

high prices paid in assembling the system, the need to import fuel to
power the generators, the unfavorable pattern of electric utilization,
the need for political pay~ffs; all made. electricity in Cuba expensive. 18
This expense did not sit well in a Cuba suffering from the world depression of the early 1930s.

Municipalities began to renege on their bills.

By mid-1932, twenty-three municipalities owed the company $613, 326.

I
I
1·.
I
I
I
I

In some cases payment had not been made for three years.

District of Havana owed about $4 million.

After a series of warnings,

Cuban Electric began a selective cutback in electric service.

19

These cutbacks served to stiffen public resentment, triggering
a flurry of consumers' strikes in favor of lower -rates which President
Machado refused to gr_ant.
cipient labor movement.

Cuban Electric had also to deal with an inThis also was resisted with the aid of Machado.

Machado's fall on Septemher 1, 1933, opened the way for the
electric workers, the Federaci6n Sindical de las Plantas Electricas y
de Agua.
mands.

I
I
I
I
1·

The Federal

20

In November, the new union presented a list of forty de-

Management agreed to all but ten.

The electric workers,

18 The original investment of the Electric Company in Cuba was
said to be $200 million. The New York Times, December 6, 1933.
19 G-2 report, July 18, 1932, National Archives, RG 165.
#2655-9-89 (2). (Courtesy of Louis Perez.)
20 Hereafter referred to as the electricos.
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adamant in their position, called a nation-wide strike.

21

An investiga-

tion by the short-lived revolutionary government of President Ram6n
Grau San Martin in 1933 revealed that Cuban Electric was in economic
trouble, having eliminated its annual dividend, cut personnel from 4289

.

to 1988 and salaries above sixty dollars by 2 5 perc~nt.

22

Despite these findings, on December 6, 1933, Grau San Martin
reduced the Electric's rates by 45 percent and granted its·customers a
four to eight month m~ratorium on payment.
or dismissals would be permitted.

23

No further wage cuts

Secretary of Government Antonio

Guiteras then intervened the plant, in part to assure Havana's electrically ,pumped water supply. 24
U.S. Ambassador Sumner Welles viewed the intervention of the
electric company as such a grave matter that he had the keys to the _
company delivered directly to President Grau.

.

2l Luz (Miami), August, 1966, p. 3.
electrico s - -in exile.

25

Carlos Pdo, a young

Luz is th~ journal of the

22 Foreign Policy Association, Problems, p. 404.
23 .Ibid., p~ 404. In a letter to The Nation, Ernest Gruening,
who prepared the chapter on utilities for the Foreign Policy Association's Problems of the New Cuba, wrote that "it cannot be denied that
rates in Cuba were too high before the Grau decree. " He observed that
rates remained at 1906 levels, while costs of making electricity had
diminished substantially. The Nation, March 6, 193 5, p. 278.
24 F
·
P o 1·icy A ssoc1ation,
. .
P ro bl ems, p. 408 •
ore1gn
25 Suarez Rivas, Un pueblo crucificado, p. 64.
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revolutionary in 1933, reminisced that "~he day we touched the Cuban
Electric Company was the day .•• the U.S. determine<:f to bring Grau
26
...
down."
Tony Varon~ recalls that the intervention went ahead despite
the threatening presence of American warships in Havana harbor.

Grau, Prfo and Varona were, Lr1 1934, founders of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano (PRC) whose program included the _nationalizatio~ of
the electric company, a demand shared by the middle-class founders
'

of the ABC-Radical.

28

The striking workers held the electric company for three weeks.
The plant was managed by the Cuban engineer ·R afael Giroud.
workers were proud of their ability to run the plant.
United States began to apply an economic squeeze.

Cuban

Meanwhile, the
American banks re-

fused checks authorized by the intervenors, and American suppliers

·1

withheld material.·

30

With the aid of the turncoat Batista, the Grau re•

'

I

•

gime was deposed in January, 1934, and replaced by the conservative

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

27

·Carlos Mendieta.
26 Revoluci6n, June 17, 1959. Eduardo Suarez Rivas, another
participant in the revolution of 1933, shared this view. See his Un
pueblo crucificado, p. 26.
2 7 Bohemia, March 29, 1959, p. 84.
'· .

2 8The Autenticos, in power from 1944-1952, failed to carry
out their promise of 1934 to nationalize the electric company. Indeed,
Carlos Prio was, in 1942, a lawyer for Cuban Electric.
29 One striker was Leovigildo Ru1z, author in 1965 of Diario
de una traici6n, a valuable chronology of Castro's revolution.
30 Foreign Policy Association, Problems, p. 410.
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Though Mendieta quashed the strike of the electricos, he and the
electric company yielded in May to all of the electricos' original forty

- - - - -·' "-

points.

The new contract established "historic precedents in Cuban in-

dustrial relations. 1131 The contract recognized the union, agreed to consult it in cases of hiring and firing, established a scale for ~ompensation
for discharged workers, a working week of thirty-nine hours for laborers and forty-five for office workers, both to receive forty-eight
hours pay.
In the late 1930s, the electric company, along with the rest of

the Cuban economy, enjoyed a gradual recuperation.
electricity rose about 5 percent a y~ar.

Consumption of

World War II froze the utili-

ties growth, but after the war it began another era of expansion.

In

1950, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's
(IBRD) Truslow Mission found the electric company operating at near
capacity.

Eighty percent of its equipment was over twenty-five years

old. The IBRD report concluded that "new equipment ••• is urgently
needed. " 32

CUTELCO, 1935-1959
Between the nadir of the depression (193 5) and the first of the
post years (1945), telephone subscribers nearly doubled, rising from

3 l Ibid.

I

P• 411.

32 IBRD, Report, p. 325.
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38, 000 to 74, 000.

By 1950 subscribers were up 50 percent to 113, ooo.33

Thanks in part to the backlog caused by World War II, demand continually outstripped the supply of phones.

Service was often unsatisfactory.

Again the familiar dilemma: CUTELC:O was owed almost $1 million by
local and fede;-al governments and was seeking, without success, a rate
increase over the original 1909 rates, some of which had been lowered
by President Frio in 1949.

34

CUTELCO was not defenseless.

Its chief, Sosthenes Behn, was

a deft politician, accomplished at dealing with difficult situations confronting his far-flung communications empire. 3 5 During World War II,
at a meeting with the American Ambassador to Cuba, Spruille Braden,
Behn confessed that it was essential to provide ·" a little graft" to help
keep things rolling in Ha van.a.

'W hen Braden protested, Behn replied

that, without at least $3u, 000 a year in payoffs, life in Cuba could be
difficult.

But Braden persisted and Behn, at least for the moment,

agreed to cease.

36

Management in the post-war era was pleased with its Cuban
workers, finding them the best in Latin America.

The company had

33 American Chamber of Commerce of Cuba, Cuba: Facts and
Figures (Havana: 1957), p. 219; IBRD, Report on Cuba, p. 336.

I
I
I
I

34 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 339; Hispanic
American Report, June, 1949, p. 32.

35 In Cuba, Behn was a member of the exclusive Havana Yacht
Club.
36 Spruille Braden, Diplomats and Demagogues_ (New Rochelle:
Arlington House, 1972), pp. 295-296.
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a training school and, by 1957, a factory to make telephones and switchboards.

There was one continuous headache: Cubans were marathon

talkers.

They averaged fifteen to twenty calls per phone per day, as

opposed to five in the U.S.

These calls also tended to last longer:

four and one-half minutes in the U.S.; three times that in Cuba.

This

led to a need for specially modified equipment to _handle the Cuban
traffic.

37
Like the Cuban Electric Company, CUTELCO was the subject

of continuous political attacks.

"It is time for ·congress to intervene

against exorbitant profits enjoyed by foreign capitalism and replace
present foreign companies, like the Cuban Telephone Company, by a
state org:mization, " said Congressman Jose Antonio Pascual in 1936.
11

38

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1·
·1

The telephone company cheats the state, the people and its own stock-

holders," wrote Dr. Is1·ael Soto Barroso in Bohemia in 1949.

39

Congress-

man Ventura Dellunde alleged that CUTELCO, fearful that an Ortodoxo
.victory might mean the company's nationalization, encouraged Batista's
.10

coup of 1952. -

When, in 1955, the company sought a rate increase to

permit expanded services, the liberal Catholic La Quincena called the

3 7 Interview with Harry -Klovekorn, a vice-president of the Cuban
Telephone Company. Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.
38

The New York Times, May 18, 1936.

39Bohemia, March 27, 1949, p. 56.
40 Ibid., June 1, 1952, p. 49.
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company's proposals frauduient.

If CUTELCO could pay a 6 percent

dividend, argued La Quincena, then surely it had suff_icient capital

...

for expansion and need~d no rate increase.

41

Stimt!lated by the offer

of the U.S. Export-Import Bank to ext~nd the company a substantial
loan--as soon as new rates were approved--the company continued its
campaign.
Over the years, the Cuban Telephone Co~pany had been attempting to improve its image.

By 1957, seven of its fifteen directors

and four of its seven principal officers were Cubans.

42

In 1956 the

Cuban national Antonio Rosado was named president of CUTELCO.

He

_was an engineer, a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy and M. I. T.,
and an ITT employee since 1926.

By 1958, Cubans held almost all

managerial posts and <;onstituted more than 99 percent of the five
thousand-man labor force.

43

CUTELCO once told President Prio that if it could not receive
rate increases to improve its services then perhaps the government
ought to buy it.

ITT had sold its Argentine holdings to Per6h in 1946

41 La Quincena, August 19, 1956, p. 37. The company argued
that without at least a 6% dividend no one would buy its stock.

I
I
I
I
I

42 CUTELCO's directors in 1958 included Jose E. Gorr{n (elected
1957), a partner in Cuba's leading law firm; Sergio I. Clark (eiected 1953),
an engineer and ex-minister of communications; Leonardo Morales y
Pedroso (elected 1945), a leading Havana architect; Carlos N. Parraga
(elected 1943), a lawyer; Antonio Rosado (elected 1943), CUTELCO presi~
dent; Juan Sabates (1945), past president of the Sabates soap company.
11
See in Philip Newman, "Joint International Business Ventures, Country
Study #2, Columbia University, July, 1958.
43 Kewman, Cuba Before Castro, p. 109.
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for a handsome $95 million.

Why not sell in Cuba as well?

But nothing

(

developed.

During the Batista era, the National Bank prepared a four

hundred page study of the telephone situation.

The bank's Martinez

Saenz wanted to buy out at least part of the company.

ITT President

Edmond Leavey came to Cuba in December, 1956, apparently to discuss this proposal. The Diario de la Marina then editorialized that,
"it was absurd to maintain, in the middle of the atomic age, a contract
that dates back to 1906. 1144 An American bank was willing to loan $35
million to facilitate the sale.

But Secretary of State Dulles intervened,

saying "it 'was not an appropriate moment" for such an arrangement.
Batista, fearful that Cuba might lose U.S. arms aid, agreed to shelve
. proposal • 45
h 1s
On March 14, 1957, President Batista decreed the long sought
rate increase.

He did it in a manner unforgivable to his political op-

ponents, signing it the morning after the attack by the youths of the
Directorio Revolucionario on the presidential palace.

Among the scores ·

who died on the 13th was Senator Pelayo Cuervo Navarro, a leading
Ortodoxo and critic of the telephone company.

46

Batista's friend,

U.S. Ambassador Arthur Gardner, was present at the signing; some

44 December 9, 1956.
45 This account from L6pez Vilaboy, Motives y culpables,
pp. 378-380.
46 Pelayo Cuervo was murdered by Batista's police on suspicion
that he was linked to the assauH. In the 1930s, Pelayo had been minister
of communications for President Mendieta.
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thought he had a personal f~nancial interest in it. 47 The telephone company presented Batista with a gold telephone in commemoration of the
happy event.

48

CUTELCO's new thirty-year fr?-nchise obliged it, in return for
a 20 percent rate increase, to spend $60 million on improvements. ineluding 61, 000 new phones, by December 31, 1960.

The company had

to pay certain taxes to which it was immune under the 1909 concession.
Cubans were given fi:r$t crack at a new stock offering.

Within two months

they had bought over $_10 million worth of telephone company stock, about
.
49
35 percent of the company's total share capital.
The telephone company
had become a true joipt ventur'e, and a favored investment of the bourgeoisie.

50

The U.S. Export-Import Bank ioaned CUTELCO $17. 5

million as promised. 51 Ambassador Gardner received the National
· 52 ·
Order of Merit.

47 Nicolas Rivero, Castro's Cuba, An American Dilemma
(Washington, D.C.: Luce, 1962), p. 197.
48

Such telephones were standard tokens of esteem for ITT's
preferred clients in the 1950s, going also to Per6n and Franco and to
the presidents of Peru and Chile. The gold phone may be seen in the
Museum of the Revolution in Havana.
49 Newman, Cuba Before Castro, p. 11 O. FCSC Claim #CU-2268
(the First National Bank of Boston) notes an affidavit that by 1960 slightly
more than 50% of CUTELCO's shares were owned by non-U. S. nationals.
Presumably, most of these were Cubans.
50 Noticias (New York}, July 23, 1957.
51 The New York Times, November 12, 1957.
52 Ibid., November 9, 1957.
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Chibas vs. "El pulpo"
The Cuban Electric Company'.s need for new equipment and
capital to pay for it came precisely at the height of a rousing campaign
a gainst the company by Cuba's most dramatic and free-swinging politician,
Eduardo Chibas.
Chiba.s family.

Criticism of Cuban Electric was not a novelty in the
His father, formerly president of the Santiago Electric

Company, wrote as president of the Rotary Club of Havana to El Mundo
53
. in 1928 criticizing Cuban Electric's high rates. In 1933, young Eduardo
denounced, in an exile publication from New York, the "enormous profits" of Cuban Electric. of which President Machado was "the principal
.
1154
shareholder.
In the late 1940s, Chibas began a one-man war against Cuban

Electric.

Angry vver a rate increase offered by President Grau in

1947, Chibas argued that Cuban Electric was making substantial profits
and that its rates were excessive.

They were, he calculated, thr.ee

times the highest rates of the U.S., and twice the highest z:ates in Latin
America. 55 When Cuba's Supreme Court approved the increases,
Chibas accused three of the magistrates of having accepted bribes from
the "anti-Cuban Electric Company." The court sentenced Chibas to

53 Conte Aguero, E du a r do Chibas, p. 118.
54 Ibid., p. 135.
55 Ibid.
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180 days in Jail.

He responded that "for .having defended the public

· 56
interest ••• he would gladly be imprisoned. "
Chib$.s I attacks were
given ample coverage in Bohemia, whose editor, Angel Quevedo, was
his childhood friend.

57

Upon his release from prison, Chiba.s renewed the war with a
stinging attack on his former political associate, President Carlos Prfo.
Chiba.s said Prfo had worked as a lawyer for the electric company in
1942 and had, as a senator, voted to cancel a $4 million debt the company owed to the government. 58 As president, Prio undercut Chibas
by iowering the electric company's rates.

This led the electric com-

pany to suspend its development plans. 59
Complaints against Cuban Elect:::-ic Company continued throughout the 1950s.

The IBRD report noted the widespread belief in Cuba

that the electric company's net worth was inflated in order to conceal
its true profit rate.
cessively high.

The public also thought the company's rates ex-

The IBRD added that the company was owed more than

$9 million for past service to local and federal government.

60

Some

56 Ibid. , p. 593.

I
I
I
I
I

57 Chibas was also a close friend of Quevedo 1s sister.
58 Conte Aguero, Eduardo Chibas, p. 634.
59 Hispanic American Report, July, 1949, p. 33.
60 IBRD, Report, p. 326.

;::...

385

businessmen said high power rates were holding back national development. 61 Others held that, in view of the special difficulties involved in
Cuba, the rates were not exorbitant.

62

U.S. Ambassador Arthur Gard-

rier confided that his most difficult prob.lem was trying to persuade
Batista to permit a rate increase. 63 Batista cut this Gordian knot with
a series of government loans which, by 1959, amounted to $33 million.

64

These were paralleled by loans from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.
By 1954, Cuban Electric was engaged in a planned $147 million expansion program.

To give this enterprise a suitably nationalist coloring,

Serafin Menocal, a nephew of the ex-president, was named general
superintendent of the company in Havana.

65

From 1946 to 1955, the electric company roughly doubled both
its customers (to 650, 000) and its sales of energy (to one billion kilowatt hours).

66

The wages of the electricos rose dramatically from an

61 Newman, Cuba Before Castro, p. 76.
by the National Asso ciation of Industrialists.

This view was shared

62 Interviews with Andres Carrillo, industrialist. Miami, March
10, 1971; Francisco Escobar, hacendado . Miami, April 17, 1971.
63 Samuel Shapiro, r'Castro's Challenge to America," New
Polit ics (Fall, 1961),p. 18.
64

Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study, p. 580.

65 Menocal was a competent electrical engineer, having, despite
his choice parentage, worked his way up through the ranks. In the 1960s,
'he was recalled from retirement by ITT to become vice~p r es ident and
general manager of the troubled Co mpania Panamena de Fuerza y Luz.
In 1972, this company, owned by the Boise Cascade Corp. of Idaho, was
intervened by the Panamanian government.
66 American Chamber of Commerce, Cuba, Facts and Figures,

p. 214.
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average of $95 a month in 1933 to $364 a month in 1859.
workers increased correspondingly.

Benefits for

The elcctricos cnjoye~ a hand-

some club, a cooperative department store, worker housing, financial
aid, a good retirement plan, a library,_ and a highly successful appren.
tice
sys t ~m.

67

68
A car an d a t rip
. t o M'1am1. were wit
. l un
. re~ch
o f many •

Unhappily for the electric company, it managed to offend one
who would not suffer offense: Fidel Castro.

"How often, " he once re-

I
I

marked to Jules Dubois, "did the hard-hearted electric company cut off

I
I
I
I
I

by Castro in 1953 at his famous trial at Moncada.

I

my electricity.

1169

Nationalization of the utility compani~s and refunds

of their excessive rates were among the revolutionary goals expressed
70

The electric company also suffered for the suspect behavio~ of
the chief of the electrical union, Angel Cofino.

Cofino found the labor

movement a convenient ladder into the bourgeoisje.

A one-time com-

munist, the young Cofino was the Autenticos' chosen instrument to break
the communists' hold on the Conf ederacion de Ti'abajadores Cubanos

67 Page, "Toe Development of Organized Labor in Cuba, 11 p. 192,
68 Jacques Arnault, untitled essay on the Cuban revolution as
translated from La Nouvelle Critique #139, · Paris { September-October,
1972) as found in JPRS Translations on Latin America #16, 130, p. 7.
69 Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 104.

I
I
I
I

7 o Castro, History Will Absolve Me~ p. 30.
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(CTC)--the Cuban labor confederation--in 1947. 71 Grau, with Prfo as
his labor minister, forced the communist chief, L6.z~ro Pena, out, installing Cofirfo in his stead (1947-1949).

A dozen years later, Pena

would have his revenge.

The Utilities and the RebellionOne of the curiosities of Castro's rebellion is that he did not
receive much support from the labor unions, as evidenced by the failure of the April, 1958, general strike.

The CTC chief and Batistiano

Eusebio Mujal alleged in 1957 that no more than thirty-five of the nation's 1532 locals favored Fidel.

72

Those unions--or union members--

which lent Castro the greatest support often came from the labor aristocracy: the electric, telephone and bank workers and the pharmaceutical
salesmen.

73

In 1957, a number of electrical workers and engineers joined

Castro's urban underground.

74

For reasons of internal politics unrelatetj.

7 l Cofino 's electricos aided the growth of the Cuban labor movement. Cofifi'.o advised groups who wanted to organize, including the Wooh
worth (Five and Dime) girls in the 1950s and the bank workers in the
1940s. Interview with the labor lawyer, Ernesto Freyre. Miami Beach,
June 10, 1971.
72

Letter from Mujal to The New York Times, June 28, 1957.

73 The chief of the pharmaceutical salesmen was Cesar Lancis,
a long-time Autentico. His traveling salesmen carried arms and messages for the anti-Batista forces. Lancis himself was arrested and imprisoned for a time on the Isle of Pines. Later he turned against Castro,
fleeing to the U.S. in a small boat in November, 1960. See in Avance
(Miami),- September 2, 1960.
74 Moran, "Guerrilla Warfare, "p. 60; Ventura, Memori as , p. 68.
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to the revolution, Cofino, in April, 1957, withdrew his electricos from
the CTC.

ordered Cofino suspended from all functions for two years.
tricos retaliated.

The elec-

In mid-May, one th~msand electricos staged a public

protest against the CTC.

On May 28th, a bomb, apparently planted by

electricos, exploded in Havana, cutting important electric, gas, water
and telephone lines.

The electricos also staged a sitdown strike.

tista responded by temporarily intervening the electric co~pany.
Thereafter, Cofino re~ched an understanding with Batista.

Ba75

The elec-

tricos went back to work. Cofiffo flew to Geneva, ostensibly to attend a
meeting of the International Labor Organization.

76

He did not return

to Cuba, lJut went to Miami to join the anti-Batista Council of Liberation.
Various electricos, like Amaury Fraginals, · continued their personal campaign of bomb.;..ng and sabotage.

Damages rose steadily: over

$100, 000 in February, 1958; over $350, 000 by April; $500, 000-$600, 000

in November.

77

In late 1958, Eladio Carranza, head of the telephone

cables section, and a number of electricos were arrested, accused of
sabotage.

I
I
I
I
I

This infuriated Mujal who, acting with Batista's support,

78

The union made no particular effort in the strike of April 4,

75see The New York Times, April 15, 1957; May 15, 1957;
May 29, 1957. See also Hispanic American R eport, June, 1957, p. 242.
76

Revoluci6n, January 2 5, 1959.

77 Wall Street Journal, February 3, April 4, November 12, 1958.
78 The New York Time:3, October 27, 1958,
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1958.

In fact, most electricos--like most of the bourgeoisie--did not

participate at all in the revolution.

In December, 1958, the Reparto

Electrico had the best Christmas decorations in all Havana.

79

A principal tactic of Castro's rebellion was the cutting of communication lines in order to isolate eastern Cuba.
teen lines were cut almost every night.

In 1958, ten to fif-

In one case, a whole switch-

board was taken, as well as two or three miles of phone cable, all for
use in Castro's camp in the Sierra.

Special precautions had to be taken

0

in Havana to block saboteurs attempting to tunnel into m'ain phone lines.
By late 1958, over a thousand phone poles were down in the three eastern
provinces.

8

° CUTELCO did its best to repair these, believing "our job

is to keep se~vice. 11 81

CUTELCO in Early 1959
Only a few of CUTELCO's five thousand workers . participated
actively in Castro's rebellion.

82

Nonetheless, on January 1, 1959, a

well-organized M-26 militia of CUTELCO employees appeared and took
over the phone company.

CUTELCO emerged unscathed; only a few pay

'/ 9 Interview with Andres Suarez, Cuban politician and official in
the Treasury Ministry in 1959. Author of Cuba, Castroism and Communism, 1959-1966, Gainesville, June 27, 1971.
80 The New York Times, October 22, 1958.
Harry Klovekorn. Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.

Interview with

8l Interview with Harry Klovekorn. Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.
82 By March 1, 1959, CUTELCO had installed 171, 434 telephones
in Cuba, and had 4, 929 employees. See in FCSC Claim #CU.,-2615.
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phones were vandalized.

The first storm signal was Bohemia editor

Angel Quevedo's announcement that he would not carry CUTELCO advertising because the telephone company "was an accomplice of the
dic t .a t ors h"1p. 1183

Five days later, memoranda were discovered in the office of
Batista's public relations man, Edmund Chester, indicating that the
CUTELCO had sperit some $16, 000 on a "propaganda bc:irrage, "in addition to regular advertising, in order to win the 1957 increase.

84

Revoluci6n charged that CUTELCO had bribed newspaper editors and
perhaps other officials as well. 85
On January 21, Castro said telephone rates were going to be

I
I
I
I

lowered because they flowed from ''burdensome concessions" made by
the dictatorship.

86

Communications minister, Enriq~e Oltuski, dis-

covered that the 1957 contract had mysteriously disappeared.

Review-

ing CUTELCO's history, Oltuski· saw "fabulous profits" up to 1930, and

83 Bohemia, January 11, 1959, p. 78.
84 Revoluci6n, January 16, 1959.

I
I
I
I
I

85 This charge is a~parently accurate. Ambassador Bonsal was
told by a phone company official that one condition for the 1957 rate increase "was a contribution to the government's slush fund for subsidizing
the mass communications media. " (Bonsal, Cuba, p. 47.) ITT' s Cuban
operation has a certain familiar ring, reminiscent of the company's political operations in Chile in 1970 and in the United States in 1972. In Chile,
ITT was alleged to have plotted to block the inauguration of President
Allende; in America, to assist the re-election of President Nixon.
86 Diario de la Marina, January 22, 1959.
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then another good era after 1935, so good that Batista's friends urged
him to take over the company.

87

A worried telephone company made

a sympathetic gesture, passing the revolutionary government $500, 000
. a d vance tax payments. 88
in
Every revelation about the telephone company was puffed into a
scandal.

In mid-February, Revoluci6n discovered that seven hunqred

Batis t iano families had received free telephone service. · This service
. stemmed from the 1909 concession which stipulated that 2 percent of
all telephones would be allotted free to the government.

But, in 1959,

what had once been time-honored practice, became a "scandalous
;
1ari"t y. 118 9
1rregu
Labor at CUTELCO was also under attack in those early months.
· The telefoneros had been dominated since 1944 by the ex-communist
9
Vincente Rubiera;· a man noted for his honesty and democratic practice. ~
His stewardship had satisfied both workers and n:ianagement.

91

Unfor-

.tunately, Rubiera was guHty of indifference to Castro's rebellion, having
neither favored nor opposed it.

In 1956, he had joined Jorge Manach 1 s

87 Bohemia, February 1, 1959, pp. 45, 146.
88 Revoluci6n, January 22, 1959.
89 Ibid., February 14, 1959.
90 Page, "The Development of Organized Labor in Cuba," p.
91 Interview with Harry Klovekorn.

195.

Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.
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Movimiento de la Naci6p, a distinguished group of Cuban politicians
looking for a peaceful solution to the political crisis.

This group suf-

fered the fate of many Cuban organizations, falling n.part before the ink
was dry on its original manifesto.

Mo~t dangerous for him, Rubiera

had held office during the regtme of CTC chief

Eusebio Mujal, and

was viewed as a Batistiano.
On February 13, Rubtera was summoned to a meeting of the
National Federation of Telephone Workers.

He recalls that the meet-

ing, chaired by the new GTC chief, David Salvador, was packed with
non-CUTELCO workers.

92

Rubiera was charged with having accepted

$59, 000 in gifts from the telefoneros.

93

When he attempted to speak

in self-defense, he was threatened by armed militiamen .a nd forced to

leave.

94

He was thereafter barred from participating. in union politics

for ten years. 95 Rubiera was replaced by Hugo Martinez Blanco,
M-26er and, for a time, a leading member of the "Humanismo Sindical"
movement.
The Electric Company in 1959
For the electricos, · 1959 began on a note of optimism and fri-

I
I
I
I
I

volity with a Baile de la Libertad at their beach club in Miramar.

The

92

David Salvador, like Rubiera and Cofino, was an ex-communist
and a democrat. Within a year, Salvador himself was barred from participation in union politics. Thus did the democr~ts destroy one another.
93 Revoluci6n, February 14, 1959.
94 Testimony of Rubiera in James Monahan and K. O. Gilmore,
The Great Dec eption (New York: · Farrar, Straus, 1963), p. 21.
95 Revoluci6n, February 14, 1959.
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company was also optimistic.

It was a $300 million enterprise with

brilliant plans for the future.

A vast expansion was under \~ay.

power plants were under active consideration.

Atomic

96

During the first hectic week of January, 1959, Angel Cofino
returned to Havana to assume his position as secretary general of the
el ectricos .

He was immediately pounced upon by the CTC's new chief,

David Salvador.

Only those who participated actively in the revolution

and "are members of our organization" could participate in the labor
movement.

97

Cofino, said Salvador, had been "living a comfortable

life" in Miami while the rebels were risking their necks against Batista.

The Castroite Octavio Louit said Cofino should have joined the

revolution in 1957 when the electricos split with -Mujal and the CTC. 98
Cofino's successor, Amaury Fraginals, added his voice to the
angry chorus: Cofifio was a "stool pigeoi-i and traitor" and ought to be
imprisoned.

99

Fraginals recalled that, in February, 1957, Cofirio

had denounced acts of sabotage by the elec t rico s and that, in April, 1957,
following the assault on the presidential palace, Cofino had telegraphed

96"Cuba lacks both hydroelectric potential as well as native
petroleum supplies, and was forced to import oil to generate electricity.
This was one reason for the relatively high cost of electricity in the old
Cuba.
97 Revoluci6n, January 8, 1959.
9 8Ibid., January21, 1959.
9_9 Ibid., January 21, 1959.
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Batista asking for an audience. lOO On January 23, Cofino attempted
to defend himself, speaking for twenty minutes before an audience of
. hostile electricos, saybg that) to forestall nationalization, Cuban Electric must lower its rates and improve .its service in rural areas.
fino's defense was of no avail.
for ten years.

Co-

The electricos voted to inhabilitate him

101

The vehemence of Cofino's enemies and the regularity of Revoluci6n's attacks against him suggests he was feared, a man of some following.

Yet his former supporters took no public stand in his favor.

March, 1959, he was arrested.
. a rich bourgeois.".
posit box.

102

In

Revoluci6n accused him of living "like

Investigators discovered $120, 000 in his safe de.

But there· was no real evidence against him.

He was

released the followin& day.
In early 1959 all the electric company's sins of omission and

commission, real or imagined, were exhumed, examined and rained
down on the company's head.

And because Castro's government was

in no way indebted to or intimidated by the United States, the protection
that the American Embassy once afforded Cuban Electric Company was
greatly diminished.

I
I
I
I
I

100 Ibid.
101 Ibid .• January 24, 1959. New charges introduced on Jan·. uary 24 included that of hiring'968 Batistianos in the mic}-1950s. At
this meeting, the dice were clearly loaded against Cofino. Though he
spoke for 20 minutes, his comments were given but two brief paragraphs in Revoluci6n.
102 Ibid, March 23, 1959.
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The most immediate dilemma for the electric company was
the electricos' demand for a 20 percent wage hike and changes in hiring
and firing practices.

103

wanted their jobs back.

Workers dis~issed during the Batista era
An "Amoss go. home" campaign began against

the company's U.S. president.

The company responded with some im-

patience that the electricos were the best paid, best treated workers
in Cuba.

Average wages had risen from $231 a month (including bene-

fits) in 1949 to $330 in 1958.

Employment during those years had risen

from 4, 846 to over eight thousand.

104

Nonetheless, · encouraged by a

slowdown strike, the company yieided to almost all of labor's demands,
rehiring those fired for "political reasons" since 1952 and paying insurance benefits to the families of workers killed in Castro's rebellion.
Despite these difficulties, the electric company said it was going ahead
with its $100 million expansion plan.

. .. .

105

The .-electricos' new chief, Fraginals, pushed hard for the wage

increase, a victory necessary to steal the thunder from the communists
on the electric syndicate's executive board.

His successful drive for

a new contract cost Cuban Electric, Fraginals proudly noted, some $4
million more in salaries. 106 Thus were labor and capital destroying
one another.
103 Wall Street Journal, January 8, 1959.
104 Revoluci6n! February 9, 1959.
105 Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1959 • .
106

.
Monahan, The Great Deception, p. 74.
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I
I
I
I
I

Under Suspicion
In February, Communications Minister Oltuski announced an

investigation of contracts _m~de _by the previous government with the
electric and telephone companies, who.se rates he deemed excessive.
Even before the 'investigatory panel had been named, Oltuski assured
the public that rates would be lowered. 1 OS Bohemia thought the ghosts
of the electric company's old enemies, Chibas and Guiteras, "would
.

f

.

Jump or Joy.

-I
1·
I
I
I
I

107

11

11109

Che" Guevara, never one to hide his true feelings, said in

late January that the telephone and electric companies ought to be nationalized.

11

O The intellectual, Mario Llerena, denounced the tele-

phone and 'electric companies "which had always enjoyed the privilege
.
111
of exploiting and r _o bbing the C~ban people with impunity •••• "
He-

chided the government for being afraid of the big utilities.

Oscar Pino-

Santos said the electric company had received $41 million in loans from

1~7 The New York Times, February 24, 1959.
l08 Revoluci6n, March 12, · 1959.
l0 9 April 12, 1959, p. 92.

I
I
I
I
I

110 "Che" Guevara, "Proyecciones sociales del ejercito rebelde, "
Humanismo (Mexico) (January-:-April, 1959 .) Script of a talk given in Cuba
before the 'Socieded Nuestro Tiempo, " January 2 7, 1959, p. 3 55.

111

Bohemia, March 8, 1959, p. 65. Mario Llerena is a graduate of Princeton Theological Seminary. Today he edits anti-Castro
hooks for the University of Miami press.
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the bloody hands of the Batista government.

112

Bohemia's Enrique de

la Osa discovered that the electric company was paying only 10 percent
of its true water bill.

113

In April, the Association of Industrialists

declared that the high cost of electricity was hindering Cuba's development.

114

Thus, from left to right, Cubans from Marxist journalists

to millionaire industrialists were ranging themselves against the utility
companies.
On March 3, the Council of Ministers cancelled CUTELCO's
1957 contract, cut telephone rates, and ordered the temporary intervention of the company.

CUTELC0 1 s officials were stunned.

Its stock

began to tumble, dropping from eighty-seven to twenty dollars a share
by mid-summer.

115

Communications Mi:r'iister Oltuski told CUTELCO's

management that he wanted to root out a "Frankenstein" wh~ch some
thought resided inside ~he company.

He urged management to go home

I
I
I
I
I
I·
I
I
I
I
I

and relax: they would continue to be paid and within two months the
· company would be returned.

116

Oltuski assured the press "of one thing

112

Ibid., January 18, 1959, p. 156. In the first year of the
revolution, the journalist and Marxist intellectual Pino-Santos wrote
more detailed and incisive criticism of the old system and the bourgeoisie than anyone else.
l13 Ibid., February 15, 1959, p. 86.
114 ANIC, Informe y plan del desarrollo industrial, p. 34.
ll5 Fortune, September, 1959, p. 264:
116 Interview with Harry Klovekorn.
1971.

Coral Gables, June 9,
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.
11117
you can be sure, we are not gomg to stab the company m the back.
CUTELCO's American managers passed their time playing
bridge.

The vice-president for plant management, Harry W. Klovekorn.,

noticed that his phone was being tappe~.
feared to talk to him.

Former employees and friends

Klovekorn's Cuban assistant took over his job.

Klovekorn's former secretary began wearing a pistol.
was a communist.

He thought she

118

The new telephone rates were welcomed by the public.

Bohemia

editorialized that the intervention was the realization "of a long-awaited
dream,

11

11
•
11119
the end of half a century .of torture. ·
On March 23, the

CTC staged a massive parade in support of Castro's revolutionary measures.

Intervention of the telephone company was the revolutionary

government's first major intrusion into the private sector.
were quite satisfactory.

The government demonstrated that it could

legislate happiness for the public, and support for itself.

I

I
I
I
I
I
I

The results

The American

Embassy remained mum, Ambassador Bonsal having received no instructions to protest. 12 O

117Havana Times, March 7, 1959. It might be said in Oltuski's
defense that, according to one leading businessman, Oltuski "didn't know
what was going on either." Interview with Abel Mestre of CMQ. Coral
Gables, June 8, 1971.
ll8rnterview with Harry Klovekorn.

Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.

119Bohemia, March 15, 1959, p. 63. Bohemia was the only
journal to oppose the rate increase in 1957. The magazine's large circulation made it financially independent and, hence, freer to speak its
mind than the rest of the press.
120 Bonsal, Cuba, p. 47.
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The electric company made a show of confidence: "The Future

121 The
of Cuba is our Future, " read its ad in the hpril 19 gohemia.
electric company noted it rvas spending $20 million that year for ex-

pansion.

úe

May an electric company ad in Revolución proclaimed:

"We have faith in Cuba and its high desti.ri"". "122 The company de-

clared that over the last decade it had spent $179 million to expand

facilities,

and that

from 1958-1962 it would spend an additional

$1??

million. 123 Cuban Electric 'was, with the possible exception of Moa
Bay mines, the islandf s bi.ggest investor.
In union elections in early summer, the Fidelistas within the

eléctricos beat back a communist challenge despite the communistsr
use of falsified identity eards and electoral documents .124 Cofifiots

allies were also defeated. Business was good.

first

haU of 1959 were ahead of those

foi

R.evenues

for the

125

1958.

. I)rring the summer, Ambassador Bonsal tried to interest the
Cubans in the idea of government regulation of

utilities as an alterna-

tive to national"ization. l: JuIy, he arranged a tour of regulatory agencies in the U. S. for Communications Minister Oltuski, a University of

121p. rcz.
122 ¡1",ro1n"i6n

May 11, 1959.
.r./ray

123

Be¡srni¿,

124

P"rrslución, May 28, 1959.

24, 1959.

125Noti"ias (New York), July 21, 1959.
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Miami graduate who, prior to the revolution, had been planning to establish himself in Florida.

Fertile ground? Oltuski found his eleven

day visit " use f u 1• 11126
The electricos contributed generously to the collection for the
agrarian reform.

Altogether they donated some $140, 000 in cash and

twenty-four tractors.

During the presentation ceremonies, Cuban

Electric's President Walter Amoss, having resisted the earlier "go
home" campaign, stood on the reviewers' stand next to Fidel Castro.

127

In July, Cuban Electric offered to house four thousand visiting

campesinos for the July 26 celebrations in Havana and provided $5, 000
for expenses.

128

But there was more labor trouble.

Earlier, a

com-

mittee of revolutionary electricos had tried to expel 236 "strikebreakers"
hired by the company in 1957.
out solution.

The question rocke~ back and forth with-

Scuffles between opposing sides '~ook place within the

elect!'ic company's Havana offices.

Finally, in July, Fidel, counter-

mantling an earlier decision by the labor minister, had all 236 thrown
OU.
t

129

l26Havana Times,. July 30, 1959. The appropriateness of Bonsal's invitation, even if innocent, seems dubious, coming as it did in
the midst of the government's investigation of the electric company.
127 n· . d 1 M .
1ar10 e a
ar1na, April 11, 1959.
128

Revoluci6n, July 23, 1959.

l29 Diario de la Marina, July 1, 1959; Havana Times, July 2,
1959 •
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Were the electricos alarmed by the specter of nationalization
of their company?

They made no public manifestation of it.

they were preoccupied by their own internal power struggle.

Perhaps
The young

Fidelistas, having won in Havana, wer.e seeking control of the provincial syndicates.

By August, the M-26 was complaining of "chaos"

within the electric syndicate.

130

The M-26 demanded that the ol~er

men of the electricos I directive board demonstrate "revolutionary comportment" by resigning.

The Seventh Congress of Electric Workers

scheduled for September was postponed.

Electric Rates Cut
On August 19, without the slightest warning, the Council of
Ministers approved Law 502, cutting electric rates , an average of 22
percent. This would, on the basis of 1958 billings, mean a loss to the ·
electric company of almost $17. 5 million.

131

The cabiriet's decision

was based on the report of Roberto Acosta's investigating committee.
Acosta's report found the company's assets inflated, its earnings exorbitant.

The electric company's true value was not $292 million as

indicated in the company's ·books, but $206 million.

Profits were 15

·
132
percent, not 5. 75 percent as claimed by the company.
Operating

130 Revoluci6n, August 10, 1959.
131u.s. Congress, Claims, p. 131.
1 3 2 The electric company says its earnings,- 1948-1958, averaged
5. 64%. From 1928-1958 earnings averaged less than 5%. See in U.S.
Congress, Claims, p. 131.
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expenses were $5 million too high becaus.e of inflated engineering, legal,
fuel, interest and other costs.

133

in 19 58 on "indirect publicity?"

134

.
.
Why did the company spend $134, 000

Was this a slush fund for bribes to

newspaper editorialists? · A "great pa~t" of the company's American
executives were old men, thirty-year men, over sixty years of age.
..
•
. d o f excess personne
.
1. 135 B y
a 1so comp1a1ne
A costa 1s comm1ss1on

eliminating these expenses, rates could be slashed 20-30 percent without injury to the company's expansion plans.
Acosta report reflecte?

The Acosta

II

136

Revoluci6n said the

• ••.. 11137
a quarter century o f extortion

report was a devastating blow for the electric com-

pany which, during the first . eight months of 1959, had striven mightily
to be a corporate good citizen, even to the extent of bringing in funds
from New York to maintain the rhythm of its construction program.

138

On October 9, the company issued a detailed rebuttal nf the Acosta report,· denying its assets were inflated and arguing that the report over-

133 The New York Times, September 12, 1959; Revoluci6n,
August 22, 1959.
134 Revoluci6n, August 22, 1959.

I
I
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I
I

l35 An ironic claim, since the Fidelistas were forcing enterprises to hire extra workers in order to improve the employment
situation.
136

The New York Times , September 12, 1959~

137 Revoluci6n, August 22, 1959.
138 u.s. Congress, Claims, p. 131.
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stated revenues and underes~imated expenses.

.

Moreover, the report,

though recognizing that the company was losing $1. 5 million a year on
its natural gas operation, advised against a rate increase unless the
139 Th
. 11 y expan d e d its
. gas f ac1·1·1hes.
.
company su b stanha
e company
tried to discuss these details with government officials,but after a time
all consultations were rebuffed.
The Acosta report seemed indicative of a squeeze play in which
declining income would confront rising costs until the company faltered
and the government intervened.

But there is another side.

Ambassador

Bonsal was aware from his own experience that a utility company using
its own engineering and manufacturing subsidiaries, without benefit of
140
competitive bidding, might well have high· cost~ and unfairly high rates.
Acosta's report had cited U.S. authorities to the effect that the electric
company's assets were so inflated that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would not permit the company to sell securities on the American market.

141

Fortune observed that a twelve year

(1940-1952) SEC investigation into charges of inflated values and excessive interest rates by American and Fbreign Power "found substance in
.
142
some of the complaints."

13 9 Ibid.
140 Bonsal, Cuba, p. 47.
141 The New York Times, September 12, 1959.
142Fortune, February, 1962, p. 218.
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I
I

Almo~t si,multaneously with the publication of the Acosta report,
~e electric company had succeeded in floating $15 million in bonds on

I
I
.1

t!ie New York market.
~~g~
~

But news bf the lowering of electric rates had

the bonds seem a dubious propo~ition.

143
The issue was cancelled.

QG~Ob~r. American and lib reign Power cut its quarterly dividend in

~.~lt,

ci1-

~raphi,c demonstration of the importance of its Cuban subsidiary.

I
I

tg:_~ ~l~ctric

I

145
·
~~J:)ts.; " · - - ':(hi,s. ~atte:i;- complaint was a favorite one of the electric

The.- ac_o~ta..

:report stimulated a regular barrage o~ attac~s on

company~

CTC chief David Salvador praised the rate cut

¥.:}_<!- qeI)O~I)Ged the company for excessive rates and "alteration of re-

·. ·.

I ·•.
I
I
I

. '

I.

'

· Q.Q:l:J::l~@:y-'s. Cuban consumers.

A 111:~m:th·late:r,_ Carteles found "almost

146
•
• e 1ectr1c
. • b"ll
~--ll- H_ avana II was pro t estmg
its
1 s.

CUTELCO Going Down
.. . '";_: -,. : ~oUowing its intervention in .March, 1959, CUTELCO's new
·. ·. .
~ .aJ1agers reported they were saving at least two million a year by
.e_l:j.p'l.ipati_ng foreign technical help and superfluous personnel.

I

I
I
I
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But

CUTELCO's American managers were told, contrarily, that by late
1_959 the company's staff had practically doubled.

I

144

As the Cuban economy

- 1_43 Th e New York Tim e s, August 26, 1959.
1 4 4 Noticias (New York), November 3, 1959.

l _4._5 Revoluci6n, August 21, 1959.

1-46
·
- ~ Carteles, October 4, 1959, p. 38.
147
.
April 12, 1959, p. 90.
· B o.h em1a,

I
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I

slowed, various businesses requested the removal of telephone switchboards from their offices.

CUTELCO's revenues fell accordingly.

By

I

the fall of 1959, more than one hundred switchboards (fifty line units),

I
I
I
I

mute evidence of Cuba's sagging econo~y, clogged CUTELCO's warehouse.

148

Pri':ate phones were also being removed: where two had

served before, one was now sufficient.

The once garrulous bourgeoisie

found it did not have much to say--over the telephone at least.

Who

might be listening?
More evidence was adduced to discredit the former management.

I

Communications Minister Oltuski was investigating a "report" that the
telephone company had given $2 million in stocks to Batistianos to
149 Th A
. ·1·1tate. t h e 1957 rate increase.
..
.
.
G eorge
e merican
engmeer,
f ac1

E. Goldthwaite, contracted by Batista in 1955 to study the proposed rate
increases·, .tol.d Bohemia that the 1957 increases were unnecessary and
that the new contract was more favorable to CUTELCO than to Cuba.
·Goldthwaite wanted to know why his recommendations had been ignored.1

50

CUTELCO employees were apparently satisfied with the nationalization.

In October, Luis E. Mustelier, the company's new commercial

director, said he wasn't going to renew his subscription to Life en

148 Interview with Harry Klovekorn.' Coral Gables, June 9, 1971.

l49 Diario de la Marina, April 2 5, 1959.
150

·.
Bohemia, May 10, 1959, pp. 8-9.
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Espa~ol because of the shabby treatment the magazine had been giving

. recen t mon tl1s. 151
Cuba in
In March, 1960, CUTELCO's new managers announced they were
152
.
th e IIc h ron1c
. d e f.ic1enc1es
•
• II in
•
C u b a I s te1ep11one service.
.
overcoming
Among improvements cited vyere a savings of $5 million through increased efficiency, the installation of 40, 000 new phones and the e1:1ployment of 952 new workers.

153

U.S. sources tended to· take a dimmer

view, seeing by late 1959 the exhaustion of cash reserves, the skipping

of dividends, and an appeal to the government for a $15 million loan to
meet operating expenses.

154

CUTELCO's new management was also

I
I·
I

neglecting to pay its bills.

I

president of ITT came down from New York to see Oltusk.i on several

I

I
I
I

I
I

When ITT complained about the failure of its

Cuban affiliate to pay up for long distance calls, Bohemia chose to see
·t h·is as a

menace. 11155

II

ITT did attempt to negotiate with Castro's government.

occasions, but without re.s ult.

156

A vice·

In October, 1959, most of the American

151 Revoluci6n, October 10, 1959. Mustelier, whose son died in
the fight against Batista, later joined the counterrevolution, participating
in the Bay of Pigs invasion. In captivity he was accused of owning 118
caballerfas of land. Hence, he was a latifundista. See in Aurelio Martinez, Historia de una agresi6n (Habana, 1962), p. 42 _1 .
152 Bohemia, March 13, 1960, p. 43.
153

El Mundo, March 6, 1960.

154Noticias (New York}, November 24, 1959.
155Bohemia, January 24, 1960, p. 68.
l5S Interview with Harry Klovekorn.

Coral Gables, Jurie 9, 1971.
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management personnel left; the last, Vice President I, W. Gleason, was
expelled in February, 1960.

Thereafter relations were frozen.

Only the denuncias continued. · In April, Bohemia's Carlos
"" d a d eerie
. d a h ost o f
C astane

II

scan d a 1s II. uncovere d b y t h e new manage-

ment. 157 These included the $900, 000-a-year engineering fee, the expenditure of $400, 000 a year on advertising, $919, 000 in "bribes" to
the press in 1957, discrimination against Cuban technicians, overpayment for equipment bought from company affiliates·, and excessive
overtime pay.

Also, all the company's internal business. was conducted

in English because the American managers didn't know Spanish.

158

Cuban Electric Go ing Down
On September 3, 1959, Havana Province's electricos elected
their new chief: a stranger~ Octavio Louit.

He had led railroad strikes

in Guantanamo in 1956 and in Santiago in April, 1958.

H·e was arrested

by the Batista forces, tortured, and imprisoned until Fidel's victory.
Louit was a strong anti-communist.

159

At the tumultuous CTC assembly

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I
I
.I

of November, 1959, he was chosen to be one of the CTC's thirteen diAn old AFL-CIO cold warrior thought Louits selection to be

I

157 In exile, Carlos Castaneda became an editor of Life en
E spanol. Thereafter, editor of El Dfo in Puerto Rico. While Cas taneda was attacking the telephone company, he was himself being attacked by the communists for being a counterrevolutionary. See in
Havana Times, January 25; 1960.
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rectors.

158 Bohem i a , April 17, 1960, pp. 41, 96, 110.
15 9 Revoluci6n, July 26, 1959.
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window dressing.
was held.

160

Later that month, the Seventh National Congress

There Fidel Iglesias was elected secretary general of the

,.
.
161
electr1cos.

With its rates cut and bond issue quashed, the electric company
was in trouble . .Already s_ome workers were urging the company's nationalization.

162

Thanks to a series of temporary interruptions of

service, the government was threatening to place inspectors inside the
plant.

In November, the el.ectric company, desperate for funds to pay

off an $8 million loan from . 5-:µc U:. S. banks, turned to Cuba's Banco
Nacional.

163
This request was ignored; the company defaulted on its loans.

The Banco Nacional also denied the company permission to convert Cuban pesos into dollars to pay foreign creditors.
In November, Angel Cofino emerged briefly from obscurity to _

attend the wedding. of his son. 164 Carlos Prio, Tony Varona, Mario
Fleites and various others of Cofi.fi'o 's old Autentico cronies were pre!sent. In January, 1960, the clouds lowered again; the IYIRBM was said
to be investigating an offer by Cofiffo of $10, 000 for the agrarian re- ·
form.

165

By December, 1960, Cofino was in asylum at the Argentine

Embassy.

I

·1
I
I
I

160 Romualdi, Presidents, p. 210.
161 Revoluci6n, October 2, 1959.
1 6 2 Ibid., September 23, 1959.

l6_3 U. s. Congress, Claims, p. 130.
164 Havana Times, November 9, 1959.
165 Ibid., January 25, 1960.
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On January 5, 1960, the electric company inaugurated its

Tallapiedra hydroelectric generating plant, providing 66, 000 kilowatts
for Havana, a concrete demonstration of the company's development
.plan.

This did nothing, however, to soften Communication Minister

Oltuski's own report on CCE.

Echoing the earlier Acosta report, 01-

tuski criticized the engineering services provided by American and
Foreign Power's Ebasco division, services which cost $4 million in
1959.

166

Oltuski charged that construction of electric plants at Bo-

quer6n, Matanzas, Regla and Santiago had been paralyzed since 1948.
He decried the "chaotic" and "inefficient" condition of the electric company's administration.

167

President Amoss replied that the electric

.
Cu b a . "th e b es t e 1ec t ric
. .service
.
· L a t"m America.
·
company h a d given
in

,il 68

A week later, CCE's New York parent; Electric Bond and Share, warned

of a potential powe~ shortage if higher rates were not adopted.

169

Elec-

tric company officials told the Wall Street Journal that they were negotiating "from a position of strength. "

170

Whistling in the dark! Towards

the end of 1959, workers' militias were formed, further eroding the

166

Oltuski even had the audacity to cite the Ame rican Foreign
Policy Association's dour comments of 1934 on the el ectric company.
167 Bohemia, February 14, 1960, pp~ 51, 87.
168 lbid.
169 lb.d

1 •

170

I

I

February 21, 1960, Supp. 8.

Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1 ~60.
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power of CCE's management and the electrico union.

In January, 1960,

platoons of militia women from the electric company marched to the
171
palace to present $50, 000 for the purchase of arms and aircraft. ·
• !

•

By April, the electrico's contributions _for arms exceeded $100, 000.

172

In April, 1960, the new chief of the Santiago branch of the elec-

tric union, Salvador Gonzalez, asked for the electric company's nationalization, citing the company's refusal to adhere to announced expansion plans.

173

In June, Oltuski accused the company of "sabotage, "

~d warned of drastic :r:neasures. 174 The Castroites inte~preted the
U.S. Embassy's failure to protest. the lowering of electric rates as
indicative of the weakness of the company's arguments.

These new

.
175
rates saved the public $17 million.
Oltuski said he agreed with Fi..,.
del's History Will Absolve Me: Cuban Electric ought to be natfonalized.
This was only fair, thought Oltuski, since, over the years, the company's profits surely exceeded its investment.

But Cuba needed to put

all available capital into the agrarian reform and did not have the $40
million a year necessary for development of electric services.

Oltuski

warned that,if the company refused to continue its planned expansion, it
would be nationalized.

I
I
I
I
I

176

171 El Mundo, January 14, 1960.
172Ibid., April 13, 1960.
173 Ibid.

I

}ipril 9, 1960.

174Ibid., June 17, 1960.
l75Ibid., June 23, 1960.
176 Ibid.
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Nationalization
The nationalist axe fell on the electric and telephone companies
on August 8, 1960, in retaliation for President Eisenhower's cutting of
the Cuban sugar quota.

As news of the. nationalization spread, trucks

of the two utility companies raced through the streets, to~ting their
.
.
177
'
horns m triumph.
The telefonero leader, Hugo Martinez, thought

it a great day; imperialism's terrible monopolies had been laid low.

178

Electrico leaders, Ama~ry Fraginals and Fidel Iglesias, expressed publie ·satisfaction. Fraginals said the nationalization showed the imperialists that, although "we are a small nation, we have the courage and au. to engage m
· great enterprises.
·
"
dac1ty

179

· Students 1aunc h e d co ff"ms

bearing the names of the telephone and electric companies I mascots,
11

11

1

Tonito Rin-Rin and Reddy Kilowatt," into .the sea from the Malecon. CUTELCO was christened the "13th of March" in memory of the assault

on the presidential palace in 1957.

The electric company was renamed

"Antonio Guiteras II after its old antagonist.

American and Foreign

177 The New York rimes, August 9, 1960. This was a replay of
1933 when 'a fleet of electric company service trucks filled with cheering employees sped through downtown streets announcing the seizure of
the properties by the government." (New York Times, January 15, 1934.)
One wonders if many of the same men were at the wheels of those delirious trucks in 1960.
178 El Mundo, August 9, 1960.
179

Ru{z, Traici6n, 1960, p. 222; El Mundo, August 12, 1960.
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Power's Chairman Henry Sergeant said he was not at all surprised.

180

But he must have been unhappy, given the fact that in Mexico, only a
few months before, American and Foreign Power had managed to sell
off its utility for $70 million.

In Cuha _they would get nothing.

181

The electricos apparently believed nationalization meant new
jobs, prestige and importance for themselves.

T:Venty-four of Cuban

Electric's highest functionaries, mostly American, were removed and
replaced by five revolutionaries.

A saving? Perhaps.

an illusion since the new administrator,rebel

But more likely

Captain Angel G6mez

Trueba, hastened to appoint no less than eighty-nine auxiliaries. 182
.A great celebration titled "A Night without Reddy Kilowatt" was pre-·

pared to introduce the new leaders.
In October, th~ electricos suffered a sudden reversal.

The CTC

leadership accused Fraginals and his associates of the Havana branch of
"creating problems" with the new administration. . The Havana electricos

180 As chairman of Cuban Electric's Board of Directors, Sergeant had been receiving $4, 500 a month. ( El Mundo, August 11, 1960.)

-

181 Cuban Elect;ic claimed a loss before the FCSC of $323 million. (Claim #CU-2578.) The FCSC allowed $267. 6 million, subtracting,
among other things, $38 million owed to Cuba's Financiera Nacional.
(Decision #CU-4122.) In ITT's claim before FCSC (CU #2615), CUTELCO's
total assets were valued at $135 million. ITT itself claimed a loss of $61
million, $53 million for CUTELCO and the remainder for subsidiaries in
Cuba. The FCSC ruled ITT's losses to be $50 million, with an $80 million loss for the company's Cuban and American stockholders. (FCSC
Decision #CU-5013.)

0

182 R.u1z,
I
T ra1c1
. "6 n, 1960, p. 222 •
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were guilty of "economism ",.:..of preferring their own narrow interests
11183 Th
.
"h
.
t o f t h e revo 1ut10n
.
·
agamst
t e h"1gh er mteres
an d t h e !1at10n.
e
company's. intervenor undercut Fraginals' power by removing his allies
from key positions.
police.

Fraginals began t9 be follovred by the secret

184 ·
The electricos split.

Some joined the underground; others joined

the pro-Castro "United Front of the Revolution. " On November 27, the
government intervened the Cubanaleco workers' club, ostensibly to end
. 1 d"1scr1m1na
. . t·10n t h ere. 185 T wo d ays 1ater, a series
.
o f b om b ex· rac1a
plosions left much of H~vana without electricity.

A number of electri-

cos were detained on suspicion. 186
On December 5, pro-Castro electricos of the newly-formed
"United Front of the R,evolution" denounced the silence of their old
leaders over the recent bombing and suggested that electricos Jesus
Fernandez, Juan F. Collado and Pedro Fraginals and others were involved.

187

I
I

A few days later, some electricos were captured while at-

tempting to escape from Cuba by small boat.
The CTC called a meeting for December 9 to expel Fraginals
183 El Mundo, October 5, 1960.
184 Monahan, The Great Deception, pp. 75-76.
185 The electric, telephone and bank sectors employed whites
almost exclusively.
186Ru{z, Traici6n, 1960, p. 361.
l87 Pedro Fraginals, a leader of the worker.s' militia and brother
of the Havana syndicate leader, Amaury Fraginals. Rufo, Traici6n, 1960,
p. 367.
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I
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I
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from the labor movement.

To forestall this, the electricos made a

dramatic but futile gesture: one thousand marched on the presidential
"F ragwa
. 1s s1,
f
C u b a s1,
~ Rus1a
. no. rrl88 Pres1"d ent
.
pa1ace s h ou t IDg

Dortic6s invited Fraginals into the palace to make his complaint.
Fraginals said the electricos W8.nted their contract _respected and the
government's meddling to cease.

189

At the-San Vicente plant at Ciego

de Avila, the CTC leader and communist Jesus Soto was almost mobbed
.
.
190
by angry electric workers.
The electricos were waking up at last.

But it was too late.
The Castro regime summoned all its forces to crush the electricos.

Emilio Aragones, national director of Castro's M-26 Movement,

demanded the expulsion of Amaury Fraginals, Fidel Iglesias and other
.
.
1ea
. d ers. 191 Wh en t h e C T C hierarchy_
.
counterrevo 1ut10nary
e l'ectrico

assembled, thirty-one of the CTC's thirty-three affiliates supported the
government's position.

192

The· Federation of University Students marched

l88 The New York Times, December 10, 1960.
l89 Monahan, The Great Deception, p. 79.
19 0wall Street Journal, December 23, 1960.

I

I
I

191 The M-26 was a moribund organization from late 1959 on.
Nonetheless, it was useful to summon such a respected ghost to join the
general protest. Fidel manipulated Cuban organizations just as Batista
had done. The key element in both cases was the same: the president had
supreme power~ One had to obey.
192 El Mundo, December 14, 1960.
•,

I

..

..
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to CTC headquarters to demonstrate their support.

Pro-government

union officials charged that the rebellious electricos had been duped,
led to believe that nationalization meant lower salaries and reduced
·benefits.

,v

The mischievous hand of th~ old Mujalista Angel Cofino was

seen behind all this.

193

A CTC Assembly on December 15 expelled Fraginals, Iglesias
and their associates.

Cofino was also drummed out, barred forever

from the labor movement.
postponed.

Elections within the electric union were

Castro was there, berating the electrical workers "because

they did not think as a class, but as a sector of a particular union.

11

Fidel saw the electricos betraying the whole working class "for a little
crumb •.• for a miserabie dish of lentils. ,il
only paid good wages ..• because
electricos were present.

11

94

The electric company
•

,

,

the people paid the bill.

11195
. Few

Most of the crowd was comprised of students

and workers in non-electrical industries.

196

In the days that followed, the electric union disintegrated and was

then ground fine under the heel of the revolution.

Fraginals went into

hiding; then into exile. 197 On December 19, six hundred electricos

193 Ibid.
194

Arnault, La Nouvelle Critique, p. 52.

195 Rufz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 378.
196
197

Ibid., p. 377.

.
Wall Street Journal, December 23, 1960.
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signed a petition denouncing their former leaders and asking for "severe
and exemplary punishment" for the saboteurs of November 30, who had
been "paid, organized and directe.d" by the imperialists.

198

The next

day, a number of counterr.evolutionaries were expelled from the electric
union in Santiago.

199

The following week, communist party members

led a purge of the electric union in Las Villas.
basement of the electric company in Havana.

200

A bomb went off in the

By late January, 1961,

689 electricos had been fired for their failure to cooperate with the
• · t ra t•ion. 201
company I s new a dmm1s
Thus the fate of the electricos: pummeled from without by the
Castro regime; disintegrating from within, thanks to the intrigue and
ambitions of its union chiefs.

The Castroites discovered that the old

unions could be destroyed as easily by manipulating hopes and ambitions as by head-on attack.
Neither the electric nor the telephone company were defended
by their unions.

When the capitalist system was. challenged by the

198 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 380. A curious aspect of Cuba's
revolutionary rhetoric i s that all classes and groups are seen as inert,
unaware of their self-interest, and incapable of defending it until "imperialism" (the CIA) takes them by the hand. Thus, for the Castroites,
all counterrevolutionary activity originates in New York or Washington.
199
200

El Mundo, December 21, 1960.
t

Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 388.

201 Avance (Miami), January 27, 1961, p. 21.
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revolution, labor folded its arms ••• or applauded.

The electric and

.

telephone companies I past misdeeds, real and imagined, were brilliantly
manipulated by the Castroites to create a public opinion unfavorable to
-the utilities.

They became pariahs: indefensible.

The revolutionary

government wanted the utilities to radically expand their services into
the countryside.

Only government-owned utilities, indifferent to con-

siderations of profit, could provide such services.
The 1960s would prove to be a great watershed decade in which
the American utilities . that had brought electric power and communications to Latin America in the 1920s and 1930s would be judged anachronisms.

After a generation of training, the Latin Americans were fully

capable of running their own utilities.

202

202 As of October, 1970, 1, 778 of CUTELCO's 5, 000 employees
had gone into exile. Some 400 of these found work in telephone companies in the United States and Puerto Rico. See in Unidad : O rgano
oficia:.l de la Federaci6n de Tr aba.jadores Telef6nicos de Cuba en el
exilio, January, 1971. In exile, the Telephone Workers' Federation,
presided over by Vicente Rubiera, depends heavily on contributions
from ITT.
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IX.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

The Catholic church was Cuba's principal private institution.
Certainly it was the oldest.

But like other Cuban institutions, it was

weak, suffering a multitude of flaws.

"Era hueca,

Catholic. 1 This may be too severe a judgment.

II

said one thoughtful

But the church did suf-

fer from a surfeit of foreign clergy, an insufficient concern with social
problems, and a divided leadership.

Most of all, the church seemed to

have limited its clientele; it was lar:gely an urban phenomenon, a ser-

I
I

I
I

vice for th.e souls of the bourgeoisie.
These things began to change after World War II.
ban seminaries appeared,

8.S

Properly Cu-

well as a Catholic university and vigorous

new Catholic organizations concerned with social problems.

Castro's

revolution caught the church in this period of transition, at a hopeful but
vulnerable moment.

Progressive Catholics, admiring Castro's social

program, embraced the revolution.

As Castro moved further to the

left, raising the lance of social justice against the rights cif private prop-

I
I

erty, the church was left confused, disoriented and disunited.

time the issue was reduced to "Rome or Moscow?, " it was too late. 2
1 "Era Hueca ": it was but a shell; a facade. Interview with
Miguel Bretos, member of the J6venes Estudiantes Cat61icos {JEC) in
Matanzas. Coral Gables, February 17, 1971.
.
211
II
··
Rome or Moscow? : title of a pastoral letter of Archbishop
Enrique Perez Serantes, November 13, 1960.
.

I
I

By the
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By 1961, Cuba's Catholic church was in an advanced state of disintegration.

Cuba's nuns and priests were exiled to Spain, -Mexico and the

United States from whence they had come.

In less than three years, the

mirage of five centuries of Catholicism was collapsed into impotence.

Difficul ties
The motives for the church's weakness in Cuba were cyclical,
endlessly feeding and .reinforcing each other.
was perhaps the most important.
element of -colonial control.

The Spanish connection

Spain used the church in Cuba as an

In four centuries of Spanish rule, there

was but one native Cuban bishop. 3 This discredited the church in the
eyes of the criollos (native Cubans),· discouraging interest in church
careers.

·T his anti-national role was most notorious during Cuba's

war o~ independen~e when the church, then largely comprised of Spanish
priests, had strongly supported Spain.

,

heroes Jose Marti and Antonio Maceo.
The Cuban church also suffered great material loss at Spanish
One result of the liberal revolution in Spain of 1820 was the sup-

pression of religious orders in Cuba.
exiled, church properties seized.

I
I
I
·1

Churches were turned into

Spanish fortresses; Te Deums were sung on the deaths of the Cuban

hands.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Convents were abandoned, brothers

The law was later reversed, but the

3 Cuba's native bishop was the santiaguero Echevarria Nieto. See
Gerardo Lebroc, "sfntesis hist6rica de la iglesia cat61ica," in Anuario
c!e la i gl esia cat6lica, Cuba: isla v dias pora, 1972, ed. by Eduardo Boza
Masvi dal (Caracas: Ediciones Paulinas, 1972), p. 11.
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damage could not be undone • . And in the 1830s this suppression was
renewed.

4

.

In 1861, the state agreed to pay rents of some half a mil-

., . .
5
lion a year on confiscated church properties.
These payments were
discontinued during Cuba's war for independence in 1895.
cash settlement was made.

Eventually a

The 20th century found the Cuban church

stripped of its income-producing lands and properties, while the populace was disinclined to contribute, having come to think of religion as
a service provided by the state.
rich for sustenance.

6

The church was forced to turn to the

But the rich were hardly stable alli~s, having

themselves been pulverized by war and revolution and depression.

Thus

the church in Cuba lacked all manner of stability, power and prestige.
The situation was quite different from that of Columbia or Peru where
a powerful oligarchy and prestigious church lent support to one another.
These negative factors had their practicaJ. effect. In the Cuba of
,
the 1950s, a bright young member of the alta-:-burguesia with a religious
vocation was dissuaded from entering the priesthood by his parents who
wanted something better for him.

A young girl's father prevented her

from attending a colegio run by Mexican nuns who were themselves
hardly edu<?ated.

I
I
I
I
I

Even the famous Belen prep school was not always

4 G· erar do L e b ros,

"s~m t es1s
·

h.1s t6 r1ca,
·
" A nuar10,
·
p. 13.

5 David A. Lockrnj.ller, "The Settlement of the Church Property
Question in Cuba," RAHR (November, 1937); p. 488.
6 Bishop Evelio Diaz commented in 195 9 that th~ church did not
., own a single plantation or have any investments in them. (Diario de la
Marina, November 24, 1959.)
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held in great esteem.

In ~e 1920s, some thought it much too Spanish •. 7

The austerity, regularity and submission demanded of true
Catholics grated ·most unhappily against the exuberance, individualism
and indiscipline of the Cuban character.

Moreover, there was the ques -

tion of manliness, of machismo. The church was thought womanish, effeminate.

There were, on occasion, rumors of homosexual scandals.

A man might take his wife and family to church on Sunday, but he would
remain outside smoking until the service was over.
'

manera

11

ran the popul_ar phrase.

8

the Cuban's religious indifference.

"Cat6lico a mi

There were numerou~ jokes about
The average Cuban was said to enter

church on but three occasions and on two of th~se--baptism and burial-he was carried.
This was clearly the case in the countryside·.

Although there

were some zealous rural priests and some chapels at sugar mills, in
general the campesino was unattended by the _c hurch.

How different from

South America--in the Andean countryside, for instance, where the
church was omnipresent and the parish priest a virtual cacique, social
and spiritual.

In a survey of religion in the countryside by the Agrupa-

ci6n Cat6l~ca Universitaria in 1957, only 52 percent of the heads of
farm families interviewed declared themselves to be Catholics.

Ninety-

three percent never went to mass; 53 percent had no idea who their

7 Interview with Ramiro Sanchez who maintained statistics on
the church for Acci6n Cat6lica in Havana. Miami, February 18, 1971.
8 "Catholic in my own fashion. "

...

.....
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parish priest

Wf!S.

9

An anthropologist studying the rural town of

Bejucal in 1954 found that "participating in religious practice ••• was
· limited to only a small number of p·eople.

111

O

The greatest enterprise of the church in Cuba was the education
of the sons and daughters of the bourgeoisie, especially at the colegio
(high school) level.

In 1959 the chut'ch maintained twenty-four schools

for boys (16, 000 students) and eighty-eight for girls (65, 000 students). 11
Most prestigious were the Jesuits' Belen and the Chri~tian Brothers'
La Salle for boys, and the Merici and Sacred Heart Academies for girls.
The church's schools helped to mold bourgeois values which in 1959 were
attacked as selfish, exclus~vist, arrogant.

At the Colegio Belen, stu-

dents were encouraged to emulate their parents' contempt for the dirty
business of Cuban politics.

12

The bourgeoisie's link with the church was evident in the location of the churches.

The largest churches rose in the wealthiest dis-

tricts, showcases for the pomp and circumstance of the marriages of
the rich.

Among the newest was Corpus Christi, located conveniently

9 Oscar A. Echevarrfa Salvat, La agricultura cubana, 1934--1966
(Miami: Ediciones Universal, 1971), p. 14-16.

I
I
I
I
I

lO George M. Stabler, "Bejucal: Soc ial Valu es . and Changes in
Agricultural Practices in a Cuban Urban Community" (Unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation: Michigan State University, 1958), p. iii.

11 List provided by Ramiro Sanchez, op. cit.
12 Interview with Father Daniel Baldor, S. J., rector of Belen
in the 1950s. Miami, June 10, 1971.
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close to the Yacht and Country Clubs.

The land was donated by Carlos

Miguel de Cespedes. a former minister of Machado.

Cespedes' home.

which had previously occupied that site, had been burned down by a mob
in 1935.

13

Outstanding among the church builders was the energetic ItalianAmerican priest, Father Lorenzo Spirale.
sent Spirale to Cuba in 1926.

The Augustinian order first

I

After learning Spanish, Spirale, anxious

I
I
I

to build churches, won over the rich by engaging their wives in church
activities and ingratiating himself with them in every possible manner,
even accompanying them on t::--ips to Europe.

Spirale became a close

·,

friend of Agustin Batista of the Trust Company of Cuba and of such .
powerful families as the G6mez Menas, the Fanjuls, Mesas, Fernandez
Casas, Cardenas, and Palacios.

14

On one occasion he accompanied the

grande dame of Cuban suciety. Marfa Luisa G6mez Mena to lunch at the
Ritz in Paris, thereafter eliciting a $200, 000 donation.

The countess

later remarked that it was the most expensive lunch she had ever had.

15

.

Spirale, whom the lawyer Jorge de Cubas thought the most suecessful priest in Cuba, was once asked to build a church at the exclusive

13 Carlos Miguel de Cespedes, the "master builder" of Havana,
built much of the gilded suburbs of Miramar and the Country Club District in the 1920s. See Woon, Cocktail Time, p. 98.
14 J. J. Kelly, OSA. La Cuba del padre Spirale (Madrid: Ediciones
·Fe Cat61ica, 1971), p. 156.
15 Ibid .• p. 219.
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beach resort of Tarara for some of his wealthy friends.
the money.

He built the church.

They raised

On another occasion Spirale built a

church and school in the elegant Biltmore district, but only after convincing its owners that a church would.enh~nce real estate values.

16

The close links between the rich and the church were often the
subject of negative comment.

The Vincentian Father Hilario Chaurrondo

thought the building of fine churches for the rich, while ignoring the needs
of the poor, was a shameful thing, a kind of 11 crown of thorns" on the
.
conscience
of C atho 1·1c Havana.

17

to build the Clinica San Lorenzo.

Such criticisms encouraged Spira1e
The clinic, financed by Spirale's rich

friends and named after himself, was designed to serve the poor in one
of Havana's more wretched barrios.

I
I
I
I

Completed in 1948, the clinic was
•. ,

manned by volunteer doctors and young burgueses of Acci6n Cat61ica.
Spirale's fellow Augustinian, Father Kelly, thought the clinic a political
weapon.

It would demolish the "attractive but false and misleading com-

.munist propaganda

"

.-

.

1

.
8
about the church's lack of concern for the poor.

Another weakness of the church lay in the looseness of its organization, a looseness which conspired against effective soc:ial or political
action. The Cuban church was divided in twain, the Archbishop of Havana

I
I
I
I
I

ruling the three western provinces and the Archbishop of Santiago ruling
the eastern provinces.

They commanded (in 1959) a small army of

16 Ibid.,
· p. 168.

l 7.La Quincena (Havana), April 15, 1960, p. 20.
18 Kelly, La Cuba dcl Padre Spirale, p. 202.

425

religious personnel: 426 di.o cesan priests, 6~6 regular priests, 398
teaching brothers, 2773 nuns and various hundreds of others in training in seminaries.

There were at least thirty-eight different orders in

Cuba. 19 There were Jesuits and Augu_stinians, Dominicans, Franciscans and Salesians; there were Carmelites and Barefoot Carmelites;

I
I
I
I
I

there were Daughters of Charity as well as ?ons and Brothers of
Charity; a great confusion of qrders, all with their own interests, each

I

seemingly going its own way.
The Archbishop of Havana, Cardinal Manuel Arteaga y Betancourt, was a native Cuban o{ patrician lineage.
father had fought for Cuban ~ndependence.
first native-born cardinal.

His father and grand-

In 1946, he became Cuba's

He made substantial contributions to the

church, but in 1959 he was eighty years old, ill, arid not always of
clear mind.

Some thought the real leader of the church, "Cuba's

Spellman, "was the bluff and vigorous gallego; the seventy-six year old
Archbishop of Santiago, Enrique Perez Serantes.

20

And there was the

papal nuncio, Msr. Luis Centoz, a man of independent power, beholden
only to Rome.

In addition there were four bishops who might make of-

ficial pronouncements within their dioceses; there were thirteen independent Catholic lay organizations each with a "spokesman"; and finally,

19

I

Boza Masvidal (ed.), Anuario, p. 174.

2 0 Letter to author from Enrique Baloyra, member of Agrupaci6n
Cat61ica in Cuba. Charlotte, North Carolina, May 18, 1972.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
.I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

426

the lay intellectuals whose µiain function ·seemed to be to belabor the
bourgeoisie when they were not attacking one another.

"solid and unitary structure" or°'th~ church which was to confront the
Castro revolution.

Sometimes it seemed more an anarchy than a

hierarchy •

The Renaissance of the 1950s
After World War II, the church, aware of a need for improve~ent, began to take some important forward steps.
the need of a truly Cuban priesthood.

Most urgent was

Seminaries had existed in Havana

and Santiago since the 18th century but had been periodically closed down,
graduated few priests, and were of minimum prestige.

After World

War II, however, Cardinal Arteaga revived Havana's San Carlos Seminary, the Jesuits established their Calvario, and novitiates and retreat
houses for various other orders were founded.
There were efforts to organize the laity to stimulate a more
Catholic solution to Cuban problems.

The Jesuits, preferring ever to

work close to the centers of power, organized, Lr1 1931, the Agrupaci6n
Cat61ica Universitaria,

I
I
I
I
I

Such was the

whose theme was

11

21

·an elitist corps of Catholic university students

en cada primer puesto un Agrupado, " that is, an

2lorganized by Father Rene de Castro, S.J., the Agrupaci6n
included Bishop Boza Masvidal, the editor Angel Fernandez Varela of
lnformaci6n, the hacendado Melchior Gast6n
. .and other members of the
alta-burguesia.
(
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Agrupa do in every important post in the nation.

22

Most of the Agrupa:..
,

ci6n members (1959) were drawn from the alta-burguesia and were

... .
sometimes chided as ninos bitongos (rich little mother's boys) by their
enemies.

A certain level of intelligence and moral probity was de-

manded of new members.
conspiratorial aura.

The organization had an aristocratic and

Some thought it merely a Newman Club; others,

closer to the mark, saw it as another Opus Dei.
prised a reformist bourgeoisie.

The Agrupados com-

Their pamphlet, l Por que la reforma

agraria? of 1958 helped to precipitate the social revoluti~n which ended
by devouring them all.
The agrarian reform pamphlet reflected the intent of the Agrupaci6n's director, Father Armando Llorente, S. J., to do one work of
serious social investigation a year.

The pamphlet was not the usual

romantic lament for the poor, but rather a serious study based on data
collected during thousands of hours of volunteer field work.

23

The

study confirmed the general impression that Cuba's campesinos were
not receiving a just share of the island's wealth.

24

This was "a great

22 Agrupaci6n Cat6lica Universitaria, Memoria de la convenci6n
de Atlanta, December, 1963. Pamphlet, p. 96.
23 Agrupaci6n Cat6lica Cubana, l Por que reforma agraria?

(Havana: 1958), p. 12. The agrarian reform pamphlet was primarily
the work of three men: Melchior W. Gast6n, the very Catholi,c and
reform-minded owner of Central Dolores; Oscar A. Echevarria y Salvat,
sub-secretary of commerce in the first year of the Castro government,
and the psychiatrist Rene F. de la Huerta. All are in exile in the U.S.
24

Ibid., p. 62.
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·I
social sin" which had to be rectified.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

The pamphlet concluded that:

It's now time that our nation stop being the private preserve of a few powerful men; we firmly believe that within
-a few years Cuba will be not the property of a few, but the
true country of all Cubans •••. in this work of social redemption .•• the church, ever more powerful in our nation, will
play an important and effective .role. 25.

In the future the pamphlet would frequently be cited by Fidel, Carlos
~

Rafael Rodriguez, Jacques Choncho!, Dudley Seers and others as evidence of the need for a complete social and economic revolution.

26

Gast6n Baquero, columnist for the conservative Diario de la Marina,
wrote that when students took an interest in the fate of the campesino,
then '.'something new is happening in Cuba •••. 1127
The laity's concern with the agrarian problems was not new . .
The Catholic ·senator Manuel Dorta Duque drafted such a reform in
1947~

I
I
I

He proposed a property limit of 100 caballerias (3, 300 acres.),

to sell land to campesinos, to discourage foreign ownership, and to
establish, with government aid, a private cooperative movem~nt.

He

even_ planned for an agrar:ian reform institute, the Instituto Nacional
Agrario (IN'A), which would include private and public members.

But

Dorta was defeated in the 1948 elections and his plan, like so many

I
I
I
I

25--2:-!
Ib"d '

I

P• 63.

26 Echevarria, La agricultura, p. ix.

S. J.

... .... .. ..
~

2 7 Paraphrase of Gast6n Baquero provided by 1\rmando Llorente,
Interview. Miami, January 13, 1971.
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28
.
. t o o bl'1vion.
o th ers, passe d 111
Dorta Duque's secretary in 1948 was the Agrupado Angel Fernandez Varela, a lawyer and congressman who made a powerful contribu.tion to the church in 194 9 by drafting and eventually winning approval
of a law permitting private universities.

This enabled the Augustinians

to create their long-planned Catholic university, the Universidad de

The university was the crowning achievement of Cuba's brieflived Catholic renaissance.

It would provide a Cuban-trained Catholic

The indefatigable fund raiser Father Spirale persuaded his rich

friends, the G6mez Menas, Velascos and Tarafas, to make substantial
contributions.

-

I-

Villanueva.

elite.

I
I
I
I
I

The new·university would have chemistry laboratories

and engineering facilities. · On the promise that the university would
undertake sugar research, the Asociaci6n Nacional de Hacendados
donated $300, 000. 29 Bright young Catholic intellectuals like Jose
Ignacio Lasaga, a contributor to the agrarian reform pamphlet, and
Jose Ignacio Rasco, soon to be leader of the Christian Democratic
Party, became professors there.
The creation of the Universidad Cat6lica was resisted by the
University of Havana.

At the private university, discipline and intel-

lectual standards could be more easily maintained than at the highly
28 E chevar ria, La agricultura, p. 88. Interview with Father
Juan Manuel Dorta Duque, S. J., son of the senator and currently head
of Colegio Belen's alumni program in the U.S. Miami, June 13, 1971.
29 Kelly, La Cuba del Padre Spirale, p. 222.
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politicized and often chaotic University of Havana.

A new Catholic

consciousness was being created, but at the cost of close ties to the
bourgeoisie and to the Americans.

The first president of the university

was the Irish-American Augustinian Father James Kelly.

In 1950, at

the Catholic uniy-ersity's first graduation ceremony:, 'three honorary
degrees were given.

One went to President Carlos Prio. Two went to

Americans: one to the American ambassador, Robert Butler, a member of the University Council; the other to Father Spirale.

30

By 1959,

Villanueva was thriving, boasting an enrollment of some 1, 600 and more
. - profess1ona
.
1 sta
- ff •.31
than 1 50 m

While the Agrupaci6n and the CathoHc university courted the

I
I
I
I

upper bourgeoisie, Acci6n Cat6lica courted the important center, and
especially young men and womeri.

The.ir motto was· "piety, study, action.

By 1959 they had a following of about thirty thousand.
. pa:r t y:
11c

"w e

11

It was not a Catho-

d"dn't
- " sa1·d one mem b er.
1
ma k e po 1·t·
1 1cs,

32

N one th e 1ess,

Acci6n Cat6lica had developed capabilities which seemed political.

They

were the organizers of the. massive Catholic Congress of November, 1959.
'

And they also helped to tra~n such Catholic leaders and intellectuals as
Andres Valdespino and Amalia Fiallo.

I
I
I
·1

I

30ibid., p. 207.

31 Interview with James O'Malia, formerly professor at the
University of Villanueva. Coral Gables, May 21, 1971.
32 Interview with Jose Mont6 Sotolongo, former Catholic affairs correspondent for El Mundo. San Juan, Puerto Rico, March 8, 1971.
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Finally, there was th~ Franciscans' J6venes Obreros Cat61icos
(JOC), the Young Catholic Workers organization, with perhaps twenty
thousand members.
ing organization.

Like Acci6n Cat6lica it was a teaching and train-

It did riot pretend to be a labor union.

It also was an

importan:t takeoff point for Catholic labor leaders like Jose Planas and
Reinol Gonzalez, both leading participants in Castro's revolution.
The church's increasing social consciousness was given voice in
a new publication: the Franciscans' La Quincena, a bi-weekly public ation reminiscent of the U.S. Catholics' Commonweal.

La Quincena,

founded in 1955 and advertised as "a Christian response to the problems

of today, ".became a vigorous supporter of Castro's social revolution

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

until its director was stiiled by more conservati_v e churchmen in late
1960.

The Church and the Revolutionary War
Chief among the attractions of the revolution for Catholics was
Castro himself.

His friend and advisor at the Jesuits' Belen prep

school, Fr. Llorente, S. J., had written that Fidel was destined to go
f ar.

113 3
· everyone ' s a dm1ra
· t ion
·
·
·F 1· d e 1 "kn ew h ow t o win
an d a·ff ec t ion.

Castro had been baptized by the Spanish priest, Enrique Perez Serantes.

In 1953, Archbishop Perez Serantes saved Fidel from probable execution by Batistianos following the assault on the Moncada Barracks. When
Castro returned to Cuba in late 1956, his rebellion received important

33 Llorente interviewed in El Mundo, March 20,

1960.
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aid from clerics the island over, mainly in the form of sanctuary.
supplies and communications, and morai' support.
Best known were priest~· iike Father Guillermo Sardinas who,
responding to Raul Castro's pleas in La Quincena for chaplains, left
-his parish in Nueva Gerona in mid-1957 and, with the permission of

,

Msr. Evelio Diaz, went up into the Sierra.

He

.

would later appear--

bearded and wearing a green cape--as the guerrilla priest, a very

· · t ed m
· th e
. f"1gure. 34 s· ar ct·""
roman t 1c
111as never b ore arms or par t 1c1pa
fighting.

There we.re no Camilo Torres in the Cuban rev9lution.

35

In the Oriente area, and especially in Santiago", priests including Father

Antonio Rivas, later Chaplain for Castro's "Second Front" guerrilla
column, and Father Jorge Bez Chabebe, chaplain of the Catholic youth .
movement in Santiago, aided Castro's rebellion.

36

In the rebel hotbed of Manzanilla, just wel3t of the Sierra Maestra,

Father Antonio ' Albizu served as a contact for Castro's couriers.

37

In Havana, Padre Moises, Chaplain of the Col6n .Cemetery, sent young
men up to the Sierra.

Also in Havana. Msr. Eduardo Boza Masvidal and

34 Meneses, Fidel Castro, p. 50. Also in Leslie Dewart, Christianity and Revolution : The L esson o f Cuba (New York: Herder, 1963),
p. 108.
3 5 Camilo Torres: Colombian priest and sociologist who abandoned
his priestly tasks and died fighting as a guerrilla. Some Cuban priests did
. take up arms in the counterrevolution against Castro.
36 James Monahan and Kenneth Gilmor.e , The Great Deception,

p. 27.
37 Dewart, Christianity , p. 107.
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his aide Father Madrigal sheltered numerous Fidelistas.

Fr. Manuel

Rodr1guez Rozas, who, like Boza, would soon be a b~shop, also aided
young rebels. 38 Roddguez Roz~~' aide, Juan Ram6n O'Farrill, joined
Prio's anti-Batista Organizaci6n Autentica in 1956, was reportedly tortured by Batistianos for hiding rebels, and went to Miami where he
helped to organize the Movimiento d e Resistencia Civica {Civic Resistance Movement) in the U.S. 39 Catholic lay leaders like Antonio Fernandez, president of Acc.i 6n Cat61ica'.s youth branch, and Enrique Canto, expresident of Acci6n Cat6lica in Santiago also aided Castrq's rebellion. 40
Catholics, both priests and lay leaders, aided Castro's rebellion in response to the Batistianos' killing of young Catholic rebels like
J

the student le~der Jose Antonio Echevarria, gunned down during an attempt to assassinate President Batista in March, 1957~

Echevarria,
'

38 Eduardo Boza Masvidal, born in 1915 of a distinguished though
not particularly wealthy Havana family. Graduate of La Salle, the University of Havana Law School, and San Carlos Seminary, where he was ordained in 1943. Among founding members of the Agrupaci6n Cat6lica.
In 1959, president of the University of Villan1-~eva, in 1960 auxiliary bishop of Havana. For background data, see El Mundo , March 26, 1960.
Rodriguez Rozas , while a student in the San Carlos Seminary in the 1930s,
joined the ABC and participated in the overthrow of President Machado.
See in El Mundo, March 20, 1960.
39

~ather Juan Ram6n O'Farrill, the auxiliary chief of the Corpus
Christi Church in Havana in 1959, was the scion of one of the oldest families of Havana, a family famous for its participation in Cuba's war of independence. His alle gations of torture were denied in the Batistiano propa. ganda letter, Report on Cnba of February, 1958, which did note that O'Farrill was an important fund raiser for Castro. · For biographic data see
Diario de las Americas (Miami), April 19, 1970.
4 oClaude Julien, La revoluci6n cubana (Montevideo: Ediciones
· Marcha, 1961), p. 42.
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from a bourgeois family in Cardenas, was a graduate of the Christian
Brothers' La Salle prep school.

His confessor was the Franciscan

Fr. Ignacio Biain, editor of the anti-Batista La Quincena.

Following

Echevarria's death, some priests defiantly offered masses in his honor;
lilies were placed on the spot of his "assassination. 1141 When Rene
Fraga Moreno of Catholic Action in Matanzas was shot down in July,
1957, the bishop of that province, Alberto Martin Villaverde, presided
over his funeral cortege and issued a pastoral letter citing the victim as
"an example of clear patriotism and valiant protest against police
.
1142
violence.
During the abortive general strike of April, 1958, forty youths
were killed in the Havana area.

Among these were four young Catholics,

·including the youth leader Luis Morales Mustelier.

43

A number of

priests marched in the funeral procession for these young men.

Three

of the boys were graduates of the Christian Brothers 1 Colegio La Salle.

44

·Another to die in the stril~e was the Catholic labor leader Sergio Gonzalez,
known affectionately as "El Curita" (the little priest).

Gonzalez had

41 The New York Times, April 14, 1957.
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I

42 Ibid., Suly 2 7, 1957.
43 Luis Morales Mustelier died at 28. A BANFAIC employee, he
received a U.S. State Department scholarship to the University of Michigan. See in Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 253. Also, The New York Times,
'April 12, 1958.
44 Angel del Cerro, '\. Ha comenzado la persecucicn religiosa?"
Cuadernos (Paris), special supplement on Cuba (March-April, 1961),
p. 27.
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previously directed a numb~r of sabotage operations in Havana, includ-

.
45
ing an assault on the Banco Nac1onal.
The final and most notorious event was the gunning dov.rn of four
A grupados (all students at the University of Villanueva) as they drove
towards Oriente Province in late 1958 to join Castro's band.

46

Fr.

Llorente estimates that 90 percent of the Agrupados were against Batista.

Many were Castro's friends from Belen.

Others, remembering

Fidel's violent and erratic career at the University of Havana, were un1147
easy, unw1·11·mg t o "d ec1.d e· f or F"d
1 e 1•
The killing of Catholic youths and the growing destrµctiveness of
Castro's rebellion precipitated Cardinal Arteaga's peace-making effort
·.
.

.•.

of late 1956.

This effort failed.

not a persuasive figure.

Neither s·ide would hear him.

Moreover, he was going against his own in-

Thereafter, other churchmen began to speak out, with an

"impartiality" that generally favored Castro's side of the argument.

In June, 1957, Archbishop Perez Serantes i~sued a pastoral
letter asking the end of government terror in Oriente Province, terror
. h 1ac k e d " any
· JUS
· t·f·
w h 1c
1 1e d cause.

45

1148

A wee k 1ater,

c ar d.ma1 A rteaga

C arteles , October 4, 1959, p. 48.

46

Bohemia, January 18, 1959, p. 26. These Agrupados were
· proceeding to the Sierra on the suggestion of Father Llorente.
47 In terv1ew
.
. Father L·1orente.
with

Miami, January 13, 1971.

48 The New York Times, June 1, 1957.

1·

He was

stincts, as he had long l)elieved that the church should stand clear of
politics.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I·

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

436

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

(ie~lared that "the path of violence if fruitless." The church, he said, ·
11

5-hould be above all political strife, but we cannot remain indifferent

· the present s1.t·ua t"10n.
~n

.At

e:

1149

t~1e end of February, 1958, Archbishop Perez Serantes called

~-~q{e.~ rneetip.g of the hierarc!ly in Santiago to drc1,ft a request for Ba-

t!5-~~·6-

:r~5-ignation.

:aishop$ Alberto Martin of Matanzas and D!az of

fi~v~1_1;~.• both Fideiistas, agreed, while Bishop Riu Angles of Camagiiey

~~4.

fy'la:rtfoez Dalmau of Cienfuegos were against it. 5 o Riu opposed

~~'-:\~~~ p~rticipation in· politics in any way.

Martinez Dalmau was a

Bati:stiano, according to some a cleric on the renaissance model com!!l~t.e. '.YitJI bus~ne1;3s interests and mistresses.

I
I
I
I

51

Cardinal Arteaga sug-

~e,E3ted a c?mpromise calling for the establishment of a government of
~-~tAqn_a l unity rather than for Batista's immediate resignation.

This

~n.ttiative proved fruitless, but it did underscore the divisions within the
.

Qlmrch.

~

.

'

subsequent months, Bishop Martm made a personal plea for

~~tista's resignation.

Msr. Boza Masvidal sent Batista a letter pro-

tes.ting the shootings following the April, 1958, strike.

Batista,

4_9Ipid., June 7, 1957.

I
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50 J;)ewart, Christianity, p. 109.
51 According to the Batistiano Mario Cobas Reyes, Martinez
1Jalmau tried, without success, to convince his fellow bishops in 1958
tp_at <;:astro was a communist. In January, 1959, Castro ordered
M~rtinez Dalmau's arrest, but the bishop was hidden by Father 0 1
J[arrill and later smuggled out of th e country. Mart inez Dalmau, now
partially blind and in his eighties, prays daily for the disappearance of
II
''God's enemy .•• materialistic communism from Cuba. See in Diario
Las Americas, June 7; October 27, 1973.
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forewarned of the letter's contents, refused to accept it.

52

And there were other evidences of division and ambiguity within
the church.

Though some students from the Catholic university were

dying in the anti-Batista fight, the Am~rican rector, Father Kelly, refused to suspend classes.

Student leaders at the University of Havana,

closed since late 1956, warned Kelly that degrees awarded during the
$truggle would be invalidated.

In July, Cardinal Arteaga, who had been

struck on the head by Batista police officials attempting to search his
residence, nonetheless. consented to bless the new Havana tunnel--with
Batista st~nding by his side.

53

And the church accepted Batista's gift

.
54
of a great statue of the Sacred Heart on the outskirts of Havana.
In December of 1958, Father Llorente was commissioned by the

Papal Nuncio to visit Castro in the Sierra.

The chu'r ch thus joined the

hacendados, the ganaderos . the Batista military, labor, the communists
and the CIA, all of whom had sent agents up to see Castro in the latter
part of 1958.

In an interview on December 11, 1958, Castro assured

Llorente that he was not a communist.
Catholic.

But neither was he a practicing

"He perdido la fe, " said Fidel, "I have lost my faith. " Castro

52 Dewart, Christianity, p. 112.
53 Report on Cuba (Washington). July, 1958. The Report on Cuba
was a monthly Batista propaganda letter published by an enterprising Col.
Kief er (USA) and his family at their offices in Washington's Du Pont Plaza.
54 Batista built this statue as an expression of his gratitude to the
nun who had taught him how to read.
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I
I
I

thought the revolutionary war might last two or three more years.

The

only guerrillas Llorente observed were fifty peasants, mostly unarmed.
~

.

~

Castro's aide, Humberto Sori Marin, told Llorente th~re had been
several attempts 1P kill Fidel owing to his hard-driving and absolute rule
over the guerrillas.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I·
I

Sori Marfu mused that, when the fighting was over,

he himself might attempt to assassinate Fidel.

55

The future president

of Cuba, Judge Manuel Urrutia, then in the camp, was already ari obje~t of derision, the soldiers laughing that the "Presidente en armas"
~as afraid of rats! Llorente noted that the guerrilla priest, Father
Sardinas, was kept in an encampment several miles awa;.
complained t~at Sardinas was useless.

Even Fidel wanted another priest

sent up. 56
Llorente, ever thinking of his Agrupados, suggested that Fidel
might want more university students to help administer the towns he was
now capturing.

Castro thought it a good idea.

This was ·apparently the

I·
I

..
!

genesis of the participation of the Agrupados Amalio Fiallo, Jose Ignacio
Rasco and Manuel Artime.

Only a few months before, this trio had·. con-

.

.

stituted the Liberaci6n Radical political party and were preparing to run
in the national elections scheduled for November, 1958.

I
I

Sori Mar!n

551nterview with Fr.Armando Llorente.

57

The lack of

Miami, January 13, 1971.

56 Ibid.

Father Sardinas is said to have had various "personal
problems "--liquor apparently among them--and often appeared to be off
fioa~ing in the clouds.
57 Marques Sterling, Historia de Cuba. p. 622. ·
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electoral guarantees dissuaded them from participating.

By the end of

December, Artime, who later led the 2, 506 Brigade ~to the Bay of
Pigs, went up into the Sierra. 58 ' .The ·communist Carlos Rafael Rodri-

guez said Artime arrived just three days before Batista's flight, and
,
,
59
that, within two days, Sori Marin had commissioned Artim~ a captain. ·

First Days
Batista once commented to an aide that he resigned because of
t.he opposition of the hacendados, colonos, the army, and the church.

60

Thfs was an exaggeration, as the church as a whole had been ambiguous.
But it was a pleasing and flattering exaggeration.

...

lessen his own responsib~lity.

Batista did this to

Castro, like Batista, also exaggerated

the church's role--in this case to win the church's support.

Castro de-

clared that Cuba's Catholics had given the revolution "very substantial
assistance. " 61 Archbishop Perez Serantes, Castro's old friend, stood
at Fidel's side in Santiago during his January victory address.

On the

march to Havana, Fidel stopped to kiss the flag of Belen, his Jesuit
alma mater.

In Havana C2.rdinal Arteaga embraced a barbudo.

62

58 Castro said that the Agrupaci6n Cat6lica sent Artime to the
Sierra. See in El Mundo, January 22, 1960.
59 Otero, Playa Gir6n, Vol. IV, p. 152.
60

Suarez Nunez, El gran culpable, p. 127.

61 Diario de la Marina, January 7, 1959.
62

.
Barbuda: bearded guerrilla fighter.
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Castro's men sported a profusion of scapulars and rosaries. 63 A most
Catholic band of guerrillas!
All these good omens appear to have gone to the church's head.
Perhaps this was the time to roll back.the advance of secularism and
protestantism? Cardinal Arteaga urged President Urrutia to decree a
more stringent divorce law to protect the Cuban family from disintegration.

I
I
I
I
I

The Diario de la Marina urged a greater religious content in

public education.

65

Perez Serantes thought most Cubans "deprived of

the religious instruction" to which they had every right.

66

Protestants

and Evangelists, then making substantial inroads into "Catholic Cuba,

11

wondered: How far did Cardinal Arteaga's influence extend?
The Cardinal represented the most conservative wing of the
church.

I
I
I

64

He was famous for such statements as "there can be no other

religion; either Catholic~sm ••• or chaos.

1167

Some Catholics concluded

that the C<?rruption of the ~atista era was owed to the lack of religious
and .moral training in public education.

The Evangelists approached

both the new education minister and Fidel on the issue and received

63 This flaunting of religious medals was later seen as a cruel
deception. In fact, however, the religious medals were sent up to the
Sierra by good Ca.tholics in Havana and Santiago and Castro's men, most
of them simple guajiros, wore them without guile.
64 n·1ar10
. d e I a M ar1na,
.
January 11, 1959.
65 Ibid.
661bid., June 13, 1959.
67 Revoluci6n, February 21, 1959.
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assurances that the church would not be permitted to infiltrate the public
schools. 68 Nevertheless, the church continued to talk, and the nonCatholics to worry, about this issue. -·

Ley 11
The war between church and state began on January 11, when
the goverrunent published Ley 11 (Law Eleven), invalidating all degrees
and credits awarded by the Catholic university--and other private universities--after November 30, 1956.

69

Havana University's FEU stu-

dent organization had warned this would happen; nonetheless, it caused
great indignation within the church and the bourgeoisie.

Interestingly,

the same issue had arisen in the revolution .of 1933, when President
Grau cancelled all credits received in examinations since 1929--when
the University of Havana had been closed by the goverrunent.

70

Following the issuing of Ley 11, the revolutionaries sprang to
the attack.

Ricardo Alarc6n, leader of the student wing of Castro's

M-26, accused the University of Villanueva's rector, Fr. Kelly, of having

68 Bohemia, February 1, 1959, pp. 108-109.
69 Ley 11 also dissolved a number of fly-by-night universities
set up during the Batista era. No less than 20 "universities, 11 most of
teacup proportions, had appeared since the passage of the churchsponsored private education law: 9 of these were in Havana. See in
Diario de la Marina, January 28, 1959. Others appeared after 1956 to
service students incommoded by the closing of the University of Havana.
7 o The New York Times, February 4, 1934.
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expelled students who protested the November, 1958, presidential election and of having expelled others caught with revolutionar~ propaganda.
Alarc6n charged that Villanueva maintained a "test-tube atmosphere"
in which Cuban values were degraded and pushed aside.

I

Villanueva

was really an American enclave, safe under the "good auspices of the
.
1172
American Embassy.
The private universities responded that their creation was not
"treason" against the revolution, nor did they intend to compete unfairly with Havana University.

Some thought that if university students

were to be punished for "working" during the dictatorship, then why not
punish professionals and businessmen as well?

73

Villanueva's students

thought their participation in Castro's rebellion evident to all.

Had not

four of their members been martyred? The former Batista police chief,
Ventura, once charged that at least one hundred Villanueva students were
participating in pro-Castro activities.

74

But the issue would not die.

!The _church is_sued a collective pastoral letter, signed by the cardinal and
all the bishops, in defense of the church's educational rights.
of instruction had to be maintained, said the pastoral.

I
I
I
I

71

Freedom

It noted rumors

7l Ricardo Alarc6n, a close associate ~f "Che" Guevara, advanced to the presidency of the Havana Law School, then to the Ministry
of Foreign Relations. He is presently Cuban ambassador to the United
Nations in New York.- See in Thomas, Cuba, · pp. 1286, 1286 n. 27.
72 Revoluci6n, January 16, 1959.
73 Diario de la Marina, January 23, 1959.
74 Ibid., February 10, 1959.
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In March, Revoluci6n' s columnist Euclides Vasquez Candela

asked: "Catholic Education: What For?

1176

the possibilities of reform within the cJ-iurch.

Vasquez Candela ridiculed
He cited the church's dis-

graceful pr_-o-Spanish stance during the war of independence.

Had not

Cardinal Arteaga brought the national symbol, the image of the Virgen
de Caridad, to Havana a few days after Batista's coup in 1952 in order
to bless the new president and his criminal horde? Had the cardinal not
baptised Batista's ~on, eve~ while he (Arteaga) was still recuperating
from a beating by the Batista police? The rest were no better.

Vas-

quez recalled the papal nuncio's equally abje.ct and servile behavior.
The bishop of Camagi.iey (Mart:fnez Dalmau) was . "a fascist. " As for
the church's system of education:
The tactic used by the church in Latin Americc:1. to gain
dominance has been to educate for its service the dominating groups and classes ..• Catholic education has only
served to convince the poor of their necessary inferiority •••
Belens and La Salles for the rich, nothing for the poor. 77
The following day Revoluci6n produced a letter from Fr. Kelly
to Batista's police.

75_
Ib"d
_
1_•

I

It listed all the students at the Unive.r sity of

February 19, 1959.

76

Euclides Vasquez Candela, a sociology professor at the University of Oriente in the 1950s, was a leading figure in the brief-lived
"humanist wing" of the Mr26. He was also a sharp critic of the communists. He lost his job with Revoluci6n because of his attacks against
them. See in Avance (Miami), January 20, 1961.
77 Revoluci6n, March 2, 1959.
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Villanueva, with annotations indicating their possible political activity.

78

Kelly retorted that the letter, which he had not annot~ted, was the only
way of avoiding a wholesale Batista crackdown on the university, as the
police had wanted to investigate a bomb explosion there.

Fr. Kelly as-

serted that, far from betraying students, he had protected tl:lem.

In one

case he had personally escorted the student rebel, Jesus Barriero, from
.the police station to the safe haven of the Uruguayan Embassy.

79

Father Kelly was ill-attuned to deal with a heroic culture like
Cuba.

He was a disciplinarian,
not . a diplomat.
.

keep the university open, no matter what.

He was determined to

Thus, he refused to close

down for any event, even the martyrdom of some young revolutionaries,
not on the school calendar.
The University of Villanueva was not really "American." Fr.
Kelly was, as were his fifteen fellow Augustinians and a I?-andful of lay
professors.

The rest of the university's 167 professors were Cubans.

'The .real power in the school was the viceregent, Father Alberto Medina,
a Spaniard,

II

gallego de pura cepa.

r,80

Students at Havana University, loathe to permit their peers at
Villanueva .a two-year head start in their careers, strongly supported

I
I
I
I
I

78 Ibid., March 3, 1959.
7 9 Ibid., March 4, 1959.
80 "gallego. de pura cepa ": a 100 percent Spaniard. Selfdescription of Father Medina ir1 Diario Las Americas (Miami) October 13,
. 1971. Also, interview with James O'Malia, professor at the University of
Villanueva, previously cited.
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Ley 11.

The Havana students staged a motorized protest, a caravan of

autos snaking through Havana.

A compromise was worked out.

The

validity of degrees and credits earned during the revolutionary war
would be suspended for two years, whi!e the legitimacy of the awards
would be verified by special examinations.
The attacks on Fr. Kelly continued.

In a television interview,

the minister of education, Armando Hart. a Havana graduate, suggested
that Fr. Kelly resign.

81

At Villanueva the student leader Jesus Barriero

suggested a purge whose victims would presumably include Fr. Kelly.

82

By chance these attacks on the church coincided with the cele. bration of "Catholic Students' Day." The Catholic intellectual Angel del
Cerro urged Catholic unity so as to better aid the revolution.

83

Ancther

speaker asked for government scholarships for students at Catholic
schools.

Following an open air mass, 10, 000 Catholic students marched

in the streets.

It was an impressive flexing of church muscle, one that

would be repeated at the great Catholic congress of November, 1959.
Father Kelly's situation at Villanueva continued to decline.

In

mid-April, he was replaced by Msr. Eduardo Boza Masvidal, a Cuban
priest and Havana Law School graduate who had given substantial aid to
Castro's revolution.

Boza Masvidal's role .at Villanueva was largely that

81 Revoluci6n, M.,a.rch 6, 1959.
82 Ibid •• March 9, 1959.
83 Diario de la Marina, March 8, 1959.
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of a figurehead.

He was pr.eoccupied by other business.

Medina continued to run the show.

In June, the Catholic university was

seized revolucionariamente by Jesus Barriere, now leader of the
Federaci6n de Alumnos Revolucionaries of Villanueva.

His group oc-

. .
.
b u1·1a·mg f or t h ree d ays. 84 B arr1ero
.
cupied the admm1strat10n
though t

Villanueva "academically excellent" but there would have to be a purge
of the faculty.

Catholic Intellectuals
Self-defense was not the only activity of the church in the first
six months of the revolution.

The church, and especially the Catholic

intellectuals, embraced the revolution's promise of social justice,
equalitarianism, distributio.n ism.

And.res Valdespino, Father Biafn,

Angel del Cer:ro, Jose Ignacio Lasaga- -joined c::1ergetically in the task

.

of pummeling the old bourgeoisie.
The leader in this was Andres Valdespino, former president of
the youth wing of Acci6n Cat61ica, and, in 1959, subsecretary in the
Ministry of Treasury.

85

Valdespino turned out a nood of p~lemical

articles, mostly in Bohemfa.

I
I
I
I
I

The Spaniard

His forte was emotion, rather than close

84Havana Times, June 8, 1959.
85 Valdespino was by inclination a man of letters. He now
teaches literature in New York. His treasury appointment was ap'parently based more on friendships, and a reputation for honesty and
energy, than on a knowledge of economics.
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argument.

His subject: the sins of the bourgeoisie.

In mid-March, Valdespino observed in

11

The Legacy of the

Martyrs" that a genuine social revolution was underway.
tern, he thought, paraded a most false liberty.

The old sys-

What kind of liberty was

there for the poor and the sick? In the old Cuba, a few blocks from the
"sumptuous palaces of millionaires, are the sh~cks and slums •••• "
Such disparities had to be ended.

The telephone and electric monopolies,

those familiar robbers of the poor, must lose their "irritating privileges •••• " 86

In "The Christianity of the Whitened Sepulchers, " Valdespino
flay.e d the rich who had aided the rebe.l!io11: financially but who opposed
the revolution's reforms.

Valdespino cited papal encyclicals, the Bible

and Christian doctrine in support of Castro's progra.ms.

87

A year later

he was attacking "the ineptitude and .•• greed of our unscrupulous governing classes that, to enrich themselves, legislated in favor of foreign and
1 o l"1garc h"1es.... II .88 C u b a 1n
: many ways
.
nat 1ona

II

'
. a s t at e of
was l"1ving
1n

colonial servitude ...• " 89 Valdespino wanted neither capitalism nor
communism.

Rather, he s~mght a "real Christianity'.' of honesty and

86 Bohemia, March 15, 1959, pp. 50, 199.
87 lb l·' d •

I

March 22, 1959, pp. 61, 97.

88 lbid., February 28, 1960, p. 81.
8 9 lbid.
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'a usterity, an end to latifundia, the regulation of foreign investment,
the salvation of public education.

90

Angel del Cerro shared Valdespino's views.

He saw Cuba's de-

pendence on the U.S. as a powerful fac~or in the "frivolity, skepticism
and demoralization" of the Cuban character.

91

Del Cerro believed rural

unemployment t~e responsibility of the state and th~ rich. 92 His greatest anxiety was for reform in the church.
was ambivalent.

The church's role in ~ociety

He recalled that the Catholic youth group JEC had once

protested the graft and corruption in the Prio regime, but more consistent action was necessary.

Too many priests, argued del Cerro, were

,

reactionaries, too few like the Franciscan Fr. Biain, a leader of those
.
.
seeking a reduction in the· inequality between classes. 93
Even some Jesuits were not above criticizing the rich.

In April,

Father Freixedo, S. J., published excerpts from his beck, Forty Cases
of Social Inju stice.

Freixedo presented examples of the arrogance and

selfishness of the bourgeoisie drawn from his experiences as an advisor
to .the Catholic worker movement.

94

9 o Ibid~, January 18, 1959, p. 13. For an either or proposition
which Valdespino accepted, see his "O Cristo o Wall St!' (Christ or Wall
St.) in Bohemia, July 26, 1959.
91 Ibid., April 5, 1959, p. 78.
92 Ibid., April 19, 1959, p. 69.
93 Ibid.
9 4Ibid., April 26, 1959, p. 26. Se e also the original: Freixedo,
S. J., Cuarenta casos de injusticia social'; exam en de conciencia para
cristianos distr aidos (liabana: Centro de lnformaci6n y Acci6n Social,

1958).
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These Catholic intellectuals were masters of indignation; men
who knew everything about distribution and nothing about production.
They dealt in easy generalities, moral fervor and tremendismo . They
failed to be concrete, to evaluate seriously, empirically, the performance of the bourgeoisie.

SurP-ly there was a difference between, say,

the millionaire Melchior Gast6n, president of the Catholic Businessmen's League, an enlightened hacendado who shared his profits With
his workers and who had underwritten bothlPor que reforma agraria?
and Fr. Freixedo's Forty Cases, and the worst of the Batista bourgeoisie,
certain of those newly rich colonels and generals who lived in a sea of
corruption amidst plaster busts and satin draperies.

But. Bohemia's

intellectuals would make no such distinctions . . Rather, it seemed their
intent to confirm the public suspicion that Proudhon was right: All
property is theft.

The bourgeoisie must therefore be destroyed.

The Church and the Agrarian Reform
The agrarian reform of May, 1959, almost immediately split
the chu~ch.

In general, the intellectuals ~nd Franciscans were favorably

disposed, while the Jesuits were at first suspicious and then opposed.
There was no unified church position; rather, there was a babble of
contradictory voices.

,
Evelia Diaz, having been promoted to bishop in March, was the

.

. ..
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first to speak out~ 5 Towards the end of May, he declared the agrarian
reform was "a necessary and magnificent" idea, one .in keeping with the
.: .
church's view of social justice. The rich, he thought, must learn to
put the common good before their own narrow personal interests.

96

Archbishop Perez Serantes also approved of the reform, leading Fidel
to dee l are t h at t h e c h urch had

II

•
.
1197
assumed a revolutionary posture • .

~

Bishop Alberto Martin of Matanzas hoped the reform would rec~ify the
grave inequalities in the distribution of property in Cuba: "We do not
hesitate to declare the distribution of wealth as it currently exists in
Cuba a grave evil which, in the nanie of social justice, demands energetic
.remedies. "98 The Franciscan Father Biain told the Knights of Columbus
that the agrarian reform .was both necessary and Christian. 99

The

campesino, said Biain, had previously lacked the fundamental right to

95 "Arzobispo Coadjutor y Administrador Apost61ico de Habana 11
••• this was Evelio Diaz's new title. This made him third in the hierarchical
pecking order after Cardinal Arteaga and Archbishop Perez Serantes. In·
fact; however, since the aging cardinal was larg~ly a figurehead, Diaz became number two. But, in a sense, as head of a larger archbishopric than
Perez Serantes, Diaz was number one. Nonetheless, the liberal Diaz generally seemed overshadowed by the more conservative and disputatious
Boza Masvidal who did not even become a bishop until 1960. This uncertainty of rank and voice was a source of confusion that unquestionably diminished the church's authority in 1959 and 1960.
96 Bohemia, May 31, 1959, p. 69.
97

R evo.1uc1"6 n, June. 1 5, 1959 •

98 Bohemia, July 5, 1959, p. 79.
99 Diario de la Marina, July 16, 1959.
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the "vital minimum" (a key _concept in the papal encyclical Rcrum
Novarum) necessary for a decent life.

"Great remedies" were re-

. dt o cure " grea t ev1·1 s. 11100' "
quire
Other Catholics supporting the agrarian reform were the Catholic
youth leader, Manolo Fernandez, Angel del Cerro, and Father Angel

. 101 ·
·
·
Gaztelu.
Their approval seemed to reflect moral enthusiasm rather
than serious study.

Father Gaztelu s _a id he understood the moral, but

not the technical, significance of the reform.

102

Father Biain con-

fessed that "I don't have anything more than a general ide.a about these
. 1 exper t 1se
•
. th"1s. ut03
,. umgs; I h ave no t ec h n1ca
m

.1-1-..

The enthusiasm of many churchmen for the agrarian reform-made
the editor of the Diario de la Marina uneasy.

Rivero regarded his

newspaper as the paladin of the church and saw himself as the defender
of orthodoxy, both social and religious. 104 His paper was the chief
spokesman for the alta-burguesia, and was ultra-sensitive to the

100 Revoluci6n, June 22, 1959.
101 Father Angel Gaztelu, a Franciscan active in the struggle
against Batista. Elevated ~o Msr. in February, 1960, by Pope John
XX III.

102·
Revoluci6n, June 6, 1959.
103 Ibid., February 16, 1959.
104 From Miami exile in 1960, Rivero wrote an open letter to
the church hierarchy, asking, in most pathetic voice, if he had failed in
any way to defend the church, its doctrine and hierarchy against the com_.
munists. See in Diario de la Marina (Miami), September 2, 1960.
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I·

possibilitie~ of communist infiltration and leftward drift. 105 Rivero

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I·
I
I

battled these phenomena from his editorial page and from a column en-

I
I
I
I
I
I

titled Rel:impagos (lightning flashes) written by "Vulcano," a pseudonym
used by Rivero and the priest Fr. Rubino. lOG
Following Bishop Diaz's interview approving the reform, Revoluci6n's Vasquez Candela suggested that Rivero's La Marina, which
was less than enthusiastic about the agrarian reform, was "aga~nst the
church.

1110711

Vulcano,

11

•

•

who had previously been belaboring Angel del

Cerro for his suggestion that the church was pushing too hard for religious education in publi~ schools, 1 OS shifted his fire to Jose Ignacio
Lasaga, reminding him that the agrarian reform was arousing great·
disconten~ because of its ~any unjust features. 109 Bohemia accused
La Marina of challeng~ng the church's right to give advice on public issues.

La Marina complained that some Catholic leaders were adopting

105 La Marina at times demonstrated a maverick willingness to
criticize the failings of the bourgeoisie, espe_c ially the failure of conservative politics and the nmoral crisis" of the late 1950s. The concern
over the "moral crisis" can be interpreted as a genteel criticism of Batista's crowd of nouveaux riches. The Diario's writers g_e n~rally ignored the U. S. and foreign communities. The English speaking community had its own press, the Havana Times and the Havana Pest., For
the Diario's views on the moral crisis, see its pamphlet, Ante la crisis
cubana (La Habana, Editorial Lex, 1957).
l O6 D1ar10
· · L as A mer1cas
~ ·
(M.1am1. ), J anuary 16 , 19 7 0 •

107 Revoluci6n, June 1, 1959.
l08 Diario de la Ma rina, April 30; May 1, 1959.
10 9 Ibid., June 3, 1959.
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positions more to the left than those of the communists. Noting that he
was being attacked by some burgueses for "seeing communists everywhere,

11

Rivero added that "the frivolity and lack of seriousness of

some members of the bourgeoisie was_ aiding communism just as much
.
. m1·11·10na1res.
.
11110
.
as th e ego t ism
an d avarice
o f certam

Rivero's views received some support from his fellow Agrupados.

Father Llorente authorized a young Agrupado, the lawyer Luis Figueroa,
to question the reform in the name of the Agrupaci6n, warning of cer-

tain unfortunate articles and of the danger that the law would precipitate
.

.

an economic slowdown. Rivero ran this on page one.

111

But Llorente

did not withdraw his support from the agrarian reform as yet, permitting

the Agrupados to continue their rural activities •. These men, calling
themselves "Comandos Rurales,

11

dental assistance to campesinos.

organized co-ops and lent medical and
At one point, Artime's "Comandos II

claimed they had organized some 75, 000 campesinos. This figure seems
unlikely.

112

Artime became assistant chief of one of !NRA 's twenty-six

rural development zones but quit in the fall of 1959 in .t he belief that the
·c ommunists were taking over. l 13
.. .. _.

110niaric, de la Marina, June 14, 1959.
111 Int

.
erv1ew
w1"thL.
u1s F"1gueroa.

Miami, April 2, 1971.

112 Claim of Roberto Varona, architect and chief of the Comandos
· Rurales in Manuel Artime, Traici6n gritan 20, 000 tumbas cubanas
(M~xico: Editorial Jus, 1960), p, 185.
113 Ib"d

-2:...·' p. 13.
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I
I
I
I

Rivero and Llorente were not alone in their uneasiness over the
reform.

In June, sixty-two priests assembled at Colegio :Selen to pri-

vately review the political situatio~. 114 There the Jesuit Mc1:nucl Foyaca,
the leading advocate of a greater social consciousness within the church
in the 1950s, warned of certain earmarks of communist thinking in the

I
I
I

agrarian reform.

115

Biain countered by intensifying his defense of the

. L a Q umcena.
.
116 The Jesuits
. and Franciscans
.
reform lll
were at l oggerheads.
· Uneasy Summer

1·

Surrimer and fall passed with the church's attitude toward the
agrarian reform unresolved.

Nonetheless, at the annual meeting of

the hierarchy in Santiago in mid-July, the bishops agreed to support

I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

the work o; the revolutionary government.

117

When the defector Pedro

.

Diaz Lanz, former· chief of Castro's air force, told a U.S. Senate
committee that there was no religious freedom in Cuba, Bishop Boza

114 Bohem:i.a immediately got wind of this supposedly secret
conclave. Bohemia, July 5, 1959, p. 90.
115 The hacendado Francisco Es cobar recalls F oyac a giving a
speech in 1-955· highly critic al of the s oft m o ral tone and extr avagant
'displ ay of wealth of Cuba ' s b ou r geois i e. Interview. Coral Ga bles,
April 1.7, 197 1.
116 La Quincena's maximum circulation was around 30, 000 according to a former staff member. Interview with Gustavo Pena Monte.
_M iami, June 3, 1971.
l l 7 Revoluci6n, July 15, 1959.
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publicly denied it, as did the widely admired Padre Teste.

118

On July

26th, the papal nuncio offered a high mass at the Havana Cathedral in
honor of the sixth anniv12rsary of Ca 9 tro's attack on the Moncada
barracks.
In August, at the XV Congress of the Confe~eraci6n de Colegios

Cat6licos, the Catholic intellectual, Jose Ignacio Lasaga, portrayed the
revolution as nationalist, socialist and radical.

The twentieth century

was the age of equality; the church would have to learn to live with
Castro's revolution.

119

·
In its closing declaration, the Congress asked

the widest freedom of education and promised cooperation with the
revolution.

The colegios offered

so.a scholarships for the sons and
120

orphans of. fighters in the revolutionary war.

Bohem ia, reviewing

the Congress, thought Catholic education needed to display a spirit of

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

austerity, moving· away from the "competition in exhibitionism, luxury,
and vanity" characteristic of certain leading (and unnamed) private
. h l 121
SC 00 s.

118 Ibid., July 17, 1959. Sergio Diaz Brull, Pedro Diaz Lanz 's
half-brother, the man who aided Pedro's escape from Cuba, says that
Pedro has come to regret his appearance before the U.S. Senate committee, realizing that the hearing was designed as much, if not more,
for the domestic political advantage of certain senators, as to learn anything about Cuba. He alleges that Pedro was pressured into testifying
by U.S. Senate emissaries. Interview with Sergio D1az Brull. Miami,
January 18, 1971.
119 Diario de la Marina, August 5, 1959.
12·0 Ibid., Augu~·t 6, 1959. Castro had earlier requested that his
alma mat er, Colegio Belen, accept certain designated sons of war heroes
as scholarship students. Belen agreed. Interview with Father Baldor,
rector of Belen. Miami, June 10, 1971.
121 Bohemia, August 16, 1959, p. 76.
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In August, one of the chief agents of the abortive Trinidad rising

was discovered to be the Spanish priest, Fr. Velasco.

He had served

as a go-between, linking the plotters in Cuba with President Trujillo in
the Dominican Republic.

There was no support among the Cuban clergy

for this adventure; the issue faded.

But horizons for the church were

lowering. Workers in the private schools were demanding a minimum
salary of $85 monthly.

This, combined with lower enrollments, marked

the beginning of an economic pinch which would eventually ruin private
education.

The government said it would not press for un,iformity in

Cuban school books, but here again the direction seemed clear.

Revo-

luci6n1s "Jacobino" wrote in early winter that some private schools
-~

were imbuing their students with an "anti-national" mentality, encouraging them to believe that Cuba was incapable of true national sovereignty.122
The Diario de la Marina thought the situation sufficiently grim to raise the
issue of "Roma o Moscou ? " Rivero editorialized that, while church
doct;t'ine supported a more just distribution of material goods, it could
not approve such progress at the expense of class warfare.

"It is unac-

ceptable to the Catholic church that, in the name of doctrine, divisions
are sown in society, tending to benefit some and exclude others. 11123

I
I
I
I

~·

Msr. Boza agreed, saying that the powerful classes and the producing
classes also had the right to exist.

Property.must be defended but it

122 Revoluci6n, November 4, 1959.
123

Diario de la Marina, September 8, 1959 • .
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must also fulfill its social function.

124

The Catholic Congress
Many burgueses looked to the Catholic church to save them from
the onslaught of what they increasingly came to regard as Castro's communist revolution.

"Catholicism, " said the Diario de la Marina in Sep-

tember, "is the only force capable of opposing the advance of theories prop- ·
.
11125
agated by Soviet propaganda.
The church's potential political power
was demonstrated in the Catholic Congress of November 1959.

The

Congress> organizers denied--rather honestly it seems--all political ·
. 126
intent. But as the Congress drew nigh, it came, willy-nilly, to have an
increasingly political cast.

Fidel said that reactionaries wanted to use

the Congress as a weapon against the revolution. 127 Jose Ignacio
,

Rivero of the Diario de la Marina was privately urging such a course. ·
He told Father Baldor of Belen that the Congress should be organized
as a political instrument, in the same way that the communists used
. •

11

their youth congresses.

124Ib.d
1 •

I

11128

November 21, 1959.

125Ibid., September 27, 1959.
126Ibid., November 17, 1959.
127 Ibid., November 24, 1959.
128 Diario de la Marina (Miami), September 2, 1960.
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But the Congress' executive committee were reluctant to chal- .
lenge Fidel.

A key member, Jose Ignacio Lasaga, believed "that the

realm of the church is the realm of principles, and not the battlefield
. 1•t•
. 1 movemen t s. " 12 9 B"1s l10p D~iaz a 1so oppose d t h e propose d
Gf po
1 1ca

"planteamiento" (confrontation), fearing it would split the church.

The main event of the Congress was an outdoor mass on November 28th.

The weather was bad that day, windy and rainy.

Nonetheless,

an extraordinary crowd gathered in the streets, many determined, like
one young woman, to d~fy the weather.

The Congress must be a sign to

Castro. 131 The Diario de la Marina thought the crowd unprecedented;
incredible.

. 132
Bishop Perez Serantes thought there were a million present.

Masons, Protestants, men of the most diverse faiths were present;
some provided funds to pay the transportation of people from the provinces.

133

Castro .was there and was kissed by his mother and sisters.

The rebel chaplain, Fr. Sardinas, appeared, bearded and wearing an
oliv~ green cassock.

Next day, the Congress continued at the La Tropi-

cal Stadium, a few months earlier the assembly point for tractors donated

l29 Letter of Jos~ I; Lasaga to the author.
ber 31, 1972.

I
I
I
I
I

130

Annapolis, Decem-

13 0 Interview with Father Armando Llorente.
13, 1971.
131 Interview with Sarah Sanchez.

Miami, January

Coral Gables, January 26, 1971.

132 Diario de la Marina, November 29, 1959. One suspects the
Diario's superlatives were meant .to suggest that the church could assemble
larger crowds than Fidel, heretofore Cuba's champion mass-mobilizer.
l33 Ibid.; also interview with Father Llorent e, Miami, January 13,
1971.
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by the bourgeoisie for the agrarian reform.

Now the atmosphere had

changed; there was a certain tension in the air.

Mateo Jover spoke out

for the common good as above the r~ghts of class or individual, but went
on to warn against the dangers of exaggerated nationalism.

Jose Ignacio

Lasaga ended on an emotional note: "Social justice yes; redemption of
the worker and the farmer yes; communism no!" The crowd shouted
back " ;Cuba si, comunismo no!" 134
To placate those who insisted the Congress send Castro a message, set some limits on the reach of his revolution, the Congress concluded by promulgating a Catholic social credo which stressed the right
to a living wage, to property and private education, and the right to freedom agair~st all totalitarfan doctrine.
In

tpe

135

midst of the Congress, Pope John XXIII sent a friendly

message, elevating Bishop Diaz, the hierarchy's most ardent Fidelista,

to Archbishop of Havana. Other clerics known as friends of the revolution were also promoted.

In Rome, the pope received INRA chief,

Antonio Nunez Jim~nez, a man regarded as a communist by many conservatives.

136

These demonstrations of a more liberal and flexible

attitude in the Rome of John XXIII were a source of despair to Cuba's

134 Diario de la Marina, December 1, 1959.
135 Ibid.
136 Revoluci6n, November 17, 1959.
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I
I

conservative Catholics.

These were the first indications that Rome

· would not support counterrevolution, nor encourage ·a church of silence
in Cuba.

Lowering Horizons
Catholic? regarded the Congress as a triumph.
reigned.
II

Enthusiasm

Angel del Cerro thought the church was attuning its elf to the

• an d commun1•t ar1an
• II revo 1u t'ion o f our t•ime. 137 V_a ld esp1no
•
equal"t
1 ar1an

was pleased that the Congress had offered something more than sterile
anti-communism.

138

Boheinia's editor Angel Quevedo thought the Con-

gress demonstrated the compatibility of religion and the revolution.

139

Had not the Congress enjoyed "the warmest and firmest protection of

-1
I
I
I

the revolutionary a~thorities? " 140 The euphoria of the Congress carried over into politics~

The A grupado Jose Ignacio Rasco announced the

formation of a Christian Democratic Movement, accompanied by assurances, which need not be taken seriously, that it had nothing to do with
the church.

141

The Congress was a triumph, but) rather than a point of advance
toward greater achievement, the Congress marked a zenith from which

I
I
I
I
I

137Bohemia, December 6, 1959, p. 89.
138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., p. 71.
140 Ibid.
141 Diario de la Marina, December 19, 1959. Rasco may have
thought th at his fri e ndship with Fidel would protect him. He had been
a classmate of Fidel's at Belen, had participated with Fidel in university politics, and had accompanied Fidel on his April, 1959, trip to the
United States ,and Latin America.
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the church would now begin to decline.
reached_ its climax.

Cuba's religious renaissance

Within a year the church's infh~ence. all the social

infrastructure painstakingly built over generations. was to be tumbled
down.
The Catholic Congress had indicated the church's intention to
undertake a more vigorous social program. But, according to Father
Llorente, its attempts in this direction were deliberately frustrated
by the government.

142

Nothing was accomplished.

In December, two priests, Fathers Ram6n O'Farrill and Eduardo

Aguirre, fled to Miami.

There, O'Farrill warned that Castro was plan-

ning to found a national church.

A standard tac_tic. O'Farrill thought,

of communist revolutions~ 143 Bia:in berated the .defectors as fools and
liars, men who lacked the courage and inclination to carry out the social
gospel of "visiting the sick, entering the ho~es of the humble. rrl4 4
Fidel saw the defectors as traitors. allies of Padre Velasco of the Trinidad plot.

A week later Father Maximiliano Perez who, like O'Farrill,

had supported the revolution, also fled into exile. 145
Father Biain recognized that the bourgeoisie, even_the "Christian
bourgeoisie,

11

was "scandalized, " distraught over its loss of prerogatives

142 Interview with Father Llorente.

Miami, January 13, 1971. ·

143 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 220.
144 Diario de la Marina, December 17, 1959.
145 Ibid.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

463

Spanish embassies.

The ambassador, a man of short temper, rushed

to the TV studio to challenge Castro.

Castro, astoni~hed at Lojendio's

·
149
effrontery. gave the arnbassador forty-eight hours to get out of Cuba.
The Lojendio affair served to underline the links between Spain
and the church, just as the earlier difficulties at the University of Villanueva had illustrated the church's ties to the U.S.

Thus the foreign

and az:iti-national aspects of the church were once again emphas_ized.
Towards the end of January, 1960, Pope John received Cuban
.
M.1n1s
. t er Rau'1 R oa. l 50 Th ereaft er, R oa t o ld th e-press t h at
F. ore1gn
the "immense majority'_' of Catholics had aided the fight against Batista.
Most everyone realizes, said Roa,
permeating the revolution.

the "profoundly Christian spirit"

151 The Pope promoted more churchmen

known as friends of the revolution.

Most significant was the appointment

of Manuel Rodriguez Rozas as bishop of Pinar del Rfo.

The new bishop

had sheltered various rebels, including Castro's first premier, Jose

,
Mir6 Cardona, during the revolutionary war.

Rodriguez had also barred

149 The estrangement between Cuba and Spain was relatively
brief. Castro, who for a time had enjoyed denouncing "the fascist"
Franco, found that, with the severing of relations with the U.S., economic links with Spain were most necessary. In 1964 Cuban exiles
machine-gunned a Spanish freighter carrying olive oil to Cuba. Franco
thereafter privately warned the U.S. that if such incidents continued he
would send destroyers to escort his merchantmen.
150 El Mundo, January 24, 1960.
l5l Bohemia, February 21, 1960.

Supplement 13.
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in Cuba's distributionist revolution.

Too bad for them! The whole world

.
·
h is
. t6 r1co....
.
" 14 6 B 1am
. t wan t e d
was sh1. f tmg
away f rom " cap1. t a 11smo

to move away from thE: extraordinary individualism of Cuban society toward "a more communitarian sense o:f sodal life. 1114 7

The Lojendio Affair
Among those who shared Biain's views was the Spanish priest
Father !IYaki de Azpiazu, a Franciscan and frequent contributor to La
Quincena.

Azpiazu combined his enthusiasm for the ''humanitarian

revolution" in Cuba with attacks on Franco's Spain.

This distressed the

Spanish Ambassador Juan Pablo de Lojendio, Marques de Vellisca.
When, during a TV interview, Azpiazu complained of the lack of press
freedom in Spain, the ambassador had him deported from Cuba.

Lojendio

then called a number of Cuba's Spanish clerics to his embassy and asked
them to reassert their loyalty to Spain and Franco.
measures were also discussed.

Counterrevolutionary

A document was read, noting that thou-

sands of Catholics had been slaughtered by the communists during the
Spanish Civil War. 148 Was this what lay ahead in Cuba?
Premier Castro, aware of Lojendio's activities, denounced him

I
I
I
I
I

on television.

Castro also read from an intercepted letter whose con-

tents linked clerical counterrevolutionaries in Cuba with the U.S. and

146 Bohemia, January 17. 1960, p. 3~
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid .• p. 62.
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certain rel!gious festivals during the latter part of the Batistato as a
visible sign of protest.

152

The government viewed these elevations as

evidence that the Vatican approved of Castro's revolution.

1960: Mikoyan in Cuba
~. .;F~_
D:u.~ry,

1960, when Rector Boza Masvidal dedicated the

Ca"\~~lt~ ~i:i.Jve_~Eiity's ne_w Pope Pius XII Social Research Institute, he
ob~~~ved_tjl~t. J::ie_n_c_efq:rth all students were to be given a course in Christian_~o~i_a~_ dqc_trine.
.
153
mu.n1_~II1 .•. · ·

Th_i_s, Boza felt, was the best way to resist com11

f:.- TV pi:qgram,

11

•

was inaugurated,

its ~_i_ss19n, H}:{e that of the Pius XII Institute, to present the church's
soqta} doctI_'i_Ile_.. It~ moderator was the Agrupado Jose Ignacio Lasaga,
11

the Ill.an who had inspired the shouts of comunismo no" at the Catholic

154

Congress. ·

In eai:ly February, Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan ar-

rived in Cub_a to i11augurate a Soviet Trade Fair. · The presence of the
"atheist" Milwyan seemed suggestive to many of the real direction of
Castro's revolution.

Others were less sure, recalling that Khruschev had

just visited the United States.

I
I
I
I
I

•

Un MensaJe para Todos,

What was the difference? No sooner had

Mikoyan made the traditional obeisance to Cuban nationalism, placing a

,
wreath at the foot of the Marti statue, when about thirty students appeared

15Z ·
·El Mundo, January 30, 1960.

153 Ibid.
154 Ibid., February 27, 1960.
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and attempted to remove it. 155 Police fired warning shots; some seventeen students were arrested.

A number of the demonstrators were

Agrupados, including the Muller brothers and Juan Manuel Salvat.

156

This was the first instance of open resistance by Catholic counterrevolutionaries.

The Jesuit-controlled Agrupados would struggle against Fidel,

their former classmate at Belen.

The Agrupados and their allies at

Havana University were denounced as traitors by the Castroite s'tudent
leader, Jose Rebell6n.

On one occasion, the Castroites invited a gang

of communist-led dockworkers to th:e university to beat up the Agrupados
and other anti-Castro students. 157
This was a time of great internal turmoil for the Agrupados. ·
Many app:coved Castro's social measures but could not tolerate his dictatorial nature, nor his encouragement of class warfare.

Some Agrupados

thought they were being "pushed" by the church, or being used by the big

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

interests hiding behind the church.

155 Hugh Thomas suggests that the students were encoU:raged by
Villanueva's rector, Msr. Boza. But he gives _no evidence. Thomas,
Cuba, p. 1265.
156

.
The New York Times, February 5, 1960. Juan Manuel
Salvat (1940) had been a student of the Jesuits at their Sagua la Grande
colegio, a member of the Agrupaci6n Cat61ica, and a law student at the
University of Havana. Sal vat and Muller were denounced as counterrevolutionaries in league with their fellow Agrupado, Manuel Artime, by
the Directorio Revolucionario in June, 1960. In August, 1960, Muller
. and Salvat sought exile in the United States.
157 Interview with Enrique Baloyra of the Agrupados who participated in these events. Miami, April 8, 1971.
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In late 1959, the Agrupado Manuel Artime began organizing a

counterrevolutionary group, the Movimiento de Rescate Revplucionaria
(MRR).

Artime resigned from !NRA in November and was thereafter

hidden by the Jesuits.

It was a Jesuit who put him in contact with the .

CIA which spirited him out of Cuba in December, 1959. 158
While some elements in the church were practically at war with
Castro, others continued to urge coexistence.

Bia:in of La Quincena

thought the student protests against Mikoyan reflected an "anti-communist
phobia.

11159

That same week,· Bishop Evelia Diaz sat at Castro's side

at a dinner honoring Jo~e Marti.

160

Biain ran an article by the Spanish

Jesuit Santiago de Anitua suggesting that capitalism was in world-wide

I
I
I
I

crisis: "The epoch of the bourgeoisie iD finished: the communitarian
.
.
.
11161
epoch now advances 11~e the sprmg tide.

La Marina's Rivero thought this all incredible nonsense.

Biain

was, in his view. "a Christ with two pistols and a machine gun" who was
aiding "the fires of social subversion" and helping to promote class warfare. 162 Rivero also defended La Marina, no ting that he had put his
158 Haynes Johnson, The Bay o f P i g s (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1964). p. 23.

I
I
I
I
I

l5 9 La Quincena, February 15, 1960, p. 23.
160 On that occasion, Bishop Diaz made a speech favorable to
the revolution. According to Thomas, this was the last such address to
be made by a Cuban bishop. Thomas, Cuba, p. 1264.

161 L a Qu incena, February 29, 1960, p. 1.
(Madrid) 'September-October, 1959.
162 Bohemia, February 21, 1960, p. 65.

Reprinted from Arbor
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entire fortune into it.

Salaries at La Marina, Rivero claimed, were

almost ten times that of profits.

163

Communism Ts the Issue
By early spring, the church was regularly discussing the communist issue.

On television, Msr. Boza attacked the Soviets; they

could fly a sputnik around the earth, but suffered slavery at home.

164

The new Bishop Rodriguez Bozas attacked both communism and the
anti-communism which wa,s merely a front for the protection of selfish
material interests. 165 A Catholic youth group issued a pamphlet re166 Add" .
.
th e commurusts
.
i c 1ose ties
.
.
.
ca11m.g
to th e B atista
regrme.
1tlona1

bishops were appointed, :Jose M. Dominguez Rodriguez and Eduardo
Boza Masvidal, both to be auxiliary bishops of Havana.

Both were

.
167
younger men, graduat~s of Cuba's San Carlos Seminary.
Interpre-

tations of these new appointment~ were mixed.

The newly elevated

Msr. Boza Masvidal was a vocal anti-communist.

Was the church

turning away from the revolution?

16~ Ibid., p. 64 . According to Rivero, salaries at La Marina
in 1958 amounte d to $93 6, 051. Profits were $95, 000.
16 4 Ibid., March 6, 1960, p. 68.
165 El Mundo, March 20, 1960.
l66 The New York Times, March 22, 1960.
167 El Mundo, March 26, 1960.
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The communists begari to counterattack.

At the IV Congress of

Socialist Youth in early April, the communist intellectual Juan Marinello
•I •

warned Catholics to stay out of politics and "to remc1in inside their ternples adoring their images." If they trfod to come out and make a counterrevolution, then they "will find us in the first line, fighting against
them. 11168 A group of Catholic university students countered in La
Marina that, if the communists tried to take their ideas outside .of the
lecture hall, "they will meet Catholics in the front rank fighting against
. d e f ense o f Ch r1s
. t.1an c1v1
: ·11za
· t.ion an d d emocracy. " ·16 9 E 1g
· ht
th. em m
Catholic organizations issued a joint statement denouncing Marinello's
.
11170 The
remarks as " an insolent threat to free religious express10n.
signatories supported all revolutionary measures to "end misery, hunger and exploitation and to distribute the national wealth more equally, "
wh 1"l e a t th e same t"1me repu d"iat"mg

ll

11171
. . communism
.
ath e1st1c
.•

Churchmen also wrestled with these issues in book length formats.

Foyaca published La iglesia frente al coniunismo, a compendium

168Bohemia, Apri117, 1960, p. 55.
169Havana Times, April 7, 1960.

I
I
I
I

·1

170 Ibid., April 14, 1960. The eight Catholic organizations included Acci6n Cat6lica and its masculine and feminine youth groups, the
Knights of Columbus, Confederation of Marian Congregations, Damas
Isabelinas, Confederation of St. Vincent de Paul, Catholic Teachers
Association, Confederatidn of Catholic Fathers and the Family Christian
Movement.
171 Bohemia, April 17, 1960, p. 55.

469
172
. 1s 1n
· sunp
·
1·r·
· h commentary.
·
o f papa1 encyc 11ca
1 ic d r orm wit
Father
Felix Alluntis, a professor at the University of Villanueva, published

,

the Filosofia cristiana de la p r opiedad.

It urged thP. broadest possible
. 173
diffusion of property "in order to establish a healthier social order. "
The views of Alluntis and his associates were most unappreciated by the

bourgeoisie who felt they were being betrayed by the church.

The son

of a hacendado commented that his class had carried and built up the
church; now they were being condemned by it.

Some burgueses felt

a certain crude sense of satisfaction when the church itself was done
in by the Castroites.
Spring also saw the collapse of Jose Ignacio Rasco's Christian
Democratic Movement.

It had never amounted to much: a declaration

of principles; a trip by Rasco in January, 1960, to a meeting of Christian Democrats in ·Lima; and then, in April, into exile.
The signs were mixed now.

Church functions such as the cele-

brations of Holy Thursday continued without interference.

But priests

and nuns were required to register with the Ministry of Labor as workers.
Rich Catholic women of the Damas Isabelinas, of Acci6n Social Franciscana, continued to hold their canasta parties at the Yacht and Country
Clubs.

The funds derived from these affairs underwrote La Quincena's

attacks on the rich.

La Quincena now denounced the whole Miramar

172 Manuel Foyaca, S. J., La Iglesia frente al comunismo.
Havana: Editorial Lex, 1960.
173 El Mundo, April 9, 1960.
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section, that bourgeois enclave of the powerful who lived with "indifference, ostentation. "

174

At the end of April, Castro's sister Emma

was married in the Havana Cathed~al.

175

Archbishop Diaz officiated.

On the same day, Agrupados at Havana University were protesting the
arrival of a new lecturer, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a leading member
of the communist party.

"The Enemy Is Within"
The intervention of La Marina by the government in May, 1960,
was viewed, with philosophic detachment by Biafo at La Quincena.

He

I
I

thought La Marina's dis.appearance was an unfavorable comment on the

I·

of the ''high and middle bourgeoisie," classes which favored U.S. in-

I
I
I

status of press freedom in Cuba.

But hadn.'t La Marina been a defender

tervention even at the risk of a bloodbath? 176

A

few days later, Cuba

established full diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

Stung by

these events, Archbishop Perez Serantes prepared a pastoral letter for
Sunday, May 16.

"The enemy is within, "he said. He sympathized with

many of the social measures of the revolution, but warned that there

174 La Quincena, April 30, 1960, p, 12.

I

I
I
I
I

175 Those attending Emma's wedding included diplomats and
revolutionaries, but no members of Havana's gilded bourgeoisie. The
Castros, though economically well situated, were in no sense members
of Havana's social establishment. Fidel and his family were outsiders.
176
.
. L a Qu1ncena,
May 15, . 1960, pp. 32-33.
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could be no compromise with communism.

"Con el comunismo nada, .

absolutamente nada. " 177
The archbishop's pastoral, all the more impressive because of
his lifelong friendship with Castro, carried only his signature.

What

of the other bishops? The pastoral was given the widest possible circulation; by mid-June, 200, 000 copies were circulating in Havana,
mostly reprinted in church bulletins.

With the intervention of La

Marina, the church had lost an important medium for conveying its
messages.

The remaining media were either pro-government or fol.
178
lowing a line of extreme caution.
Public discussion, by the church
.

or anyone else, was increasingly impossible.

But Castro decided, at

least for fue moment, not to do battle with the church.

Thereafter,

President Dortic6s declared that church-state relatfons had never been
,179
b e tt er.

· In June, Bishop Boza suggested the government ought to reimburse those who suffered expropriation.

He criticized the excessive

level of state control of Cuba's economic and social life.
ment radio denounced Boza.as a reactionary.

180

The govern-

Boza was becoming,

177 Diario Las Americas (Miami), May 18, 19_60.
178

This was the tactic used by El Mundo and Informaci6n.

179 El Mundo, May 31, 1960.
l80 Julien, La revoluci6n cubana, p. 182.
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I
I
I
I
I
I
I

by design or default, the church's chief spokesman. He remained in that
1a1 ·
position for the remainder of the church-state struggle.
In mid-July, Bishop Boza offered a special mass at the Havana
Cathedral for the victims of communist persecution around the world.
The cathedral was packed.

Many stood outside.

Inside

"men ana- worn en

~

with tears streaming down their faces shouted 'Cuba si, Rusia no' and
'Viva Cristo! ' "

182

When the faithful debouched from the cathedral,

they were harassed by young communists.
were fired.

The police intervened; shots

A similar. disturbance occurred the next day outside the

fashionable Jesus de Miramar Church on Fifth Avenue.

183

Castro

angrily denounced those falangista and franquista elements within the

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

church who were trying to create problems.

Why, he wondered, didn't .

those elegant ladies at the cathedral show some real Christianity by
helping the sick, planting trees or doing something useful?

"Those

ladies have forgotten Christ's command: 'Throw the money changers
·
,,184
frorp the tern ple'.

181 Hugh Thomas wrongly asserts that "the radical Msr. Diaz
was in mid-February repla~ed as coadjutor to the archbishop in Havana
by a tough anti-communis t , Msr . Boza Masvidal. ••• " Though Boza may
have app eared to replace Archb ishop Diaz, he (Boza) was only auxiliary
bishop of Havana. Diaz r etained his more emirient position. See in
Thomas, Cuba, p. 1268.
182

The New York Times, July 18, 1960.

l83 The church may not have been entirely unprepared for such
~· · · di~turbances. The Agrupaci6n had, according to one source, "hitting
units" prepared to do battle with Castroites who attempted to intervene
religious services.
184 Ru{z, Traici6n, 1960, p. 201.
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Interdict?
On August 7, the cr..urch issued its first collective pastoral letter condemning "the growing advance of communism in our country. " 185
Signed by Cardinal Arteaga and all the bishops, it reviewed with satis.
.
faction the revolution's distributionist-minded economic and social

programs, but then went on to indicate that the rights of some were being

.

.

unjustly infringed upon.
of communism.

More important, however, was the question

Everyone _ought to unders_tand that communism and

Catholicism "flowed from two different concepts of human nature.

The

church is today .and will forever be in favor of the
. humble, but it can
.
.
.
.
11186
1
never coexist with communism.
By chance, the pastoral fo lowed
~:m the heels of Castro's nationalization of a large sector of U.

s.

in-

vestment (sugar, ~lectric, telephone) in Cuba.
Boza Masvidal read this p?-storal at the Havana Cathedral.
Outside there was another near riot.

Government-organized parking

lot attendants scuffled with young Catholic workers of the JOC.

187

Others were dissuaded from fighting by Boza's assistant, Father Sardi.has, the · guerrilla pri~st, and then stopped by the timely arrival of the
.
188
police.
Arc~bishop Evelio Dfaz telephoned the presidential palace

185 Dewart, . Christianity, p. 160.
186

Rufz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 221.

1 8 7 Bohemia, August 21, 1960, p. 49.
188 The New York Times, August 9, 1960.
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to threaten interdict.

189

"If there are no guarantees, all churches will

be closed tomorrow morning and the church will be d.e clared in silence
., .
190
so that the whole world will know what is happening in Cuba."
President Dortic6s· gave the necessary guarantees. Castro also
responded, accusing the church of "systematic provocations" by "fascist priests" aided and abetted by the Spanish and U.S. E~bassies.

191

'!be revolutionary government would "remain serene" in the face of
these provocations, ~hoosing to err on the side of generosity.
priests were arrested.

192

No

Relations returned to "normal. " · '!be bishop

said neither he nor the church thought Castro a communist.

193

'!be

threat of interdict passed.
The pastoral letter of August 7th elicited the most varied response.

At a church in La Vibora (a district in Havana), the parish

priest asked his parishioners to join him in fifteen minutes of silence
in protest agafust the revolutionary laws.

194

· In revolutionary Bayamo,

189 According
to '!be New York Times (August 8, 1960) Arch,
bishop Evelia Diaz had now taken over the administration of the entire
Cuban church owing to the poor health of the 81-year-old Cardinal Arteaga.
190 Th·e New York Times, August 9, 1960. El Mundo's Catholic
affairs writer, Jose Mont6, filed a story on this event, but management
refused to print it. Mont6 then decided to quit. Interview, Miami, February 7, 1971.
191

The New York Times, August 11, . 1960. According to this
Times story, about 500 of Cuba's 800 priests were Spaniards. But, on
August 21, the Times estimated that 800 of Cuba's 1000 priests were
foreigners.
192 Ibid.
193 El Mundo, August 12, _1960.
194Bohemia, August 21, 1960, p. 48.
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in Oriente, when a priest attempted to read the pastoral, the faithful

drowned him out by singing the national anthem. At ~antiago's Santa
~
., .
195
Lucia church, a priest refused to read the letter.
Cuba's Catholic
organizations declared their support for the pastoral.

Bohemia judged

the pastoral a serious step; a return of the church to politics. 196 The

I
I
I
I

I

Wall Street Journal editorialized that the "powerful Roman Catholic
11

•

church was becoming the core of re$istance to Castro.

197

Father

Madrigal assured worried Cuban parents that Catholic colegios would
open in September.

They would not be intervened by the government.

198

'The New York Times cited a Jesuit who declaz°.ed that "the church is
.
now m il1tant
an d prepare dfor t h e f'1gh t.

11199

Con la Cruz y por la Patria
Castro now began to encourage a national church.

Father O'Far-

rill was offered the "pontificate" of such a church in late. 1959.
fused it.

200

He re-

Another who was allegedly approached was Bishop Alberto

195Ib"d
__
1_., p. 73.
196 Ibid., August 14, 1960, p. 73. Bohemia's editor and owner,
Miguel Angel Quevedo, long a staunch supporter of the revolution and a
personal friend of Castro, fled into exile iri early August, 1960. Thereafter Bohemia became, for all practical purposes, a government organ.
197 Wall Street Journal, August 12, 1960.
198

Bohemia, August 21, 1960, p. 69.

199 August 21, 1960.
200 Diario de la Marina (Miami), October 15-, 1960.
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,
.
201
Martm, an outspoken opponent of Batista.
In early 1960, the Havana
newspaperman Antonio Pruna Lamadrid attempted to recruit Father
Jorge Bez Chababe for the schismatic movement. 202 Pruna explained
that the new organization would rid Cuba of Spanish clergy.

thers Bez and Rivas, who was also approached, refused to participate,
~
·. 203
though still another, Father Sardinas, agreed to go along.

The schismatic movement was called "Con la Cruz y por la
Patria" (With the Cross and for the Country), a title suggestive of an
organization loyal to both church and revolution.

Its real leader was

Father Germ~n Lenee, a veteran of the "Iglesia Cat61ica Apost6lica
Mexicana, "the schismatic church fostered by Mexico's President
Calles in the 1930s.

·

The leader of the Mexican·church, Jose Javier

Cortes, had been invited to Cuba in December, 1959.
himself had little stature among Cuban Catholics.
. par1s
. h m
. H o 1gum
, m
. 1951 for cer t am
.
f rom h 1s

II

204

But Lenee

He had been expelled

11205
scan d a 1ous ac t•1V1•t•1es.

Lenee had not participatE:d in the revolution against Batista.

206

20 1 Miguel B retos, a friend of Bishop Martin, rejects this as
"myth." Interview, Coral Gables, February 17, 1971.
202

I
I
I
I
I

Both Fa-

Carlos Todd, formerly a columnist for the Havana Times ,
thought both Prur.a- -the titular president of "Con la Cruz .•• "- -and
his adjutant, Lulu Horstman, to be communists. Cuban Information
Service Newsl ette r , December 24, 1960.
203 M
. onahan, Th e G reat. Dec eption,
.
p. 143 •
204Avance (Miami), February 3, 1961.
205El Mundo, September 13, 1960.
206Mambi (Miami) January 31, 1961.
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"Con la Cruz" made its public debut in July, 1960.

Lenee criti-

cized Boza Masvidal's anti-communist sermon of July 17, saying that
some Catholics were trying to incite a clash between church and state. 20 7
He argued that the revolution's social program was in full accord with
the church's social doctrine.

He wondered why, prior to 1959, the

churc~ had failed to denounce the failings of the bourgeoisie.

208

On

August 15, "Con la Cruz" held an open air mass "for the health .of Dr.
Castro" before a cro~d of eight thousand at the municipal ~mphitheater
in Havana.

209

Lenee officiated against the backdrop of a huge Cuban

,
flag.

Bishop Diaz authorized the affair.

Fathers Arechea, Berenguer

and A nge1 Gazte'1u were present. 210
In the fall, Lenee became a regular fixture on the Cuban scene,

·appearing every few days to denounce counterrevolutionaries.
not without friends.

He was

In September when Lenee's old bishop, Alfredo

Muller, spoke disparagingly about the leader of "Con la Cruz" during

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

.,

.a mass at the Havana Cathedral, Muller was verbally challenged by an
altar boy, to the scandal of all attending.

207 El Mundo, July 19, 1960.
208 Ibid., August 10, 1960.
209 Ibid.

J

August 16, 1960.

210Ib.d
__
l_•

I

August 16-17, 1960.

211 Ibid.

I

September 13, 1960.

211
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Curiously, while the church could tolerate Lenee, it could no
longer stomach Biain's continuous sniping from the pages of La Quincena.
On August 7, he was deposed by Bi.shop Boza. 212 Though instructed to
cultivate the virtue of silence, Biain c9ntinued to give his views in sermons and in occasional essays for other periodicals. , In late August,
the Spanish Jesuit Marcial Bedoya was shot and wounded while protecting a youth wanted by government authorities.

There were scuffles be-

tween Catholics and revolutionaries at churches in Camagiiey.

213

In

Havana, the church held a week-long meeting of Juventud Cat6lica,
with some six hundred delegates presided over by four bishops.
Diaz enjoined the young Catholics to "remain united in Christ.
organize for action, marching like

~

Bishop
Let us

pe::tceful army, without violence ••• '~ 214

In September a new organization appeared, the Uni6n de Cat6licos

Revolucionarios. : Was this another government-inspi:..-ed effort to split
the church, or did this merely reflect political opportunism and the love
.of (?Ommand evidenced in the multiplicity of ephemeral organizations so
typical of Cuba?
of the revolution.

The Uni6n sent a letter to Cardinal Spellman in defense
215

"Catholic revolutionaries" planning a congress for

September were denounced by Bishop Perez Serantes for attempting to

I
I
I
I
I

"foment disunity" within the church. 216
212 Julien, La revoluci6n cubana, p. ·190.
213 The New York Times, August 22, 1960.
2.14 La Quincena, September 15, 1960, p •.53.
215 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 273.
216 Diario de la Marina (Miami), September 10, 1960.
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"Cuba Si; Esclavos Jam as"
In Santiago, Archbishop Perez Serantes was an angry and baf-

fled man.

Who would have imagined, he said in a pastoral letter of

September 24, that after all the church had done to aid tI:ie revolution
it would end with "the iron hand ..• of communism hovering threateningly
over our heads? 11 Oriente Province, he recalled, · had given everything
to Fidel, "money, clothing, prayers, sacrifices, all the men necessary •••• " Oriente had sent its priests: Sardinas, Rivas, Lucas, Guzman, Cavero and Barrientos.

217

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

And now communism and false ac-

cusations ! He denied that the United States or Spain had any influence,
direct or indirect, over his or the church's behavior. 218 The church
was not d e. f ense1ess.

lll'H

vv

e are,

in numbers to the communists.

II

p erez
'

s erantes

warne d ,

II

•
very superior

11219

In Havana, the September 4th parish bulletin at Bishop Boza's

Nuestra Seriora de la Caridad Church denounced an attempt by the
Brigada Femenina Revolucionaria to turn campesinos against the church.

21

_7 Avance {Miami), October 21, 1960, P• 17.

218 Leslie Dewart's Christianity and Revolution emphasizes
those portions of the pastoral letters which suggest the church's affinity for the U.S. A full reading of the letters suggests this is a distortion. Quite to the contrary, the church in this epoch was most
anxious to deny the American connection in b~th word and deed.
219

Avance {Miami), October 21, 1960, p. 17.
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~

The Brigada was issuing propaganda depicting Marti as opposed to the
sacrament of baptism and to the fees the priests charged
for. this ser.
vice.

220

On September 9th, all church radio and t~levision programs

were barred.

The Agrupaci6n Cat6lica's one hour show on Telemundo

had closed earlier when the program's directors refused to grant the
government the right to prior censorship.

Jose Ignacio Lasaga's CMQ

program was closed down for having ." indirectly criticized the government. 11221 JOC's radio program on CMQ had also been silenced, without explanation.

Catholic organizations protested, but without result.

222

Toe closing down of the church's radio and TV outlets was paralled by the government's increasing nationalization of the economy.
same nationalization was also reducing the church's income.

Many ~f

the bourgeoisie, the financial mainstay of the church, had left.
lic schools were against the wall.
lapsed.

Many had large defici~s.

Red ink appeared on the ledgers at Belen.

223

This

Catho-

Some col-

The Havana

Miljtary Academy. where Artime once taught, was, in November, designated a training school for the rebel army.
Bishop Boza wondered in La Quincena: "Is the Cuban Revolution
Christian?" For Boza, the answer was a resounding no! The revolu-

I
I
I
I

tion had done some good works, but it was now discovered to have ·a
220Ibid., September 23, 1960, p. 11.
221 Diario de la Marina (Miami), October 8, 1960.
22 2 Ibid., October 15, 1960.
223 Interview with Fr. Daniel Baldor.

Miami, June 10, 1971.

I
- - - - - ----

-------

481
materialistic base, to lack respect for human dignity a.nd freedom.
Respect for private property was "indispensable for the exercise of
individual liberty." The revolution·was arousing class hatred, smearing its enemies, attacking the U.S. and other western nations.

What

about "Red Imperialism?" Communism in Cuba was no ionger a phan. rea1·1ty. 224
t om; 1"i was a. t rag1c
In November, Father Teste, founder of Cuba's Boys' Town,
went into exile.

Following Castro's victory, Teste's friend Nunez

Jimenez of INRA had offered him the cattle of the Batistero Ram6n
Hermida. 225 Teste was surprised by this gesture of revolutionary
generosity.

"Who are you,

He refused to accept.

11

he asked, "to give me Hermida's cows? 11

rn· 1960,

I
'I
I
I
I
I
I

Teste again refused.

Thereafter, he sensed the revolution was after him and, with a revolver
II·
JUS

I

Nunez Jimenez asked Teste to help im-

prove the revolution's relations with the church.

. h"1s· cassoc k
m

I

t m
. case, "h e fl e d t o M"1am1.
. 226

A few days later Alberto Martin, bishop of Matanzas, died.
Some said he died of disappointment with the revolution.

He also had

a long record of heart trouble. 227 It was symptomatic of the status of

224.The New York Times, October 31, 1960; La Quincena,
October 30, pp. 3, 33.
225 Ram6n Hermida had been minister of government for Batista in 1953.
226 Interview with Father Teste.
227 Interview with Miguel Bretos.

Miami, May 14, 1971.
Miami, ~ebruary 19, 1971.
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church-state relations that his death was not even mentioned in the
government controlled El Mundo.
After a year of relative tranquility, the Catholic university returned to center stage.

In November, ·some of the university's more
~

revolutionary students published a letter in their newspaper, Guia,
describing the rector and his staff as representatives of the Spanish
alange and messenger boys for the U.S. State Department.
students refused to recant.

,,

The

The rector. Bishop Boza. expelled them.

Castro denounced Villanueva as a
The students there were

228

11

100 percent Yankee university."

.., .
,,229
senoritas.
There were. said Fidel,

11

no heroes among the sons of the rich.

11230

The university retorted-

that it was very Cuban; moreover, almost half of its students were
.
231
poor boys on scholarships.

Students at Catholic colegios also entered the political struggle,
,
attem'p ting a strike in mid- November in honor of Porfirio Ramirez. a
student at the University ~f Las Villas, who had recently been executed
.
f or count errevo 1u t 1onary
ac t·1v1't"1es.

232

F a th er L ence o f "C on la C ruz II

228 El Mundo, November 13, 1960.

I
I
I
I
I

229 "Senoritas"- -a derisive term referring to the young gentlemen of the bourgeoisie.
230

El Mundo, November 27, 1960.

231 La Quincena. November 30, 1960, pp. 5; 33.
232 El Mundo, November 15, 1960.
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urged parents not to let their children participate.

He told Havana

University students to sing the national anthem should any priest mention the recently arrested counterrevolutionary Hubert Matos. 233 The
strike was a fizzle, the government pr.ess reporting that only
11·

madaptados 11 and

II

I
ego1stas,

II

spurred on by

actionary clerics, " had dared to participate.

II

a few

the most ranc1"d an d re-

234

"Roma o Moscou ? "
In Santiago on November 13, Archbishop Perez Serantes is-

sued another fighting pastoral letter.

Implicit was a warning to Cubans

not to depend on American arms, money or intervention to save them.
This was an ideological battle.

"Gold cannot buy and cannot destroy

ideas. " Cuban Catholics had to fight Marxism with their own spiritual
resources.

The struggle was not Moscow vs. the United States, but

"Roma o Moscou. " 23 5 The reading of this pastoral at the Santiago
Cathedral was interrupted by students shouting revolutionary slogans
and singing the M-26's marching song.

In the plaza outside the cathe-

dral, militiamen armed with new Czech weapons practiced close order
drill.

236

233 Bohemia , November 20, 1960, p. 57.
234 El Mundo , November 13, 1960.
235 The New York Times, November 13, 1960.
236 Ibid., November 14, 1960.
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Why didn't the chu:rch re-invoke its earlier threat of interdict
in the face of these provocations? Sometime during the fall of 1960, a

decision was apparently made to tolerate whatever Castro might offer,

I
I
I

to turn the other cheek and keep the church's
few th~y might

qe.

Hot on the heels of Archbishop Perez Serantes' pastoral came
the pastoral letter of December 4th, addressed this time directly to

I

Castro and signed by the entire hierarchy.

II.~

sp~cific complaints.

I
I
I

.,

doors open, no matter how

This pastoral dealt with

First, the government, all denials to the con-

trary, was using Marxist and pro-communist materials to indoctrinate
its followers.

Second, priests who read the previous collective pas-

toral in their churches were arrested; 0thers threatened.

Third, an

anti-religious campaign "of national dimensions" was afoot.

were b.eing: held all over Cuba in which the church was being insulted.
The church was barred from access to radio and television media;
calumnies were daily launched against the hierarchy.

Catholic groups

were 1:5eing organized with the sole purpose of attacking the church;
" provoca t eur.s " were h aras.smg
.
.
c h urc h services.

Government spokes-

men w.e re equating anti-communism with counterrevolution.

I

I
I
I

I

Meetings

The pas-

toral denied that Catholic schools were "prep schools for the privileged."
Many church schools were free and others provided scholarships.

Priests

who worked at and were paid by sugar centrales were not, as Fidel called

485

them, botclleros. 23 7 The pastoral concluded that the church "was
ready to sacrifice itself without the least r'ear and ready to lose every.
b e f ore 1"t wou ld y1e
. ld on 1"t s prmc1p
. . 1es. 112 38
t h mg
The pastoral of necember 4 w3:s a formidable document.

Like

the earlier declarations of Perez Serantes, it suggested a real determination to do battle with "communism. " But the church never suggested the means.

Who was to fight? In Mexico, when church and

state collided in the 1920s, the church called for a national economic
slowdown and launched the Cristeros (Catholic guerrillas} against the
government.

But in Cuba,; unlike Mexico, the church had no fanatical

peasants at its disposal.

Cuba's bourgeoisie preferred exile or ac-

commodation to confrontation.

And how could tqe church's comments

be taken seriously when there was such evidence of division within the
clergy?
Castro was not intimidated by the church's threats.

Father

Lenee of "Con la Cruz" announced he welcomed aid from Russia.
After all, it was the "West" that wanted to "assassinate" Cuba. 2 39

23 7
· Botelleros is a term of disrespect generally reserved for
Batista officeholders who received salaries without working. The
existence of the priests at the sugar mills was discovered following
the nationalization of the sugar sector.
238 All above data on the December 4th pastoral is from Diario
de la Marina (Miami}, December 10, 1960.
239 El Mundo, December 9, 1960.
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Nuns were said to be passing· from door to door selling stamps bearing
the counterrevolutionary legend: "Oh Virgin Mother ..•• Pray for Cuba,
Save Cuba •••. " 240 On December 7th, Bishop Boza Masvidal's church
was bombed.

I

241

· Castro became ever more vehe-

ment, wa'rning the bishops that "one of the commandments cf God's law,
S~ores Archbishops, is not to lie. 11242
as indifferent to Batista's crimes.

He portrayed C~rdinal Arteaga

He saluted the good priests, men

like Fathers Lenee and Sardinas, and wondered why high church positions went only to "fascists." But Castro believed in freedom of conscience: "Our people h~ve many beliefs.

Some are devoted to the Vir-

.gen de la Caridad, others to witchcraft .•• some believe in horoscopes,
others in the stars. " 243 .
Fidel might admire Father Lenee, but the church did not.
Bishop Boza excommunicated him "for disobedience. 2 44 Lenee replied
that he had committed no crime.
tionary in order to say mass ?

245

Did one have to be a counterrevoluCastro angrily declared that the

240 Ibid., December 10, 1960.
241

I
I
I
I

Damage was minor.

The New York Times, December 8, 1960.

242E1Mundo, December 17, 1960.
243 Ibid.
244 Bohemia, January 1, 1961, p. 59.
245 Ibid.
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hierarchy would have to excommunicate the revolutionary government
and the whole people of Cuba. 246 El Mundo wondered how the church
in Italy and Pr:.rncc could coexist with large communist parties, while
the Cuban church could not?
Lenee a position.

247

The University of Las Villas offered

Despite his excommunication, Lenee and "Con la

Cruz" continued their activities.
Bohem ia now began to attack the church's Cementerio de. Col6n,
Havana's principal cemetary, denouncing it as a latifundia, a business,
another indication of the church's bourgeois mentality.

Burial plots

for the rich cost from $200 to $500 per square meter.

Cardinal Ar-

teaga was said to have a "giant tomb. " There were even class differences in death; the poor were buried in a muddy and ill-kept corner,
.t h e1r
. graves mar
.
k e d w1"th woo d en crosses. 248 Th e a d mm1s
. . . t ra t or o f
the cei:netary replied--from exile--that the church was not to blame for
the opulence o{ the magnificent tombs of Pedro Baro, the Fallas, Gon.zalez de Mendoza, Truffins, Riveros, some of which boasted elevators
and other amenities.

246 El Mundo, December 20, 1960.
247 Ibid.
248 Bohemia, January 1, 1961, p. 70. Carlos de la Torre, administrator of the Ccmenterio de Col6n in 1958, was, in 1974, manager
· of the Bess Comb Funeral Home in Miami.
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January, 1961: The U.S. Breaks Relations
The end of the old order was at hand.

On January 3rd, the

United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

On .t his news, the

nuns of the Merici Academy began to depart into exile.

I
I
I
I
I

I·
I
I
I

schools were on the verge of collapse.

A colegio that began in 1959

with seven hundred students had half that in 1960 and less than two
hundred in January 1961.

The owner was still required by -law to main-

tain a full teaching staff.

No layoffs.

249

At mid-month, La Quincena >

the only public voice left to the church, was seized by units of the women's militia.

The Knights of Columbus and the JOC were also

·intervened. 2 50
When the young literacy teacher. Conrado Benitez, was found
hanged, apparently by 'counterrevolutionaries, Castro blamed the U.S.
and the Catholic clergy.

Fidel asserted that Benitez was hung because

he was a communist. 251 In early February. President Dortic6s threat-

ened to nationalize all Catholic schools on the grounds they were pre- ·
paring a counterrevolutionary strike.
portedly did strike.

I
I
I
I
I

Other private

252

Five Catholic colegios re-

A demonstration again s t s t rikes (a real novelty

for revolutionaries) was held by secondary students in front of the
249 Cuban Information Service Newsletter (Miami) January 14,
1961.
250 Ibid.
2 5 1 The New York Times, January 25, 1961.
252 Wall Street J ournal, February 6, 1961.
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presidential palace where they shouted against the University of Villanueva and flaunted signs with the legend "abajo los ninos bitongos. 112 53
There were even some demonstrators from La Salle and La Inmaculada
Academies.

254

The FEU, hearing that private schools planned to pun-

ish dissident students,organized the Asociaci6n de J6venes Rebeldes
(Association of Young Rebels) to resist such retribution. 255 Students
at one Catholic colegio were expelled for participation in military maneuvers.

Belen was accused of hiring professors purged from the Uni-

versity of Havana.
from Villanueva.

Havana, meanwhile, offered to take students expelled
Belem's Escuela Electro-Mecanica was seized by

revolutionary students on the grounds that it had been funded by the sugar
millionaire Aspuru, allegedly a close friend of Batista. 2 56 The papal
nuncio protested the s 7izure, bu:t to no avail.

The Jesuits were said_to

be refusing to accept milicianos (militiamen) as students.
On March 1, a bomb of uriknown origin exploded at the Colegio
Nobel.

A number of students were injured.

Was this to discourage

parents from sending children to private schools? Or was it a counterrevolutionary response to the statement of Nobel's director in favor of
government intervention of private schools? Education Minister Armando

2 53 "Abajo los ninos bitongos"--down with the little rich kids.
254 El Mundo, Fe~ruary 8, 1961.
255Bohemia, February 19, 1961, p. 62.
256 Toid., February 26, 1961, p. 71.
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Hart, ruminating about these matters, recalled that when he intervened
the Colegio Baldor in early 1959 Fidel had warned h_im against "infantilismo revolucionario" and told him that the government would adopt a
·,

policy of tolerance f or private schools,

257

That policy of tolerance was

now at an end.
The government's attacks on the church continued apace.
Havana Cemetery was nationalized.

The

In Santiago, the Asociaci6n. de

J6venes Rebeldes pur.ged Father Jorge Bez Chabebe and seventeen stu.
.
. 2 58 Fr. L ence said
. that
dents f rom t h e In stl'tuto p re- U niversitario.
revolutionary reforms were hurting the church's income.

He estimated

the church had lost some $60, 000 in income from its Havana properties,
owing to the rent and urban reforms. 2 5 9 The communist intellectual
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez thought the guerrilla activity in the Escambray
was owed "in good· part to those bishops ~ho combat the revolution.

11260

Some priests had, in fact, joined ·the counterrevolution, among them
the recently captured guerrilla priest Francisco L6pez Blasquez.

257 El Mundo, March 2, 1961. Colegio Baldor, owned and administered by a brother of Father Daniel Baldor, S. J., rector of Belen.
Father Baldor thought at the time of Colegio Baldor's intervention in
early 1959 that there was no cause for alarm; this was an isolated incident. The state would never intervene a Catholic school. Interview
with Father Baldor. Miami, June 10, 1971 • .

258 El Mundo, March 10, 1961.
2 59 This modest sum, if correct, only serves to underline the
church's lack of properties in Cuba.
260

El Mundo, March 19, 1961.
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El Mundo editorialized that all the church's pastorals, sermons
and bulletins were for naught since the people would not tolerate the
church's interference in politics.
the clergy.

261

Catholics had turned their back on

But on Holy Thursday some 70, 000 habaneros turned

out to march in the traditional parade. It was a peaceful affair, distressed only by occasional hecklers shouting "Fidel-Fidel. "
The private schools now sensed their time had come.

262
There

were rumors that they would be closed to permit student participation

in the literacy campaign.

263

At the University of Villanu~va, exams

were given early so that students might not "lose the year." Paradoxically, the end of private education in Cuba was precipitated by the
stroke designe~ to save the old order in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs landing.
Among those in the exile landing force were many Agrupados.
Manuel Artime, co.mmander of Brigade 2 506, was, of course, an
Agrupado.

The' Brigade was named after another, Carlos Rodriguez

Santana, serial number 2506, who had died in an accident while training
in Guatemala.

Other Agrupados, Rogelio Gonzalez Corso, 264 Alberto

261 El Mundo, April 11, 1961.
262 Bohemia Libre (Miami), June 4, 1961.
263

Castro's celebrated literacy campaign was deftly combined
with counterinsurgency operations against rural guerrillas.
264 Rogelio Gonzalez Corso, Agrupado and National Coordinator
of the MRR underground, was execute d on April 18, 1961.
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Muller, J.M. Salvat, and Enrique Casuso, were active in the underground.

The offices of the A grupnci6n were intervened on April 17th

by the militia and thereafter converted into a Marxist indoctrination
center.

265

Militiamen invaded the Catholic university. Some students
.
266
wanted to fight, but Vice-Rector Medina told them to go home.
Villanueva's priests were arrested, as were some lay teachers.
Cuban churches were invaded and searched.

Bishop Boza's church was

alleged to contain larg~ quantities of medicines, stockpiled to succor
the wounds of the counterrevolutionaries.

268

He was arrested.

nal Arteaga sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy.

Cardi-

269

A triumphant Castro announced on May Day that three priests,
all Spaniards, had been captured at Playa Gir6n.
audacity of these "tascist and falartgist priests,
foreign priests from Cuba.

265

11

!rt response to the

Castro banished all

Private education, including the University

of Villanueva, was to be nationalized.

266

I
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I
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Schools demonstrating a "patriotic

Agrupaci6n Cat6lica, Memoria, p. 7.

n·1ar10
· L as Amer1cas
; .
(M"1am1. ),

0 c t ob er 13 , 1971 •

267' Among those lay teachers arrested was professor James
O'Malia. He was held in La Cabana prison for two months·, then deported. Interview, Miami, May 21, 1971.
2 6 8 El Mundo, May 16, 1961.
269 The cardinal remained in Cuba, however, dying there in 1963.
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attitude" were to be indemnified and invited to work with the revolution.
Churches were to remain open, but religious instruction could only be
.
. . "d e th e c h urc h es. 270 .
given
ms1

The great exodus began. Within a few days, some three hundred
nuns and priests were escorted aboard the steam er Covadonga, bound
for Spain.

271

A month later, 109 Christian Brothers left by air for

.
. 272
M 1am1.
In September, 1961, there was a last flickering of resistance.

Bishop Boza, released after his arrest in April, became engaged in a
controversy over the timing of a religious procession.

A near riot

developed with some 4, 000 persons shouting anti-communist slogans.
A Catholic youth was shot.

The communist ·labor leader Jesus Soto de-

mantled the firing squad for the bishop and his rebellious minions.

The

minister of interior viewed the affair as a Cathoiic plot; virtually every
remaining Catholic leader was accused of complicity.
not already in exile sought asylum or were arrested.

Those who were

273

Bishop Boza

and 13 5 priests, 46 of whom were Cuban, were arrested and deported.
This left but 130 priests in Cuba, a skeleton force sufficient to man the
major churches.

In 1689, almost three centuries before, the Cuban

270 El Mundo, May 2, 1961.
271 The New York Times, May 7, 1961.
27 2 Avance (Miami), June 9, 1961.
273BohemiaLibre (Miami), October 1, 1961, p. 47.
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church boasted 225 priests. 27 4 A high Vatican official commented
privately that the "impeding and imprisoning" of Catholic bishops,
especially in the case of Bishop Boza, automatically excommunicated
€astro and his chief assistants.

But Pope John XXIII refused to make

any public announcement to that effect, fearing it would only worsen
relations with the Cuban government. 275
Richard Eder reported that some members of the hierarchy felt
the priests who left Cuba ought to have tried harder to stay.
there seemed no overall church policy.

276

But

Each order, each priest, did

as it or he saw fit.
Some Catholics refused to admit defeat.

"They shall not pre.,-

vail, " wrcte Andres Vald.espino from exile, because "faith is the real
soul of the church.

And faith cannot be· sent to the firing squad wall. 11 277

And Archbishop Perez Serantes told his parishioners in May, 1961, as
the church tumbled down:

11

Be calm and hopeful brothers, fear not, for

despite the blast of the st<;>rm ••• we are doing well; we are in the boat

274 Lebroc, "Sintesis Hist6rica, "Anuario, p. 9. By 1964, the
number of priests in Cuba ~creased to 21 O. (The New York Times,
May 24, 1964.) Iri 1972, Cuba had 200 priests and 50 seminarians.
(Latin America Calls, Washington, D. C., April, 1972.)
275 The New York Times, January 4, 1962. Jose L Lasaga suggests that the pope was then "already thinking of a new approach to the
relations between the church and the communist regimes, and decided not
to make a 'loud' formal protest •••• " {Letter to author, Annapolis, December 31, 1972.)
2 75 The New York Times, September 19, 1961.
277Bohemia Libre (Miami), October 1, i961, pp. 46; 51.

I
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of that expert fisherman of Galilee ••• who permits these things to test
.
11278
and strengthen our faith.
.
But the church was not "doing well. " It had suffered a stunning
defeat.

But the men who had participated in that debacle, and who were

in part responsible for it, would admit nothing.

The glowing but vacuous

idealism of the intellectuals, the empty threats of the bishops, the failure of organization and leadership, all these things were evident.
For the church, the Cuban revolution was but a renewal of the
eternal paradox between heaven and earth.

No Cuban ruler would have

tolerated an activist and interventionist church; politicians in soutanes.
.And yet, without political action, the church could not defend its religious interests.

It was both cruel and fatile of the bourgeoisie,. whose

own institutions--hacendados, ganaderos, politic_a l parties--had collapsed without resistance, to ask the church to assume the burden of
stopping Castro.

As Belen's Father Baldor once observed, the remedy

to communism "must be present beforehand... . Castro was a fruit of
the failure of ~uban society.

11279

The church would be reduced to a tiny elite.

Wit~ but a token

force of priests, the sacraments could not be widely dispensed.

And,

with the intervention of the church's educational system, few indeed of

278

.
Ibid., June 4, 1961, p. 37.

279 1nterview with Fr. Daniel Baldor.

Miami, June 10, 1971.
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the coming generations would be able to ~all themselves Catholics. 280
Toe priests who remained did so on Castro''s terms. leading the old
historian Herminia Portell Vila to ·write bitterly from exile that. "just
as in 1898, the representatives of the Catholic church are now the allies of the colonial oppressor." And this time the situation was even
worse since the oppressor "is atheist, communist and officially dedicated to the destruction of religion. 11281 This is, of course. the extreme view of the exiles.
emasculated it.

Castro did not destroy the church. but rather

He re_c ently commented that his government chose not

to persecute the church "in order not to give the imperialists ammunition which they could use in their campaign of presenting the Cuban
.
.
11282
as ant•1-re1·1g1ous.
R.evo l u t 10n

The tragedy of the Cuban church was that its renaissance came
a decade too late. the revolution a decade too soon.

Rad the renaissance

280 In 1972, one Cuban priest estimated that only 7-8% of Cuba's
Catholics were practicing their faith. There has been a sharp reduction in the admini.stration of baptism and other sacraments. (Fiero
Gheddo, "The Church in Revolutionary Cuba, " Katholische Missionen
January-February, 1972, as translated in Latin American Documentary
Service: III, 13a, December, 1972.)
281 Diario Las Americas (Miami), August 1, 1971.
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Fidel in Chile (New York: International Publishers, 1972),
p. 71. The Chilean theologian Father Pablo Ricard made an investigation of the Cuban church's situation in 1972 and concluded that "there
is no religious persecution in Cuba. " He did find, however, that the
church was living "as in a ghetto, in fear of disappearing, " because its
activities have been so circumscribed by the Castro regime. (Latin
America Calls (Washington, D. C. ). April, 1972.)
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come earlier--and more vigorously--the revolution might have had to
contend with a more socially conscious, active and popular church,
a
.
.

church more capable of defining--and defending--its interests.

Had the

revolution come later, it might have found a church whose violent antagonism'towards socialism had mellowed under the influence of Pope
John XXIII and the Marxist-Christian dialogue of the 1960s.

Instead,

the church, fragmented, unsure, too .closely linked with foreigners and
the rich, challenged a popular government and was resoundingly and

.

__/-

)

humiliatingly defeated.

The bishops had sounded the call. to battle.

The faithful did not respond.
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At first we thought the revolution
. would last for only a few months.
Then we thought maybe a year or
two •••• And when the Bay of Pigs
invasion came, we thought it would
be over.
Member of the American Club,
Havana, 19731
The face of luxury, which reflected
the elegant life of a minority that
was al ways giving parties, driving
luxurious cars, and traveling in and
· out of the country, had to change ••••
The bourgeois facade of Cuban so. ciety had to change ••••
.

.

2

Fidel Castro, 1961

.;

X.

THE FALL OF THE BOURGEOISIE

In January, 1959, Cuba enjoyed a moment of extraordinary

civic euphoria, a regular civic feast.

In a remarkable shift from the

individualism and selfishness of the Batistato, there was, mercurially,
a willingness to sacrifice and a desire to promote the national interest.
When Fidel's victorious column reached Santa Clara, he and his

I

I
I
I
I

barbudos were offered a splendid lunch by the rum baron "Pepin" Bosch.
Many had expected Bosch to seek political office--perhaps the presidency
-~in the new era, but he modestly stepped aside, renounced all political

1 Joe Nicholson, Jr., "Inside Cuba," Harpers (April, 1973), p. 64.
2 Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture, pp. 202.;203.
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ambition, and offered his services, gratis, to the government.
In Havana, Castro received a tumultuous reception.

3

Some

thought the habaneros, rueful of not having participated more actively

in Castro's rebellion, wanted to make an overwhelming demonstration
of their revolutionary solidarity. 4 There was an element of fraud in
this.

Batistianos were observed among the frenetic throng, happily

wearing M-26 armbands.

Such instant converts were known as "revo-

lutionaries of the Second of January. " Looking down from his office
window, the vice-president of Atlantica del Golfo was astonished.

Hun-

dreds of thousands in the streets, and there among them Fidel Castro,
115
.
mounted triumphant
on a tan k : "Itwas madne.s_s.
To t h e 1awyer

Mario Lazo, Castro's welcome was reminiscent of the collective delirium aroused by the arrival of Cuba's first president, Estrada Palma,
half a century before. 6
· For Cuban youth, this was a shining moment.

At last one of

their own, honest, young, idealistic--a real hero--would lead the country.

Youth would no longer be a perio_d of torment, of adjusting one's

idealism tcr the sordid realities of their fathers' world.

They volunteered

I

.,
[

I
I

3 Some members of the U.S. Embassy had hoped that Bosch,
renowned as an organizer, administrator and honest man, would seek
the presidency.
4 Interview with Enrique Baloyra, Miami, April 8, 1971.
5 Interview with Francisco Rodriguez.
1971.
6 Lazo, Dagger, ·p. 179.

Coral Gables, May 14,
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for everything.

volunteered to tend wounded rebels.

A well-known Havana architect

worked himself to death in those early months, designing and supervising the contruction of housing for the poor~

The intellectual Andres

Valdespino thought Cuba was at last one people; united.

Cubans had given

the entire world "a glorious example of invincible will, a demonstration
of their authentic vocation for liberty.
No one knew ~hat was coming.

117
The businessman Andres Car-

rillo suspected that Fidel would install a mild nationalism on the Mexican model. 8 The labor lawyer Ernesto Freyre wondered ''how can we
help him succeed?"

9

The Diario de la Marina saw a marvelous future

for Cuba: an infinite ho~izon was opening; Cuba would become a "real
nation.

1110

The Havana Times respectfully urged President Urrutia to

clarify his position on communism.

This was really unnecessary, but

it would tranquilize those fringe groups in the U.S. and elsewhere that
. delight in "fabricating stories .•.. "

11

Subsequently, Fidel, "Che, "

Raul, the entire rebel leadership, were heard to deny all allegations of
communism.

I
I
I
I
I

Aristocratic young ladies from the Merici Academy

"We don't intend,

II

said Fidel, "to take anything from

7 Bohemia, January 18, 1959, p. 113.
8 Interview with Andres Carrillo.

South Miami, March 10, 1971.

9 Interview with Ernesto Freyre.

Miami Beach, May 4, 1971.

10 Diario de la Marina, January 7, 1959.
l l Ibid.
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. anybody. 1112 The bourgeoisie was reassured; moreover, they were, like
most Cubans, overwhelmed by Castro's oratory.

They found him spell-

binding. 13 The rich flocked blindiy to Castro's side.

The new Ameri-

pan ambassador, Philip Bonsal, was amazed: "In those days, Cubans
of all classes, especially the wealthy, had climbed on the Castro bandwago~ ••••"

14

But few of these men knew Castro.

A handful had met

him, briefly, for interviews in the Sierra during the rebellion.

Even

his president~ Manuel Urrutia, would later confess that he had met
Castro only in November, . 1958.

15

Fidel was an unknown quantity.

Castro and the Bourgeoisie
Within the first months of the revolution, it became evident that
Fidel Castro had neither personal sympathy nor political respect for
the old bourgeoisie.
.

Cuba's burguesia had
temporized with Batista
.

and failed to provide jobs, to industrialize the island.
sonally would undertake that task.

Now he per-

He was aware that they would resist

12 Ibid.
13

Although the burgueses hate Castro, they none~heless bear
him a grudging respect as· a master orator, a remarkable politician.
One commented that he would enjoy nothing better than a long conversation with Fidel--before shooting him. Castro was especially attractive
to women, girls imagining him their lover; women their son.
14 Bonsal, Cuba, Castro and the U.S., p. 29.
15 n· . d 1 M .
1ar10 e a arma, J anuary 7 , 1959 •
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this shift in power.
revolution.

By mid-March, he warned that "the big interests will do

.
. if
,,16
everything to cruc y us.
.
Castro also disliked the bourgeoisie for personal and social reasons.

His warrior's beard and Spartan uniform were symbols of that

disdain.

He was fond ~f saying, "I wasn't born poor; I was born rich. 1117

'!hough his sugar-planter father was moderately wealthy- -some believe
h'e'left an estate of $300, 000:...-the Castroa were in no sense part of the
gilded bourgeoisie.

I
1·
I

I.
I
I

He was hypersensitive to the dangers of counter- .

His father was an illiterate immigrant who had

gotten ahead by dint of hard work and, according to Fidel's own testimony, abusing his workers, and cheating his neighbors by infringing on
their properties. 18 Fidel was born to Angel Castro's household servant.
'!hey married sometime thereafter. l 9· By dint of the. family money,
Castro was able to go to the Belen Academy in Havana, the leading prep
school· of the bourgeoisie.

There he demonstrated extraordinary talents

as a student, athlete and fledgling politician, but little ability, or respect, for the arts of bourgeois society.

He never learned to dance,

1.6 Ibid., March 14, 1959.

I
I
I
I
I

17 INHA, Vol 1, #3, p. 73.
18 Interview with Andres Carrillo. Miami, March 10, 1971. ·
Enrique Meneses alleges that Fidel's father, who died in October, 1956,
left an estate of more than $500, 000. (Meneses, Castro, p. 32.}
Meneses says the Castros' fortune was based on the sale of land to the
United Fruit Company in 1920.
19 Fidel was technically a bastard, a situation which, in the eyes
of many burgueses, made him a resentido.
·
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never cared much about his appearance, never demonstrated good table
manners. 20 Af Belen he was an outsider.

He seemed bent on picking

fights with the sons of the most prominent burgueses.
came to visit him.

21

His parents never

His advisor at Belen, who greatly admired Fidel's

athletic and intellectual abilities, nonetheless thought of him as a "pea.
.
1122
sant w.dh money.
Fidel once said he was ashamed to have gone to
Belen.

None of his childhood friends at Biran, "not one, graduated from

high school. •• very fe·w even reached the third or fourth grade." Some
·
23
didn't even have shoes.
Fidel seemed to care little.for bourgeois society or opinion.

He

He cont~nued these habits at the University of Havana.

A fellvw

law student remembered seeing Fidel at the wake for Ruben Batista,
one of the first victims of the Batistato.
his shirt open, unshaven •••• "

24

Fidel was

fl

.

unkempt as usual,

When Juan Almeida (in .1_959 commander

of Castro's Rebel Army) met Castro in 1952 at the university, Fidel was

20 Interview with Father Manuel Dorta Duque, a professor at
Belen. Miami, June 13, 1971. Castro 1 s disdain for bourgeois practice
parallels that of "Che" Guevara, who, like Castro, was a burgues--but
an outsider. Guevara's mother's family had once been wealthy.
21 Interview with Salvador Sotomayer,
June 27, 1971.

Belen 143.

22 Interview with Father Armando Llo.rente.

Coral Gables,

Miami, January 13,

1971.
23
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El Mundo, June 28, 1960.

241nterview with Luis Figueroa.

.I

1·

once told a friend that he preferred to eat in th.e kitchen with the hired
help.

I
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Miami, April 2, 1971.
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wearing a rather worn shirt, · with a collar that had evidently suffered
.
25
many repairs.
He made one serious attempt at bourgeois r1=spectability, marrying the daughter of a well-connected family from Havana.
weds went to Miami for their honeymoon.
to practice law in Havana.

Neither his marriage nor his law

Fidel absent-mindedly ate half of the wedding

.
. .
.
26
dinner he was brmgmg home from the butcher shop and arrived late.
His law practice, given over to the representation of indigents, was not
successful. Thereafter, he gave full time to politics and the pursuit of
power.

In early 1952, Fidel told a former classmate at a Havana re.s-

taurant that he was m~king up a list of persons who might be interested
in overthrowing President Prfo. 27 This plan did .not mat_erialize, but
with Batista's coup in March, Fidel's life-purpose became clear.
It is significant that in Castro's most important early statement of prin-

ciple, History Will Absolve Me, he declared that the bourgeoisie had failed
to lead.

I
I
I
I
I

Thereafter, Fidel attempted

This was a rather typical pattern for a

proto-bourgeois from the countryside.
practice was a success.

The newly-

"The future of the nation and the solution of its problems can no

25 Carlos Franqui, El libro de los doce.

(Mexico: Ediciones

Era, 1966), p. 17.
26 lnterview with Carlos Martin, a friend of Frank Dfaz Balart
who roomed with Castro as a university student. Castro married Diaz
Balart 1 s sister. Miami, January 28, 1971.
27 Interview with Feder5.co "Ficote" Lindner.
1971.

Miami, May 2,
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longer depend on the selfish interests of a dozen financiers, nor on the
cold computation of profits by ten or twelve magnates in their airconditioned offices. " 28 While the-nation's .urgent problems demanded
attention, those charged with their solution "happily chat in some Fifth
Avenue mansion in Havana.

11

29

And he provided another insight into

his thinking, saying that "when we speak of the people, we do not mean
the comfortable and conservative sectors of the nation .•• we mean the
,,30
unredeemed masses ••••

In History Will Absolve Me and in other documents of that period,
such as his Manifesto No. 1 to the people of Cuba of August, 1955, there
were continuous warnings of anti-bourgeois measures: land reform,
profit-sharing, rent increases, tax reforms, th_e confiscation of assets
of embezzlers. Castro made his attack quite specific, writi....'1g in Bohernia in 1956 that his 26th of July Movement was free of bourgeois influence, free of:
landlords like "Fico" Fernandez Casas, without sugar
plantation owners lik e Gerardo Vazquez, without stock
market speculators, without commercial and industrial
magnates, without lawyers for the big interests, or provincial chieftains •.•. The 26th of July Movement is the
revolutionary organization of the humble, for the humble
and by the humble. 31

28 Bonachea and Valdes, Revolutiona ry Struggle, p. 189.
29Ibid., p. 190.
I

30 Ibid., p. 183.
31 Ibid •• p. 318. Ironically, it was precisely 11 Fico" Fernandez
Casas wh_o provided considerable aid for Castro's rebellion. See pp.
73, 80.
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In the Sierra Maestre Castro made his final and lasting commit-

ment to the peasants who helped him and to the countryside which he
admired.

He had always felt himself a stranger in Havana.

Fidel once

observed that "he had the soul of a .peasant arid liked to live with nature-if only to change it.

1132

For a time during the rebellion, he seemed to moderate his
anti-bourgeois spirit.

He accepted their money and promised a land

reform with compensation.

He had no plans "for the expropriation or

nationalization of foreign investments .•• 1133
Once in power in 1959, he began to turn against the bourgeoisie.
In early March, he acknowledged the aid of the rich to the revolution.

His refo1·ms--like the recently-announced rent law--were not meant to
harm any sector.
republic.

Fi?el thought Cuba ought to become a middle-class

In the past "only money counted." Now "honor and ability"

34

would be the most important virtues.

.
The rich should take heart be-

cause there was a chanc~ for them to participate in the industrialization
of Cuba.

"Industry," said Fidel, "will have every guarantee. 1135 None-

theless, he was suspicious of the rich, saying that "the Cuban oligarchy
had joined the revolution only in the hope of influencing the government. 1136

I
I
I
I
I

32 Karol, Guerrillas, p. 346.
33 See above, p. 2 58.
. tionary Stru ggle, p. 366.

See also Bonachea and Valdes, Revolu-

34 Diario de la Marina, March 17, 1959.

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
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He alleged that some rich burgueses, in conjunction with the "international
oligarchy, 11 had already begun to attack the· revolution.

Fidel then made

his first denuncia of the social habit~ of the bourgeoisie, saying he had
little sympathy for those rich women ¥.'.'ho looked down on their colored
maids "in order to make themselves feel like great ladies ••••

1137

The

maids who worked in the seaside cottages of the rich couldn't even go
swimming because the best beaches were all private.
opened all Cuban beaches to the public.
era, "Private Property, Keep Out,

11

Two days later he

The signposts of the bourgeois

began coming down.

Most Cuban men of wealth were not yet alarmed.

True, a num-

ber of rich men closely associated with the Batista regime had fled in
late December and early January.
them.

Some returned.

Others, fearful of civil war, had joined

Alberto Fowler's millionaire grandfather had

fled in his yacht in late December.

But ·Alberto, an enthusiastic member

of the M-26, persuaded him to return to Cuba. 38 By mid-January, the
social chronicler Luis Posada reported that Havana's vigorous social life
was again in full swing. 3 9 The Cuban bourgeoisie and their American
counterparts gave generously to funds for the reconstruction of areas

37

Ibid.

38 Interview with Graciela Fowler, Alberto's niece. Coral Gables,
February 20, 1971. Mr. Fowler made extensive new investments upon
his return to Cuba. Thereafter, he lost everything. Margarita de Fowler
filed a claim with the FCSC for $1, 070, 000.
39 Diario de la Marina, January 13, 1959.
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ravaged by the rebellion.
amount of reform.

Most seemed ready to tolerate a modest

Dorothy Rice Sims wrote from the Havana Country

Club that "righting centur:es of wrongs cannot be accomplished overnight •••• A little time, a · little understanding, and a little faith are all
that are needed to make Cuba one of the paradise spots of this earth.

,,40

High society's attention focused on the forthcoming Baile Rojo
at the Country Club.

The dance had been cancelled in 1957 and 1958.

But in 1959 everyone was there, including the American and Spanish
ambassadors.

It was an ~xtraordinary affair, highlighted by special

dances done by Graciela Rocha G?mez Mena and Vivien Conill Gimenez,
two young women of "refined and delicate beau/ty.

11

They danced "L2-

Guajira." A few weeks later, teenagers gave a costume ball at the
Country Club.

The winners of the best costume contest were dressed

as the Alcalde and Alcaldessa of Segovia.
In late May, Treasury Minister L6pez-Fresquet shocked so-

ciety by announcing a proposed tax on the cr6nica social.

Each time

a distinguished habanero appeared in the cr6nica, it would cost one
'dollar; plus one dollar per adjective, ten dollars per square inch for
each photograph and one hundred pesos for each mention of a noble

1·
I
I
I
I

title. 41 The whole social industry protested. If society were to fall,
what would become of the seamstresses, the cooks and gardeners and
decorators? This measure was never enacted, but it was symptomatic

40Havana Times, March 21, 1959.

41

.
Ibid., May 28, 1959.
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of the revolution's contempt for bourgeois society.

Earlier, members

of private clubs had been forbiddE;n to play canasta, .poker or dominoes. 42
There were ominous reports that blacks were trying to gain entrance to
the clubs.
The_bourgeoisie was not effectively defending its class interests.
The Diario de la Marina declared that Cuba's conservative monied
classes didn't seem to know what they wanted.
disoriented, timid.

"One sees therri divided,

Each one of its sectors is wrapped in a shield of

egoism which impedes not only act~on, but even consideration of action."
If this situation continued, warned the Diario, the future of Cuba would

be left completely in the hands of the radicals: 43

·t

Carlos Pr10
Nowhere was the confusion and lack of leadership more evident
than in the person of ex-President Carlos Prfo y Socarras, whom Ba. tista had overthrown in 1952.
again be president.

In 1959, some thought he should once

" had been a competitor of Castro, striving
Prio

with his own group, the Organizaci6n Autentica (OA), to dethrone Batista~ but the OA had been a conspiratorial group of the old model

42 Havana Times, April 23, 1959.

43 June 18, 1959.
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without charismatic leadership or broad support. 44 Prfo had helped to
finance Castro.
,. .
Like many others, Prio thought he would be able to manipulate

the youthful guerrilla leader.

45

At O.A headquarters near the Hotel Na-

cional, everyone seemed to believe--in those first days of 1959--that
the Autenticos could remove Castro whenever they chose.

But the

46
thought was, why not wait till his popularity wanes a bit?
,,
Prio and his ·Autenticos were exaggerating their power.

The

·Autenticos--the vehicle of middle-class rule in Cuba- -h~d bogged down
in a sea of corruption in the 1940f;l.

One of their most promising members,

Eduardo Chibas, had left in 1947 to found the ~rtodoxo Party.

Chibas

made a career out of denouncing corruption in the Autenticos.

In 1848

the Autenticos were again split when the party's two principal leaders,

44

Prio. is alleged to have spent anywhere from $3-5 million to
defeat Batista from 1952-1958. See for example, Taber, M-26, p.
103. Batista claimed that Prio had spent $3 million (The Nev/York
. Times, April 23, 1957 . ). According to the Autentico Conchita Castaneda, 89 cases of arms, each weighing 500 pounds, were smuggled into
Cuba by the Autenticos in preparation for a planned uprising of September, 1958, but the arms were captured and the attack postponed. (Diario
de la Marina, February 8, 1959.)
45 Prio told his friends that he could manipulate Castro. Interview with Raul Shelton. Coral Gables, June, 1971. Some members of
the older generation thought that Castro might be satisfied to become
chief of police.
46 Interview with Sergio Diaz-Brull, a member of the OA.
January 18, 1971.

Miami,
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Grau and Prio, fell out. 47 On March 10, 1952, when Prio was overthrown by Batista, he failed to resist.

Thereafter, his repute in the

eyes of all but his closest followers was nil. 48
Roberto Agramonte, leader of ·the Ortodoxos after Chiba.s' suicide, thought Prio's failure to resist Batista a sha!-'Ileful affair. 49
Young Fidel Castro was also an Ortodoxo: his opinion of Prio was
equally p~or.

In 1952, Fidel criticized Prio on a radio p·rograrn for

11

•
t practices
.
" on. h"1s f arm.
unJus

50

E ven a f ter P r10
~ b egan t o h e 1p h"1m,

Fidel maintained a cool attitude.

In March, 1958, Fidel said that "Prfo

represents the past, we represent the future. rr5l
t

.

Pr10 once wrote that in 1933 "we went happily to the fight, with
the joy of youths whose only fear was a life without dignity. 1152 In 1959
.

t

· Castro's revolution confronted Pr10, then a fifty-six year old millionaire, with a chance to return to the revolutionary idealism of his youth.

47 Prfo, as president of the Directorio Estudiantil Universitario
'in 193 3, was the one who. proposed Grau for the presidency. Thereafter,
Grau r eturned the favor, becoming Pr19 1 s mentor and making him minister of l abo r in 1947.
48 In almost 100 inter;iews with Cuban exiles, this writer rarely
heard a good word about President Prfo. Rather, he was denounced as
a thief, as incompetent, as a coward, as a cocaine fiend- -some alleged
he was drugged on the day of Batista's coup.
49 Alloza, Noventa entrevistas politicas, p. 7.
50Granma, June 18, 1967.
51 Havana Times, March 5, 1958.
5 2 Raul Roa (ed.), Pluma en ristr e : Pablo de la Torriente Brau.
(Havana: Ministerio de Educaci6n, 1949), p. xiii.
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Revolution or comfort; the public or the private interest? It was going
to be a difficult choice for Prio, and for the whole generation of 1933.
On January 2, l 959, Prio expressed his complete faith in the
new government. 53 A few weeks later, swept up by the. mounting nationalist wave, Prfo declared that he had never yielded to pressure
during his presidency.

11

Perhaps, he speculated, this was why the

American intelligence service .failed to warn me about Batista's plans
for a coup." 54 Prio. explained that as president he had been unable to
enact certain reforms because "a multitude of powerful interests"
blocked these measures in the congress.

His proudest achievement,

the Banco Nacional, had been strongly resiste.d by American banks .
and by Wall Street.

In exile in America, he had been constantly per-

secuted by U.S. officials. 55 Prio concluded that he had done his part;
now he was retiring frc,m political life.
Neither Prio nor his Autenticos protested when, on January 7,
. the revolutionary government abolished all political parties and dissolved the congress.

Nor did the Autenticos protest when ex-President

.G rau, once the proud leader of the PRC and the man responsible in good
part for Prio's own career, was accused of collaboration with Batista. 56

I

53 Ru£z, Traici6n, 1959, p. 15.
54 Revoluci6n, January 3 0, 1959,

I

I

I

55 Ibid,
56

-

R
' compc1red Grau 's
coll b
. evo l uc1.·6 n, January 29, 1959, In 1953, Prio
a o ration with Batista to that of Pierre Laval with the Nazis. (Bohemia,
J anuary 18, 19 53 , p, 52 .)
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Castro later contended that .he had been generous with Grau and others
.
.
57 .
of his ilk. After all, he could have denounced them all to the MRBM.
The Autenticos did not receive a single post of importance in Castro's
government. Nonetheless, the Autentico's titular leader, Antonio "Tony"
Varona, pledged his party's full support to Castro's economic and social reforms.

58

There were other signs of disintegration among Cuba's old
political elite.

Eduardo Suarez Rivas, "the most productive of all
59
Cuban legislators, " s:omplained that the law obliging legislators of

the Batistato to return their salaries to the government was not being
applied equitably.

Some, he alleged, were no~ being sanctioned.

Castro,

who observed that Suarez Rivas had been collecting $5, 000 a month as
a senator, told him not to worry: "Nobody will be left out. 1160 Another
veteran of 1933, Aureliano Sanchez Arango, disbanded his AAA organization.

;

Prio's former vice-president, Alonso Pujol, left for Europe

and the baths of Bad Neuheim.

57 Bohemia, June 21, _1 959, p
58

dent.

nia:.rio de la Marina, March 19, 1959.

59 Comment by Rafael Guas Inclan, Batista's former vice-presiDiario Las Americas , March 20, .. 1970.

60 Bohemia, March 8, 1959, p. 83. Repayment of legislative
salaries could be expensive. Senator Manuel Perez Galan paid the
MRBM $222, 538 in February, 1960. A total of some $10 million in back
salaries was involved. (El Mundo, February 3, 1960.)
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The Agrarian reform of May, 1959, split the Autenticos wide
open.

elections were to occur.

He wondered when

But Prfo undercut Varona, saying the latter's

v1ews were not those of the party and that he fully supported the reform.

61

Autenticos did not care if a few big interests lost out.

were the party of the working and professional classes.
Cubans to remain united behind "my friend Fidel.
Europe.

1162

They

' urged
Frio

Prfo then flew to

His associate, Varona, agreed to cease criticizing the revolu-

tion.
The Autentico 's facile yielding to Castro's revolution reflected,
in part, a genuine fear of an invasion by the. Batistianos, aided by Trujillo.

I
I
I
I

"Tony" Varona was critical of the reform.

son.

But Batista's ex-minister of defen . ~e has suggested another reaPrfo feared an investigation of his past financial activities.

La".V'-

yers working for "Che" Guevara were reportedly considering indicting
Prfo for the death of the communist labor leader Jesus Menendez in
1948. 63 Moreover, Fidel had recently reminded Prio of his vulnerability.

Prio's estate, "La Chata, "had been raided by police agents--

on suspicion--in early June.

Some thought Frio a virtual prisoner.

~

When Prio returned from Europe in September, he reiterated

I
1·
I
I
I

his confidence in Castro.

But, according to other sources, the word

61 Bohemia, June 28, 1959, p. 77.
62Revoluci6n, June 17-18, 1959.
63 Rey Perna, Mirando a Cuba , pp. 161-162.
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was out in Havana that Prfo wanted to "derail" Castro. 64 In public,
Prio continued to defend Fidel, st_a nding by his side at a parade in October.

A month l~ter Prio's OA disintegrated.

Raul and Mariano Sori

"Marfn, brothers of Castro's minister· of agriculture, quit, saying the
OA h<:1-d failed to assume the proper revolutionary attitude. SS On the

,
other hand, the Autentico labor leader Cesar Lancis was compfa.ining
that the revolution was moving too fast, going too far to the left.
Prio's own loyalty to the revolution remained unshaken.

At the

end of 1959, he saluted the achievements of the revolution "without
reservation. 1166 Privately, he su.f fered a dis~ppointment when "Che"
Guevara disapproved a glycerin plant that Prfo wanted to build in conjunction with U.S. interests. 67 In February, 1960, Prio's mother
died.

She was eig~ty-nine and a daughter of a hero of the independenc_e

struggle.

She had been a great admirer of Castro, who reminded her

of the independence fighters of 1895.

She was proud that Castro "had

stopped the .Americans from interfering in Cuba·.

64

1168

·.
Wall Street Jour:l)al, July 29, 1959.

" Traici6n, 1960, p. 53.
65 Ruiz,
66

Bohemia, January 3, 1960, p. 81.

67 Letter of Antonio Barro to "Dear Nick." Havana, January 4,
1960.
68 El Mundo, March 4, 1960.
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Lawyers in Trouble
By early 1960 Cuba's m<?~~-powerful professidnal organizations-the associations of lawyers and doctors- -were disintegrating.

A mun-

ber of lawyers had contributed significantly to Castro's rebellion: at
least four had been martyred.

Almost all the members of Castro's

first cabinet were lawyers, including Fidel himself, President .Urrutia,
Agriculture Minister Sori Marfu, Education Minister Armando Hart,
Labor Minister Martinez S~nchez, Treasury Minister L6pez-Fresquet,
National Bank President Felipe Pazos, and Minister of Justice Alfredo
Ya.bur. 69 Ironically, the devotion of the revolutionary government to
the rule of law was minimal.

Castro's government had come to power

denying the legality of the Batistato.

His first premier, Jose Mir6

Cardona, former pres'ident of the Havana Bar Association, declared in
11

1958 that in Cuba there is no more law.

,,70

In a curious· way, Mir6

was merely echoing what others had said to justify Batista's regime.
Thus, in the early 1950s the Court of Constitutional Guarantees legitimized Batista's coup, ruling that "revolution is the source of the law. 1171
In 1959, Premier Mir6 suspended many civil liberties guaranteed by the

I
I
I

1940 Constitution.

69 Revoluci6n, June 2, 1959.
70 Hispanic American Report.
71 Dubois, Fidel Castro, p. 30.

May, 1_9 58, p. 256.
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In the spring of 1959, the halls of the Havana and National Bar
Associations rang with charges a~d counter-charges as lawyers identified
with the Batista to were attacked by ·the Fidelistas.

The Batistiano Gas-

t6n Godoy, whom the Colegio de Abogados had previously nominated as
"Presidente Exemplar" of their association, was disbarred.

72

A group

of young revolutionary lawyers began to attack the "irritating privileges"
of the old legal elite.

In the past, the legal profession had been dominated

by three great firms: Gorrin, Maffas, Macia y Alamilla, the largest and

.

best known, which did much of the sugar industry's legal work; Lazo y
Cubas, which handled the largest share of American investment in Cuba; .
~

· and Nunez1 Mesa y Machado.

73

Ao the revolution moved forward, the old-line firms began to
experience difficulties.

Some of their clients alleged that the old firms

did not have the necessary connections with the new government.
Ernesto Freyre, who joined Cbrrin and Manas in 1934 and had handled
labor problems for Texaco, B. F. Goodrich, U.S. Rubber, ITT and
other American companies, was concerned by Castro's attack on the
big law offices.

He organized his own firm: Freyre, Castillo y Ferre.

74

Within the bar association there appeared a vigorous claque of Castroites,

72 Revoluci6n, February 19, 1959.
7 3 Interview with Pedro Mendive, president of the Havana Bar
Association in Exile. Miami, May 5, 1971.
74 Interview with Ernesto Freyre.

Miami Beach, May 4, 1971.
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a number of these abogados sin pleito; that is, young lawyers without
jobs or prospects.

Luis Figueroa, a professor at Havana Law School,

recalled that some of these had been his students.

75

This group of per-

haps fifteen or twenty super-Fidelistas . had a disruptive effect at the
Havana Bar Association's meetings.
'The decisive test for the lawyers came early.

In March, 1959,

Cuban Air Force pilots.accused of bombing towns in Oriente Province
during the rebellion, were acquitted of criminal charges.
had fallen on Castro's ~riends, the peasants.

Their bombs

Fidel called the court's

decision "political" and demanded a new trial.

The president of the

Colegio Nacional de Abogados, Enrique Llanso! protested Castro's
interference, saying that ·the law and the courts must be respected.
But a trial was held.

This time the fliers were condemned to death,

saved only by the intervention of Archbishop Perez Serantes.
yers for the defense were persecuted.

The law-

One was kicked out of the Army,

another lost his job at the University of Oriente.
not be denied.

76

The revolution would

Cuba's lawyers were in trouble.

By June the Fidelistas organized the Uni~n Nacional Revolucionaria de Abogados.

I
I
I
I

I

the bar association.

They demanded a purge of Batista elements from

Later that month, the young lawyer, Enrique Llaca,

75Interview with Luis Figueroa y Miranda. Miami, April 2, 1971.
· Figueroa was also a director of the Havana Bar Association.
76 Ru!z, Traici6n, 1959,

p.

64.

!I
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author of articles critical of the revolution, was arrested, then re.
77
leased. Llaca sought asylum in the Chilean Embassy.
The practice of law was becoming increasingly difficult.

When

the lawyer Ernesto Freyre attempted to defend a client's hacienda,

asking for a legal order to document its seizure, the intervenor produced a rumpled copy of the agrarian reform law, declaring that "revo-

lutions don't need resolutions. 1178 When he appealed the intervention of
the U.S. Rubber Company, the intervenors simply laughed.
In January, 1960,

a militia

79

was formed within the Colegio de

Abogados with the lawye.r Andres Silva as commander.

On Law Day

in June, Luis Figueroa, who had been asked to make a revolutionary
speech, gave an address in Orwellian double talk, saying that 'we were
against imperialisms ~ear or far, for an agrarian reform with indivi?ual lots, against racial exclusivism at th~ university. ,:BO
In July, the National Union of Revolutionary Lawyers determined

that Cuba's bar associations must be incorporated decisively within the
revolution.

The immediate motive for this was the news that Jose Mir6

Cardona, once Castro's premier and later ambassador to .Spain, had
sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy.

Mir6 had once been president

77 Llaca's father was a principal officer in Julio Lobo's Banco
Financiero.

7B Interview with Ernesto Freyre.

Miami Beach, May 4, 1971.

79 Ibid.

801nterview with Luis Figueroa.

Miami, April 2, 1971.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
.1

I

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

520

of the Havana bar; now it must be cleansed.

Andres Silva ordered the

·
.
81
lawyers' militia to occupy the Havana Bar Associatiqn's offices.
The

revolutionary lawyers began to clean house, denouncing the previous
leadership as counterrevolutionary.

Spme months later, the National

Bar Association was also toppled.
The revolutionary lawyers wanted work.

They wanted to follow

the accord adopted by the Colegio de Abogados in July, 1950, that clients
should be divided equally.

The big law firms never agreed to this.

1960 the tables were turned.

In

The properties of eighty-eight lawyers of

the Batista.to were seized by the MRBM. 82 The revolutionary lawyer
Jose Musa explained that, because the big law firms dominated everything, the lawyer without connections, "n0 matter how talented he was,

I
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1183
. . ma k e a d ecent 1·1vmg.
.
cou ld never

In August the revolutionary lawyers 1 associatiol1 gave full sup-

port to the nationalization of U.S. · investments.

Towards the fall, the

right of the "rebel junta" to rule the Havana bar was challenged, the
former officeholders declaring that they had been freely elected.
then, could they be thrust aside? 84 But they were.

How,

Ther~after, bar

8l Angel Aparicio, legal advisor to President Dortic6s until October, 1960, says he witnessed the president order 25 "communist lawyers"
to seize the Colegio de Abogados. See in Avance (Miami), November 4,
1960, p. 21.
82 El Mundo, July 29, 1960.

83 Bohemia, November 13, 1960, p. 65.
84 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 274.
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president, Silvio Sanabria, and the other members of the Havana bar
fled to Miami.
The whole legal system was collapsing.

In mid-October, twenty-

two leading judges denounced the Castro regime for betraying the revolution.

Th'e judges, led by Supreme Court Justice Alabau Trelles, de-

clared that there was no law in Cuba.
All citizens ••• are relieved of their duty of obedience
to this government; it is lawful to offer civic resistance
and armed warfare to destroy it .•.. administrative and
judicial employees are obliged to abandon their government posts and immediately join the fight against ~his
illegal dictatorial government. 85
Some heeded this call.

Others did not.

I.

The chief justice of the Supreme

Court, Emilio Menendez; sought asylum in mid-November.

By Decem-

ber, the Colegio de Abogados had called its first session--in exile in
Miami.
For those lawyers who had supported the revolution in the hope
of establishing their own firms, there was a surprise in store.
new Cuba, lawyers were increasingly unnecessary.

In the

In December, 1960,

Castro observed that, t1:1anks to the nationalization of the economy, there
were no longer any big interests to defend.

Of what use was a legal sys-

tem which ·had "merely served the privileged and the interests of the rich
and the powerful? 1186 The judiciary system was purged.

85 Ibid., p. 317.

.-

86 El Mundo, December 16, 1960.
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Supreme Court justices were fired.

thousand lawyers were working--many in non-legal capacities--for the
revolutionary government.

87

By ' f 962, some nine hundred of Cuba's

six thousand lawyers and judges had sot,1ght asylum in the United States.

88

Doctors
Of all Cuba's professionals, her doctors were perhaps the most
respected.

Poor stud_ents from the countryside often entered the law

school because it was the cheapest--requiring the fewest materials-and the easiest way to become a professional.
was different.

The medical profession

High standards were demanded.

The presidency of the
·,

Cuban Medical Association, the Colegio M~dico, was, like the head of
the Havana bar~ a position of considerable prestige.
Although some doctors might shine- -and get rich- -the prof ession in general was an unhappy one in the 1950s.

There were no jobs.

Seventy percent of the medical students graduating in 1955-1956 had to
~migrate in search of work.

89

Medical care in Cuba was good--but

only for the urban bourgeoisie. Most doctors were oblivious to the
medical necessities of the peasantry.

I
I
I
I
I

By the end of 1960, more than two

One doctor thought the inexpensive

medical care provided by mutual associations "made social security

8 7 Bohemia, November 13, 1960, p. 65.
88 The New York Times, February 16, . 1962.
89 Ricardo Leyva, "Health and Revolution in Cuba, " in Cuba in
Revolution, ed. by Bonachea and Vald~s, p. 473, n. -58.
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· 1ation
.
f or common sic
. kn ess unnecessary. 1190 Th e rura1 f o lk, wh o
1eg1s
comprised the bulk of the Cuban population, had no such ass?ciations.
Castro's revolution cracked the medical profession wide open on these
two issues.
During Castro's rebellion, the doctors, led by their president,
Raul de Velasco, had vigorously protested the Batista .regime.
least eleven doctors joined Castro in the Sierra.

91

At

Several doctors were

killed by the Batistianos, including two who were shot for attending
wounded rebels.

The Havana police harassed the medical association,

searching its premises.

In 1957, the government threatened to disband

both the medical and the bar associations.
Most of Cuba's 6, 500 doctors welcomed Castro's victory.

A

few, like the surgeon {ose Nunez Portuondo, Batista's ambassador to
the United Nations, did not return to Cuba.

Nun'ez became a leader of

I
I
I
I
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the counterrevolution. Among the more revolutionary doctors was

90 Robert E. Hernandez. "La atenci6n medica en Cuba hasta
1958, 11 Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. XIJ#4 (October_.1969),
p. 556.

91

Velasco was also president, in 1959, of the Comite Conjunto
de Instituciones C{vicas, or Joint Committee of Civic Institutions. It
represented some 40 professional groups, including lawyers, doctors,
architects, engineers. In early 1959, its principal officers included
Velasco, Mir6 Cardona, president of the Havana bar, Oswaldo Dortic6s,
president of the national bar, Luis Figueroa of the Agrupaci6n Cat61ica.
The Comite had been critical of Batista; it would, in 1959, be full of
praise for Castro. Some hoped that it would serve as a moderating
force--in place of the moribund political parties--vis-a-vis the
revolution.
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,
,A~~~~do Rui~ Leiro who, in January, 1959, "captured" the Havana
M~gical School and declared himself rector.
~y §lummer, difficulties began to develop within the profession.
So.me of ·f!avana 's private clinics were .beginning to go broke, reflecting

th~ night tq A.merica of their richer clientele.

In August, a generational

~!~§1:l: };?~g~ri~ A group of revolutionary doctors formed the Partido

M.~~l'e9.

cle l~ :Revoluci6n (PMR), challenging the older Acci6n Inmediata.

Th~ l~.~ ter group, founde~ i.n the 1930s, had achieved certain benefits for

t.h~ ~~cJtc~_l profession!

s~~~

as a retirement plan and a minimum wage.

~-~~!qi:i: I!iIJ?:edi~ta split_~fter ~atista 's coup, some for Batista, some

.

f

'Fhe
Medico de la Revoluci6n announced that Acci6n In- ·- - Partido
- - . . ..
ll:_l:~c!~ata hc!,d lost its energy and its wilL

Its members were mostly in

t]::l_~~r 5-~ties, while the revolutionaries were hardly thirty.
~o~

riew ideas, new leadership.

It was time

The PMR announced its intention to

el:i_rninate the use of friendship, nepotism, and other tricks to monopo-

~lze positions within the medical profession. The PMR denied that it
~avored socialized medicine as charged by Acci6n Inmediata.

The

F,>:M:R thought socialized medicine "impracticable" at the moment; nonetheless, it was determined that medical care should reach _every farm

I
I
I
I

@.4 f actoz:-y. 92
~w:~rd the end_of 1959, elections were held for delegates who
woul_d select a new president for the Cuban Medical Association. Acci6n

92

n·1ar10
. d e 1a M ar1na,
.
August 30, 1959.
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hunediata carried Havana., but the PMR won the countryside.

There-

after, the medical delegates met in Santiago where the PMR won 287267.

Comandante Osc2.r Fernandez Mel, the twenty-nine-year-old chief

of army sanitation, was the new president.

The partisans of Acci6n In-

mediata cried f~aud, alleghlg that doctors with gov_e rnment jobs had been
obliged to vote for the PMR.

93

Some conservatives were scandalized

that Catholics like Calixto Mas6 and Ram6n Casas, the recently elected
president of Acci6n Cat6lica, had favored the PMR.
Former President Urrutia observed that the "democratic physicians" opposed any medical system which might tend to the "socialization
or collectivization of medicine, an~, consequently, the infringement of
professional freedom and the bureaucratization of physicians.

1194

The

greatest push for socialized medicine was coming from the communist
party.

The communists argued that Cuban medicine "within bourgeois

society is not capable of resolving the health needs of the people. 119 5
"The evidence seemed to support this contention. While Cuba might
boast as many doctors per capita as England (one doctor for each 920

I
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persons}, _they were--like manyihings in Cuba--bunched in Havana for
the service of the bourgeoisie.

Havana had one doctor for each 360

persons, while the peasants in Oriente Province had but one for each

93 El Mundo, January 10, 1960.

94 Manuel Urrutia Lle6. Fidel Castro Inc.: Communist Tyranny
in Cuba (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 102.
95 Bohemia, January 10, 1960, p. 71.
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2174 persons.

96

Medical care in Cuba was becoming socialized simply by the

I
I
I
I

day-to-day drift of events.

250 graduates of Havana University's ~chool of Medicine would go to
the Oriente and the Sierra to do voluntary work as part of a new Servicio
g7
M~dico Social.
In October, when the young doctors completed their
service, some 225 were give]J. positions in government hospitals.

I

98

Most of the medical school's three hundred graduates were going into

I
I
1·
I
I
I

In February, 1960, it was announced that

the government service.

Others fled to Miami.

In October, seventy-

seven doctors were denounced as traitors and expelled from the medical association for having departed Cuba.

Purges of Batistianos and

counterrevolutionaries further reduced the doctor's ranks.

..

In October, Eduardo Bernabe Ordaz, a commander in the rebel
army, became president of the Havana Medical Assodation.

One of his

first initiatives was to urge the dissolution of all political parties within
the medical ass0ciation.

The Colegio Medico,said Bernabe Ordaz, must·

give "unconditional support" to the revolutionary government.

99

In

November, the president of the National Medical Association, Leopoldo

I
I
.1
I
I

96 El Mundo, June 4, 1960.
97 Bohemia, February 21, 1960, p
98 El Mundo, October 12, 1960. As of June, 1960, the Ministry
of Health had a total of 2610 positions for doctors: 184 were vacant.
(El Mundo, June 3, 1960.) 'Thus, by mid-1960, approximately 40% of
Cuba's 6500 doctors were employed by the government.
99 E1Mundo, October 15, 1960.
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Araujo, announced that four hundred doctors had joined the newlyformed Milicia Medica, headed by Comandante Bernabe Ordaz.

A

previous chi~f of the Havana Medical Association, Enrique Huertas,
was now in exile, making broadcasts on the CIA' s Radio Swan.
By late 1960, the flight of doctors was so serious that the Colegio
Mlldico urged those in exile to return, promising jobs for all. lOO Few
took ~dvantage of this offer.

By 1961, about. two thousand doctors had

fled Cuba, including all but seventeen of the 158 senior professors at

the University of Havana Medical School. lOl

In 1962, th~ number of

doctors employed by th~ government rose to 3, 960, almost four times
. the 1958 figure. 102

Jobs and the Revolution
'

All across Cuba in 1960 and 1961 the old organizations of the
bourgeoisie were sharing the fate of the Cuban bar and medical associations.

Young men, often of the lower-middle class, would form "revo-

lutionary" associations to challenge the old order.

The new associations--

with government backing-··would defeat the older men; the old organizations would disintegrate, its members passing into exile.

Thus there

lOOibid., November 27, 1960.
lOl Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Socialism in Cuba (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 69.
102 C. Paul Roberts (Ed.), Cuba, 1968 (Los Angeles: University
of California, 1970), p. 108. By 19 70, the Colegio Medico Libre (in
exile) had 2, 793 members. About 1 /2 of all Cuban .doctors had defected.
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were revolutionary pharmacists (Movimiento Farmaceutico de Superaci6n Revolucionario), revolutionary architects (Movimiento Revolucionario de Superaci6n Arquitec·t6.nica}, revolutionary radio broadcasters (Frente Independiente de Emis.oras Libres), and revolutionary
students (Frente Estudiantil Revolucionario}.

There were even revolu-

tionary optometrists- -the Junta Revolucionaria del Colegio de Optomitristus.

Among the most important motives behind the formation of these

new organizations was the search for jobs.
In a Cuba suffering chronic unemployment and underemployment,

the search for work--la busca as it was poignantly called--was a.tremendous preoccupation for young Cubans, and especially for the more
I

ambitious members of the ~tite bourgeoisie.

.

The government was the

largest single employer; jobs were the principal motive for political

I
I
I

activity.
tion.

103

Jobs were the issue in the 1905 election and the 1906 revoluWith each new regime, there was a tremendous turnover in

the bureaucracy, a situation which created both social mobility and intense sensitivity to political developments. In the old Cuba, one was
obliged to be an opportunist. · This situation continued after World War II,
despite attempts to create an apolitical career civil service with real

I
I
I
I
I

103 Jenks, Our Cuban Co lony, p. 97; Mario Guiral Moreno, "El
problema de la burocracia en Cuba, 1 Cuba Contemporanea, Torno II,
#4 (August, 1913), p. 260. Guiral Moreno observed in 1913 that recently graduated '=ngineers and architects could not find jobs, while
positions in government were occupied by political cronies rather than
technicians. The situation was much the same in 1958.
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job security.

When Grau became president in 1944, there was a great

shifting of bureaucratic posts. When Prfo took office in 1948, ten
thousand jobs changed hands.

104

When Batista overthrew Prio; there

was a regular battle for government posts. 105
Batista's "economic miracle" and the new rush of American investment changed the skyline of Havana but failed to yield sufficient jobs.
A study by the National Council of the Economy in 1957 demonstrated
that jobs were falling behind population increase. lOB In 1959, there
were proportionately fewer jobs available than in 1899.

The quest for

jobs had more than a little to do with the fervent greeting the habaneros-. burgueses and proletarians alike--gave Fidel ~hen he swept int? th~t

city in J~nuary, 1959.

Thereafter, Castro suspended the civil servants'

right to job security until April 1.

In three months, some 50, 000 of

Cuba's 160, 000 bureaul.:rats were replaced.

107

Such a vast shifting

104 Marques Sterling, Historia de Cuba, p. 52 5; C. A. M. Hen11
nessy, The Roots of Cuban Nationalism, International Affairs (Londont
(July, 1963),p. 351.
105Nelson Amaro Victoria, "La revoluci6n cubana,l por que?"
(Guatemala: Talleres Gra.ficos "Rosales, 1967), p. 86.
106 Cuba, Econ6mica y Financiera (Havana), March 7, 1959, as
cited in Granma, June 3, 1973.
. 107 The total number of government employees as of June, 1959,
was 160, 000. (Revoluci6n, June 17, 1959.) In April, however, Castro appeared to suggest that Cuba had but 100, 000 government employees.
(Diario de la Marina, April 10, 1959.) Obviously these figures fluctuated
rapidly, especially in light of shifts in employment in the Army and Public
Works Department. Some of the 50, 000 who lost their positions were botellos or bureaucrats who received checks but who did not work. There
were 300 of these ghost workers within the Internal Revenue Department
(Wall Street Journal, February 13, 1959), 580 in the Ministry of Health
(Revoluci6n, January 26, 1959) and equivalent numbers in other ministries and departments.
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caused terrible anxiety despite Fidel I s assurances that "jobs for all" ·
was the number one priority of his government.
. To open up the bureaucracy for Castro's friends, and ease the
·blow for those discharged, all public employees ,with twenty years'
service were pensioned off, . no matter what their age. 1 08 As Batista's
army was disbanded, the discharged soldiers also received pensions.
All new officials were to be members of Castro's M-26.
ficult to find such men.

It was dif-

When no qualified M-26er's could be found, the

businessman Danilo Mesa was persuaded to become second in command
of the MRBM.

He, in turn, found it difficult to hire subordinates with

· 110
the proper credentials.
But his agency would ultimately provide·
eleven hundred new jobs, and that was what counted.
By early March, eight hundred fiscal inspectors of the Treasury

,t·

Ministry were replaced with an equal number of university students. 111
By autumn, ten thousand jobs were created for rural school teachers.
In Havana, a Buro de Empleos Revolucionarios was established in the

home of Batista's former defense minister.
patiently outside.

I
I
I
I
I
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112

Long lines of blacks waited

The~e would be jobs for young revolutionaries in

108 Diario de la Marina, March 18, 1959.
109

1971.

The New York Times, May 26, 1959.

llO Interview with Danilo Mesa. Gainesville, Florida, June 21,
Mesa was a retailer of radios, TV's and high-fidelity equipment.
111 Diario de la Marina, March 10, 1959.
112 Ibid., March 4, 1959.
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the rapidly growing rebel army and in the soon-to-be-created !NRA,
the super-agency of the revolution.

And finally there was the ultimate

recourse of all Cuban govc:rnments: public works.

By August, some

sixty thousand new employees were w~rking on 450 different public
. t s. 113
wor k s proJec
In the rush for jobs, the old society was being torn apart.

A

member of the generation of 1933 commented bitterly that the Castro
revolution was "the great chance for every kind of climber and oppor.
11114
tun1st. • • •
But had not previous revolutions offered similar opportunities to previous generations ?
Jobs were also used, as they had always been, for political purposes.

"Che" Guevara later admitted that the revolution had bought

the cooperation of certain burgueses with jobs, paying "succulent salaries" to "the Barquins, to the Tete Casusos" and others "in order to
buy the.i r silence. " 115 Later, such persons were dismissed.
In early 1959, the revolutionary government urged private in-

dustry to hire more workers whether they were needed or not.

The

ll3Havana Times, August 22, 1959. Carmelo Mesa-Lago has
pointed out that employment actually dropped slightly during the first
years of the revolution. But it was the illusion of more jobs that caught
the public's fancy. See his Labor Force, p. 35.
114 Comment by Aureliano Sanchez Arango, a hero of the generation of 1933, later education minister, then foreign minister for President Carlos Prfo. See in Diario Las Americas, April 11, 1972.
115Bohemia, February 12, 1961, p. 59.
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Hatiiey Beer plant was asked to hire one hundred additional men.

As more and more burgueses passed into exile, their positions opened
up to the F£tite bourgeoisie, to the rebellious clerks.

This was evident

in the sugar industry, where by 1961, .every one of the chief administrators of Cuba's 161 sugar mills was different from that of 1959.

Julio

Lobo's Tinguaro was now managed by a .! .'modest volunteer teacher, "
a self-educated fellow who had once worked for the advertising department of the Sabates soap firm.

The administrator of Jose Manuel

Casanova's Orozco was a sewing machine mechanic. l l 7, Of the 966
principal positions at Cuba's 161 sugar mills, 694, or about 72 percent,
changed hands between 1959 and 1961.

118

ment kept the entire nation in suspense.

The:se vast shifts in employMany burgueses were so con-

cerned with getting or holding a job, that they had no time for counterrevolution.
Class Warfare
Castro's determin~tion to raise up·the humble and to destroy the
bourgeoisie, created a situation of class warfare.
fare never turned violent.
Club.

I
I
I
I
I

116

But this class war-

No furious proletarians assaulted the Country

The luxurious offices. of Julio Lobo were not razed by angry sugar

116 lnterview with "Polo" Miranda.

Miami, January 2 0, 1971.

117 Bohemia, January 15, 1961, pp. 36; 89.
118 Based on comparison of data in the Anuario azucarero for
1959 and 1961.
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workers.

The mansion of the Countess of Camargo was not sacked.

Perhaps this lack of inter-class violence was simply a matter of tradi• !

"

tion: as Fidel had sai~ in March, 1959, "Cuban society has never been
characterized by class conflict. 11 119 No doubt it also had to do with the
relative prosperity of 1959.

Had Castro's revolution occurred in 1933,

in the midst of terrible hunger and massive unemployment, then ~eal

class warfare, with lynching and peasant violence, might have developed.
But it did not.
geoisie.

Rather there was an ~conomic war against the bour-

There were verbal assaults, but no physical attacks.

the government feared ~his would bring American intervention.

Perhaps
Rather

.than attempt the physical elimination of the bou-r geoisie, Castro simply
let them emigrate to America.
Had Castro ch~sen to unleash violent class warfare, no doubt
the great rally of July 26, 1959, when a million peasants ! machetes in
hand, gathered in Havana, would have been an appropriate moment.
But instead, President Dortic6s urged the avoidance of class conflict.

I
I
I
I
I
I

1.
I
I
I
I
I

Many burgueses took the visiting peasants into their homes as the government suggested.

The specter of class warfare rose again in October

when Cast:r~o mobilized the masses in Camagiley at the time of Comandante Hubert Matos' defection.

The Diario de la Marina thought that

119 Diario de la Marina, March 17, 1959. The absence of violent class warfare may also be attributed to the generally classless
nature of Castro's rebellion. The rebellion was not spearheaded, as
were the French and Russian revolutions, by a vigorous new class
· struggling to rise.
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· ·1 war.
Cuba W.?-,S on th e verge o f c1y1

12

° C astro

th en angri·1y a t tac k e d

the rich, saying that thousands of cam p esinos had been assassinated
during his rebellion because "o(tli.e egotism and avarice of the great
interests.

11121

In late November, Fidel denounced the ricachones, . those

members of a bourgeois "fifth column" opposed to his reforms.

122

On

December 16, he declared that "this ••• is a radical revolution, a social
.
11123 Th e New Yor k Times
.
revo 1utlon....
concluded that Castro's re-

cent speeches had introduced an ominous note of class warfare. 124
If class warfar~ were beginning, it seemed to have little effect

on the gay whirl of Havana's high society.

Indeed, in October, 1959,

when most Cubans were mourning the death of :the rebel leader Camilo
Cienfuegos in a plane crash, Cuba's high society danced the night awa.y
in a "Baile de las Americas

II

at the Country Club.

Its organizers an-

nounced that, while they did not want to appear insensitive, they had
incurred considerable expense in arrangements, and therefore intended
to proceed as planned.

125

Fidel did not attend • . He spent the Christmas

120 October 23, 1959.
121Revoluci6n, October 26, 1959.
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122 .B ohemia, December 6, 1959, p. 97.
123 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1959, p. 229.
l24 December 17, 1959.
125 Dia rio de la Mar ina, October 31, 1959. Castro was intensely
conscious of the frivolity of the bourgeoisie. In a speech in September,
1961, he read some of the social columns of the 1950s from the Diario de
la Marina, contrasting this with the bloody struggles of his rebellion which
occurred on the same day. Richard Fagen sums·up Fidel's thoughts in the
caption: "They danced while we died. " See his Transformation of Political
.Culture, p. 203.

535 ·

holidays of 1959 in a peasant's hut in the Zapata swamps.
Towards the end of 1959, there were new signs of the class nature of Castro's revolution.

Luxurious houses abandoned by the Batista

bourgeoisie began to be used as dormitories by scholarship students from
the provinces.

In March, 1960, the MRBM intervened the Havana Bilt-

more Club on the grounds that it had benefited from $800, 000 worth of
dredging, done at government expense.

A portion of the club's grounds

had allegedly been stolen from the state.

The Biltmore, which had once

served sixteen hundred members, was opened to the general public.
Admission was fifty cents on weekdays, one dollar on weekends.
Fear was working its way into bourgeo~s households.
businessman asked his maid a question about the revolution.

126

A British
She re-

plied simply that she was for Fidel because he was helping the poor.
.
.
. . .
127
Thereafter, he feared to comment on the .revolution m her presence.
A Cuban· burgues told an American newsman that if Castro were ass as-

· sinated, the bourgeoisie would be held responsible.
blood bath.

128

There would be a

In Havana's tree-lined suburbs, amidst the villas and

palacetes of the rich, the most common topic of conversation was:
"Whose property will be taken next?"

129

126 El Mundo, May 1; May 5, 1959.
127
128

Interview with John Wheeldon.

Miami, February 10, 1971.

U.S. News and World Report, February 8, 1960, p. 43.

1 2 9 The New York Times, April 3, 1960.
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1

The upper classes were being destroyed, but no one seemed to

I

care.

The powerful force of envy and resentment was working its will.

e rr":gê" overheard a bus driver comment, as they passed some luxurious apartment buildings, that the humbling of the rich made hím feel

good.130 A middle class intellectual said the ruin of the rich did not
bother her in the least. They deserved it. 13t t"*r"rats former minister
of defense

\Mas

content. The bourgeoisie had supported Castro.

Now

they were beÍng displaced, humiliated, just as he and the Batistianos
had been
Ú:

I

732

April, castro declared that the upper classes li/ere being

eLiminated. What could they do wit,l. their pesos ? Even real estate
was no longer ,"f". 133 In June, castro again denounced those

men of

wealth who not only "dominated the economy, politics and the army, but
had dominated Cuban culture as well.

" wtrile the poor had nothing,

"90 percentt'of cubats senators and congressmen had become big land

owners and millionaires. No aristocratic club, he observed, 'had ever
expulsed a meinber for being a thief. rr134 By mid-summer, Tad szurc

reported that "the social revolution Ís completing the initial phase of
130¡t1"rview with Antonio Barro. Miami, june 24, 1g?1.
131¡r1""view with Eloisa Lezama Alvarez. San Juan, March 16,
1971.

t32 Rey Perna, Mirando a Cuba
133 The New

L34

.J

D1

p.

York Times, A pril 4,

Mundo, June

28

,

1.960.

64.
1960.
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destroying the old order ••• ~ The monied class has been eliminated as
a social force.

1113 5

In October, fo~lowing the nationalization of most

large Cuban businesses, Fidel declared proudly that: "In twenty months
the revoluticnary government has completed, and in many cases surpassed, the pr9gram laid out at Moncada. " He ex:tended a note of sympathy for the rich.

The revolution wasn't the end of the world.

Surely

. 136
they had some money abroad?
The rich were losing not only their power and position, but
their servants as well. In the past, a rich man might have had a dozen.
Even a poor clerk at El Encanto had one.

Prior to the revolution, ser-

vants were not protected by government legislation.

But, in early 1960,

the young, social engineer Carmelo Mesa-Lago urged that servants be
given an eight hour day, paid vacations, sick leave, social security,· a
minimum wage,
and other benefits.
.

137

This caused such
. agitation

among "the bourgeoisie that the minister of labor was obliged to denounce
as unfounded rumors that servants were to receive a minimum wage of
$60 a month.

138

Fidel had already declared that he favored doing away

with the Job of "servant!' · But he was loathe to move too ·quickly on such
a prickly issue.

Rather, he began various programs to lure servants

135 The New York Times, August 2, 1960.
136 El Mundo, June 28, 1960.
137

Ibid., January 15, 1960.

138 El Mundo, April 2, 1960.
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I
I

't

away

from the bourgeoisie in the hope of converting them into nurses,

teachers, and attendants at day care

i
J

""r.t"r".139

Patria Potestad
By the end of 1960, an ever-increasing number of bur
high and low, ltrere fleeing Cuba for

eses,

Miami. In the first ten months of

1960, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued 64,935 passports, twenty

times the number issued in a like period in 1958. 140 This must have
been encouraging

to ttchett.Guevara who once observed that ttl measure

the depth of the social transformation by the number of people who are
affected by

it

and feel that they have no place in the new soci"ty. "141
:

The flight of the bourgeoisie in late 1.960 was accelerated by

rumors that the revolution intended to wrench Cuban children from their
families to educate them in communist boarding schools in Cuba or even

in Russia. Tl:is became known as the patria potestad scare. Documentary evidence supporting the rumor was secretly circulated among
bourgeois parents .142 Though the rumor lffa.s apparently a ploy by
139 The New

York Times, Janu ary 25, 1961.

140 Crrb"n

Information Service (Miami) , December 24, 1960. A
study by the International Rescue Committee showed that arrest, the
threat of arrest, and harassment were the motives most frequently cited
by the exiles for their flight. (Cuban Information Service, Janu ary 7,1961.
141

Co**ent of "Che't Guevara to President Nasser of Egypt in
June, 1959. See in Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, The Cairo Documents
(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1973), p. 344.
142
I

J

Interview.

O:re of these documents was seen
San Juan, Ntarch 16, 1971,

by Eloisa Lezama Alvarez.

)

races of the Havana Yacht Club: The U.S. Marines were coming! At

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

last! Alas, it was· only a rumor •146 Fidel also heard it. He urged the

·1

populace to take a tour of the Country Club district where "four ·or five

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

539

counterrevolutionaries, the Castro government's interest in promoting

day care centers gave it a certain credibility.

Indeed, the Castro govern-

ment had announced its intention to bring in train loads of girls from the
countryside to work at the centers.

Bourgeois mothers were horrified.

Commit their children to the hands of ignorant peasants! As one burguesa
had said of her children, "I don rt want them to be brought up common!" 143
But this was increasingly the prospec~ at hand.

Frantic Cuban mothers

.
144
began to place their small children on the plane to Miami.
The
Castro government angrily denied the patria potestad rum.ors.

Raul

Castro calling them "a calumnious· farce. 11145 · Nonetheless. thousands
of children were sent, often alone, to America;
In November, a more pleasing rumor fluttered across the ter-

hundred"lived in palacetes and then to swing over to the poor districts in
neighboring Marianao where thousands lived in misery.

Those big

houses, said Fidel, would soon be used to board scholarship students

143 Miller, Ninety Miles, p~ 117.
144 Among these was Nelson Valdes, then 14; in exile, a leading
authority on the Cuban revolution.

145 El Mundo, Janua;y 8, 1961.
146 Interview with Berta Regla Canler de O'Connell.
. January 6, 1971.

Miami,
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from the countryside.

A hundred palacetes with Cadillacs would be set

aside for the use of foreign visitors. 14 7
By the summer of 1960, Americans were leaving the island in
.
ever-increasing numbers •. It was no longer a pl_easure to live in Cuba.
'

There were no parts for one's auto; imported products were no longer
available.

A general nervousness pervaded bourgeois society.

social editor of the Havana Times, Mary Louise Wilkinson, left in
June.

In her farewell column, she reminisced about life in old Havana:
Monday at the'Vyoman's Club, Tuesday meetings with
the Book and Thimble. Thursday sessions ••. of the
Mothers Club ..• Little theater openings, Choral Society musical comedies, Community Chest drives, and
the relentless round of cocktailing to the wee hours. \
48
remember ••• I remember .•. and I shall never forget.
Havana now had a great surplus of Cadillacs, proud symbol of

the old order.

One American considered pushing his Cbupe de Ville oH

a pier into Havana harbor, but this seemed rather foolish.
keys to an American diplomat and left the country.

I
I
I
I

He gave his

By the end of 1960,

fifteen or twenty cars, including a number of Cadillacs, were abandoned
outside the Embassy.

149

Rebel soldiers, some farm boys who could

hardly drive, were appropriating cars in the streets.

I

The

The sugar en-

gineer Ado°Ifo Rodriguez had his Ford convertible taken at gun

147

El Mundo, November 2 7, 1960.

148 Havana. Times, June 16, 1960 •.
149 Interview with Waylle Smith, former third secretary in the
American Embassy in Havana. Washington, September 30, 1'970.

.

'
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point.

150

The Countess of Jibacoa was killed when her limousine was

struck by an auto driven by the rebel soldier Julio Tejas.
son was injured in a crash.

151

Fidel's

Efignio Almeijeras. Havana's chief of

police. drove happily to a rally in a Mercedes 190 SL sport coupe with
the top down.

Bishop Boza thought the seizure of the big houses and

the Cadillacs foolishness.

152
This was not going to solve Cuba's problems.

During Christmas week. some burgueses defied the governments
injunction to enjoy the holidays by staying horn e with their shades
drawn. 153 It was now embarrassing to be thought a burgues.

Burgueses

were characterized as "gusanos" (worms) in the revolutionary press.
A young burguesa who visited Europe in 1959 was careful to keep this
a secret in 1960. It was · embarrassing. perhaps dangerous. to show
• ·1
any evi•ct ence o f IIpr1v1
ege. 11154

On January 4, 1 ~61, the United States broke relations with
Cuba.

Curiously, despite the intensity of the regime's verbal attack on

the Americans, they wer~ not molested by the masses.

The Cuban

150 Interview with Adolfo Rodriguez, former engineer at the
G6mez Mena's Central Resoluci6n. Miami, March 17, 1971.
151

El Mundo, July 22, 1960.
Rosa de Herrera y de Arango.

The Condessa de Jibacoa was

152 Diario de la Marina, (Miami), December 31, 1960.
153 Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1961.
1 54 Interview with Sarah Sa~chez.

Coral Gables, May 21, 1971.
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bourgeoisie continued to pay them court to the end. 155 In Santiago in
December, 1960, the cream of the _community turned out to dedicate a
new U.S. cultural center.

A student at the reception voiced a common

feeling among Cuban youth: "I like the·u. S., but I'm for Fidel all the
way.

11156

There was no frenzied sacking of the consulate in Santiago.

The consul played tennis until the day he left.

Indeed, some Cubans

tried to block the vice-consul's departure, lying down in front of his
Chevrolet.

157

For their closest friends, the Americans carried out a

few personal mementos: some jew~lry, or perhaps a silver candlestick.
In Havana, the embassy's last days were equally tranquil.

On January

5th, the remaining embassy personnel were es'corted to the Miami- -

I·

Havana car ferry by a battalion of women's militia.

I
I
I

155 The Cuban revolution has often been characterized as a nationalist phenomenon. But the nationalist bent seems to typify more
the leadership than the masses. In one survey of Raul Gutierrez Serrano less than 1 % of the populace interviewed favored the nationalization
.of industries; only • 28% were anxious to "end American domination of
Cuba." (See in Bohemia,· February 22, 1959, p. 80. ) Fourteen months
later, despite Fidel's efforts to impart a nationalist education to the
public, only 3o/ointerviewed in Lloyd Free's survey mentioned the U.S.
when asked about the "worst aspects" of the present situation. (Lloyd
Free, Attitudes of the Cuban Peo ple Toward the Castro Re gim e, (Princeton: Institute for International Social Research, 1960 p. 13.) Castro
has admitted this extraordinary lack of nationalist consciousness among
the Cuban people, recalling that, when he was a university student, there
were but a handful of anti-imperialists at Havana University. Fidel, of
course, was one of them. (Fidel in Chile, (New York: International
Publishers, 1972), p. 84.)
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No one challenged

156 Interview with Harvey Summ, former American consul in
Santiago .' Washington, December 16, 1970.
157 Interview with ~e.r nard Feminella, vice-consul at Santiago.
Washington, December 16, 1970. To "leave" Cuba, members of the SanUago consulate had merely to drive to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo.
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. d epart ure. 158
th e1r
For many burgucses, leaving Cuba was a traumatic experience.
By 1961, they were allowed to take only a few personal possessions.
Everything else- -houses, cars, clothes, all those earthly goods they
had striven so 1:1-ightily to pile up--was taken away. ·one exile hid

$20, 000 in cash inside some cigarettes.

On the big haciendas, servants

were burying the family china and silverware to save it from the revolution's grasp.

The hacendado Jose Manuel Casanova and his family,

fearful of using Havana airport, tried to leave quietly on a freighter.

On the ship they were recognized by a militiaman.

But he had been a

.
159
friend of Casanova's father and let them go unmolested.
For the
lower bourgeoisie, it was more difficult.

Many didn't know English.

They would lose all their social security and insurance benefits and
would have to start at the bottom all over again.
In January, Chekov's "Th·e Cherry Orchard" opened in Havana.
·El Mundo observed that Chekov's play described "with humor and implacable irony the economic and moral disintegration of the landowning aristocracy. " The writer thought habaneros would find the play

158 Interview with Wayne Smith, 3rd secretary of the American
Embassy in Havana. Washington, December 16, 1970. By January,
1961, only 500 of the American community of some 7, 000 to 8, 000 persons remained in Cuba. (New York Times, January 5, 1961.)
159 Interview with Jose Manuel Casanova.
20, 1971.

Coral Gables, June
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attractive since it paralleled recent d.evelopments in Cuba.

I

But

there were no cherry orchards in Cuba: it was too warm for that.

Nor

would the destruction of the Cuban bourgeoisie achieve ·the same level
of tragedy, or romance, as the destruction of the Russian aristocracy.
Bourgeois Cuba had no Nicholas, no Alexandra.
Cuba dici have, however, the Countess of Camargo.

It was to

her home, the "House of the Forty Doors," that militiamen flocked in
February, 1961.
at home.

The c01,mtess, Maria Luisa G6mez Mena, was not

She w~s in residence at the Waldorf Astoria in New York.

Only a few of her once bustling staff of fourteen servants were to be
found.

Inside the countess' palacete, the young milicianos were aston-

ished, surrounded on every side by macble and crystal.

In one cor-

ridor they encountered an 18th century gold filigreed desk.

A servant

explained that it had once belonged to Marie Antoinette. · When an inventory revealed certain objects ·to be missing, the militiamen began
to search the premises with a metal detector.
freshly mortared wall was discovered.
were brought in.

I
I
I
I
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In the basement, a

Workers with pneumatic drills

After seyen hours of work, the wall was breached.

A lantern's light illuminated the secret chamber. It
was a spectacle worthy of the adventures of Aladdin
or of the Count of Monte Cristo. Inside there was a
fabulous treasure: vases of pure gold, objects of art,
statues and figurines, candelabras ••••161
~:

160 El Mundo, January 21, 1961.
161 Bohemia, February 12, 1961, p. 81.

The Brigadistas were often young burgueses filled with revolutionary

I
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idealism.
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The milicianos were at first stupefied, then indignant.

One commented

that with a single vase a hospital might have been built.

And this was

not all.

The countess was known to have removed her emerald collec-

tion, worth perhaps $5 million, to a foreign bank.

162

Maria Luisa's

palacete would become Havana's Museum of the Decorative Arts.
beach house at Kawama was also confiscated.

Her

By spring, its brightly

striped umbrellas shielded young literacy workers on vacation •. A new
era, observed Bohemia, was aborning in which shoe-shine boys swam
in the pool at the Vedado Tennis Club; in which a tomato picker was

worth rriore than a condessa.

163

At Varadero Beach, the DuPont's "Xanadu" was transformed
into a training school for Brigadistas of the alfabetizaci6n campaign.

Their parents were filled with despair, certain that their

once-sheltered daughters would be seduced by the provincianos~

The

·Havana Country Club was nationalized; its once-smooth golf greens
would be occupied by a school of the arts where peasants' daughters
might take up dance or painting.
centers with Cuban names.

Private clubs became workers I social

The Havana Biltmore became the Cubanaca.n.

Others were named after heroes of the revolution.

The Vedado Tennis

,,
Club became the Club Jose A. Echevarria; the Club de Professionales,

162 Ibid.

.

163Ib'd
_1_., p. 80.
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the Club Comandante Piti Fajardo.

The old monuments to bourgeois

confidence in America: the memorial to the Battleship Maine on the
Malec6n, the busts of McKinley and Teddy Roosevelt and Leonard Wood
were torn down.

164

Fidel expressed mock-sympathy over the fall of the rich, those

who:
knew how to sit down at a table and eat well; those who
never forgot anyone's birthday, who never missed a
canasta party, whose names were never absent from
the social chronicle .•.• how sad it will be to have Havana
without those Cadillacs ••• so beautiful, so new ••• _and
now we don't see any more of those parties where they
165
used to spend one hundred-thousand pesos on flowers ••••

Counterrevolution
Efforts to destroy Castro's revolution had begun even before he
~

came into power.

Ex-President Carlos Prio and his Autenticos had at-

tempted to beat Castro to the Palacio Presidencial.

Some, including

the American Embassy, had hoped that Carlos Marques Sterling would
win the elections of 1958 and hold forth as provisional president until

more acceptable elections could be arranged.

U.S. Ambassador Earl

E.T. Smith then told news'men--off the record..:.-that the United States

I
I
I
I
I

could not tolerate Castro or his followers

164

in power. 166

The New York Times, January 20.

165
· El Mundo, March 5, 1961.
166 Taber, M-26, p. 201.

1961.

Cuba I s labor

.
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czar, Eusebio Mujal, had approached the State Department in 1957 with
plans for a provisional government to stop Castro.

167

Rufq L6pez-

Fresquet, a fund raiser for Castro, · says that, in 1958, he tried to organize an anti-Batista group strong errough "to dispute power with Fidel
Castro." He wanted U.S. aid.

When this aid did not materialize, Rufo

went on to become Castro's enthusiastic minister of the treasury.

168

In the first week of 1959, some anti-Castro Cubans planned to assassinate Castro as he marched toward Havana.

But his column became

too numerous, causing the assassins to lose their courage.
Once Castro was in power, a new series of efforts were made
. to blast him out.

In Washington, Vice President Nixon, supported by

his friend Robert Hill, then ambassador to Mexico and formerly an official of the United Fr;uit Company, urged a hard line position.

169

By

May 14, 1959, a few days after Castro announced his agrarian reform,
the Central Intelligence Agency had established its Double Check Corporation in Florida, a front to aid operations in Cuba.

170

By the fall

of 1959, CIA operatives were smuggling counterrevolutionaries out of
Cuba.

By March, 1960, the United States launched its multi-pronged

167 Romualdi, Presidents and Peons, p. 195 • .
168

L6pez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months, p. 34.

169

Robert Hill was, in 1972, assistant secretary of defense for
International Security Affairs.
170 Miami Herald, March 5, 1963.
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plan to bring down the Cast:r:-o regime.
of the Castro regime was begun.

171

Radio propaganda critical

In the summer of 1960, CIA sabotage ·

teams were loosed against the Cuban economy.

By fall, 1960, American

planes from bases in Guatemala were air-dropping
.
- supplies to counter.

revolutionaries in the Sierra Escambray.

Vice President Nixon has

declared that if he had won the election of 1960 he would have urged
President Eisenhower to invade Cuba in December, 1960.

172

Could the Cuban bourgeoisie save itself? Within Cuba, a number of counterrevolutionary efforts had been made, but these suffered
the same flaws as bourgeois politics and society.

There was no unity,

no respected leadership, no universally acclaimed program.

The Trini-

dad revolt of the cattlemen in August, 1959~ was easily crushed. 173
The Castro regime was keenly aware of these efforts. · "Che" Guevara
announced in July, 1959. that "what happened in Guatemala will not
. 11174
happen here.
In February, 1960, Castro's Treasury Minister Rufo L6pez-

Fresquet and a group of friends planned a coup, but nothing came of
it. 17 5 . That same month, the millionaire Francisco Cajigas was elected

171 See above, p. 159.
172 Jules Witcover, "Nixon for President in '68?" Saturday
Evening Post, (February 2 5, 1967 ), p. 96.
173 See above, pp. 239-241.
174
175

Havana Times, July 27, 1959.
.
L 6 pez-Fresquet, My Fourteen Months., p. 192.
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provisional president by an exile group organizing in Florida. 176
.

.

Cajigas persuaded the Spanish dictator, Generalisimo Francisco Franco,·
to help underwrite the "Blue Legion'.' of counterrevolutionaries which
Cajigas was organizing in the Dominican Republic.

Protests by the

United States cut short this particular adventure. 177
The Cuban-American lawyer Mario Lazo thought that in early
1960 "labor, business, religious and professional, could have up.ited

and overthrown him (Castro) if they had been given any encouragement
by the State Department. " 178 All the exiles wanted explicit promises
of U.S. support.

None seemed capable of doing anything on their own.

Ex-President Carlos Prio, the logical _choice for leader of the
count~rrevolutionary forces, was, in tr.e spring of 1960, still courting
the Castro regime.

In June, Pdo attended a lunch with Fidel in honor

of the revolutionaries of 1930.

In July, .he declared that "imperialist

. " ma d e 1't 1mpera
.
t'1ve th a t h e s t ay "w1'th" Cu b a. 179 In Augus t ,
aggression
· he sailed once again for Europe.

From Spain he asked that the U. s;

try to understand Cuba so that the "revolutionary process might be

1ao

shorter and less difficult.11

Upon his return to Cuba

iI?- late

September,

176 El Mundo, March 15, 1960.
177 Diario Las Americas, January i3, 1970.
178 Lazo, Dagger, p. 220. That is Lazo's opinion. A major
purpose of this dissertation has been to prove the contrary; that is, that
these groups were divided, leaderless, incapable of resistance.
179 Ruiz, Traici6n, 1960, p. 194.
180 El Mundo, August 18, 1960.
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he signed the Declaration of Havana.

once again, going to Brazil from whence he issued still anot.her declaration of his "unalterable" support for the revolution.

I

181

In January, 1961, in a stunning turnabout, Frio declared that

Cuba had been "handed over" to communism.

He said his behavior of

the previous two years was dictated by the desire to serve "the com. t eres t •
mon m

Some d ay, I w1·11 exp1am
. my ac t"ions. 11182 Th a t d ay h as

yet to arrive.

In Cuba, Frio was denounced, Bohemia _observing that

Prfo had fallen into the arm~ of the very Batistianos who expelled him
from power. 183 Frio ~as also denounced in Miami.

The columnist

Carl~s Todd said Frfo had "murdered his own Autentico Party" and
heaped calumny ••• on those who opposed Castro•s tyrannical regime.
while he carefully ten<;led

II

.

La Chata

II

and his other interests in Cuba.

184

Exiles in Conflict
In Miami, the anti-Castro fore es were hornets' nests of com -

peting interests and personalities.

The leader of one exile group ob-

served that "every Cuban wants to be a leader ••• each wants to head a
group, however small ••••"

I
I
I
I

Then, in December, 1960, he left

185

Another exile commented that "new

181 El Mundo, December 16, 1960.

182 Diario de la Marina (Miami), January 28, 1961.
183 Bohemia, February 5, 1961, p. 62.

184 Cuban Information Service, February 4, 1961.
185 Comments of Sergio Aparicio of the Democratic Revolutionary
Front. The Front allegedly began to organize on January 6, 1959. (The
New York Times, August 13, 1960.)
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There are so many that it is a joke. 11 186 By

"groups keep turning up.

Christmas, there were at least fifty different groups

_in

Miami alone.

187

A soldier of fortune fo~nd that, in some of the exile groups, politicians
outnumbered fighters.

Miami had become "a cauldron of chaos and dis-

trust. 11188 Moreover, it was difficult to train the Cubans, and especially
to maintain discipline.

"These men were all volunteers, sons of wealthy

. d"1v1"dua1·1s t s. 11189
f am ill. es an d a 11' 1n

The exiles could not agree on anything.

Manuel Artime thought

the key issue was the "tesis generacional, " that is, the young men
could not agree with the. old.

190

The young Turks, like Artime and

Manuel Rasco, both barely thirty, could not agree with politicians like
Tony Varona and Justo Carrillo, members of the generation of 1933.
Ulises Carbo, a memb,er of Artime's forces, r .ecalled that, rather than
a common effort to defeat Fidel, there was a power struggle to see "who
.
t o b ecome
.
was gomg
pres1"d ent. 11191
The Cuban press, re-established in Miami, added to the confusion.

The Diario de la Marina in exile assaulted Bohemia in exile.

186 The New York Times , August 13, 1960.
187 Wall Street Journal, December 6, 1960.
188Hans Tanner, Counter-Revolutionary Agent (London: G. T.
Foulis & Co., Ltd •• 1962).iP· xii.
189Ib"d
_l_• I P• 3 •
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190 Martinez, (ed.) Historia de una agresi6n, p. 122.
1 91 Ibid., p. 133.
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The Diario could not agree with Bohemia's editorial assertion that, following Castro's removal, big land ?wners would be in.demnified but their
•' f 92
properties would not be. returned.
The Diario de;:iounccd Jose Mir6
Cardona, Castro's former premier, no\v the exiles' political chief.

Diario said that it had attempted for years to unite the conservative forces

in Cuba but:
it seemed more convenient for .them to make secret
arrangements with the leaders of the left by means of
financial payoffs .•.. The conservative forces divided
and competed among themselves, the bankers thinking
one thing, the commercial interests another, the industrialists ••• the farmers ••• each one measured events
from a narrow point of view and all of these secretly
came to terms with the left •.•. Now the conservatives
were crying like a bunch of women .••• 193
The cost of this division was substantial.

I
I
I
I

The sons of more foan
.

.

a few of these contentious politicians would soon be dead or captured in
Cuba.

There were many individual acts of heroism, espe_cially among

those burgueses who had earlier been well disposed to Castro.

Andres

Vargas G6mez, once a diplomat for the Castro regime, made a number
of clandestine trips to Cuba.
only

I

The

a small

But he was, like others, operating with

group, uncoorc;linated with the larger effort. 194 The only

192 Diario de la Marina (Miami), October 29, 1960.
193 Ibid.' November 19, 1960.
194 Andres Vargas, G6mez, grandson of the hero Maximo G6mez,
favored Castro in 1958. He told his superior and father-in-law, Secret a ry of State Miguel Angel de la Campa, but Campa merely replied, "I
de n 1t want to know anything abot:t it. " Vargas G6mez was captured in
.19 61. He r ecei ved a 30 year prison sentence. Interview with Maria
Teresa de 18. Campa Roff de Vargas G6mez. Coral Gables, November 24,
1970.
;
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unifying force was the power and the money of the CIA.
The Cubans viewed the United States with blind trust.

195

Many

of the expeditionaries which the CIA was training "had gone to school in
the United States and spoke English.

'l;'hey were proud of America .••

and they like to compare themselves to Americans •••. 'We even look
more like Americans than other Latins, 1 they would say proudly. 111 96
Ambassador Bonsal, employed as a liaison between the State
Department and the Democratic Front, found it difficult to deal with the
refractory exiles.

The old politicians, Bonsal discovered, thought the

Americans we;e going to catapult them into the Palacio PresidenciaI.

197

Those with nationalist sensibilities were humiliated by this terrible .
dependence on the U.S.

They realize, said. E. Howard Hunt, political

director of the CIA operation, that "they 1 re not much more than puppets.
Despite that, they go on day after day, doing what I ask because they
know there is no other way their country can be rescued.
pendent on us.

They're de-

11198

All over Miami, the sons of the bourgeoisie were joining the
anti-Castro expedition.

Julio ·Tarafa, scion oi a great hacendado, heard

195 Johnson, The B ay of Pi gs, p. 27.
196 Ibid., p. 99.
19 7 Bonsal, Cuba, p. 180.
198 E. Howard Hunt, Give Us This Da y (New Rochelle: Arlington
House, 1973), p. 175.
. ...
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about ;t in tlle bar of the ~den Roe Hotel in Miami.

Scme months later

he was flying over C::uba in a darke_ned C-46, kicking out bundles of arms
to the anti-Gastro guerrillas below. 199 Many of his frie_nds were there
in the brigade: Alberto Fowler, Adolfo Mendoza, Enrique Falla, Jorge
Silv~, ·~P~~ ~f the gilded bourgeoisie. 200 But Tarafa was worried; there
was

§1!<:l:1. d~~a~reement a,mong the invading Brigadis tas that he feared

they w~~~d e_11_d up fi_~ hting one another en route to Havana. 201
~he e:~iJ:es_ ~a.:i:_leq into the Bay of Pigs with the firm conviction
that 1\he Un~tetj S_tates would not let them fail. 11202 Their landing barges
wer~ (:r:ei_ghte_d wit4 unwri_tt~n_understandings, unjustified confidence.
·The q_l_q :r-el~_g~:ms of depe1:1dency, the old spirit 'of Plattismo among the
bourgeoisie, was l_a unched before dawn on April 17, 1960 ••• and sunk
before noon.

J:he United States, in a sudden about face, abandoned its

historic role as defender of the Cuban bourgeoisie.

President Kennedy

refus ed to give the exHes the air support they had ·requested and ex0

pected.

He was cutting them off, leaving them on their own.

out American support, they could not survive.
not win over the masses.

But with-

For the bourgeoisie could

The bourgeoisie had nothing to offer them.

Castro had given them everything. A terrible feeling of betrayal arose

I
I
I
I
I

among the Brigadistas.

As the U.S. destroyers began to disappear over

199 II:tierview with Julio Tarafa. Southampton, New York, November 29, 1971.
200 Ibid.
201 Ibid.
202 Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 99.
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the horizon, the invaders felt"betrayed. 203

One Brigadista ran to a

tank to try to shoot at the departing American ships • .
The Bay of Pigs invasion accelerated the destruction of the
bourgeois Cuba which the invaders had -come to save.

As the invasion

got underway, Castro announced defiantly that his was a socialist revolution.

Tens of thousands of burgueses--potential counterrevolutionaries

all--were arrested and placed in preventive detention.

Doctors, law-

yers, clerks, accountants were herded into the Havana Sports Palace,
into movie theaters.

It was a frightening and humiliating experience.

The failure of the invasion suggested that outside remedies could no
longer be hoped for.

Exile seemed the only recourse.

On May Day, Castro presented a social analysis of the Bay of
Pigs invaders.

Of the ,thousand prisoners, eight hundred were from

bourgeois families ("familias acomodadas ").
almost one million acres of land.

They had once owned

They also had 9, 666 houses, seventy

factories, ten sugar mills, two banks, five mines, and two newspapers.

203

The Americans, however, felt guiltless. General Maxwell
Taylor,. who carried out a posthumous investigation of the debacle,
found no evidence to support the exiles' allegations on the promises of
massive U.S. air support. (Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co •• 1.972), p. 187.) Taylor
declared that the success of the invasion depended on · "the popular reaction in Cuba. " Equipment for 30, 000 Cuban recruits had been carried by the invasion force. But no such volunteers or defectors had
ever appeared.
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.
204
Two hundred were members of Havana's most exclusive clubs.
This
and other analyses were not entirely accurate, since properties of the
family were sometimes attributed to the son.

Nonetheless, there is no

question that the Brigade was composetl largely, of burgueses.
Interviews of Bri ga dista~ by their captors evidenced a confusion
of motive and an extraordinary bitterness toward the United States.

The

cattleman Fabio Freyre Aguilera, a member of the Nunez Mesa family,
owners of a sugar mill and extensive lands in Oriente Province, declared
that he had come to fight fo"r free enterprise and the Constitution of
1940.

205

The Babun brothers, who once had aided Castro, complained

that the Americans "had completely fooled them. 11206 Felipe Rivero

,

.

Diaz, a cousin of the owner of the Diario de la Marina, said he hadn't

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

joined the revolution b~cause he did not think it would ~in. 207 He had
been told that the purpose of the invasion was to reinstall President
,
. .
,,208
..
Carlos Prio, a man 11he disliked very much.
Carlos Rivero Aguero,

204 Otero, Playa Gir6n, p. 8. Another analysis of the brigade
found it to comprise 100 latifundistas, 24 large property owners, 67
owners of substantial real estate, 112 large commercial interests, 194
ex-Batista military men, 3 5 incl.ustrial magnates, 179 unic;ientified burgueses and 112 "lumpens." See in Martinez (ed.) Historia de una agresi6n,
p. 416. The Castro government's fi~re of 1, 000 prisoners is somewhat
erroneous, the actual number being 1, 178. (New York Times , April 27,
1962.)
205 otero, PlayaGir6n, pp. 49-53 •.
206Ibid., pp. 127-128.
207 Ibid., pp. 193-197. Rivero lived on the income from family
i:iterests in the Matahambre copper mines.
208 Otero, Playa Gir6n, p. 203.
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whose father was Batista's candidate in the 1958 presidential elections,
declared that he had been "misled" by the Americans ..'

209

In prison, the brigade leader Manuel Artimc composed a verse

dedicated to Cuba's campesinos.

.

• • • And although they say that we are bourgeois, we
will throw away the guns and fill your table. The land
will be yours .•. bought with work, with the sweat of your
arms ••• a government you elect will help you .•. and on
arriving at your door, you will see the beloved sign:
Private Property. Together the two of us will march
to make God's just revolution •.•• 21 0
For a brief moment, there was an admirable and· beautiful unity
among the prisoners.

This was shattered when wealthy Cubans began
t

-to buy the freedom of their relatives.
first to be ransomed.

Jorge Alonso Bermudez was the

H~ was regarded as a Judas by the Brigadistas. 211

The Azqueta sugar.family put up $100, 000 to buy the freedom of Fabio
Freyre; the family of Jorge Govin Throckmorton paid $50, 000.

212

William D. Pawley, one-time American businessman in Cuba, paid

$25, 000 for the release of a fourth man.

213

Sixty wounded prisoners

had previously been released on the promise of a $3 million ransom.

209Ibid., p. 380.
210

Manuel Artime Buesa, Marchas de guerra y cantos de presidia,
(Miami: Talleres la Noticia, 1963 ), pp. 71-72.
211

Johnson, The Bay of Pigs, p. 273.

212

Jorge Gavin's grandfather was a founder of El Mundo and
the Havana Post.
213

The New York Times, August 8, 1962.
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Eventually, a committee organized by the Kennedy administration bought
the freedom of the remaining prisoners for $62 mill~on worth of medical

.
and other supplies.

:

...

Approximately half of the Brigadistas subsequently

joined the U.S. Army.

While prepari:t:1g for the great return, they were

being integrated into American life •

In Exile

Though America had abandoned the Cuban bourgeoisie at the
Bay of Pigs, it had done so with remorse.

Thereafter, the U.S. en-

couraged the bourgeoisie to abandon Cuba.

They came by the thousands:

by chartered plane in the Freedom Airlift; by raft or even innertube

I
I
I
I
I

across the turbulent Florida Straits.

By 1970, some 600, 000 Cuban

exiles, mostly burgueses, were in the United States.

This was 10 per-

cent of the Cuban population of 1959 and almost half of the bourgeoisie~
Exile in America was not a new experience for Cubans.

The

historian Portell Vila estimates that 30, 000 Cuban families fled to the
United States in the 19th century during the Cuban wars for independence.214
Thousands more came ~u6ng _the struggle against Machado in the 1930s
and Batista in the 1950s. Miami came to be regarded as Cuba's "seventh

I
I
I
I
I

province. " · Most thought, as had exiles of other eras, that they would
soon be going home again.

The banker Carlos Nunez was so confident

of an early return that he spent the remainder of his fortune freely in
Florida in 1961.

The cover of Bohemia in exile for May 7, 1961, car-

ried the legend "very soon we Cubans will be free. "
214Ferguson, Cuba, p. 200.
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During the missile crisis of October, 1962, Miami was again
abuzz with expectation.

Railroads and airbases in south Florida were

choked with American troops in invasion gear, waiting for the signal.
·it seemed like 1898 all over again.

The scion of the Menendez tobacco

fortune waited expectantly in full paratroop regalia inside an Air Force
C-130, its motors running.

He was to be a pathfinder for the 82nd Air-

borne division whose troops were to parachute onto the golf course of
the Havana Country Club, near his former home.

Within moments of

takeoff, President Kennedy reached his understanding with Soviet Premier Khruschev and the invasion was off. 2l5
In subsequent years, there would be countles s adventures for,
.
·
216
small bands of exiles, often financed by the CIA~
In 1964, when
Cuban exiles were dis<;overed to be conspiring with conservative interests to overthrow the president of Costa Rica, the State Department
demanded the termination of all CIA financing of independent exile
groups.

21 7

Thereafter, Cuban soldiers of fortune from all over the

Caribbean began to drift into Miami, out of work, out of luck.
215Interview with Alonso Menendez.

Miami, March 22, 1971.

216 For example, according to Jack Anderson, the Cuban exile
Virgilio Martinez, who, in 1973, was indicted for participating in the
Watergate break-in of Democratic Party Headquarters in Washington,
11
D. C., was involved in no less than 300 11 CIA directed 11black boat"
operations to retrieve persons and intelligence in Cuba during the 1960s.
,(Albuquerque Journal, August 14, 1973.)
2l 7 The writer observed these developments while serving as
Cuba analyst in the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, 1963-1965.
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For most exiles, immediate necessities took precedence over
dreams of a return to Cuba.

Those who spoke English illld had a trade were often quickly and easily
employed. Others wer_e not.
creditation in America.

Some doctors found it difficult to win ac-

Dentists were blocked by American professional

associations. Lawyers were unfamiliar with American legal codes and
were obliged to earn a living any way they could.
Others washed dishes.

Some picked tomatoes.

Women, who literally had never boiled water,

became cooks.- The daughter of one rich man wiped tables in the cafeteria of the University of Miami.

For the once-proud bourgeoisie, it

was a crushing loss of status.
Nonetheless, the bourgeoisie began to struggle back.
institutions were. re-created.

Familiar

"Pepin" Bosch gave a substantial dona-

tion so that the Belen prep school might open ir.. Miami. 218 Thus Belen,
closed in Havana in May, 1961, re-opened in Miami the following September.
start.
Miami.

Student population was down from 1250 to 92, but it was a

By 1973 Cuban exiles had opened seventeen private schools in
The Augustinian's Biscayne College would replace the University

of Villanueva.

I
I
I
I
I

There was the question of earning a living.

. in Miami.

The American Club in Havana became the American Club

Cuban priests opened parishes in Miami.

oid businesses

were transplanted; Havana's Caballero FuneralHome re-opened on

. 218 Jose Jorge Vila and Guille~mo Zalamea Arenas, Exilo,
(Miami: Editorial AIP, 1967), p. 203.
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Miami's Eighth Street.

Indeed, that once decaying area began to thrive

as "little Havana. "
Those exiles who had been ardent Fidelistas in 1959 and 1960
sometimes found it more convenient to. live in Costa Rica or Venezuela.
There was a real fear of the Batistianos in Miami.

For a time, the beer

baron, Julio Blanco, once a fervent Castro supporter, was ostracized
by his compatriots.

Others in like position chose to adopt low profiles,

giving no interviews, refusing to join Cuban associations, living apart.
All had perforce to adapt to America, just as they had adapted to each
successhre government in Cuba.

The exiles told the ingenuous Ameri-

cans what they expected to hear: of their gratitude, pleasure and satisfaction in being in the U. S. A.
,·

Some were more honest.

The Cuban newsman Luis Ortega

wondered if the exiV~s hadn't made a mistake in coming to America.
Castro had taken his property, but America was taking his children.
'When he tried to teach them Cuban history and tradition, they replied
that it was a bunch of garbage.

They wanted, like most immigrants,

to become assimilated, to become Americans.· A color television set,
wrote Ortega, "is not sufficient compensation for being left without
country and without children.

11219

Wealthy Cubans have moved smartly into American society.
Alonso Fanjul, former president of the Havana Country ·c lub, became,

219 Patria, (Miami), September 11, 1970, as reprinted from El
Tiempo (Miami), June 21, 1970.
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with his wife Lilian G6mez Mena, a leader of society in Palm Beach.

Julio Tarafa married Jill Hearst of the publishing empire.

Guillermo

Aguilera married into the Iselin banking family in New York.

His pri-

vate parties at El Morocco would be photographed for Vogue.

As the

. prosperity of the bourgeoisie became more marked, the former memhers of Havana's clubs banded together to form the Big Five Club.
Not everyone prospered, however.

The

II

co 1ossus· o f sugar,

II

Julio Lobo, attempted a comeback in his familiar role as sugar broker.
Operating from his long-established New York offices, by 1963 he was
handling 20 percent of U.S. overseas sugar purchases.
was necessary because of an enormous debt.

This enterprise

In 1958, Lobo had pur-

chased the former Hershey mills from Atla.ntica del Golfo on the basis
of a $2 5 million loan from the First National City Bank.

He had given

his signature in guarantee and was, despite Castro, obliged to pay.
But, in 1964, a misjudgment about Indonesian sugar plunged him into
bankruptcy. 22

° For two years, he maneuvered to salvage something.

Ironically, it was America that finally laid him low.

In 1966, the U.S.

government filed a tax claim against Lobo for $2 5 million .for the period
1957-1963.

I
I
I
I

I

There was no more hope . . Exhausted, bankrupt, Lobo de-

. ~Spain.
. 2 21
part e d f or ex1·1 e m

Lobo was defeated, but many of Cuba's sugar bourgeoisie, owners,
managers, and technicians, went on to enjoy a splendid success in exile,
demonstrating that they had sufficient talent, ambition and know-how to
220 The New York Times, July 24, 1964~
221 Ibid., November 16, 1966.
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succeed anywhere.

Part of the Cuban quota which Castro had lost fol-

lowed the exiles to America.

Indeed, the U.S. Agri~ulture Depart-

ment's lifting of sugar cane acreage restrictions in Florida in March,
1960, may have even lured some Cubans there.

By October, 1960, the

hacendados Fanjul and Azqueta and the Cuban capitalist Sanchez had put
up $1. 5 million for four thousand acres of land west of Palm Beach,
bought some old sugar mill machinery in Louisiana, and gone into business as Osceola Farms.

222

Other Cuban plantations arose: by 1961,

Fernando de la Riva (owner of four sugar mills in Cuba) and his associates were carving the_ eighteen thousand acre Talisman Sugar Planta. tion out of Florida swampland. 223

•

1

· ..A.Jmq~f
aU of these operations are manned in every category by
-~-. :;: :· .
.
.
:

,

.

Cuban exiles.

The hacendado Manuel Arca was elected general manager

of the Glades County Sugar Growers Co-operative Assoc~ation.

The

hamlet of Belle Glade on the shore of Lake Okechobee became almost

a _Cuban

country town.

One exile, pleased to hear Spanish spoken on all

sides there, found Belle Glade reminiscent of Caney or Giiisa.

224

222 Arca, "Influence of Cubans", p. 101.
223 The New York Times, January 18, 1962. Young Fernando de
la Riva observed in 1962 that the tractor operators at Talisman had, in
Cuba, been sugar planters with properties worth as much as $22 million. Riva noted that Castro had once denigrated these members of the
sugar bourgeoi~:lie as "parasites" and the "country club set. " Riva thought
the Talisman operation proved that "the wealthy class of Cubans is willing
11
to work.
224
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Ram6n Carona in Diario Las Americas, May 27, 1972.
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Togay, Cuban sugarmen are to be found everywhere in Latin
America, servicing the U.S. 's Cuban quota which ha~ now b_ecn distributed to the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Peru, Mexico, Venezuela and
elsewhere.

The administrator of the Dominican Republic's largest sugar

enterprise .is the Cuban hacendado Teobaldo Rosell.
Fernando de la Riva is now managing several mills.
active in Venezuelan sugar.

225

In Brazil, young

The Azquetas are

In Ecuador, Cuba's Rafael Gonzalez Car-

denas and his son Daniel manage the Aztra sugar combine.

226

In Peru,

Antonio Navarro managed Grace's giant Paramonga sugar.' plantation for
several years.

Ironically, he was recently dr"iven out of Peru by that

government's nation.a lization of the Grace enterprise. 227
Cub~n exiles have also "triumphed" (as they like to call it) in
banking and real estat~.

1?r 1972,

the Cuban Henry Gutierrez had built

the sixty story Republic ·ii~{ ,~:ilding, : the tallest building in Miami, and

225 Teobaldo Rosell, once a Castroite> (code name Rebecca), is
today a conservative, but a progressive one. He was recently honored
for his civic contributions to the town of La Romana, where he is vicepresident of Gulf and Western Industries 1 sugar complex. (Diario Las
Americas, May 22, 1971.)
226 The Aztra sugar combine, built in the 1960s, exports most
of its sugar to the United States. (Diario Las Americas, May 2, 1972.)

I
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I

227 See The New York Times, May 1, 1972. Peru's National
Agrarian Association and her cattlemen's association have suffered the
fate of their Cuban counterparts, the two being disbanded in May, 1972.
(Times of the Americas, May 24, 1972.) In Peru, Navarro was Gerente
General, Sociedad Paramonga Ltda. He is married to Avis Hedges,
daughter of the Cuban textile magnate, Burke Hedges. Interestingly,
Navarro has been quite critical of the old Cuban bourgeoisie for its failure to lead. See his speech before the Sugar Club, New York. (Sugar
Club Annual, p. 12.)

565

one of the tallest in the southeastern U. S.

In North Miami, the Egozi

brothers, once owners of a modest leather shop in Havana, have parlayed enterprise and determination into the $2 5 million dollar Suave
,
Shoe firm. Carlos Prio runs a Caribbean shipping line; Carlos Portela
and his old partner Augusto Ladesma run a canning plant.

By 1970,

Cubans were reportedly contributing $800 million to the gross national
product of Florida's Dade County.

They h_a d unquestionably demonstrated

their ability to perform, to make money in a modern industrialized society.

They are very proud of that.

A former vice-president of Cuba

observed with satisfaction that, at a recent exile fiestaza (super party),
.
228
th e servant s were Amer1cans.

Along with the exiles' economic success,· the old social life is

.
re tu rn1ng.

Th e cron1s
. ta

J.oaqum
~ d e p osa d a 1s
. once agam
. ac t"1ve. 229

And at the Big Five Club's annual New Year's Party in 1973, fifteen
hundred Cubans, rich and happy, danced the night away.

Among them

one might discern the fa~iliar faces of the old gilded bourgeoisie:
Cardenas, Arrellano, G6mez, Falla, Sampedro, Escagedo, Saladrigas,
Beguiristan, Sanchez, Nunez Portuondo, Batista, Garrig6, Fantin,
,
230
Garcia Montes.
Much of the old bourgeoisie has recovered, jtist

228 Diario Las Americas, February 4, 1972.

229 Posada writes, however, not for Miami's Diario de la Marina
which collapsed, but rather for another paper which shares the Diario's
views, the ultra-conservative Diario Las Americas.
230 o·

· L as A mer1cas,
' ·.
J anuary 7 , 1973 •
1ar10
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as they had done in the 1920s and 1940s, and are living well again.

And

many members of the :r,etite bourgC:oisie, having taken advantage of the
broader opportunities in America, can now afford to drive Cadillacs
'

and have their photographs appear in fhe Anuario de familias cubanas,
the guide to the bourgeoisie in exile,

There, as in Cuba, smooth-faced

countesses appear in paintings whose backgrounds portray the elegant
gar·dens of great estates, while the nouveaux riches pose, astonished
by their good fortune, beside their swimming pools.
Socially, the bourgeoisie in exile has become more open, mobile
and democratic than it was in Cuba. 231 Politically, the bourgeoisie,

.
having suffered a massive psiquitriamiento (psychological scarring) in
Castro's revolution, has become ultra-conservative.

A poll by the

University of Miami in 1971 revealed that 73 percent preferred the
Republican party.

Seventy-eight percent saw "law and order" as the

issue of prime importance.
of President Nixon.

232

The Cuban exiles are great admirers

Jose Manuel Casanova, the hacendado, served in

1972 as leader of the Cubans for Nixon Committee in Florida.
The economic achievements of the exiles have not been matched

I
I
I
I
I

by an equivalent political development.

Rather, they seem suspended

in space, reluctant to become fully Americanized, but unable to organize

231

Mariano Perez Duran has commented on this in the introduction
to the Anuario de familias cubanas of 1972, p. 3.
23 2 Miami Herald, June 18, 1971.
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for a return to Cuba.

Thus, as of 1970, only 50, 505 of some 600, 000

exiles in the United States had reg~stered to vote.
The exiles have yet to agree on a common program to liberate
Cuba. 233 There are still numerous uncoordinated groups of would-be
liberators.

In 1963, the number crested at about o.ne hundred.

a decade later, there were approximately fifty groups.

234

Almost

They issue

ringing pronunciamientos about communism and liberty, about their
cita con honor- -their rendezvous with honor and the heroic tradition.
But no one takes them seriously.

Even their own newspaper, the Diario

Las Americas, considers it back-page material.
tion groups are bitter.

The few active libera-

The bourgeoisie, with the exception of "Pepin"

Bosch and. a few others, will not support them.
In some ways, the Cuban exiles as a social conglomerate have

achieved remarkably little.

I
I
I
I
I
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Despite their extraordinary income, it took

ten years for them to erect a most modest obelisk to honor the Brigadistas who fell at the Bay of Pigs.

A planned monument to those who risked

their lives in rafts and inner tubes and even bathtubs to cross the Florida
Straits has come to nothing. 235 Exercises which require· some evidence
f

of cub~, of love of the island, seem to fall very flat indeed.

This is

233 The Agrupado Enrique Baloyra commented that, in 1959,
did not have a clear alternative to offer the people. We still don't. "
Interview, Coral Gables," May 18, 1972.

234 Diario Las Americas, January 27, 1972.
2 3 5 See in American Club Bulletin (Miami), October 31, 1971.
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not to say that the exiles do not love Cuba, but simply that this affection
cannot surmount those inbred and historic characteristics of individualism
and social irresponsibility which contributed so powerfully to the bourgeoisie' s destruction by Castro's revolution.
Nowhere is this lack of social cohesion more evident than in the
failure of the Cubans to vigorously protest the imprisonment of their
friends and relatives in Cuba.

was so vigorous and effective as to lure--in the opinion of some--the
United States into the Spanish American War, today, relative to Cuban
prisoners, there is nothing but a great sile11ce.

1.·

I
I
I
I

Whereas in the 1890s Cuban propaganda

'

1

A Dying Generation

The great preoccupation of the ~xiled bourgeoisie is to live well,
and to forget.

Many like to think of Castro's revolution as something

visited on them by nature, by forces beyond their control.
and the Americans are to blame.

The Russians

"All this comes from Russia, " says

the Marquesa de Justiz de Santa Ana.

236

It is the fault of the Americans,

says the former president of the hacendados, Lincoln Rod6n. 237 In the

I
I
I

236 "Todo eso viene de Rusia." Comme:it of Maria Francisca de
la Camara y O'Reilly de Zarraga, the Marquesa de Santa Ana Coral
Gables, February 24, 1971 Others believe, however, that the Russians,
far from controlling Fidel or his revolution in 1959-1960, were astonished
when he chose to leap boldly into the socialist camp. Indeed, some Russians came to ask the economist Nicolas Muniz how this all happened. Th'ey
were as baffled as the Americans. (Interview with Nicolas Muniz.
Miami, April 7, 1971.)

I.

237 Boletin Informativo, Asociaci6n de Antiguos Alurnnos de los
P. P. Jesuitas de Cuba. January, February, March, 1971.

I
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exile press the columnists ignore Castro's revolution, except to denounce
it.

No one dares to consider the bourgeoisie's responsibilities therein.

There is a tacit understanding that this is not a fit subject for discussion.

It would reopen too many wounds, jog too many bitter memories. And
there might be financial or even physical reprisals.

Rather, the old

politicians talk only of the heroism of '98 or 193 3.

In exile, the Autenticos have forgotten their fierce enmity for
the Batistianos.

Was there a quarrel?

as Castro once had predicted.

They are friends now, together,

Their unity was sealed in a kind of dy-

na.stic marriage in 1972 when Carlos Prfo 's daughter married Alfredo G.

Duran, a veteran of the Bay of Pigs and a stepson of Batista's former
vice-president, Anselmo· Alliegro. 238
But other battles go on.

.

f

The same Pr10, the multimillionaire,

recently attacked the Sarra family, famous for their extensive real
estate holdings in Cuba.

Prfo declared that, in a liberated Cuba, fam-

ilies like the Sarras would not be allowed to rec~up their real estate
empires.

The Sarras replied bitterly that their father had been an

honest man.

I

Could Pr10 say the same?

239

But these battles will soon be stilled, for the generation of 1933,
those men who were the leaders of the bourgeoisie both political and

n·iario
.

L as A.mer1cas,
' .
.
3 0, 1972. Castro said
. that
January
"one day they will join hands-- all of them." _(Granma, May 3, 1970).
Prfo's daughter is a graduate in political science at Duke; her husband
is a graduate of the University of Miami law school.
238

239 Diar.i o Las Americas, July 8, 1970.
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commercial in 1959, are part of a dying generation.

Batista's one-

time vice-president, Rafael Guas Inclan, wrote in 1970, upon the death
of his friend and fellow politician Jose Suarez Rivas, that "our generation is at the end of its life, its most r.epresentative figures are falling •••
dispersed over the face of the earth ••••

11240

The year before, in 1969, Grau San Martin, the paladin of the
revolution of 1933, died in Cuba.

According to a long-time friend, when

Castro urged Grau to leave Cuba, the ex-president replied, "I have decided to stay and have burned my suitcases. 11241 Though Cuban intelligence officials were certain that Grau had millions in banks overseas,
he nonetheless died a pauper, owing his friend~ $29, 000.

He had re-

fused to accept any of his pensions, or his check from Fidel's Refor!'na
Urbana, which he thought unconstitutional.
nue mansion was put to new use.
which reads:

11

Thereafter, his Fifth Ave-

Across the front is now a large sign

, 11242
Albergue Lenin.

But no one cared much about Grau in Miami.
the death of Sergio Carbo in 1971.

More shocking was

Carbo, editor of Prensa .Libre, was

the man who had inspired Batista to make his sergeant's coup in 1933.
One could then see almost the whole of the leadership of the generation
of 1933, in black, waiting to pay their respe_cts at the Caballero Funeral

I
I
I
I

Home.
240 Ibid •• March 20, 1970.
241 Ibid., June 13, 1870.
242 "Albergue Lenin"--a Russian cultural in~titute.
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On August 8, 1973,. Fulgencio Batista, the epitome, for good or
ill, of the self-made man of the Cuban bourgeoisie, died of a heart attack at his luxurious seaside villa in Portugal.

Batista, who had risen

· from cane cutter to trainman to sergeant to colonel and thence to the
presidency, died quietly.
world.

He had become one of the richest men in the

"My father came from nothing, 11 said Jorge Batista, "and won

everything. 11243 Batista's body was returned to Madrid by chartered
plane and buried quickly as required by Spanish law.
friends and admirers assembled at the cemetery.

A few hundred

It was hot there

under the summer sun; Batista's wife Marta was obliged to take refuge
in an air-conditioned limousine.

Batista's son Ruben observed that his

father's body would not.be returned to Cuba "until our country is once
. f :ree. 11244
agam

243 Diario Las Americas , August 9, 1973.
244 Ibid., August 8, 1973.
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.
The terrible curse of disunity has
brought and continues to bring ruin to
the island of Cuba.

Felix Varela , 19th Century
Cub an Authorl
The Israelis have been united for two
thousand years in defense of their interests ••• while the Cuban exiles have
but thirteen years of disunity and: almost total abandonment of our island.

.I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

Cuban exile, 1971

2

The most important part of the revolution is becoming organ1z~d. Every
man and woman. ·•• must be organized.
The isolated citizen, no matter how
great his patriotism and his revolu ~
. tionary fervor, lacks strength and efficiency. The revolution cannot count
on isolated persons.
3
Fidel Castro, 1961

XI.

CONCLUSION: INTEGRATION AND DISINTEGRATION

In less than three years, from 1959-1961~ the Cuban bourgeoisie

was destroyed by Castro's revolution.

The bourgeoisie fell not only be-

cause of external pressures, but also because of internal weaknesses.
In the unchecked ambitions and opportunism of the aspirants to bour-

I
I
I
1·.
I

geois status lies the inner dynamic of the Cuban revolution. These
1 Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Manual
de capacitaci6n dvica (Havana: Imprenta Nacional, 1960), p. 156.'

l

I

I

I
I
l

J
2 Dr. Gilberto Cepero ir. Diario Las Americas, December 10, 1971.
3 Fagen, The Transformation of Political Culture, p. 197.
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appetites had been whetted by a_bourgeoisie more efficient at flaunting
its wealth and position than at creat!ng opportunities for the masses.
Castro would charge the bourgeoisie was better at consuming than producing; that they had failed at the entrepreneurial task.

The bourgeoisie,

he would argue, had, by 1959, become a luxury that Cuba could not
afford.
The destruction of the Cuban bourgeoisie (1959-1961) was in
many ways the fulfillment of fears and prophecies which Cubans and
foreign observers had long entertained.

From the first days of the

republican era, Cuba's Catos warned of the need for a bourgeoisie with
a firm nationalist attitude; a bourgeoisie both honest and efficient, one
that could provide jobs required by a growing population. The bourgeoisie
had a chance to do this in the early republic when the isl~nd's economy_
burgeoned in a great sugar boom and Cu1Jan millionaires were legion.
But the bourgeoisie did not--and never has- -thought in terms of the
nation. Rather, many burgueses sold their lands and sugar mills to
the Americans, and invested their money in the glittering Havana which
was their monument.

When sugar lost its magic and sugar prices fell,·

there were instances when the bourgeoisie demonstrated that, united,
it could achieve important national objectives. 4

4 Such nationalist moments as the various bank moratoriums of
the 1930s and 1940s, the Sugar Coordination Law of 1937, the recapturing of the sugar and banking sectors hy Cuban entrepreneurs, the
creation of the National Bank.
·
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In general, Cuba 1 s burgueses

Such uni~y. however, was atypical.
I

remained wrapped in their extraordinary individualism, unable to see
beyond the interest of their immediate families.

They sought the plea-

sures, but not the responsibilities, of affluence. And after 1930, they
saw themselves, not as potent actors, but as victims, trapped by the
declining world sugar market, he~med in by the demands of labor on
one side, and the Americans on the other.

The bourgeoisie, lacking

unity and leadership, did not struggle effectively against these forces.
Rather they surrendered, giving themselves over to the pursuit of the
good life, rather than the building of a modern nation.
In a sense the bourgeoisie was defeated by the time Castro took

power.

By January 1, 1~59, the Cuban army, a principal prop of the

bourgeoisie, had been destroyed.

Its remnants were bitterly divided,

Batista denouncing his generals as traitors anc! incompetents. But it
was the bourgeoisie that financed the rebellion which destroyed Batista's
army, contributing millions to a rebel leader they had never met. And

it was the lust of the generals to live like burgueses that destroyed the
army from within.
The bourgeoisie greeted Castro's revolution with mixed emo-

I
I

tions.

I
I
I

could be bought.

Some tho"L,.ght it the long-sought answer to the cry for honesty,

reform, and a decent nationalism.

Others were more cynical, !h,h1king

Castro one more "revolutionary" politician who, like the men of 1933,
-

-

I

To many burgueses, Castro's revolution of 1959 was

seen as an opportunity to get ahead • . The old society would be cracked

575
open. What plums might fall to the swift, the devious, the opportunistic?
But Castro outplayed ·the bou~geoisie at their own game.

Se-

cretly despising the bourgeoisie, he nonetheless attr'acted many bur-

--

···

gueses to his side by appealing to their nationalism and idealism.

The

bourgeoisie imagined Castro a fellow burgues, a reformer of~ering
bourgeois solutions. The bourgeoisie's early support gave his revolution important momentum.

Thereafter he veered increasingly to· the

left, alienating the bourgeoisie bit by bit, sector by sector, leaving
them confused and divided.

In the first months of 1959, the bourgeoisie disgorged a regular
torrent of "voluntary" contributions to Castro's revolution.
gave time, money, cattle, land, and even ·sugar mills.

Burgueses

Much of this

was in the natur~ of conscience money, in expiation for past sins. In
1959, those who had never paid taxes besieged their tax collectors. Rich
men thought they could buy their safety. · Some, like Julio Lobo, the
"colossus of sugar, "thought themselves indi.s pensable.

The revolution

could not succeed without them. They were safe.
Many of Castro's early reforms did not arouse overwhelming
concern because they had honorable precedents in Cuban history: rent
freezes and reforms, nationalizations and interventions, the temporary
'

setting aside of the law, measu.res to restrict United States influence.
All these things had been attempted, at !_east to some degree, by previous regimes.

The early executions of Batista war criminals were

approved by some of the richest burgucses.

And Castro's first steps to
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redistribute the wealth in Cuba did not arouse und~e alarm, but rather
seemed part of the distributionist trend begun by the revolution of 1933.
Castro had a certain safe l&.titude of action because Cuba was a nation
of curiously mixed tendencies: aristocratic and elitist on the one hand,
distributarian and equalitarian on the other.
In 1959 and 1960 Cuban capitalism was assaulted from every

side. On the one hand, the revolution offered an idealistic program of
distribution, equality and disinterested service to the nation.

On the

other, a storm of criticism linked past business success to manipulation of the public trust.
was not.

Some of this criticism was accurate, some

The bourgeoisie failed to contest it; could not disengage it-

self from the crimes of the Batistato, and thus gave the impression that

I
I
I
I

all business was crooked.

As a result, private enterprise joined politics

as an area of activity that, in the popular· imagination, ought to be
.eliminated.
The enmity between business and the revolution intensified by an
I

almost automatic progression. What busineesman would invest in a new
factory; or even maintain an old one, if he feared his business would be
confiscated? Businessmen uneasy over the future, hurt by declining

I
.1
I
I
I

profits and rising labor costs"' were confronted by young revolutionaries
anxious to demonstrate their entrepreneurial mettle.

The businessmen's

retrenchment was interpreted as evidence of hostility to the revolution
and was countered by state intervention.

The fears of business and the

ambitions of the young rebels fed one another, driving Castro's revolution
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further along the road to government ownership of business and, evenI

tually, to socialism.

Only gradually did the bourgeoisie come to understand the true
direction of Castro·'s revolution, that he intended to sacrifice their inter~sts, their "bourgeois privileges, rr in order to win the support of
the masses.

But as this mortal challenge became clear, the bour-

geoisie found itself utterly divided, confused, leaderless.

Even before

Castro came to power, the bourgeoisie had split into those .in favor of,
and those against, Batista.

They split again and again as each n 7w

revolutionary reform came into play.

They split on the issue of age,

for this was in part a generational revolution, the generation of '53
· forcing out the generation of 1933, which in the 1950s had dominated so
much of Cuban life.

The sons of the old politicians of '33 helped to

finance Fidel; the sons of rich hacendados were, in early 1959, among

.I

the most vigorous critics of the "old system." The . social bo~ds. that
·once seemingly unified the bourgeoisie, melted away.

1·

The once re-

spected powers of the tejido familiar, the system of blood-linkages to
.

~

the richest families which comprised the inner fib e r of the alta-burguesia ,
proved impotent; meaningless.
The bourgeoisie also split on economic interests, each sector
thinking it might achieve some advantage over the other.

The colonos

demanded not only a lion's share of sugar profits from the hacendados,
but the hacendados I lands as well.

The industrialists, the gariaderos,

the tourist sector, each hoped to win the government's support, to become
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the favored sector. No one would cooperate.

I

The game was rather to

take advantage of the other's misfortune. In 1959, tens of thousands
of habaneros refused to pay thei_r _rent. Down with the landlords!
Others refused to pay their utility bills. Small colonos would not pay
their land rents.

Everyone was angling to serve his private interest

and, inadvertently, to destroy the capitalist system in Cuba.
Every sector was divided against itself.

Small and medium-

sized hacendados hoped to benefit from a land reform which would hurt
the large.

Small colonos anxiously eyed the lands of the big colonos.

Bank tellers dreamed of becoming bank executives; clerks of becoming
bosses. Small businesses applauded the nationalization of their larger
competitors. It was a cruel moment, a time when "everyone wanted
5
.
something •••• "_ Burgueses began to call it the revclucion del callo,
a revolution in which no one protested until his corn,his callo, was
stepped on.
.In the crucible of the revolution, the bourgeoisie's vaunted self-

confidence vanished like a wisp of smoke. Those intellectuals, burgueses all, who might have been expected to defend their class, instead
attacked it. Almost all the leading Catholic intellectuals were revealed

I
I

II

to be demo'cratic socialists, opposed to the bourgeois interest.

Imper-

'

tant burgueses denounced their own class. Bohemia, the principal
journal of the bourgeoisie, attacked bourgeois culture from the left,

5 Interview with FranciGco Rodrfguez.

Miami, May 14, 1971.
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while the Diario de la Marina, the paladin of the "gilded bourgeoisie, "
lacerated the failures of the conser.Jative .class~s from the right.

Bour-

geois values seemed, in the face of the revolutionary whirlwind, indefensible: too selfis~. too individualistic.

Freedom seemed merely a

privilege to purchase something.
There was also enmity between classes, as labor pressed capital for wage increases, for profit-sharing.

"Pedimos, Pedimos, " was

the chant of labor in early 1959. 6 The once vertical links between labor
and the middle class, which the Autentico party had fashioned in .1933,
were nonexistent in 1959. Many workers were delighted by the ruin of
their patrons.

Few indeed resisted or even resented the nationalization

· of their factories, no matter how well they might have been paid and
treated. .T he bank workers, the electricos, and telefoneros, cheerfully
abandoned their employers.
None of the natural leaders of the bourgeoisie seemed able or
willing to oppose the revolution.

Many had humiliated themselves by

cooperating with Batista. Others, including some of the richest and most
influential business leaders of Cuban society, refused to fight.

.

.

Many

of the old .politicians were burnt out cases, men whose history of opportunism left them without a following.

Cuba's principal politician,

~

ex-President Carlos Prio, was typical of these.

He "retired" from

6 ''We demand, we demand" ••• from a political cartoon in
Bohemia, February 15, 1959, p. 86.

·1
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

580

I
I
I
I·
I
I
I
.I
I·

I·
I
.1
I

politics in early 1959, but continued to support Castro's revolution until
the winter of 1960. Castro's first cabinet seemed most distinguished
for the anxiety of its "democratic!' members t~ resign.

Premier Mir6
.

'

Cardona left after thirty-seven days. President Urrutia offered his
resignation three times.

The other democrats left without a struggle

following Castro's agrarian reform.

They did not approve of it, but

they did not oppose it either. Even when the communications media were
still open, few dared speak their minds. Almost everyone kept his true
opinions to hims elf.
The burgueses were divided even in their _own minds.

Every-

one said things in 1959 that, in exile in 1961, tp.ey would regret or retract..

Many who played along with the revolution in 1959, appla~ding

its every step, would declare, in 1961, that they laiew all along that
Castro's was a communist revolution.
A principal element in the destruction of the bourgeoisie was

the revolutionaries' contempt for money. It had been a substitute for
the political involvement' which the bourgeoisie disdained. When Castro
indicat.e d his disinterest in money, the bourgeoisie wa~ stunned.

Surely

he had an account in Switzerland? But when Castro maintained his posi-

I
I
I
I
I

tion, refusing to accept gifts from would-be benefactors, he placed himself beyond their reach.
Under the revolutionary challenge, there proved to be nothing
solid in bourgeois Cuba.

The organizations which had comprised the

root and branch of bourgeois Cuba, the associations of hacendados,

581
colonos, gan aderos, lawyers, doctors, industrialists, fell apart.
I

Castro encouraged the development of comp~ting counter-organizations:
the Colonos Libres, the Revolutionary Accountants, the Revolutionary
Lawyers.

These and other new revolutionary organizations attracted

both idealists and opportunists who had fared poorly at the hands of the
old institutions.
Even the Catholic church was incapable of withstanding Castro's
revolution. Rather, the church found itself disorganized, 'incapable of
·formulating an alternative program.

The hierarchy and the clergy

were divided, liberals vs. conservatives, Franciscans vs •. Jesuits,
U. S. · and Spanish priests vs. the Cubans. · There was no order, no unity.
When at last. the bishops $Ounded the call to battle, the faithful did not
respond.
No one could agree on how to combat Castro.

Plans were for.:.

mulated by various burgueses to harass or even topple Castro, but
none were carried out.

Some hacendados· had wanted to dump the entire

I
I
I
I
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sugar industry in Castro's lap in May, 1959, and drown his revolution
in a sea of sugar, but nothing was done.

The association of industrialists

was afraid to even write Castro a letter of complaint.
The failure of the Cuban bourgeoisie to defend itself is all the
· more remarkable in light of the struggle of the Chilean bourgeoisie
against the socialist plans of President Allende. In Chile, the socialists
.

I
I
I

I

were confronted with strikes by shop owners, truckers, doctors, demonstrations of wealthy women in the streets, tenacious struggles in

I
I
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the courts.
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Such tactics were not unknown in Cuba. After all,\ it was

the general strike of 1933--which spread ;ike·magic across Havana,
paralyzing everything--that brought down Machado." But the Cubans,
unlike the Chileans, had no barrack's door to bang on, no army to serve
as ultimate arbiter.

Moreover, the bourgeoisie feared that if they re-

sisted, Castro might, in a moment of supreme tension, release the
masses against them.

The early--and well-publicized--executions of

Batista war criminals suggested that the government would not hesitate
to use maximum force against its enemies.
Against the chaos and disintegration of bourgeois society,

I
1·
I
I

Castro presented his own alternative of mass mobilization to do battle
with potential foreign attackers.

Castro rang· the tocsin of the heroic

culture; millions of Cubans thrilled to the sound.
.

Indeed, it is interest-

.

ing to see how long many burgueses remained enthralled,at Castro'·s ·
side, ready to do battle against the imperialists.
That the masses, brilliantly encou!aged by Castro, had turned

I

against them was incomprehensible to the bourgeoisie.

I

years after the event, they still cannot believe it.

Indeed, fifteen

And yet what Castro

did was simplicity itself. He distributed all the goods and powers, the
jobs and prestige of the bourgeoisie to the masses. And if" that were in-

I
I
I
I

sufficient, he offered the masses a limitless future as well.

What did

the bourgeoisie have to counter this?
~a:ther than fight in Cuba, many burgueses began to pass irito
exlle, crossing the Florida Straits to America. Oblivious of the

I.· ..

.,. .

·'
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nationalist issue, they sought aid wherever they could find it: from
I

dictators in Spain or the Caribbean and of course from the U.S.A.

But,

in exile as in Cu~a. the bourgeoisie was unable to master its individual-

ist tendencies.

The counterrevolutionary effort was held together only

by the exiles' extraordinary confidence in the Americans and the ready

purse of the CIA.

The bourgeoisie, which had been created in con-

siderable part by American capital, was launched into battle organized,
armed and directed by America.

On the beaches of the Bay of Pigs.

the Cuban bourgeoisie was repulsed by Castro's revolutionaries, and
abandoned by the Americans. They would return to Miami full of anger
and humiliation, talking forever of the great return which, in their inmost hearts, they knew would never be.
They co~ld never return to a bourgeois Cuba, because bourgeois
Cuba no long~r existed. All the old bourgeois values, th.e old style of
life, had been rejected, destroyed by the· revolution. Work had replaced consumption as the principal ethic of the new society. Cuba's
new "millionaires" were no longer men with bulging bank accounts, but
rather campesinos who had cut a million arrobas of sugar cane.

In the

new era, Havana, once the heart of bourgeois Cuba, would find itself
seedy, down at the heels, rejected. · All attention--and. government
funding--now focused on Cuba's long-ignored countryside.
the era of Cadillacs and big houses.

Gone was

Gone were the private clubs, the

priyate schools, the servants. the attentive church.

·•
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Two day3 before the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961, the
Cuban-American Carlos Todd wrote that those responsible for the destruction of the bourgeoisie were:·
all of us who comfortably turned our backs on our responsibilities as citizens ••• and allowed our country to
· fall prey to the depredations of ruthless politicians who
sold our nation to the highest bidder. We placed our
creature comfort before the welfare and prosperity of
our country. We had the educ~tion, the intelligence
and the ability to run the country ••• we simply didn't
have the guts. No, Fulgencio Batista is not to blame,
the United States is not to blame. We, the so-called
'educated classes' of Cuba, by our inertia, our stupidity,
our blindness and our complacency are fully and totally
responsible for the crime of Castro •••• We are to. blame.
No one else. 7
There is a great deal of truth in this statement.

But credit for

the destruction of the bou.fgeoisie must also be shared with the brilliant
political gamesmanship o~ Fidel Castro, the readiness of the masses to
accept a radical nc:,.tionalist leader, the ambiguous policies of the United
States, and the bold hltervention of the Soviet Union.

On.l y in this sense

of an historic intersection of forces, intern2.l and external, can Castro's
revolution, and the fall of the bourgeoisie, be fully understood.

·7 Di.aria de la Marina (Miami), April 15, 1961. Carlos Todd,
a Cuban citizen, the nephew of t.l-ie sugar baron Julio Lobo, lost more
than $1 million in properties to Castro's revolution.
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APPENDIX I
Some Numerical Indices of the Bourgeoisie: Vocations
Vocations

Numbers

Comments
1

Dentists

2, 500

As of. 1959.

Doctors

6, 500

Members of the Colegio Medico in 1959.

Lawyers

6, 560

According to 1953 census. 3

Engineers
(Civil)

1, 468

hlcluding architects, as of 1953 census.

Engineers

University
Graduates

309 -

40,000

Pr<;>fessional
Men
Teachers

According to the Confederaci6n Nacional
de Profesionales Universitarios in 1960. 6
Professional men belonging to the various
mandatory colegios. 7

6, 000 ..

Members of the Colegio de P~dagogos. 8

Miami, April 6, 1971.

..

Bohemia, February 1, 1959, p. 16.

3 Raul Moncarz, "A Study of the Effect of Environmental Change
on Human Capital Among Selected Skilled Cubans. 11 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Florida, 1969), p. 17.
4 Ibid. , p. 11 ~
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I·
I

4

Mechanical, industrial, mining as of
1953 census. 5

1 futerview with Arnoldo Odio, dentist.

2

2

5 El Mundo, May 18, 1960.

6oiario de la Marina, September 29, 1959.
· 7 El Mundo, October 4, 1960.

8 Illan, Cuba, p. 34.
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Vocations

Numbers

University
students

25, 000

Government
employees

185, 000

Employees of
American
firms

87, 498

Comments
Approximate number, 1959, at all Cuban
u~iversities, private and public. 9
_1950 data. Includes both local and national government. Not all would be
inemb"ers of the bourgeoisie. 10
A substantial port~on of these would be
lower middle class workers in American
companies like the telephone and electric
companies. 11

Some Numerical Indices of the Bourgeoisie: Possessions
Itenis

Numbers

Comments

TV sets

400,000

As of 1959. Difficult to estimate because TV'sets were often contraband. 12

Telephones

171,434

As of March 1, 1959. 13

Savings accounts 335, 556
Refrigerators

253, 140

As of 1961. 14
Imported from U.S. 1952-1960. l5

9 Ibid.

lQ IBRD, Report on Cuba, p. 453.
l! Report of the American Chamber of Commerce ·in Havana Times,
April 16, 1959.
12 Cuban Economic Research Project, A Study on Cuba, p. 583.
13 FCSC, Claim #CU-2615.
14 Bohemia, October 9, 1964, p. 75.
15ttavana Times, July 11, 1960.
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Items
Electric clothes
·washers

Comments

Numbers
34, 019

Imported .from U.S. 1952-1959. Washing
was traditionally performed by servants. 16

Automobiles

140, 300

Private cars in 1958. Cuba had 226, 812
motor vehicles of all types in 1958, more
·cars per capita than any Latin American
nation except Venezuela. 17

Radios

750, 000

1958. 18

16 Diario de la Marina, December 12, 1959.
17Havana Times, December 22, 1958; Illa.n, Cuba, p. 60.
18 Illan, Cuba, p. 63.
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APPENDIX II.
The U.S. Education of the Cuban ~ourgeoisie
A substantial number of Cuba's burgueses were educated in the
United State's.

The number grew steadily over the years, :Peflecting the

growth of the bourgeoisie--and the increasing influenc_e of the Ame_ri<?~~s
over it.

Thus.,in 1923-1924, 139 Cuban students were enrolled in Ameri-

can universities. By 1936-1937 there were 261 Cubans in America.
decade later there were 585.

.

.

By 1950 there were 769.

1

A

The number

of students dropped off slightly in the early 1950s as the sons of the
bourgeoisie began to attend the new Catholic university.

But with the

coming of the Castro revolution, and the closing down of Havana Univer- .
sity, the number rose a~ain, reaching 1046 in 1958 :

2

Following is a partial listing of Cubans of some importance. in
public life in the 1950s who were educated, at least for a time, in the
United States.

Some only attended for a year or .two as a kin~ of season-

ing, and to improve their English.

Graduating dates, if known, are in

parenthesis.

1 Institute of International Education, Open Doors 1958 (New
York, June, 1958), p. 40. Of the 1046 Cubans studying in U.S. universities in 1958, 427 were in engineering studies, 216 in humanities, 144
.i n business administration, and the rest scattered in diverse categories.
2 Institute of Internatio~al Education, Education for One World,
1951-1952 (New York, March, 1952), p. 26.
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A~ca, Manuel, Jr.

Arca family of
hacendados

Rensselaer

Aspuru, Manuel

Leading hacendado

Penningto:r:i College

Bacardi, Joaquin

Bacardf rum family

Harvard

Bernabei, Anthony

General manager
El Mundo

NYU

Bosch, Jose

President Bacardi
interests

Villanova; Lehigh
University

Boti, Reginio

Economist for Castro

MA, Harvard; Lehigh
University, ~conomics

Botifoll, Luis

Editor, El Mundo

Tulane (1931)

Braga, George A.

President, CzarnikowRionda, 1950-1964 ·

Johns Hopkins (1924) ·

Camara, Jose Ignacio

Banker

Packard Business
School; Fordham, 2 years

Carrillo, Andres

Industrialist

Lehigh, graduate

Casanova, Jose M. ,Jr.

Hacendado

Culver Military
Academy (1947)

Chiba.s, Eduardo

Politician

Espfu, Vilnia

Wife of Raul Castro

MIT

Fernandez Retamar,
Roberto

Castro intellectual

Yale

Hedges, James

Industrialist, owner
La Rayonera

Georgia Tech.

Hevia, Carlos

President of Cuba,
1934

U.S. · Naval Academy

Lazo, Mario

Lawyer for U. S. firms

Cornell (1907)

t

r

. Storm King School, N. Y.
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Llerena, Mario

Intellectual

Princeton Theological
Seminary

Lobo, Julio

Sugar king

Columbia University;
Louisiana State

L6pez-Fresquet, Rufo

Minister of treasury,
1959-1961

Columbia University,
Graduate School

Machfn, Ricardo
Gustavo

Castro guerrilla

High school

Intellectual

Harvard (1920)

Marti, Jorge

Journalist

Minnesota School of
Journalism

Menocal, Mario

P~esident of Cuba,
1913-1921

Cornell, Civil
Engineering

Mestre, Abel

Owner, CMQ

Lehigh

Mestre, Goar

Owner, CMQ

Yale (1936)

Oltuski, Enrique

Minister of communications, 1959

University of Miami

Pazos, Felipe

Economist; president
National Bank 195052, 1959-60

Columbia; New School
for Social Research

Portela, Carlos

Industrialist

Georgia Tech.

Portuondo, Aurelio

Vice-president Cuban
Trading Co.

Schis~ler College of
Business, Philadelphia

Puyans, Thomas

Hacendado

Packard Business College

Ray, Manuel

Minister of public
works 1959-60

University of Utah,
Engineering

Reyes, Gustavo de los

Hacendado; member
Trinidad plot. Currently director King
Ranch, Venezuela

B. S. , Georgetown
University

.
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Manach, Jorge
f
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R~onda, Jose B.

Vice-president,· Cuban
Trading Co.

Columbia University

Riva, Fernando de la

Hacendado

Yale

Rivero, Jose Ignacio

Editor, Diario de la
Marina

Malvern and Choate
preparatory schools;
Marquette University

Rosado, Antonio

President, Cuban
Electric Co., 1959

MIT

Tabernilla Dolz,
Francisco

Batista general

Worcester Academy;
Louisiana State University

Tarafa, Fernando

Inheritor Tarafa
sugar fortune

Rensse.laer, B.A.
Engineering

Tarafa, Jorge

Inheritor Taraf a
sugar fortune

Rensselaer

Tarafa, julio

Inheritor Tarafa
sugar fortune

Cornell, Architecture

Ulacia, Eduardo

Orange grower

MIT

Zayas, Jorge

Editor, Avance

Columbia. University
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APPENDIX III
United States 'Claims A gainst Cuba
/'1,s of September 3 0, 1970, the United States F<?reign Claims

Settlement Commission (FCSC) of Washington, D. C. had received a
total of 8765 claims of loss by Americ·a n individuals and corporations
.
formerly active in Cuba.

The total loss claimed is $3, 346, 335, 726. 75 .

1

As the Commission studied these clai~s, some were rejected, S?me
reduced, a few increased.
reviewed 7079 claims.

By December 31, 1971, the commission had

Of these, 1192 were denied, usually fo~ lack of

sufficient evidence as to the U.S. nationality of the claimant, or because the claimant was unable to provide satisfactory proof of ownership of the expropriated property.
.

.

.

The remaining 5887 were certified

to have lost a total of $1, 769, 124, 172. 08.

2

Since the U.S. Congress has never appropriated funds to actually
pay claimants, despite vigorous lobbying by old Cuban h~nds, some major U.S. firms and individuals with properties in Cuba made po claim.
Thus, for example, the largest ·u. S. sugar corporation in the old Cuba,
. 3
Atla.ntica del Golfo, is not represented.
It would appear that most

1 Mimeographed information release of the FCSC, September 30,
1970.
.
2 Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States,

Annual R epo rt to th e Con gr es s for the Period Janua ry 1-Decem q er 31,
1971. (Washington , D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972),
pp. 34-35.

.

i

3 Nor did the DuPont family file with the FCSC for the loss of their
$2. ·1 million estate 11 Xanadu" at Varadero. Rather, they had Senator
Williams of Delaware sponsor a special tax bill amendment permitting
them to write off their loss. (Time, December 13, 1970, p. 80.)
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claimants filed to establish value for both tax write-offs, and also for
claims against some future Cuban regime that might be more amenable

to making restitution for proper.tie·s lost·by American cwners.
The significance of this $3. 5 billion claim is in the overwhelming
evidence it provides of the U.S. economic presence in Cuba.

An im-

p:ressive number of major U.S. corporations and powerful and influential
individuals were affected.

That this did not precipitate a massive U.S.

riposte--something a bit more forceful than the Bay of Pigs--is a tribute to the quixotic nature of American foreign policy.
The following list presents claims ~ade. by firms and individuals
for losses of $1 million or more.

The data was compiled by the author

frorp. the log books of the FCSC in November, 1970.

Few additional

claims were filed after that date.

Sugar Companies
FCSC
Claim#
2445
?156
3440
2526
2500
2683
2525
3128
1850
2622
2776
624
665

Name of Company

American Sugar Co.
Bangor Punta Corp.
Central West Co.
Czarnikow Rionda
Francisco Sugar Corp.
Guant~namo Sugar Co.
/
Manati Sugar Corp.
New Tuinucu Sugar Co.
New Tuinucu Sugar Co. Inc.
North American Sugar Inc.
United Fruit Sugar Co.
Vertientes Camagi.iey Sugar
Co. of Cuba
West Indies Sug3.r Co.

Claims of loss
(in dollars)
90,330,769.00
53,362,780.00
1, 107, 506. 00
18, 502, 362. 74
58, 505, 899. 00
17, 603, 591. 06
54,"(21,733.00
17,000,000.00
21, 895, 208. 00
114, 003, 157. 00
85, 100, 147. 69
93, 746, 321. 54
_62, 807, 696.16

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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I
I
I
I
I
I
.I .

·I.·

I·

Banks and Financial Institutions
FCSC
Claim#
1976
3656
2684
2685
2686
2687
2688
2689
3425
2268
2626
2628
2629
2334
3088
2805
· 3552

1901
2545
2498

1594

Name of Company

Claims of loss
(in dollars)

Bankers Trust Co.
Bankers · Trust Co. as Trustees
Chase Manhattan Bank

4,344,362.50
1, .081, 531.18
6, 171, 230. 22
II
8, 604, 2 06. 83
II
3,702,300.00
3,702,300.00
"If
793, 350. 00
II
793, 350. 00
8, 196, 100.• 36
Chemical Bank N. Y. Trust
12, 496, 000. 00
First National Bank of Boston
3,699,417.79
First National City Bank
II
12, 899, 142, 30
II
218, 110, 282. 59
3, 945, 000. 00
Foreign Investments
4,497,420.86
General Motors Acceptance Corp.
3, 633, 352. 56
Irving Trust Co.
1, 01'7, 935. 58 .
Irving Trust Co.
44, 059, 000. 00
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co.
7,638,928.17
Carl Marks & Co., Inc.
· 1, 737 I 745. 00
Mellon National Bank
4, 957, 740. 00
Morgan Guaranty .Trust Co. as Trustee

I

.I
I

1·
I
I
I
I

Ca.t tle Companies
726
3717
1507

5, 719, 714. 24
Compania Gaz:iadera Becerra-SA
.;rack Fall Everhart & Land and Cattle Co. 1, 711, 000. 00
2,831,638.62
King Ranch Inc.

Manufacturing Companies
244

2169
2354
2567
· 772
375
2351
1743

Air Reduction Co. Inc.
Allied Chemical Corp.
American Tobacco Co.
Armour & Co.
Avon Products Inc.
B. F. Goodrich Co.
Canada Dry Corp.
Coca-Cola Inc.

· 3, 232, 672. 75
1, 382, 685. 62
11.239,799.00
2,296,725.00
1, 865, 232. 25
3, 823, 033. 34
1, 63~, 114. 19
38,860,972.86
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Manufacturing Companies (Continued)
FCSC
Claim#

730
778
1330
3.072
2476
2038
2'l3
2326
594
887
2155
2459
2592
8292
1821
2355
2470
2644
3596
3597
1530
569
2279
133
3566
2577
2932
3074
1233
3489

Name of Compa ny

Colgate Palmolive Co.
Continental Can Co. Inc.
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.
Ford Motor Co.
General Dynamics Corp.
General Electric Co.
General Milk Co.
Gillette (Japan) Inc.
Gloria Textile Corp.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
IBM World Trading Corp.
International Harvester Corp.
In:ternational Paper Co.
International Standard Electric Corp.
Libby, McNeil & Libby
Lone Star Cement Corp.
Mathieson Pan American Chemical
Owens Illinois
Pepsi Co. Inc.
Pepsi Co. Met.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Proctor & Gamble, ,Inc.
Reynolds Metals Co.
Sherwin Williams
Standard Brands
Swift & Co.
United Shoe . Machinery Co.
United States Rubber Co.
Westinghouse Elec. International, Inc.
W. R. Grace Co.

Claims of loss
(in dollars)

29, 293, 109. 78
8, 829, 056. 57
8,878,866.00
2,134,515.00
1,777.559.00
5, 397, 303. 00
3,404,370.00
3, 272, 215. 04
3,486,500.00
6, 282, 053. 85
7,866,167.00
6,174,379.09
1, 071, 518 •. 00
3,42~,388.00
10, 016, 250. 69
25, 208, 250. 87
1,828,683.24 .
10, 577, 821. 76
2,622,990.00
- 1, 566, 981. 00
1, 284, 793. 41.
4, 996, 256. 42
3, 556, 473. 98
4,596,343.37
1; 973, 652. 00
6, 020, 039. 00
1,613.640.00
9,194,729.20
1, 075, 693. 15
2, 605, 043. 00

Mining Companies

538
2573
3337
2619
2624
2522

Berwind White Coal Mining Co.
Cuban American Nickel Co.
Cuban Iron Ore Corp.
Moa Bay Mining Corp.
Nicaro Nickel
United States of America (Nicaro)

3,311,726.00
68, 071. OOQ. 00
l,· 000, 000. 00
98,005,000.00
42, soo, ooo. ·oo
132,176,907.69

I
I
I
I
I
I·
I
I

1·
I
I
I

1·
I
I
I
1·
I
I
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I
I
I
I

596

J>etroleum Companies
FCSC
Claim#
3017
3590
2164
2734
2810
2338
938
1331
1333
1332
3018
2807

1·
1·
I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I

I

Name of Company

Atlantic Ri(!hfield Co.
Continental Oil Co.
Kewanee Interamerican Oil Corp.
Panoil Co.
Penn-Canadian Oil Co.
Sinclair Oil Corp.
·Standard Oil Co. N. J.
Texaco Inc.
Texaco Export Co.
Texaco Petroleum Co.
Tropic al Gas Co.
United Cuban Oil Inc.

Claims of loss
(in dollars)
4,398,114.00
1, 419, 182. 02
1,127,978.42
1, 518, 968. 45
4, 000, 000. 00
18, 563, 812. 35
71,686,002.90
58, 145, 692. 00
971., 880. 02
5,143,433.04
3, 409, 783. 00
5, 733, 166 .. 00

Pharmaceutical Companies
2983
2469
2646
2126

Merck, Sharpe & Dahme
~· R. Squibb. & Sons
Sterling Drug·s
Warner Lambert Co.

4, 465,
1, 058,
1, 258,
1;, 667,

846. 00
02 9. 43
409. 91
901. 00

Railroad and Transportation Companies
3683
2499
3684
2492
3681
662
1843
485

Cuban RR
Dragor Shipping Corp.
Guantanamo & Wes tern RR
Havana Docks Corp.
Havana Electric RR
Lykes Bros Inc.
Mayan Line SA
Standard Fruit & Steamship Co.

9., 450, ooo. 00
3., 729, 593. 76
2., 769, 000. 00
9, 915, 879. 00
11, 900, ooo. 00
3,663,349.24
2, 194, 609. 47
2,337,326.93

Utilities and Communications Companies
2578
3547
2615
2317

Cuban Electric Co.
Ebasco International
International Telephone
Western Union Inc.

323;000,000.00
1, 284, 919. 04
61, 089, 234. 00
1.,213,364.00

597

Miscellaneous Companies
FCSC
Claim#
3335
871
3503
548
240
2970
2535
233
3100
2372
1477
2965
2496
2521
219
18173670
646
3651
611
2035
455
547
2590
1478
1319

Name of Compani

Claims of loss
(in dollars)

American Securities Corp.
6,046,064.00
Berlanti Construction Co. Inc.
6, 190, 382.16
Brothers of the Order of Hermits
8, 300, 600. 26
of St. Augustine
Burrus Mills Inc.
9. 847, 009. 78
Calixto Lopez & Co.
4, 416, 509. 00
Columbia Pictures
1, 665, 566. 00
Consolidated Development
3, 000, 000. 00
1, 208, 000. 00
Cuba Grapefruit Co. Inc.
3,007,570.00
J. A. Doughertys Sons Inc.
DuPont Inter-American
2, 985, 234. 00
5, 473, 000. 7 5
H. Duys & Co.
17, 791, 954. 00
Hilton International
2, 500, 000. 00
Inter-American Ind.
8,394,370.50
Intercontinental Hotels
M & M Dredging & Construction Co. 1. 186, 201. 00
Namarib Co.
1. 080, 000. 00
Norgulf Terminals
1. 985, 014. 97
Norgulf Realization Corp.
1, 000, 000. 00
Pan ·American Life Ins.
2, 853, 277. 25
Rainbow Development Corp~
1, 715, 014. 15
Frederick Snare Corp.
1,972,487.26
Tecon Corp.
1, 787, 618. 21
Universal International Films
1, 099, 412. 00
University of Chicago
5, 333, 333. 34
U.S.Life Insurance Company, NY
2,022,416.02
F. W. Woolworth
9, 604, 050. 00

Persons
2563
1659
3598
2813
1097 .
1935
2927
653
2540
1393
2508

Grace Abavard
James A. Allen
Mercedes de Arango
Georgina H. Barera
Estate of William Barlow
David H. Brandon
Patricia De Broch
Richard D. Burford
Estate of William Chanler
Helen A. Clafin
Luther Coleman

1, 137, 760. 00
1,931,340.00
2, 941; 339. 00
1, 000, 000. 00
1, 095, 000. 00
1, 176, 495. 00
1,452,500.00
1, 934, 055. 92
1, 000, 000. 00
7,483;631.83
1, 399, 945. 00

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
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Persons (Continued)
Claims of loss
(in dollars)

FCSC
Claim#
3258
8388
1900
2620
2342
5093

763
3348
1092
3580
729
3.599
3640
1730
1089
2355
695
256
1916
700
652
2115
2121
1471
3669
3271
3075
697
3713
204
050
3595
2017
551
632
2495
2275
2269
502
2795
1395
657

William T. Coles
Amelia Ge.o rge Dabul
Estate of Agnes L. Dana
Estate of Arthur Davis
Alice Dobronyi
Anthony H. Forte
Margarita E. Fowler
Mr. & Mrs. Meyer Fuchsberg
Elsa Garcia
Robert George
Lester Gilfarb
Carmen de Giroux
Susan F. Godinez
Luis Goldsmith
Larry Gordon & Jack .Lustman
Helen Hackboy
George K. Harper
~mmet H. Hyman
Harry T. Johansen, Jr.
Charles K. Kinsey
Edith S. Kohn
Florence E. Lane
Richard E. Lane
Marsden· R. Leeder
Olga M.A. Lengyel
Estate of William Liebow·
Carmine E. Luria
Dorothy S. McCarthy
Estate of Arnold Mc Elfresh
Stewart MacFarlane
Mac Gache
Ralph Meyer
Estate of Harry Meyersohn
MaryP. O'Shaughnessey
Angel Pagluica
Edna Phillips
Estate of Sumner Pingree
Estate of Sumner A. Pingree
William A. Powe
Julia & Jose Raymond
Mary A. Rentschler
Ilona G. Rieger

1, 000, 000. 00
1,372,000." 00
1, 250, 000. 00
4, 316, _1 24. 31
1, 000, 000. 00
5, 385, 000. 00
1, 070, 050. 00
1, 291, 386. 26
3, 302, 750. 00
5, 245, 000. 00
1, 208, ooo. 00
2, 559, 323. 00
1, 010, 051. 00
1, 035, 5'00. 00
2, 066, 253. 00
1, 356, 732. 92
1, 643., 535. 03
1, 161, 380. 00
2,809.977.00
2,082,820.00
2, 996, 000. 00
1, 696, 200. 00
1,612,000.00
2,299,000.00
1, 110, 363. qo
1, 500, 000. 00
1, 022, 441. 51
1, 612, 309. 21
6,146,666.63
4,714,636.08
1,499,443.89
1, 110, 792. 00
1, 000, 000. 00
4, 200, oo'o. oo
6, 660, 179. 64
2, 100, 000. 00
5, 6 71, .2 3 6 • 0 0
9, 685, 245. 00
9, 920, 695. 54
5, 450, 000. 00
2, 917, 421. 83
t;t39,540.00
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Persons (Continued)
FCSC
Claim#

Claims of loss
(in dollars)
.,

515
2171
738
277
1421
1420
407
3067
1177
2357
2298
1.926

..

Alexander M. Roberts
Wm. & . Doris Robinson
Leslie W. Rogers
Anthony M. Rutz
Charles Shapiro
Wilma Shapiro
Julius J. Shepard
Frederick & Anita Swetland
Eliseo Garc1a Tuduri
Bernard Weiss
William West
Max Zinian

2,843.694.20
1, 465, 539. 88
1, 504, 050. 00
2, 082, 268. 00
2, 089, 275. 00
2, 827, 800. 00
1, 074, 7 58. 00
2, 215, 080. 00
4, 893, 375. 00
8, 67_6 , 500. 00
1, 190, 820. 00
1, 043, 888. 89

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1·

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
1·
I
I

I
I
I
I
I
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I
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·I .·
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I
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APPENDIX IV.
Intervenors
As Castro's revolution developed, Fidel was faced wit4 the increasingly critical dilemma of replacing the bourgeois administrators
and technocrats who were fleeing the island.

Some technicians were

invited in from Latin America and Eastern Europe, but these were insufficient in number.

Many posts had of necessity to be filled--im-

mediately--by Cubans.

In this moment of crisis, Fidel gave preference

to men of known loyalty to the revolution.

Technical or administrative

competence was a secondary consideration.

Som'e of these new admin-

. istrators were members of the M-26; others were commuriists. In the
future, Fidel hoped to replace the bourgeoisie, and these intervenors,
with a new generation of technocrats, loyal to him and the revolution,

and competent in their work.
An indication of the ki?d of men appointed by Fidel to be intervenors and administrators of important enterprises during the period
1959-1960 follows:
Plant
,
Ambrosia candy factory

Brief Description

Intervenor

Large candy factory,
650 employees

Bus driver

Central Cespedes

Sugar mill

Ice cream vendor

Central Cunagua

Sugar mill

Bricklayer

Central Jaronu

Sugar mill

Carpenter

601

· Plant

Brief Description

Intervenor

~

Central Manati

Sugar mill

Former service
station attendant

Central Orozco

Sugar mill

Young school ~eacher.
No knowledge of sugar
industry

Central Resoluci6n

Sugar mill

Mulatto from Santiago.
No experience

CMQ

Cuba's largest radio
and ·TV enterprise

Gregorio Ortega, writer
for Revoluci6n

Compan1a Cubana
de Acero SA

Steel fabricator

Lt. Ramon Dacal Moure

Continental Can Co.

Highly automated can
manufacturing plant

Skilled mechanic

Everhart Ranch

Large cattle ranch

Gil Vidal, Militia chief
and day laborer at ranch

Ferrocarriles Consolidados de Cuba

.Railroad in eastern
Cuba

Edmundo Machado.
No known railroad
experience

Nf

Fleischman's Yeast

Hatiiey Beer Co.

.Driver for dry cleaning
plant
Large modern beer
plant, Santa Clara

Handyman from nearby
motel

Hershey
.
. interests

Sugar Mill complex
including three mills
and a refinery

Office boy

King Ranch

High-grade cattle
ranch with 5, 000 head

Dental technician

El Mundo

Newspaper

Proof corrector

Industry

Itinerant seller of
religious medals

· Naphtha Co.

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

'/I
I
I
·1
I
I
I
I
I·
I
(

·1
I
I
I
I
I
I
.I
·I :.
I
I

.I
I

I
I
I

,.
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Plant

Brief Description

Intervenor

Otis Elevator

Industry

Young Guatemalan
communist

Partagas

Large tobacco firm

Cigar maker from
H. Uppmah ·

Prensa Libre

Newspaper

Hugo Vasquez, proof
corrector

Punta Alegre

Sugar company controlling 3 mills

Messenger boy for
!NRA official

San Andres

Pingree cattle ranch
with 12, 000 head

Rogelio G6mez Ben{tez,
militiaman

Textilera Varinelin SA

· Textile plant

Lt. Teodoro 'G6mez

Trust Company of Cuba

Among Cuba's largest
banks

Mario Ardura, militiaman.

United Fruit Co.

$8 5 million sugar mill
complex

Assistant in United
Fruit's accounting
department

Ulacia Orange Grove

Commercial orange
grove

H. Uppman

Cuba's largest cigar,
cigarette company with
1500 employees

Typist, former secretary
of office workers I union

U.S. Keds

Sports shoes

Messenger boy from
newspaper, El Pafa

Vertientes-Camagiiey

$93 million sugar mill
complex

Stenographer and communist party member

Guajiro from Oriente.
· No knowledge of oranges
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1963 to 1965 he was Cuban analyst in the Department of State, where he
received a ,Meritorious Service Award.

From 1965-1967 he was a politi-

cal officer at the U.S. Embassy in Quito,. Ecuador.

Mr. Padula resigned

from the Foreign Service to accept a Ford Fellowship to study Latin
American history at the University of New Mexico.

He currently teaches

Latin American history at the University of Maine, at Portland-Gorham.
He has traveled extensively in Latin America.
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